




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MEMOIRS
OF THE
LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION
OF
SIR ROBERT WALPOLE,
EARL OF ORFORD.

VOLUME THE THIRD.

MEMOIRS
OF
LIEUTENANT-GENERAL
OF
SIR ROBERT WALPOLE
EARL OF ORFORD
VOLUME THE THIRD

M E M O I R S
OF THE
LIFE AND ADMINISTRATION
OF
S I R R O B E R T W A L P O L E,
E A R L O F O R F O R D.

WITH ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE AND AUTHENTIC PAPERS,
NEVER BEFORE PUBLISHED.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE THIRD,
CONTAINING THE CORRESPONDENCE
FROM 1730 TO 1745.

By WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.A.S.
RECTOR OF BEMERTON.

L O N D O N:
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL JUN. AND W. DAVIES, IN THE STRAND.

1798.

M. E. M. O. R. S.

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1758

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M E M O I R S
OF
SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Original Correspondence and Authentic Papers.

PERIOD THE FIFTH.

From the Resignation of Lord Townshend to the
Dissolution of Parliament;

1730—1734.

1730.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Difficulties about Dunkirk.—French averse to concert any decisive plan of operations against the emperor.—Embarrassed state of the king's affairs in Germany.—Cardinal Fleury governed by Chauvelin.

DEAR BROTHER,

Paris, June 14—25, 1730.

LORD Harrington will have given you a full account of the extraordinary situation of affairs here, between the uncertainty of peace and war; the French having embarrassed and clog'd their own proposall of the expedition against Sicily, with insisting upon having the equilibre, and the plan of a generall war settled previously to any undertaking; two points of so perplexed and difficult a nature, as must, if insisted upon, make it impossible to doe any thing this year, now the season is so far advanced. His lordship will have informed you of my having taken great pains to fix the cardinall upon the enterprize against Sicily, without making it depend upon other considerations,

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and that I had in appearance some success, and the Garde des Sceaux seemed more practicable; but he having gained monsieur Spinola, partly by promises of a blue ribbon, and that generall being disappointed in his vast project of conquering all Italy, monsieur Chauvelin might talk at his ease, and might appear more complying with the English and Dutch, when he was sure the Spaniards themselves, though not authorised by their own court, would act a part that might answer the same end of defeating or delaying the expedition upon Sicily; and this, I think, was the upshot of the last conference which the ministers of the allies had together, of which you will see a full account in our joynt dispatch. However, as the news which came last post from Spain informs us, that their catholick majestys are resolved to continue their preparations in all events, and we shall take care to lett Mr. Keen know how desirous his majesty is not to loose this year without action, we shall save our credit with Spain, the Imperiall court will perceive that the preparations are going forward; and if they should send a trifling or dilatory answer, I do not see how the French can refuse to joyn in the plan proposed by themselves for the expedition of Sicily, and if that is once earnestly sett about, I am almost perswaded the emperor will comply with the proposall that has been made for the introduction of Spanish garrisons. As their catholick majestys appear at present easy, notwithstanding the behaviour of France, to avoid doing any thing, and as they continue their preparations with greater warmth than ever, it is not impossible but that if they should be disappointed in an undertaking against the emperor, they may out of resentment, perhaps, surprise Port Mahon. For although our behaviour does not deserve it, nobody knows to what extravagance the resentment of the queen may goe; and therefore, that matter should be immediately consider'd in transporting the troops that are now getting ready.

As to the cardinall, I find his health and his apprehension as good as ever; but then he is so weakened with age, and so fatigued with the multiplicity of business, and particularly with the affairs of the constitution, that as far as he has received and consented to any particular proposition, instead of taking upon himselfe the authority and execution of it, he leaves it to the respective ministers; by which means Chauvelin is become absolute master of the foreign affairs, and monsieur Maurepas of those relating to marine; and they take upon them to give matters such a turn as they think fitt in their respective departments. This is the reason why the destruction of the works at Dunkirk goe on so slowly, and in such a manner, as I am apprehensive that, if his eminence be not pressed in a particular manner, we shall have but a bad account of that business at the meeting

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meeting of the parliament next sessions. I must, therefore, desire you will write a letter to me, in earnest terms, expressing the great uneasiness of his majesty and his ministers, at so few hands having been employed in so long a time, and that what is done, even by those hands, seems by no means to answer the terms of the treatys, and your apprehensions that the season proper for this work may slip away without the full execution of what has been by the most solemn assurances promised on the part of the French king, and repeated by his ministers. You know I was desirous that his majesty should condescend to have given me a letter to the cardinall, taking notice of the great confidence which his eminence had always shewn towards me, of the good use I had made of it for preserving the union between the two crowns, and to desire the continuation of it on my taking my leave, and the king might take that occasion of mentioning Dunkirk, and his expectation of having his most christian majesty's promises fully repeated in that respect. Having wrote thus far, I have received a letter from his eminence on this subject, to assure me as a thing certain, that 550 toises of the jettées are actually levelled with the strand, and that a great many more workmen are employed, and that what has been promised on this head shall be faithfully fulfilled: however, it may not be amiss to have letters to spur him on, because the persons employed will contrive to be as dilatory as they can, and, by false accounts and insinuations, to sling rubs dayly in the way of the execution of this matter.

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If the emperor's behaviour should be such as might oblige the allys to act against him this year, and consequently to make preparations for the next, it will, in my opinion, be absolutely necessary not only to gain the king of Sardinia, but alsoe to make the electorall treaty, and to show all possible facility in this matter, and therefore an answer should be returned to the papers delivered by count Albert; although the elector of Bavaria insists upon distinct subsidys from Spain, * * * * * in case of what is demanded of France. I believe France does not suspect that we should have any greater share than what we have already offer'd.

Illegible.

The affair of Hildesheim seems entirely foreign to this matter, and I wish that some expedient to save the right of both sides could be found out, and that Mr. Hattorff might be seriously spoken to on that head. The misfortune is, that count Plettenburgh, who governs absolutely the elector of Cologne, received some disgust at Hannover; I wish I could be enabled to say something to count Albert, relating to Mr. Plettenburgh, that may be made use of to bring

him

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him to better temper, especially if the news be true of the duke of Mecklenburgh being arrived in his own country, and that the Aulick court has issued a decree to authorise the king of Prussia to oblige the people of Hildesheim to submit themselves to the bishop there. Should the duke of Mecklenburgh have taken his resolution by concert with the Russians, the king of Prussia, and the Imperiall court; and resolve to support himselfe against the troops of the commission; and should the king of Prussia seriously undertake to execute the Imperiall commission by force in Hildesheim, his majesty's affairs in those parts will be extreamly embarrassed, which makes it of great consequence for his majesty's interest to gain the electors, and to conclude the treaty on foot with them. For I cannot forbear observing, with great concern, that his majesty has no friend in the whole empire besides the landgrave of Hesse, and the duke of Wolfembutte, and I am afraid the last is but a very weak and precarious friend, and will be still more doubtfull when the time of his subsidys shall be expired. I cannot forbear mentioning on this head, the affair of the arrears due to the late prince of Denmark. I desire you will think seriously of these matters against the arrivall of the courier from Vienna, who is dayly expected, though I am afraid the apparent backwardness of the cardinall to act, and his too well known pusillanimity, will retard his arrivall; and when he does come, that he will not bring a decisive and explicit answer at first, unless the news that the Imperial court must have from Barcelona, of the Spanish preparations being continued there with greater vigour than ever, should have had some effect upon them.

Although I have no thoughts of taking my leave here, untill I see one way or other a decision of matters relating to peace or war, yett it may be convenient to have lord Waldegrave's credentiall letters and instructions sent, his lordship being very willing to stay and settle himselfe here at present; and I will take care before I come away, to gett a full information of every thing, and to settle, if possible, a good understanding with monsieur Chauvelin: for I find that he is in a manner become absolute master of the cardinall, and can turn him as he pleases.

HORACE

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Period V.
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1730.

Backwardness of the French to engage in a war with the emperor, arises principally from their opinion that the resignation of lord Townshend has weakened the administration.

DEAR BROTHER,

Paris, July the 7th, 1730.

I Received yesterday both your letters of the 22d past, O. S. You will see by our dispatch that goes by this occasion, how impossible it is to fix this court to a resolution of undertaking the expedition of Sicily this year, untill the plan for a generall war, or the proportion of troops for acting this as well as next year in other parts be first fixed: that is, that the French will doe nothing untill they see the answer from Spain, or learn what is the result of a Spanish courier being sent directly to England; without any notice being taken of this court, or any orders or intimation given to the Spanish ministers themselves here upon it. In the mean time the courier from Vienna is delayed; and notwithstanding the letters from thence, which arrived yesterday, dated the 24th past, mentioned his being sett out that night, he is not yett come; and when he does come, will certainly bring nothing clear and decisive, because the Imperialists will have little to apprehend when they see our preparations are so small, and so dilatory. However, we must putt on the best face we can, and talk big; and as the French still pretend to say that they will be ready for Sicily if other things are settled, I think the embarkation of the three regiments should goe on, that nothing may be layd to our charge; and I am perswaded that the Spaniards must and will give an account to their court of our readiness to concur in every thing for acting with vigour either this or the next year.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

Monfieur Chauvelin angered the Dutch yesterday very much, by intimating that there was nothing to be done on this side this year but in Flanders, which he did very maliciously, having no design to undertake any thing, but in order to fling the imputation of inaction from France upon Holland. The Dutch ministers will give such an account, as I apprehend, of the late conferences, and the conduct of France in them, as will have a bad effect upon the states, and dispose them to come into any proposition that can be made by the emperor. But as I doe not think that the cardinall has at all changed his sentiments, or system, nor is in any other ways altered than by age and fatigue, we should in my opinion goe with great caution, before we take the least step that may make a separation between England and France; and always be sure
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 1730.

not to disoblige Spain. But I shall suspend my further thoughts on this subject, untill I know what the emperor will answer to what the allys have proposed to him, and what proposition has been made in England by Spain.

I shall only add, that should the allys doe nothing this year, but all agree to act with vigour the next, I think the conduct of the emperor may be putt into such a light, considering the proposalls that have been made him, as will putt him in the wrong in the eyes of all Europe, as well in the empire as in England; and the failing of his lottery for above nine millions of florins, joyned with the extraordinary charges and difficulty he must be at in subsisting so great an army, whose expence exceeds by great sums the funds he has, must, if the allys continue unanimous, bring him to reason before next spring; and I think the parliament would have no difficulty in supporting the king for that purpose, when things are laid fairly before them; if the works of Dunkirk be demolished by that time, as they should be. I must observe on this occasion that I apprehend, that the backwardness of this court in engaging in a war this year arises in a great measure from the jealousy they have of the present situation of the ministry in England. For, notwithstanding the harmony and concert in the administration, they will not be perswaded but the removal of lord Townshend and the disposition of places have arisen from other secret springs and motives than what are the reall ones, and apprehend that there is something at bottom that affects the present measures and system of affairs; and although they wont own this opinion, yett they will think it prudent to see the complexion and temper of the next sessions before they engage in a war.

As to the memoriall to be presented relating to Dunkirk we shall be prepared out of hand. But I should be glad to know whether the two letters I wrote to the cardinall, and sent last week to the duke of Newcastle, will not be sufficient for the present, especially since Mr. Laffelles writes word, that the demolition seems to goe on in earnest; however, upon my arrivall at Compeigne, whither I goe next week, I shall make the proper use of your letter, and of the order we have received from the duke of Newcastle on this subject, and shall from thence judge what is necessary to be done. We are indeed in the most criticall situation, and every step and measure must be weighed, for fear of flinging ourselves into greater difficulties by avoyding the present. No management has been or shall be observed about Dunkirk; but the other points relating to the alliance must be thoroughly considered; and I think, by what I can see, that when the scene is opened relating to the courier that went lately for England from Spain, and it is known what the emperor says,
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1730.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Influence of Chauvelin over the cardinal.—His own decreases in the same proportion.—Speaks well of lord Waldegrave.—Desires to return home.

DEAR BROTHER,

Rivecourt near Compeigne, July 12—23, 1730.

OUR joynt dispatch will give you so particular an account of the situation of this court, that I have little to add to it. The generall ideas for a plan of operations is, I think, in the main agreeable to the manner and places in which we should on all accounts desire the war to be pushed, if it becomes necessary; though this project is at present calculated with a design, on the part of France, to appear more forward than the world will believe them to be for acting; and to endeavour to fling the fault, if possible, upon the other allys, should they appear backward in settling it; and they will certainly make use of it for that purpose with Spain: but as both the Spanish ministers here are fully convinced of his majesty's readiness to have executed his engagements, even by force, this year, and have wrote to that effect in their last letters, and consequently, if nothing be done, must lay it at the door of France; we must take care to avoyd giving them any handle to believe otherwise, and appear as forward in settling the plan as the French can be.

Walpole
Papers.
Private.

In the mean time I am persuaded of the cardinall's firm resolution not to doe any thing this year; which will soon be known to the Imperialists by the nature of the facts, and the passing away of the season, without any other intelligence; and therefore, although it is very likely that they have something more to offer than what they have hitherto produced, I do not think it likely that they will be forward or explicit in speaking again; nor indeed will they ever be so untill they find the allys in earnest for acting: and although the situation of affairs in generall, and of this court in particular, makes an accommodation very desirable on all accounts, yett you will never have it from the Imperiall court, by appearing, either joyntly with our allys, or even separately, over desirous of it. The allys together will have no influence upon the emperour but as they shall appear formidable to him; and neither England nor Holland can, by any private insinuations, dispose him to be reasonable, without their coming to an entire separation with France, which will make the emperor so much master of the negociation, and will disoblige France to such a degree, as may be attended with the worst consequences.

This

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1730.

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Private.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Influence of Chauvelin over the cardinal.—His own decreases in the same proportion.—Speaks well of lord Waldegrave.—Desires to return home.

DEAR BROTHER,

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Walpole
Papers.
Private.

In the mean time I am persuaded of the cardinal's firm resolution not to do any thing this year; which will soon be known to the Imperialists by the nature of the facts, and the passing away of the season, without any other intelligence; and therefore, although it is very likely that they have something more to offer than what they have hitherto produced, I do not think it likely that they will be forward or explicit in speaking again; nor indeed will they ever be so untill they find the allys in earnest for acting: and although the situation of affairs in generall, and of this court in particular, makes an accommodation very desirable on all accounts, yett you will never have it from the Imperiall court, by appearing, either joyntly with our allys, or even separately, over desirous of it. The allys together will have no influence upon the emperour but as they shall appear formidable to him; and neither England nor Holland can, by any private insinuations, dispose him to be reasonable, without their coming to an entire separation with France, which will make the emperor so much master of the negociation, and will disoblige France to such a degree, as may be attended with the worst consequences.

This

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This being the present state of affairs, and there being no manner of appearance of any reall action, or negociation to purpose for this year, Mr. Poyntz and I have wrote this day for leave to come home immediately, where I think I can be of more service than I can possibly be here. For, as I hinted to you formerly, monsieur Chauvelin is absolute master of the cardinall, and consequently of all affairs, and without his eminence himselfe perhaps being sensible of it. The Garde des Sceaux, by great assiduity and pains in easing the other of the business, and by great address in humouring him, two points of great moment to gain a man of his age and weakness, turns his eminence as he pleases. I should be glad to establish a confidence with monsieur Chauvelin; but as he is a person without plan or principle, and as all his politicks are governed by the little chicanes of a lawyer, so that in negotiating even with his freinds, he always appears to be in a state of contest and controversy; it is impossible to make a friendship with him. He makes use of the most servile complaisance towards them only as a means for trick and amusement, and therefore I cannot possibly gett any farther in his intimacy than the having an extream civill and decent carriage towards him; and I must own I think lord Waldegrave as proper a minister as could possibly be sent hither; for, besides his having a very good understanding, his supple and inoffensive disposition is the best talent against the artifices of monsieur Chauvelin. For as his lordship will have caution and prudence enough as to take nothing upon himselfe without orders, he has at the same time patience and phlegm enough to parry the dangerous attempts and insinuations of the other without disobliging him.

From this account of the Garde des Sceaux's character, and his power over the cardinall, you will easily imagine that my situation here is by no means agreeable. And although I am as yett personally well with the cardinall, and have in all appearance all the marks of his friendship, yett since I cannot make that use of him, as I formerly did, for his majesty's service, my continuance here will rather be more a prejudice to his majesty's affairs: for it will not be long before that want of credit which I formerly had, or the effect of it, will be perceived by other ministers. I hope therefore you will forward as much as possible my returning immediately home; and if, upon my taking my leave of the cardinall, I think it will be of any use to fix a private correspondence with him, and it can be safely done without disobliging monsieur Chauvelin, which I much doubt, I will take care of it.

LORD

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LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

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*Condemns the conduct of France.—Violent proceedings of the king of Prussia.—
Unanimity of the English cabinet.*

DEAR SIR,

Windfor, July the 13—24th, 1730.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

I Am very much obliged to your excellency for the honour of your letter of the 8th instant, N. S. and ashamed of having been so long without writing to you; but as I was assured of your being perfectly well informed, by other hands, of every thing of any consequence that I could say to you, I was unwilling to take up any of your time unnecessarily, when you have so much employment for every moment of it, in this critical conjuncture. After having been so long an eye-witness of the pityfull conduct of the court where you are, I thought I could be no more surpris'd at any thing they should do; but I own their present behaviour astonishes me, for they seem now to have as little common sense as honesty; but if they will persist in their driving us to the wall, we shall be justified before God and men if we turn upon them.

But I shall not trouble you any longer upon this subject, since your brother's private letter to you by the last messenger will have fully explained to you the unanimous thoughts of every body here on that head. What I chiefly write to you for at present is, to inform you of the situation of our affairs at the court of Berlin, of which you will be fully apprised by the inclosed papers, which I send you in the greatest confidence, and must therefore beg that in your dispatches you will not take any notice of your having received them. What turn this last incident * mentioned in those letters will take, I am not as yet absolutely able to tell; but as sir Charles Hotham will not be here till to-morrow morning, and as we have prevailed upon the king to wait for his arrival before he takes any resolution upon it, I believe, by getting so much time for the king to cool in, we shall prevail upon him to hearken to moderate counsels.

After having hinted at the disagreeable parts of our present situation, it is but just that I should touch upon the happy side of it, by telling you,—that never was any ministry more unanimous, or more cordially united in all their thoughts and actions, than the present one; and, as they have all imaginable reason to believe, never was any master better satisfied with his servants than their's is. I have millions of obligations to your brother, and not less to your-

* Frederick William, king of Prussia, treated sir Charles Hotham, the English minister, with such marks of indignity that he quitted Berlin abruptly.

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self; and hope to convince you both of the just sense which I shall always have of them; and that nobody can be with greater respect, or with more sincerity, than I am, &c.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Cardinal averse to the expedition against Sicily.—Motives for that aversion.—Artifices of Chauvelin.—Presses the cardinal for the demolition of Dunkirk.—Obtains his promise to that effect.

DEAR BROTHER,

August 2d, N. S. 1730.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

FAR from being uneasy at any part of your letter of the 10th past, O. S. (except on account of the subject,) I am infinitely obliged to you for speaking your mind so freely; it is, indeed, a time that requires our utmost attention, and freedom of speech to one another, with respect to ourselves and the publick. I have had, since your letter, two or three strong and serious conversations with the cardinal. He appears to be the same person with respect to his majesty and his ministers, for preserving the union between the two crowns, and executing jointly our engagements; he has certainly the same authority with his master, and he thinks he exercises it. But when I made him sensible of the conduct of Chauvelin in several points, as neither acting a friendly nor justifiable part towards England, and of monsieur Maurepas, with regard to the affair of Dunkirk, his eminence promised for the future that he would be present at all the conferences with monsieur Chauvelin; that he would give me private and previous audiences for being informed of his majesty's sentiments. But when I pushed him upon the expedition to Sicily, I had no effect at all: it was a rash expedition that could not succeed; all the council of France is against it; the allies, and especially Spain, would exhaust themselves to no purpose this year. In short, all the arguments I could use on this head had no effect upon him; although I told him very plainly that it would be interpreted by all the world as a resolution to do nothing, and that he would find the Dutch, being sensible of the weakness and ill consequences of this transaction, would certainly propose to give the emperor the generall guaranty, as they since have done. But the state of this matter I take to be this: the desire of the cardinal, after the treaty of Seville was signed, to execute it without coming to blows; and his apprehensions that the queen of Spain, when once the war should begin, would expect nothing less than the conquest of all Italy for her children, and the reunion of all former possessions to Spain or her family,

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family, made him flatter himselfe that by gaining time, the emperor might be brought to a pacific accommodation. This made him shift so often the project of action; this made him reduce it to that of Sicily, and afterwards clog the expedition with conditions that could never be settled this year, such as the plan of operations, and the equilibrium. As to the first, he thought it still more necessary, because monsieur Chauvelin had strongly inculcated to him, that England and Holland would never be brought to bear their proportion in the war, and that when the affair of Italy or Sicily was once engaged, we should leave the French to bear the whole burden. As to the equilibrium, he never insisted, for his own part, to make the settling of that a previous condition of the war; and, as you will have observed, it is not so much as mentioned in his letter to the marquis de la Paz of the 22d May: in short, the equilibrium is understood by Spain to mean the reunion of all former possessions to the crown; by the queen, the conquering them for her children; is meant by us and the Dutch, to preserve the ballance as it is; provided the emperor will consent to the execution of the treaty of Seville, by the cardinal, not to confirm or secure the emperor's present possessions to his female posterity, but to do nothing at present to divest him of them, provided he will consent to the execution of the treaty of Seville. But his eminence has made use of this *equilibre* to discover the views and intentions of the queen of Spain by it; and to make her sensible that what may be conquered in Italy should not goe to her children, but be given either to the king of Sardinia, or reunited to the monarchy of Spain. But the ingenious monsieur Chauvelin is fond of this word *equilibre*, without any vast views of conquests for France, or settling a new partition or ballance of power in Europe; but as, being subject to so many different senses and interpretations, and made a previous condition to all action, may serve, if he pleases, to prevent any action at all; while at the same time he talks loudly to the Spaniards of his resolution to act with vigour, when an honourable plan can be fixed for that purpose.

But the question, as you will see by our dispatches, for doing any thing at all this year, is certainly over. France will not pursue the expedition of Sicily; the Dutch, now the season of the year is so far advanced, incline to the opinion of France; and England cannot act without France and Holland: and the next question is, what then will Spain do? which I reckon will soon be known, because what was some time since dispatched from England and France to Spain, relating to the dispute about Sicily, by which that court will be convinced, that this is resolved to do nothing this year, will, in my opi-

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nion, have determined the resolution of Spain one way or other, before our answers to their memorialls shall arrive. In the mean time you will see by our dispatches, we have continued to send such lights to Mr. Keen, as will, we hope, enable him to justifie his majesty's conduct, as being without blame or reproach with respect to his readyness for fullfilling his engagements towards the crown. But you will say what is to be done next, and where will this end? we must not, as you justly observe, loose Spain, and I promise myself we shall not on this occasion, and we must not separate from France, untill we have some prospect of gaining the emperour, and what prospect have we of doing that to the satisfaction of Spain?

I cannot imagine, however mad and rash the queen of Spain may be, that she will begin a war against the emperor, without any assistance from the other allys. Lett us consider, then, what conduct she is like to pursue when she finds nothing to be done this year.

If the queen of Spain should be persuaded or believe that the same difficultys about previously settling the plan of operations and the equillibre, may be made use of by monsieur Chauvelin to obstruct all entreprises next year, as it has done this, it is possible that she may think of accepting English or neutrall garrisons, instead of Spanish, or of consenting to the grand duke of Tuscany's offer to receive and recognize immediately don Carlos as his successeur.

1st. The first of these propositions would certainly goe a great way towards an absolute accommodation, as being entirely agreeable to the quadruple alliance: though perhaps the emperor, now he has so great a force in Italy, and considering the weak and pitifull behaviour of the allys, may refuse to consent to the introduction of English or neutrall garrisons, without the consent of the emperor. But if Spain would accept of the grand duke's offer, every thing might be happily accommodated with respect to the point of don Carlos's succession.

2d. But should the queen of Spain, out of revenge and resentment towards the allys for having done nothing for her, fling herself into the arms of the emperor upon his own conditions, we must expect to see what those conditions are, in order to judge whether it is safe or practicable for his majesty and Holland to concurr in them: but by what I can learn matters seem to be upon too desperate and angry terms between the emperor and the king of Spain, to expect a reconciliation in that quarter.

3d. But if the strong professions of the cardinall and monsieur Chauvelin, by the declaration they have made to the Spanish ministers, and will, without doubt, have wrote into Spain, of their being resolved to act with vigour next year, and
 of

of their pressing instances of the other allys to concurr in an honourable and proportionable plan of troops and expence, that they may be convinced that England and Holland will concurr in supporting the war when it is once begun; I say, if these professions should have such an influence upon their catholick majestys, as to convince them of the reality and sincerity of France for acting next year, and to dispose them to acquiesce, untill a generall plan of operations shall be formed, I do not see well how his majesty and the States can decline to cooperate and fix such a plan, which France will seemingly press, and which I sometimes think the cardinall is in earnest to have settled, in order to act with vigour; though I believe monsieur Chauvelin will, by artifices and tricks, endeavour to disappoint it, and at the same time lay the blame upon England and Holland. I say, in this case, you must seriously consider what his majesty is able and willing to furnish, what expence you can make for subsidys and troops, and how the fonds may answer, and I think if France and Spain shall prove both in earnest in this matter, methods must be thought of to make an effort next year, and that the troops at present on foot will scarce be sufficient. For if we doe not seem as forward, and as well prepared as others, we shall, in this case, disoblige Spain and France, without having made up with the emperour, which I think we can never doe without satisfying Spain about the succession of don Carlos.

In the mean time, as we have hinted in our dispatch, it seems absolutely necessary, that his majesty should be fully apprised of the sentiments of the States, without loss of time, as to what they may think the most adviseable method for putting an end to this uncertain state, either by negociation, and since that negociation with the emperour can be undertaken and concluded with honour and safety, or by acting next year a vigorous part, and what share in that vigour they are willing to bear, with respect to subsidys and troops. And therefore I think that lord Chesterfield should take a trip to Holland, to learn from the pensionary's own mouth, immediately, his own thoughts, as well as to the disposition of the States, as with respect to the conduct which England and Holland are to observe, in so great and criticall a juncture, upon which indeed no resolution can be taken, untill the finall resolution of Spain be known.

In my own opinion the cardinall's sentiments are divided between the extream desire of a generall pacification without a war, and his great aversion at present to give the emperour a guaranty of all his dominions, according to the pragmatick sanction. At present, I think, that rather than agree to the latter, he will heartily concurr in a plan for acting next year with vigour; and yett I am not without a notion sometimes, that rather than have a war he may not be absolutely against a nego-

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negociation for giving that generall guaranty. As to Chauvelin it is very clear to me that he would keep things in the same uncertain state ; neither accommodate matters with the emperour, nor, if he can help it, enter into a war to satisfy Spain, though there is no turn, nor chican, he will not make use of to persuade Spain of the contrary ; and will, at the same time, use his utmost endeavours to keep the cardinall firm in not agreeing to the emperour's pragmatick sanction, relating to the succession of his dominions. In short, we must appear as ready as France can be for settling a plan of operations, untill we learn the ultimate resolution of Spain, and in the mean time learn the sentiments of the pensionary and the States, upon the present state of affairs, with respect to the conduct of the different courts of Europe at this juncture, and the part which his majesty and they should act.

In my private conferences with the cardinall, I hinted to him as if I had learnt that some false insinuations with regard to the late changes in our ministry, and the present disposition of the court and parliament, might have created some jealousy in him, as if the present administration was not willing, or would not be able to support the present union with France, representing to him at the same time, that it would entirely depend upon the conduct of France : to which he in confidence replied, that monsieur Broglie suggested odd notions sometimes ; but by some of his late letters he positively wrote, that the ministry in England would certainly be able to maintain their ground, both in court and parliament, and his eminence added, that he did not doubt but they would, provided Spain did not take any violent step with regard to our commerce, and that the works at Dunkirk were entirely demolished. This gave me an occasion to renew my instances with more warmth than ever for the expedition of Sicily and the demolition of the works at Dunkirk. I had, as I have told you before, no success in the first, but he gave me the strongest assurances that the demolition should be perfected to his majesty's satisfaction ; and he having shown me an answer which monsieur Maurepas had drawn to the paper we had delivered relating to those works, and I having convinced him that it was by no means, as it really was not, satisfactory, but would exasperate the nation, and absolutely dissolve the present alliance ; he then assured me in the strongest manner, that he would take it under his own consideration, and use his own authority for satisfying his majesty and the nation in this point : and if he continues firm, and will not be diverted by some new influence and quirk, from monsieur Maurepas, and by the clamours of the people of Dunkirk, I have reason to believe, that not only the jettées, but also the sluice of Furnes will be demolished, and that we shall soon have an answer

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swer on that point to his majesty's satisfaction. There are some days past since I had these assurances, and we have not as yet received, as he promised me, any thing in writing. I must own he has, indeed, ever since been overwhelmed with various conferences, and we have, notwithstanding our other important business, continued our solicitations, as you will see by our letters of this day, upon the affair of Dunkirk, which, if executed according to the treaty, will, I hope, be of great consequence, with regard to the rest of our affairs in parliament.

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The enclosed from Mr. Keen I have just now received by Wigs the messenger; he acts so well and has got such an established confidence with Patino, that I could wish he might continue there; but I think, indeed, he cannot do it after the arrivall of another ambassador.

I must insist upon Mr. Poyntz's continuing here as long as I do, for I cannot be without him; I can assure you he will be very easy with it, though there is no doubt but he would be as glad to get away as I can be; and, indeed, as soon as an answer comes from Spain with a final resolution of that court, and the affair of Dunkirk is over, I see no great reason for the continuance of either of us here.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

States the objections to a negotiation with the emperor.—Necessary to settle a plan of operations, which will either prove the real intentions of France, or compel the emperor to accede.

DEAR BROTHER,

August 5—16, 1730.

I Have been favoured with your's of the 27th past, O. S. and while I entirely agree with you, that the conduct of France makes it extremely desirable to gett out of this intricate and uncertain state, I must own, at the same time, that the conduct of the Imperiall court makes it very hazardous, if not impracticable, to attempt to do it by a negociation with the emperor, at this juncture, without loosing the friendship of France, and even that of Spain, at the same time.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

The emperor's apprehensions of the secret articles of the treaty of Seville, made him send so strong a force into Italy; the weakness of the allies in not making sufficient preparations, and fixing on a project for the execution of their engagements, made him reject a safe, honourable, and advantageous proposal for the introduction of Spanish garrisons. And although he has the general guaranty of his succession so much at heart, he has not vouchsafed to say that he would

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would agree to the execution of the treaty for the sake of that guaranty; and consequently, as any intimation from England and Holland for that purpose to the Imperiall court, would be construed an effect of weakness and division among the allys, it would be entertained by the emperour in no other way than with a view to gain time, and fix an absolute misunderstanding among the allys, without our being able to obtain any security for the redress of our grievances, such as the Ostend trade, &c. or for the succession of don Carlos by the admission of Spanish garrisons. And as the emperour may imagine that all possible events, such as the death of the king of Spain, of the grand duke, of the cardinal, as well as the uneasyness in England and Holland, and divisions among the allys will make for him, no offer whatsoever, unless he sees at the same time an imminent danger in a refusall or delay, will make him promise to doe what is reasonable, or dispose him to execute any promise he should make, and therefore whatever may be the desires in England or in Holland to come to an accommodation with him, it will be impossible to compass such a one as can be safe and honourable, without appearing in a condition to force him to reason. this being the case, I think there is nothing left but concerting and pursuing with vigour the plan of operations: for although the cardinal has shown by all his actions that he would prefer an accommodation to a rupture; yett I am persuaded he is soe sensible of the ill effect of these mild measures, and of the scandall of not fulfilling his engagements to Spain, that rather than lye under that imputation, and force his allys into the emperor's arms, he will come into the war. And certainly as long as France appears disposed to act with vigour next year, his majesty and the States must appear as ready and forward as this court, in order to unmask entirely the conduct of France, or to bring the emperor to reason, which naturally brings me to say a word or two upon the plan of operations.

You will see by our dispatch, that we have begun to sett the negociation on foot with the king of Sardinia, and as we must be prepared for a serious negociation there, if that prince should give attention to our overtures, I must observe to you, that I much doubt whether what is mentioned in the treaty of Seville will satisfye as the rule of proportion on our part. The French there, indeed, have agreed, on account of the nearness of their troops to Italy, compared with the distance and expence of ours, to furnish 3000 men, that is six battallions to our two, for introduction, but in the projects that have since been under consideration, when they were to find 16,000 men for the expedition of Naples, we agreed to find 8000, and in that of Sicily, although the proportion was not absolutely fixed, yett it was understood, that of the 14,000 men to be furnished by the

the allys, the French were to give 8000, and we 4000. These examples will be quoted against us, as having agreed to furnish one halfe instead of one third of what France should doe; however, we will manage for the best, when we come to regulate the subsidys to be given by us, in proportion to the forces to be lent by France to the king of Sardinia; but we should have some greater latitude for that purpose in our instructions, without being tyed down to the treaty of Seville, which is no fixt rule. As it is very possible that, considering nothing is like to be undertaken this year in Italy, and that the emperour has so formidable a force in the king of Sardinia's neighbourhood, that his Sardinian majesty may avoyd coming to the conclusion of a treaty untill he is sure of a war, and that some operations will be undertaken in other parts for a diversion, and for preventing the emperour sending more forces into Italy, we must likewise seriously consider of the forces to be employed proportionably in Flanders and Germany; this is what the French will press, and in all likelihood will be seconded in it by the king of Sardinia, for his own sake; and I must own I think we are not sufficiently instructed on this head.

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As to Flanders, we shall be able, in concert with Holland, to continue upon the defensive there. But then I believe it will be absolutely necessary to have an army to act offensively upon the Upper or Lower Rhine, in order to penetrate into the emperour's hereditary dominions, or to keep his friends in awe, as the exigency of the war shall require; and as you remember that, in the year 1727, we had about 5 or 6000 men more on foot than at present, and were to have furnished 12,000 for Flanders or Germany, I am afraid the present standing forces will scarce allow the transporting so great a number. Neither doe I think that our allys will be satisfied with 12,000 English only for that service, considering what the Dutch may require, if necessary, for their defence, and what the French will expect in Germany for acting jointly with their forces offensively. For as to the Hanoverians and Hessians, they will be a good deal confined to their present situation, unless it be certainly known what part the king of Prussia will take; and therefore I must own, it would be of great service if you could find ways and means to raise 12,000 more English, and by that means have a body of 16 or 20,000 of our nationall troops in Flanders and Germany. Such a resolution taken by the parliament in the beginning of the year, joyned with the apprehensions which the emperor will have of our designs upon Italy, from the negociations and preparations making by the allys for that purpose, of which, by the nature of the thing, he must gett some notice, will, in all probability, make him offer such terms as must enable us to satisfy Spain in a

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negociation for giving that generall guaranty. As to Chauvelin it is very clear to me that he would keep things in the same uncertain state ; neither accommodate matters with the emperour, nor, if he can help it, enter into a war to satisfy Spain, though there is no turn, nor chican, he will not make use of to persuade Spain of the contrary ; and will, at the same time, use his utmost endeavours to keep the cardinall firm in not agreeing to the emperour's pragmatick sanction, relating to the succession of his dominions. In short, we must appear as ready as France can be for settling a plan of operations, untill we learn the ultimate resolution of Spain, and in the mean time learn the sentiments of the pensionary and the States, upon the present state of affairs, with respect to the conduct of the different courts of Europe at this juncture, and the part which his majesty and they should act.

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would agree to the execution of the treaty for the sake of that guaranty; and consequently, as any intimation from England and Holland for that purpose to the Imperiall court, would be construed an effect of weakness and division among the allys, it would be entertained by the emperour in no other way than with a view to gain time, and fix an absolute misunderstanding among the allys, without our being able to obtain any security for the redress of our grievances, such as the Ostend trade, &c. or for the succession of don Carlos by the admission of Spanish garrisons. And as the emperour may imagine that all possible events, such as the death of the king of Spain, of the grand duke, of the cardinal, as well as the uneasyness in England and Holland, and divisions among the allys will make for him, no offer whatsoever, unless he sees at the same time an imminent danger in a refusall or delay, will make him promise to doe what is reasonable, or dispose him to execute any promise he should make, and therefore whatever may be the desires in England or in Holland to come to an accommodation with him, it will be impossible to compass such a one as can be safe and honourable, without appearing in a condition to force him to reason, this being the case, I think there is nothing left but concerting and pursuing with vigour the plan of operations: for although the cardinal has shown by all his actions that he would prefer an accommodation to a rupture; yett I am persuaded he is soe sensible of the ill effect of these mild measures, and of the scandal of not fulfilling his engagements to Spain, that rather than lye under that imputation, and force his allys into the emperor's arms, he will come into the war. And certainly as long as France appears disposed to act with vigour next year, his majesty and the States must appear as ready and forward as this court, in order to unmask entirely the conduct of France, or to bring the emperor to reason, which naturally brings me to say a word or two upon the plan of operations.

You will see by our dispatch, that we have begun to sett the negotiation on foot with the king of Sardinia, and as we must be prepared for a serious negotiation there, if that prince should give attention to our overtures, I must observe to you, that I much doubt whether what is mentioned in the treaty of Seville will satisfy as the rule of proportion on our part. The French there, indeed, have agreed, on account of the nearness of their troops to Italy, compared with the distance and expence of ours, to furnish 3000 men, that is six battallions to our two, for introduction, but in the projects that have since been under consideration, when they were to find 16,000 men for the expedition of Naples, we agreed to find 8000, and in that of Sicily, although the proportion was not absolutely fixed, yett it was understood, that of the 14,000 men to be furnished by the

the allys, the French were to give 8000, and we 4000. These examples will be quoted against us, as having agreed to furnish one halfe instead of one third of what France should doe; however, we will manage for the best, when we come to regulate the subsidys to be given by us, in proportion to the forces to be lent by France to the king of Sardinia; but we should have some greater latitude for that purpose in our instructions, without being tyed down to the treaty of Seville, which is no fixt rule. As it is very possible that, considering nothing is like to be undertaken this year in Italy, and that the emperour has so formidable a force in the king of Sardinia's neighbourhood, that his Sardinian majesty may avoyd coming to the conclusion of a treaty untill he is sure of a war, and that some operations will be undertaken in other parts for a diversion, and for preventing the emperour sending more forces into Italy, we must likewise seriously consider of the forces to be employed proportionably in Flanders and Germany; this is what the French will press, and in all likelihood will be seconded in it by the king of Sardinia, for his own sake; and I must own I think we are not sufficiently instructed on this head.

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As to Flanders, we shall be able, in concert with Holland, to continue upon the defensive there. But then I believe it will be absolutely necessary to have an army to act offensively upon the Upper or Lower Rhine, in order to penetrate into the emperour's hereditary dominions, or to keep his friends in awe, as the exigency of the war shall require; and as you remember that, in the year 1727, we had about 5 or 6000 men more on foot than at present, and were to have furnished 12,000 for Flanders or Germany, I am afraid the present standing forces will scarce allow the transporting so great a number. Neither doe I think that our allys will be satisfied with 12,000 English only for that service, considering what the Dutch may require, if necessary, for their defence, and what the French will expect in Germany for acting jointly with their forces offensively. For as to the Hanoverians and Hessians, they will be a good deal confined to their present situation, unless it be certainly known what part the king of Prussia will take; and therefore I must own, it would be of great service if you could find ways and means to raise 12,000 more English, and by that means have a body of 16 or 20,000 of our nationall troops in Flanders and Germany. Such a resolution taken by the parliament in the beginning of the year, joyned with the apprehensions which the emperor will have of our designs upon Italy, from the negociations and preparations making by the allys for that purpose, of which, by the nature of the thing, he must gett some notice, will, in all probability, make him offer such terms as must enable us to satisfy Spain in a

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reasonable manner, before the time of action begins. I am very sensible of the clamour that may arise against our joyning with France to pull down the house of Austria, to make that of Bourbon more considerable than ever. But whenever the war shall become necessary, that cry will be equall, whether you ask a greater or a smaller number of men; but the greater number you shall have of your own troops, the more able you will be to have an influence in the field, and in conjunction with Holland to withhold France from undertaking any thing that may make the ballance unequall.

I mention this so early to you, that you may turn your thoughts as to the fonds that may be found, with an addition of one shilling more upon land, for paying the subsidys to be given to the king of Sardinia, to some of the electors, if the treaty with them should be concluded, which, in case of a war, will become highly necessary, and finding a sufficient number of troops for our proportion in Flanders and Germany. If, after such honourable, safe, and advantageous proposals have been made to the emperor and refused, we must not execute our engagements to Spain, which can be no prejudice to the emperor unless he is resolved to become master of all Italy, and consequently of Leghorn, and the trade in those parts; and if, in order to execute our engagements, we must not make war against the emperor, who approves that execution, we shall become a most despicable nation; and if, when the war is to be declared, we do not employ such a force as may make us respected by our friends, as well as feared by our enemies, we shall make but a shamefull end of it. Our chief effort must be made in Italy; but we must likewise appear formidable in other parts, or else that effort may become useless. And I think I may say once for all, that it is impossible that the emperor, destitute of money, destitute of all sincere friends that are able or willing to help him, should he be able to make above one campaign; and I really don't think he will venture one when he sees an earnest spirit on the part of the allies to act, which, I think, the cardinal is disposed to show. At the same time I am persuaded that, when the emperor shall offer to do that which is reasonable, although our measures be never so forward, his eminence will be as willing to accommodate matters, rather than come to a rupture.

As the plan of operations will soon be considered, we shall take care not to exceed our instructions relating to his majesty's proportion; although we don't well know how to fill up the blanks, being at present only directed to say, that his majesty will furnish the same number of troops for Flanders and Germany as was projected in the year 1727, when the number of troops on foot are not so great as at that time, and when some of them are sent to Gibraltar and Port Mahon;

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Mahon; and if not employ'd this year against Sicily, may not be used the next at all in those parts, and consequently cannot be deducted from the proportion allotted for Germany and Flanders. We should therefore have been glad to have had more explicit directions on this head; because, although the blanks when filled up, will be subject, as we have declared, to his majesty's final determination; yett the credit which his majesty has been pleased to indulge us hitherto with, will make this court think that whatever proportion is putt down in our presence, may be agreeable to his majesty's sentiments; and as we shall take care not to have too great a number specified, yett should it be less than may be reasonably expected, it may be made use of by monsieur Chauvelin to our disadvantage.

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Having troubled you so long, I shall only add, that I hope lord Chesterfield will loose no time in hastening to Holland. His credit is so great with the pensionary, that to be sure he will be able to know his reall sentiments upon the present juncture of affairs; and his sense so good, that he will make a right use of that knowledge: and as it is absolutely necessary for the two nations to act in perfect concert together, I hope his lordship will exhort the pensionary to animate the States to act with vigour and resolution, as the only means to discover the reall intentions of France, if they be not disposed to act in earnest, and take our measures accordingly, with the emperor; or else the sure way to bring the emperour to reason, if France will act in earnest against him.

One word about *the equilibre*, which monsieur Chauvelin is very fond of, as being the hinge upon which all his tricks and artifice of this negociation turn: but we have explained it to the cardinall to mean nothing more, in our understanding, than what becomes necessary for the execution of the treaty of Seville, in consequence of the operations to be undertaken by concert for that purpose; and although he was very earnest to have that word inserted in the paper framed for our talking with monsieur Maffei, yett the cardinall followed our opinion in leaving it out: and should we come to action, I doe foresee that the emperour, in case of success, is like to loose a good deal in Italy, for the sake of the king of Sardinia. But I think the Dutch and we, if we are considerable in our strength in other parts abroad, may be able to prevent the ballance from being overturned in Germany and Flanders.

As to Dunkirk, I have lately had a long discourse with the cardinall in particular on that subject; and represented the fatall consequences of that work not being executed to the satisfaction of our nation, in such a manner, as made him promise me that he would send an order to Dunkirk to have the

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works demolished effectually, and lett me have a copy of it. But some days have past, and I have not heard from him since on the subject; but I shall repeat my instances again to him to-morrow, and I hope to be able to succeed. If I should not, I think the best way is for you to write a letter in French directly to him, setting forth how necessary it is to have the sluice of Furnes demolished, and the jettées levelled with the ground where they stand; taking care to state the facts and reasons for it, as you will be able to take them out of our severall letters that have passed with the cardinall on this subject; and you may conclude in a strong manner, with showing him how impossible it must be to carry on the business in parliament, and to preserve the union between the two crowns, if this be not done; since what will remain after this pretended demolition, will appear to be directly contrary to the treatys subsisting between the two nations.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Enforces the necessity of compulsory methods with the emperor.—Proposes to summon the parliament in October.—Desires to return.

August 5—16, 1730.

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More private.

BESIDES what I have wrote in my other letter, I must add, that I doe not see any possibility of finishing with the emperor by a separate negociation, without being in a condition to make him apprehend the consequences of a dangerous war. Because the strongest assurances are lyable to such delays, evasions, and chicans, before they are brought to an execution, that his Imperiall majesty, lett his professions be never so great, can allways defer the performance so long, that you will not be able to satisfye Spain; and as a coldness must take place between England and France, whenever we and the Dutch aim at a particular conciliation with the emperour, before he has executed what he promises, the naturall and politicall slowness of the Imperiall court will enable this to sett even Spain against us.

* Pulteney.

Another consideration occurs peculiar to yourself and me, which is, that the Imperiall ministers have, I am afraid, conceived such a distrust against us, and may have contracted such an intimacy with P——y * and our ennemys, that, whenever they have it in their power, they will artfully manage and delay things in such a manner as may be the most prejudiciall to the present ministry in England; and, therefore, fear only will work upon the emperour to doe right, after having rejected the offers already made. I must therefore own, that

that if the plan of operations can be finished, or agreed upon in the main, soon, and a proper paper can be prepared ready for the press, to show the unreasonableness of the Imperiall conduct, after all that has passed, I should be glad if the parliament could be called to meet at the latter end of October, or the beginning of November, and that his majesty, by opening it, may acquaint them with the reason, as being desirous to have the concurrence of the parliament for enabling him to fulfill his engagements, since all the means of an accommodation have been tryed in vain, &c.; and to ask for ten thousand more English to be raised. If this could be practicable, I am perswaded that the emperour will consent to Spanish garrisons by Christmas; but if the parliament does not meet till January, I am apprehensive that till that time, things with regard to acting or accommodation, will goe on but lamely. This thought of the parliament meeting sooner, has just now occurred to me, and the more I reflect upon it the more I like it.

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I can't conclude without desiring you to lett Mr. Poyntz and me come away as soon as we have obtained the sentiments of this court about the plan of operations; for as it is fitt that nothing should be finally concluded here without taking his majesty's sentiments upon what shall be prepared, I think lord Waldegrave will be able to doe that very well. But as long as I am here, the credit I have constantly had, and my near relation to you, will make this court imagine, that whatever is concerted in my presence is agreeable to his majesty's sentiments, or at least that I am able to lett them know what they are; which will not be altogether the case of lord Waldegrave, who may much easyer take any thing *ad referendum*, without any surmises or reflections by this court upon it, than I can; and as to any papers to be prepared for setting things in a right light to the nation, I believe you will think that both Mr. Poyntz and I may be of service in England.

This paper, which is written in the hand-writing of sir Robert Walpole, is without date or signature; but was inclosed in a letter to Horace Walpole during the course of their correspondence in 1730.

Queries in regard to the insincerity of France.—States the necessity of insisting on the demolition of Dunkirk.—And recommends the renewing of the alliance with the house of Austria.

FRANCE will certainly do nothing this year. Did their delay of the expedition to Sicily proceed from the hopes of a favourable answer from Vienna?—That expectation is now over. What measures will they now take?—

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take?—Is their first principle to avoid a war at all events?—And do they hope for this without obliging either the emperor or Spain?—If they will not attempt the securing to don Carlos the places in Italy, the queen of Spain is at present totally disobliged.—If they will not attempt it by force, have they any other method that Spain will accept, and the emperor consent to?—If no satisfaction is to be given to Spain, will the emperor be obliged by France's barely declining to introduce the Spanish garrisons?—Or will the emperor still remain uneasy till his own views and expectations are answered?—And will France consent to the guaranty of the emperor's succession?

If, then, the foundation of the treaty of Vienna was the desire of the queen of Spain, on one hand, to aggrandize her own family; and the view of the emperor, on the other hand, to secure his guaranty; is the conclusion of the alliance of Hanover to end in giving satisfaction to neither of these parties?—Or does France propose to continue negotiating, and keep these two great powers in a continued suspense, and neither break nor make up with either; and at the same time continue the allies of Hanover under the same incertitude, expences, and hazards they are now exposed to from their union and adherence to France?

What part then must the allies of Hanover take?—The present and immediate obligation upon them is the execution of the treaty of Seville.—Those that are sincere must convince Spain, as far as they are able, of their sincerity.—England has offered to joyn in the enterprise upon Italy; England is ready to act immediately in the expedition upon Sicily; England is farther willing to enter into treaties with the king of Sardinia, and to pay such subsidies as are reasonable, towards carrying on the war effectually on the side of Italy.—Of this, Spain should be made as sensible as our intentions are real and sincere: and this seems a proper way of effectuating the introduction of Spanish garrisons into the places of Italy, and securing the succession of don Carlos. For to distress the emperor, and, by success in making acquisitions, to make him feel the weight of the allies of Hanover, is the only way of bringing him to reason; which, by the present conquest of Sicily, and a more extensive war in Italy another year, if it should be found necessary, is the only practicable method.

What then retards these operations?—France insists upon a general plan, both for settling the equilibrium, and for carrying on a general war, before they begin any enterprise that may, in its consequences, draw on a general war.—A general war may be the consequence of the enterprise upon Sicily; but if
 all

all the allies show themselves, and in earnest, the success of this year may probably prevent a general war.—Or I would submit it to consideration, in what parts of the world could the emperor be able to act offensively, if he is push'd with as much vigour as the allies of Hanover are able to exert, on the side of Italy.—And I know no necessity for the allies of acting offensively in any other parts, in order to make such conquests, as shall be retained upon a peace, or become the subject of future partitions or distributions.—If the proper quotas and proportions be held ready by the allies for their mutual security, and such as may at the same time oblige the emperor to keep a sufficient force for his own security in other parts, this will make such a diversion, and find such employment for a great part of the emperor's troops, that he will not be formidable, or able to resist the allies in Italy.

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This reasoning is founded upon a presumption that France will not be brought to penetrate into Silesia and Bohemia, or do any thing that shall really distress the emperor, without England's and Holland's joining in what they can never consent to, and agreeing to such expences as they are not able to make.—And this, it is to be taken for granted, they do not demand with any hopes or desire of a compliance, but upon a resolution of doing nothing at least this year.—If there was the least prospect of their acting a better part another year, the inconveniencies of this year's delay would be more tolerable.—But I take it for granted, that the same or some other difficulties in another shape, will arise another year.

This brings this whole affair to a very great and almost insuperable dilemma.—But at the present, the part that England is to act, is to find the proper means of convincing Spain of the truth and reality of their present circumstances, and situation of their affairs.—If England would join with Spain in the enterprise upon Sicily without France, I suppose it is most certain that Holland would not.—England then and Spain alone are certainly unequal to the carrying on a war against the emperor; the consequences and dangers that would arise on all parts of the world are too obvious to want mentioning, and Spain would be disappointed.—But as the difficulties are in no manner to be imputed to England, it would be most unjust for Spain to turn their resentment towards England, who alone stand by them, and are ready to fulfill their engagements.—But a full explanation of this matter, and a good understanding settled between the crowns of England and Spain, would secure to the two nations the mutual advantage of trade and commerce; and the queen of Spain must be sensible that it is her interest to preserve the friendship and support

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support of England, who will be allways ready, upon any more favourable opportunity, and assist and support her in the pretensions of her family.—What turn the queen of Spain will take when she truly sees her present situation, or whether she will be brought to any temperament, is worth considering; but offers of that kind should arise, I think, from those who will do no more, rather than from us, who are ready to do all that is incumbent upon us; we should not disoblige by new propofalls.

The procuring a good understanding with Spain being settled as a certain point, it is now to be considered, what part we are to act with France.—Although we are not to consent to lett them lay the blame of their measures and proceedings upon us, we are not, I think, at present to bring their friendship with England to the test, upon the point of the treaty of Seville.—There is something that concerns us more nearly, wherein their conduct is so strong a symptom and indication of their disposition towards us, that it must be fully explained; I mean the affair of Dunkirk: if the Garde des Sceaux grows jealous of the friendship of England, from the insinuations and representations from hence with regard to France, he should take care not to give such just cause of complaint.—In what a light will the friendship of France stand in our parliament, if they do not only fail in the execution of the treaty of Seville, and appear at last to desert us there, but at the same time violate their own treaties, and act so infamously in regard to the demolition of Dunkirk?—That must be done, or new measures must be entered into; France must give England satisfaction, ample satisfaction, in the affair of Dunkirk, if they hope to continue the union betwixt the two crowns.—If they will not, we must consent to the demands of the emperor; if France desires we should joyn with them in preserving the ballance of power in Europe against the emperor, they must do us justice in the affair of Dunkirk.—It is not reasonable that we should stand all the hazards of disobliging the emperor for the sake of their friendship, and be ill-treated by France in a matter of undoubted right.

If therefore this summer is to be spent in negociations and inactions, and we must purchase the demolition of Dunkirk at that price, one may attone for the other; and, after the clamour and expectation that is raised upon that subject, the effectual demolition of Dunkirk may contribute as much to the making things easy, as the contrary will certainly make them impracticable.—I mean it is impossible to stand both; but one may make the other go down.—And if France will do what is right upon that point, other matters, though troublesome and disagreeable, may be got through.—But our embassadours
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must loose no time in knowing what they may depend upon about Dunkirk; for by that, I think, our future conduct must from this time be regulated: for it will be a demonstration of their regard or no regard for England.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

On the French minister at Stockholm affecting precedence over the English minister.

—Doubts the sincerity of France.—Recommends caution.

DEAR HORACE,

Windfor Castle, August 28, 1730.

I Send you herewith a copy of an intercepted letter. You will easily know by what channel this is come to our hands; and as this secrett is of the last importance to the king, he was very unwilling it should be sent at all to you. But I thought it impossible to give you a true notion of the spiritt of this letter without your reading it yourself, which made me take this method: and as you cannot possibly make any use of it in form, to make any instances, or to passe any office, founded upon this intelligence, I make no doubt but whatever use you think fitt to make of this information, you will do it with such caution, and in such a manner, as shall make it impossible to have it suspected from what grounds your apprehensions upon this head do arise. I should hope this is the spiritt of monsieur Chauvelyn only; and that the cardinal is not yett brought so far into his measures as to have ordered, or even to be privy to such directions. It will be therefore of great service, first, if you can learn from the cardinal whether he is in this way of thinking, and is even ready to seek or make occasions of quarrelling with us; and if he is, to try to convince him how ill-founded a dispute upon this pretence will be; and how impossible it will be for the king, upon any consideration whatsoever, to give up the point of equality: or if the cardinal is not acquainted with this step, he being forewarned, his being drawn into it by art or surprize may be prevented, and so the immediate ill consequences of a difference and dispute upon this question may be avoided.

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The method, therefore, that I think you should take upon this information, is to find some early opportunity to lett the cardinal know you have good reason to apprehend, from the accounts Mr. Finch has sent from Sweden, that some dispute of this kind may be sett on foot, which you must suppose that neither his eminence nor monsieur Chauvelyn can be acquainted with; and when you have asserted the undoubted right of equality, you may desire that proper orders may be sent to their minister at Stockholm, to avoid all

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occasion of disputes and differences, which can end in nothing but the destruction of the union and friendship betwixt the two crowns.

This, dear Horace, is another instance of what we have to apprehend; but, however, I am fully convinced we must still keep such a management with France as to avoid any real, and, if it is possible, the appearances of any difference betwixt us, till we know what measures we shall meet with from the emperour. But one conclusion may be drawn from what we see, and every day feel, that, as far as monsieur Chauvelyn can influence, we are to expect but little, and depend upon lesse, from the friendship of France, or any prospect of a future confidence or good understanding betwixt us.

It was thought more advisable for me to write to you privately upon this subject, than for the secretary of state to send you any orders upon it.

EXTRACTS FROM THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE'S DIARY.

Waldegrave
Papers.

September 1. Sir Robert Walpole, in a private letter he writes to his brother, by Avison, says that it may be necessary to endeavour to make up with the emperor: he advises Mr. Walpole to give a memorial, signed by us all, about Dunkirk.

September 2. Mr. Walpole shewed us this day a private letter from his brother sir Robert, in which sir Robert seems very uneasy at the present situation of affairs in England; that we are in danger to break with France without being sure of the emperor. Sir Robert presses us about Dunkirk, and to give in a memorial sign'd by us all.

September 5. Mr. Walpole took an opportunity of speaking to the cardinal about Dunkirk. His eminency seemed more disposed to give us satisfaction than he had been before; and said, *Je suis presque convaincu*; and promised, within four or five days, to lay the affair before the council; which promise came from a letter (part of which Mr. Walpole shewed the cardinal) of sir Robert, in which it was said, that lord Bolingbroke gave out, that the cardinal could not do as usual; that he was obliged to lay matters before the council. The cardinal denied the obligation; but said, he always hoped to have the approbation of the council for his conduct.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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States the difficulties and danger of opening a private negotiation with the emperor.

DEAR BROTHER,

Paris, September the 1st, 1730.

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THE messenger arrived from Spain, in his way to England, gives me an opportunity of acknowledging your letter of the 17th past, O. S.; and I agree with your notions in the main, of making the war, if it becomes necessary, active and offensive in Italy; entirely defensive in Flanders; and such a diversion only in Germany as may prevent the emperor sending more troops into Italy. I likewise agree that the conduct of France makes an accommodation, if possible, the most desirable of all: but I should be glad to have known your thoughts about the steps to be taken for this accommodation; because, if we should attempt it by any advances made first by us towards the emperor, and that without the knowledge and consent of our allies, we shall run the hazard of losing our present allies, without gaining the emperor. Nor will that acquisition, could it be immediate and real, balance the loss of France and Spain too; and whenever the Imperial court sees the least glimmering hopes of a negotiation with us, they will immediately take their advantage of it, and have no other view but to improve it into a division among the allies; and depend upon it, what I have always laid down as a maxim with regard to that court, that nothing will make them reasonable but danger from the appearance of union and strength among the allies: and as no one insinuation from one of the allies can be made without the Imperial ministers concluding it to be either an effect of weakness or division, that court will act with that view only of increasing that division, which will make them master of the whole.

The answer returned by the allies is conceived in such strong terms, and so unexpected, that it certainly surprised the Imperial ministers here, and must have an effect upon their court, if nothing intervenes to give them hopes of a negotiation; and after such an answer, I think the allies had nothing to do but to appear indifferent, to prepare for war, and to expect the first motion for an accommodation from the emperor; and in that case, it is not impossible but that he might in some time begin to sound the disposition of the allies. But if any of them, after this answer, attempt to sound him first, I am apprehensive that things will run into greater jealousy and confusion than ever.

I mention this to you, because it looks to me, from some dark expressions in cypher from Vienna, as if something might be in agitation there about English garrisons. If it be true, and the intimation went from us, I must own

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I dread the consequence. France will complain, and with just reason, of a separate negociation; will take advantage of it to animate Spain against us; and the emperour will take care to have it putt in that light of our having first broak the matter to him. You may remember, that when count Kinsky began to speak to lord Harrington first, the Imperiall court had the assurance of giving it out, that the application was first made by England to them; and therefore, if any hint should come from Vienna, I must own it will prove, in my opinion, of a more dangerous consequence, at least, (unless we were assured of Spain in the first place,) to conceal it from France, than we can ever expect to receive benefitt from it. But if we should first suggest any thing to the Imperiall court, without the knowledge of our allys, or even have that court founded upon any point, in a manner that may give them handle or hopes for a sort of a separate negociation, we shall be more entangled and embarrassed than ever. And although I own the present weakness of the cardinall, yett I don't think his intentions are altered, and I have lately seen him much out of humour with Chauvelin's conduct with respect to us; and I cannot carry my thoughts so far as to interpret that minister's behaviour in other courts, as a design to come to a rupture with us, but the effect of an ascendant and superiority which he would endeavour to obtain over England, to whom he never was a great friend. But such steps relating to rank, and of preventing our having too much credit in other courts, which are not indeed friendly and justifiable, will never, on the other side, justifie our taking any step for a separate negociation without France, and will end to our disadvantage, especially in a point in which we are not sure of having the concurrence of Spain; and by having not obtained that concurrence previously, will give France such an advantage over us, even with that court, as I must own I dread the consequence of it.

Untill I know whether any thing has been done with the court of Vienna, or what, and in what manner it has been done, I cannot pretend to judge of the matter. But I think I know the views of the Imperiall ministers so well, that the advances of any one of the allys, without the rest, towards them, will make a good conclusion of matters more distant than ever. But I will say no more besides repeating my most earnest instances to you to lett me and Poyntz come home, which, by the manner which you think we ought to act in this juncture, in taking all matters *ad referendum*, is become more necessary than ever; and therefore I beg, for God's sake, to obtain immediate leave for our coming away; for which I could mention some other reasons not proper for paper.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Justifies himself in regard to Dunkirk.—Hints as if his brother was too precipitate in treating with France.

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DEAR BROTHER,

Paris, September 10th, 1730, N. S.

YOU cannot be more sensible than I am of the great importance that the demolition of the works of Dunkirk is, and in particular with respect to yourself and me; and how necessary it is that it should at least appear in parliament that there has been no neglect, coolness, or indifference in the king, or any of his ministers, in demanding, and in endeavouring to procure satisfaction. But is it possible for you to have read our dispatches ever since my last arrivall here, and think that justice and satisfaction have not been demanded in *writing*, in the most explicit and categoricall terms? All the letters signed separately or joyntly by me and my colleagues to the cardinall, before or after the memoriall delivered by us in a conference with the French ministers, reciting the particulars of what was expected to be done for reducing the port of Dunkirk to the terms of the treatys, must be looked upon, in the naturall and usuall course of business, as so many memorialls in form; and were calculated to be read in parliament as a justification of our instances; and some of them are expressed in stronger terms than I ever saw, but in cases of a fixt design to come to a rupture. And his grace and lord Harrington will both tell you, that in the transaction of business in foreign courts, of the greatest importance, such letters as we have wrote to the cardinall, as prime minister, must be looked upon as an application to the French king, in as direct and full a manner as a memoriall addressed to him personally; and I think I may venture to lett my letters to his eminence on this subject speak for themselves, as a sufficient justification of my conduct. A memoriall to the king himself is certainly a naturall and formall way of proceeding; but in this case it could not be signed by us all, because there is nobody but myself sufficiently accredited for that purpose, Mr. Poyntz being only ambassadour and plenipotentiary to the congress, and lord Waldegrave's credentiall letters cannot be delivered but after mine of revocation; and therefore, when he becomes capable of signing a memoriall directly to the French king, that capacity ceases in me.

I shall only add, that a memoriall, when delivered to the French king, if it shall be thought necessary, can only recite, and have reference to the letters and memorials we have already given, setting forth our just demands, and our repeated!

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repeated instances made without any effect, as well as the facts of the pretended demolition being an entire evasion of the treatys, and of the promises given us so often, as well as of the French king's orders, as what has often been repeated in our application *by writing* to the cardinall. But the conclusion must be in such terms as must threaten a direct and open rupture with France, if not complied with; and whether that should be sayd to the face of the king, (although I think we have almost sayd as much in some of our letters,) without taking first the sense of the parliament, is a very doubtfull thing with me at this juncture. However, a memoriall shall be prepared; which, by the by, as you must needs reflect in what strong terms it must of consequence conclude, you will remember as to the consequences of it, that it is to be signed by me alone. But I doe not, after all that has passed this year by writing on this subject, apprehend any blame can be imputed to me for want of zeal and application, unless it arises from his grace's dispatch; who, by ordering us to deliver a memoriall, seems to have made, in some measure, that unnecessary distinction between what we have already *wrote* by orders, in explicit terms, to the cardinall, the French king's first minister, and a memoriall addressed directly to his majesty, in which there can be no difference at all, unless that the last may committ the two crowns in such a manner as to make it necessary to come to an open war upon this affair: but otherwise the application for justice is equally the same, and as regular, whether by letters from minister to minister, or by what is called a memoriall directly to the sovereign himselfe.

Upon the duke of Newcastle's last letter, we have, as you will see by our dispatches, wrote to his eminence again; and I, at the same time, added a particular letter from myself to his eminence, not proper for a publick dispatch; but I send you inclosed a copy of it, and of his answer; and I really believe that my letter, and what I sayd to monsieur Chauvelin, (with whom I had yesterday a long conversation on this subject, and who earnestly desired me, as a friend, that I would not give a memoriall, as what would serve to exasperate matters,) will produce such an effect as to have the jetties entirely demolished; but the sluice of Furnes will still admitt of some farther debate; but I shall not enter into that at present.

Before I conclude this letter, already indeed too long, give me leave to tell you, that I am very apprehensive that you are going on too fast upon a fixed principle as if all was *over with France*, and, upon that notion, without having any certain scheme of friendship or security with any other considerable power. Your measures, as far as I can guess, are vague and inconclusive; and

and will, if care be not taken, bring us to a quarrell with France, while at the same time we are destitute of any reall friend. For my part, I must own I doe not like, by any means, the conduct of monsieur Chauvelin with regard to us, joyned with the great influence he certainly has at present with the cardinall. But as his eminence has noe thoughts of giving up the system, we must by no means act as if we gave the system over; and must not only dissemble, but, in conjunction with the Dutch, endeavour to support it as well as we can, untill the emperour has a different conduct, and that we are sure of not disobliging Spain by any step taken towards the emperour. And I lay it down as an undoubted maxim, that any *advances*, or *insinuations*, or *soundings* on our part to the Imperiall court, will not have the least effect upon them, but to amuse, to gain time, to misrepresent us to our allys, to putt it in the power of France of making us ill with Spain; and, in short, in setting us entirely afloat, with too much sail and no ballast. The little inconveniencys we suffer at present from the tricks of monsieur Chauvelin, in having endeavoured to fling their aversion to a war upon us, are trifles, if compared with the fatall consequences of our acting towards them in a manner as if we were entirely broke with them: and, pardon me for saying it, I doe apprehend that we are driving too fast from the friendship of the only power that can hurt us; and without such power being against us, we have not much to fear. I say we seem to be driving, we know not to whom, nor to what; and indeed I could heartily have wished to be in England to have talked calmly over the present state of affairs with you, before you lett your jealousy of France carry you to a precipice, and to unforeseen and unextricable difficultys: but it is impossible for me to explain myselfe farther on paper.

P. S. To explain the beginning of my letter to the cardinall, it may be proper to tell you, that I was yesterday at Versailles; and his eminence having taken physic, I avoyded troubling him, although he was willing to see me in the afternoon; and therefore, upon my return home, I thought fitt to write a particular letter to him; but the visit I made to Chauvelin was not unsuccessful, who appears very earnest for the effectuall demolition of the jettées.

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THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Disapproves the measures relating to Mecklenburgh.—Hints at the difficulties which must arise in the negotiation with the emperor from the German affairs.—Desires a speedy recall.

MY LORD,

Hague, Sept. 19. N. S. ; 1730.

Harrington
Papers.

Apart.

I Was honoured by the last post with your lordship's private letter of the first, N. S., by which I am sorry to find the resolution that seems to be taken about Mecklenburg. It appears to be no less than perpetuating the commission, at least for this duke's life; for if he is too wild and extravagant at his age to be treated with at all, I presume he will hardly ever become more *traittable*. As to the dissatisfaction his majesty expressed with relation to the pensionary's ideas, I have justified him, and very truly, in my other letter to your lordship by this post; for I really had not informed him of all his majesty's demands, thinking it improper, in the infancy of this affair, to frighten him with a catalogue of pretensions, that might make him consider the very thing I was employing him to transact as impracticable.

However, I look upon our negotiation with the emperor as begun; but I look upon it too as very farr from being ended, and I foresee the many difficulties that will arise in the course of it. The king thinks the guarrantie so great a concession, that it entitles him to ask any thing or every thing. The emperor considers it in a different light; and though desirous to obtain it, will not purchase it too dear. He knows it is almost as much our interest as his, he sees our situation with France, and he apprehends little from the concurrence of such jarring particles as our present alliance is formed of. These difficulties, which to me are obvious ones, will certainly spinn out the negotiation to a considerable length, though not break it off; for the good of it is, that when once begun, and the demands of England and the republick meeting with little difficulty, as I am perswaded they will, it will be impossible to break it off, for the sake of some certain conditions that your lordship and I know of. But as these difficulties will take up a good deal of time, and probably not be discussed here; or if they were, as I am both unfitt and unwilling to be concerned in them, I submit it to your lordship, whether it is not time to think of a successor for me here; who will require some time to get ready, and who it may be proper should be here before I go. There is now a little more than three months to the sitting of the parliament, and since I am to be back by that time, I confess, I should be glad it

were as soon as possible. I therefore begg your lordship will mention this affair to the king, in what way you think properest, whether as from yourself or me.

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It is with the utmost pleasure I reflect that I can address myself in this manner, at the same time to a friend and a minister, and subscribe myself with as much sincerity to the one, as respect to the other, &c.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Instructions to open a new treaty with the court of Vienna, and to promise the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction, if the emperor will agree to the points required.—France will either undertake nothing, or bring on a general war.—To act in concert with monsieur Dieden, the king's electoral minister, and to obtain the emperor's consent to adjust the differences in Germany.

SIR,

Windfor Castle, 14—25th September 1730.

I Have already let you know that I had received yours of the 19—30th August, which came by count Kinsky's courier. I have since had that of the 2d September, N. S. and laid it before the king; and must now tell you, with a great deal of pleasure, that his majesty approved extremely your whole manner of acting on that nice and difficult affair which fell under your care and negotiation. I shall not enter into the particulars of the several reasonings you used upon that occasion; but I send you herewith the answer I have prepared by his majesty's command, to the paper you transmitted hither, copied from the original which count Sinzendorff had put into your hands. What you find in the inclosed answer is all his majesty has thought fit to give in writing, and count Kinsky has taken a copy of the same. But the king having referred the Imperial court to you, as being farther instructed upon the principal points in question, that you may be fully informed of the drift of his majesty's commands, I shall give you his thoughts, in general, upon the present situation of affairs, together with the motives which induce his majesty to enter into this negotiation, as well as the particular orders the king thinks fit to send you for your direction in transacting the same.

Grantham
Papers.

Nobody is better apprised than yourself of the sincere desire and readiness which his majesty has constantly shewn, upon all occasions, ever since the conclusion of the treaty of Seville, to have all the engagements entered into by it in favor of Spain, executed with the greatest faith and punctuality; and that the king, for the same purpose, has not only incessantly pressed his allies, particularly

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France, to enter into such measures as would most effectually conduce to that end, but also has always readily consented to every proposal that has been made to him of that nature, by offering generously to furnish all such succours as were demanded of him, though far exceeding his proportion, as stipulated by the said treaty. You have also been a witness to the several chicanes and unreasonable objections started by France against the execution of every proposal, though made by themselves, as soon as ever they found it agreed to by his majesty. And you must have observed by what invidious insinuations and false assertions they have endeavoured to persuade the court of Spain, that the inaction of this year, though evidently and solely occasioned by themselves, and consequently the non-execution of the treaty of Seville, ought to be imputed to his majesty.

Affairs being at present in this disagreeable situation, and there being too just grounds to apprehend, from what has passed, that France will either undertake nothing, even next year, and by that means keep matters in the same intolerable state of uncertainty and expence, which they are now in, or else, not content with the bare execution of the said treaty, will engage the allies in such a general war, as must inevitably overturn the balance of Europe. For these reasons, his majesty who is always desirous and determined to execute, with the greatest faithfulness, all his engagements, has been induced to hearken to and encourage any proposal conducive to that end, to the preserving at the same time the publick tranquillity and the equilibrium of Europe, even at the price of entering into such a new engagement, as, though not contrary to his treaties with any of his allies, may yet be of that nature, as in a less violent situation of affairs, he might not have chosen to take upon himself for the present; I mean the guaranty of the pragmatick sanction, which the emperor has so much at heart, and which, considering the plan of operations and the scheme of partitions which are now concerting at Paris and elsewhere, is so essential to him, as well for the security of his possessions for the present, as for the preserving them united and entire to his successor.

But as the taking such a step in favor of the emperor, though strictly justifiable in itself, would inevitably not only be highly disagreeable to France and Spain, but even lose his majesty the confidence and friendship of most of the powerful princes in Germany, and particularly of the electors of Bavaria and Saxony, *the court of Vienna cannot but be convinced of the justice, and even the necessity there is, not only that the strictest friendship and union should be at the same time established betwixt the two courts, by finally and effectually adjusting all matters*

matters at present in dispute between them; but also that the emperor, in return, should heartily concur in all such reasonable measures and proposals as shall be made to him on the part of his majesty, as well for the present quiet enjoyment of his possessions in Germany, as to secure them against any future attempts that may be made by any of the neighbouring powers, disobliged by the king's thus voluntarily and generously entering into an engagement of such vast importance and service to the emperor.

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Wherefore the king has commanded me to acquaint you, that he expects that the emperor should consent to the introduction of the Spanish garrisons according to the treaty of Seville; and that the points of the Ostend trade, Ostfrise, and Mecklenbourg, with all other matters now in dispute, that regard the king and his allies, should be adjusted to his satisfaction; and likewise, that such farther particulars as may be necessary to his majesty's security in Germany, should be settled. And in case you find the Imperial ministers ready to agree to these proposals, you may give them to understand that his majesty will also be willing on his part to give his guaranty to the pragmattick sanction, for maintaining the succession to the dominions of the house of Austria, according to what has been established by his Imperial majesty therein; provided that the emperor will at the same time give such security to the allies of Seville, and to Europe in general, concerning the marriage of the archduchesses his daughters, as may quiet the apprehensions that have arisen on that account, as to the breaking of the balance of power in Christendom.

And as the emperor seems to expect that the king, in order to make known his desire to settle a thorough reconciliation with him, should shew a disposition to give this guaranty, which his Imperial majesty appears to have most at heart, although his majesty is in no wise obliged to take upon himself an engagement of that nature; so his majesty persuades himself, that the emperor on his part will not be backward to do every thing that shall tend to re-establish the most perfect friendship between the two courts. And as the king, as elector, has several matters which ought to be adjusted, in order to remove all kinds of seeds of misunderstandings, his majesty, who makes no question but that the emperor is in the same good disposition, has ordered his minister at Ratisbonne, monsieur de Dieden, immediately to repair to Vienna, and to lay before the Imperial ministers his particular demand as elector. The emperor cannot but be sensible, that when a friendship is to be renewed, all occasions of dissatisfaction and diffidence should, in prudence, and true policy, be taken away; and, therefore, the king does not doubt but that the Imperial court will at once enter into his

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majesty's thoughts on that head, and not leave any point between the two courts unadjusted. Wherefore, when monsieur Dieden shall arrive at Vienna, you shall receive him with the utmost confidence, and take your information from him, as to what he has to propose in the king's name, as elector; and you will support his arguments and reasonings with the Imperial ministers, and endeavour to get his majesty all just satisfaction on the demands which monsieur Dieden is instructed to make.

As what you are empowered to declare to the Imperial court concerning the guaranty desired, upon their assuring you that they will satisfy the king and his allies, in all the other points above mentioned, and particularly in that of the introduction of Spanish garrisons, must give the emperor an entire persuasion of his majesty's sincere resolution to act in this affair with great honor and integrity; and as the emperor has professed that he has no design to disunite his majesty from his allies, the king thinks that the best way to transact this matter will be, that the Imperial court should consent that the business of the guaranty should not be put into the publick convention, but settled in a separate and secret article. Since by that means the emperor will have all the security he can desire from the king, and at the same time will not give any open umbrage to France or Spain, which can be of no real use to his Imperial majesty, but may be of very great damage to the trading subjects of the king, who being by this transaction to become the emperor's true and faithful friend and ally, thinks it highly reasonable and necessary that his subjects should not suffer on that account.

These then are the king's sentiments upon the present negotiation with the court of Vienna. His majesty is sincerely inclined to re-establish a perfect friendship with the emperor, and even to enter into the guaranty so earnestly sought for by the Imperial court, provided his majesty's demands as to the introduction of Spanish garrisons be agreed to, that the other points relating to him and his allies be settled, that his electoral affairs be adjusted to his satisfaction, and that the article concerning the guaranty be made wholly a secret for the present. As you know, by what I have written, his majesty's thoughts upon this important negotiation, you will so manage the business, that you may be sure of the emperor's agreeing to what is asked on the part of the king; at the same time that you give the Imperial ministers to understand, that his majesty, out of the great desire he has to give the most signal proof of his most friendly inclinations towards the emperor, consents to gratify him in giving the guaranty.

You

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You are not to be told how important a point this is. But as his majesty saw, by the paper you transmitted, and by the account you gave in your letter of the 2d, of the conversations you had had with the several ministers at Vienna, as well as by what count Kinsky has said here, that the court where you are appeared to be seriously disposed to a reconciliation, his majesty, to evince an equal disposition on his part, has been induced to open himself upon the most material points, in order to bring this great affair to as speedy and happy a conclusion as possible. You having been the hand that has conveyed the materials on which the peace of Europe may be built, and a true friendship fixed between the king and the emperor, I wish you much success in the progress of this business, and that, by your means, a foundation may be laid for such a plan to be concerted as may answer the great end his majesty proposes, of a general pacification, as well as of a particular good understanding betwixt himself and the emperor. In commending and encouraging your conduct, I must not forget to let you know, that the king thinks you did right, in your conversation with the Imperial ministers, to beat down their hopes of obtaining the guaranty; since, as you then had no instruction upon that head, you could do no otherwise than talk the language that had been hitherto used in discouraging such kind of expectations at Vienna.

I must not omit to acquaint you, that the king is hopeful that the court of Vienna will act so candidly and satisfactorily in this negotiation, that all his majesty's allies may be induced to join readily in re-establishing the general tranquillity. But his majesty always understands that the States General in particular should go along with him, both in the guaranty of the pragmatic sanction, and in all other points to be settled in this transaction, his majesty designing to do nothing without their privity and concurrence: and my lord Chesterfield has orders to acquaint the pensionary and the greffier with this whole affair, that it may be privately managed by them, and go through their hands only at present. I have particularly mentioned to you before, that the article about the guaranty should be kept a very great secret; and I must now likewise tell you, that it is the king's opinion that this whole negotiation, till finished, ought to be kept as private as possible. The success of it may, in a great measure, depend upon the secrecy wherewith it is conducted. His majesty will not fail to keep the secret on his part, and expects, from the promises already given, that the emperor and his ministers will do the same.

Though I have explained to you fully, in the former part of this letter, the motives that have induced his majesty to open himself in this manner to the emperor,

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emperor, and among others, have nakedly informed you of the present disagreeable situation we are under with respect to France, yet your own prudence will suggest to you, that you must not let the least word of that nature drop from you in your discourses with the Imperial ministers; nor give them the smallest glimpse to let them suspect that you know of any coldness or dissatisfaction between us and France: the contrary opinion ought by all means to be instilled into those you have to deal with at Vienna.

I cannot too often repeat to you, that the principal point the king has in view, in giving ear to the emperor, is to obtain amicably, by his means, the faithful execution of the treaty of Seville; and to combine the introduction of Spanish garrisons with that article which is so important to the Imperial court, the guaranty of the Austrian succession: and therefore you must always have your eye to secure their consent to Spanish garrisons, without which, his majesty cannot punctually fulfill his engagements towards Spain. So that you see it will be impossible for his majesty, unless Spain itself voluntarily comes into it, to agree to any expedient on that head, that shall fall short of the exact performance of what has been stipulated by the said treaty. Although you see plainly, by the tenor of these instructions, that the king may be disposed to give the guaranty to the emperor, provided his and his allies' demands are complied with on the part of his Imperial majesty, yet I must acquaint you, that his majesty looks upon that concession to be of so very great importance to the emperor, and so earnestly desired by him, that all the use and merit imaginable should be made of yielding to it: and therefore his majesty leaves it to your prudence and dextrous management to come into it with circumspection, to open yourself by degrees, and to make the Imperial ministers feel that the king thinks he gives a most valuable price for what he desires his Imperial majesty to agree to on his part.

You must likewise, in treating with the emperor's ministers upon these matters, give them frequently to understand, that dispatch is extremely necessary in this case. The king's hands are indeed at liberty at present; but they know very well at Vienna, how much his majesty is pressed, both by France and Spain, to conclude the treaty for settling the operations of a general war. And they know likewise, that a plan of partition is negotiating at Paris and elsewhere; and that the king cannot long put off coming into the measures of his allies. And if his majesty should be once obliged, by the delays of the Imperial court, to take his party that way, he will not have it then in his power to hearken any farther to the emperor; but must execute the

the new engagements he shall have taken. Wherefore you must spurr them up to avoid losing any time, which is extremely precious in this conjuncture, and to finish this negotiation with all the expedition possible, lest his majesty should be otherwise put under the necessity of closing with France and Spain, in those schemes that are so dangerous to the emperor's interests. And if you find that the court of Vienna flatters itself that the king's thus hearkening to an amicable reconciliation with the emperor, proceeds from any backwardness in him towards executing punctually his engagements to Spain, you must undeceive them as to that notion: for, on the contrary, the king is determined, in all events, to fulfill his treatys with that crown, but would prefer peaceable to forcible measures for the doing of it. But, if the first fail, the latter must be pursued, and that without loss of time. And what will most probably be the consequence of driving his majesty to take that part, the emperor's ministers themselves are best able to judge, from the informations they must have received of the nature of those plans of operations and partitions I have already mentioned.

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LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Sends the copy of a treaty with the emperor, and gives instructions for his conduct.—The king requests a categorical answer.—He is required not to neglect the king's German interests.

SIR,

Whitehall, 4—15th December, 1730.

YOU will, before this messenger reaches you, have learnt by the post, that your dispatches of the 18th past were safely arrived; and I shall now acquaint you with his majesty's sentiments and commands upon the contents of them.

Grantham
Papers.

It is with the greatest pleasure that I assure you of the king's entire approbation of your conduct in every step you have taken in this most important negociation; and, although the answer of the Imperial court to your paper is by no means a satisfactory one, or what, if taken abstractedly, could afford the least grounds to hope for a good conclusion of this affair, yet the account you give of the good dispositions of the emperor's ministers in general, and of the repeated assurances and professions of prince Eugene in particular, inclines the king to hope, with you, that matters may be brought to a good issue; and therefore his majesty has, as you desired, ordered full powers to be sent you, and also a treaty, ready drawn, in order to be executed forthwith, in case the court of Vienna has really those good intentions which prince Eugene has so positively assured you we should find in them.

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The time is now come that must put to the proof the sincerity of those professions and assurances. The king cannot suffer himself to be any longer amused or dallied with. His majesty's present situation, both with respect to his allies and to his own people, absolutely require, a speedy decision one way or other; and therefore, if you shall find the court of Vienna disposed either not to give an immediate answer, or to give such a one as shall not be satisfactory and decisive, you will let them know in strong but civil terms, that his majesty must look upon such a proceeding as a declaration of their intention not to conclude any thing, and take his measures accordingly. But you will be very careful, in your discourses with the ministers upon this subject, to avoid giving them the least grounds to imagine, that your insisting, thus absolutely, upon an immediate and decisive answer, proceeds from any other cause than that of the necessity there is, in the present circumstances of affairs, for his majesty to know, forthwith, what he has to depend upon, and not from any desire or intention in the king to appear to threaten or give the law to the emperor, which is the thing in the world the farthest from his majesty's thoughts. The perfect knowledge you have of the true state of his majesty's affairs, both at home and abroad, will abundantly furnish you with arguments sufficient to convince the Imperial ministers of this truth. How is it possible for the king to defer any longer the concerting and fixing upon the necessary measures for the execution of the treaty of Seville, to which he is every hour so justly and pressingly called upon by his allies, and particularly by Spain, and to which he is obliged by the strongest and most solemn engagements? Or how can his majesty meet his parliament without being able to tell them whether they shall have peace or war?

This matter, thus explained, cannot possibly leave any room for the court of Vienna to think themselves offended by your insisting thus peremptorily upon an immediate *yes* or *no*; and the treaty itself which you have to propose to them must as demonstrably convince them of the sincerity of his majesty's earnest desires and intentions to renew and cultivate the strictest union and friendship with his Imperial majesty. The king freely and generously offers whatever the emperor wants or desires of him, and only requires in return to be enabled to fulfill engagements in no wise prejudicial to the emperor, which he is obliged to by the most solemn treaty, and which consequently no consideration upon earth can ever make him depart from. For as to the points which monsieur Dieden is instructed to insist upon in relation to his majesty's interests in Germany, they are of such a nature as ought not to admit of the least difficulty on the part of the emperor, since it would not only be the most unreasonable

unreasonable thing in the world, but the highest injustice, that those vexations and injuries done to his majesty's electoral rights and interests, purely on account of differences and animosities unhappily arisen betwixt the emperor and the crown of Great Britain, should not, upon the renewal of the ancient good understanding and friendship between those two powers, be at the same time removed and redrest. Since, therefore, for the reasons above mentioned, the king thinks, that the court of Vienna cannot reasonably object to the manner of proposing this treaty to them, nor to any of the points contained in it, his majesty must look upon any delay made to the conclusion of it, as a proof of the court of Vienna's having had no other intention in setting on foot this negociation, than to amuse him, in hopes thereby to create a misunderstanding and disunion betwixt him and his allies.

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I shall not trouble you with many observations or reasonings upon count Sinzendorf's paper; for, if it contains the real sentiments and intentions of the court of Vienna, it is in vain to hope, by all the arguments in the world, to be able to bring people into the same way of thinking, who differ so widely from one another upon almost every essential point in dispute; and if it was only intended to be flung out by way of amusement, as by prince Eugene's discourses to you we must believe it was, till by the arrival of your full powers they should think it time to tell their last words, it would be only so much time spent in fighting with a shadow. I shall, however, take some notice of a few of the most essential points contained in that paper, as well to shew the impossibility of his majesty's ever consenting to them, as to explain the reasons that induced the king to order the treaty sent you to be drawn up in the manner it is.

But, in order to put into a clear light, and in as few words as possible, what I have to observe to you upon these heads, it is necessary that I acquaint you with the unalterable principles upon which his majesty entered upon this negociation, and upon which it must be carried on, if ever it is to be brought to perfection. First, that the king and the States General give their guarantee for the emperor's succession in the fullest and most extensive manner; second, that the emperor enables the king and the States to execute punctually all their engagements to Spain, by the treaty of Seville, in relation to the introduction of the 6000 Spaniards into the places of Tuscany and Parma; thirdly, that all matters in dispute betwixt his majesty, the States General, and the emperor, be forthwith adjusted; fourthly, that all the engagements entered into

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by any of the said contracting powers, with any other prince or state, remain unimpeached by this treaty, as far as they are consistent with it; and that in case of any disputes arising betwixt the allies of one or more of the contracting powers, with those of any of the others, they shall unite their common endeavours to adjust them as soon as possible, by an amicable negociation, and till that can be brought about, they shall take effectual care, that none of the contesting parties shall proceed to force.

These being the principles from which his majesty cannot depart, it will easily appear how impossible it is for the king ever to agree to almost any of the expedients proposed in count Sinzendorff's papers, and particularly to that of admitting 3000 Spaniards into Parma, and the like number of neutral troops into Tuscany. For, however this proposal may be thought in some measure to answer the principal end and design of the treaty of Seville, as effectually securing to don Carlos his right of succession to the said dutchies; yet, as it does not come up to the express words and letter of it, Spain might justly alledge, in case it was agreed to, that his majesty not having fully complied with his engagements towards them, they were at liberty not to execute theirs to the king; the consequences of which are too obvious to be mentioned. The same objection holds equally strong against the several articles proposed in the said paper to be agreed upon previous to any introduction. In short, the king is absolutely resolved, in all events, to execute his engagements to Spain, in relation to the said garrisons, to which his own, and the nation's honor, as also the interests of his subjects indispensably oblige him. The being enabled to compass that end without a war, is what alone can induce the king to charge himself with the guarantee of the emperor's succession, and consequently whatever falls short of that can never be admitted.

That the Imperial court may be fully apprised of the extent of these engagements, I send you herewith an entire copy of the treaty of Seville, that you may communicate it to them, in case you find the emperor determined to conclude matters, according to the stipulations in it relating to the said garrisons; by which it will appear, that effectual care has been taken not to impeach any of the rights of the emperor or empire, or those of the present possessors, as stipulated in the quadruple alliance.

As to what is demanded in that paper in relation to the duke of Holstein, 'tis impossible for any thing farther to be done concerning it for the present, than what you will find in the articles of the treaty, viz. that all endeavours shall be

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be used towards bringing that matter to a speedy determination, by an amicable negociation. And as to the guarrantee asked for Russia, as the king demands none from them, it cannot be expected he should give them any.

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I think I have now touched upon all the points in that paper, which particularly relate to the king, and as to those which concern the States General, I take it for granted, that their minister at Vienna will be fully instructed upon them, or that you will be informed by lord Chesterfield of their sentiments; however, I think it proper to repeat to you, that the king will not conclude any thing without taking them along with him, and till they shall be fully satisfied by the emperor upon all their pretensions. Nor will he give the guarantee demanded, without being first assured by the pensionary and greffier, that although the terms of their government should not allow them to sign the treaty at the same time with us, his majesty may depend upon their doing it afterwards, which is the reason that you will find the States mentioned throughout the treaty as one of the original contracting parties, and an article added at the end, to make them so whenever they shall be ready to sign.

Although I have, according to your desire and advice, sent you a treaty ready drawn, you must not, upon that account, look upon yourself as strictly tied down to these words, or even to the form of it. But, in case you find the court of Vienna disposed to agree to all the essential points contained in it, you will admit of any alteration in the wording or ranging of the articles; or even consent (though not till the last necessity) to their drawing a new treaty themselves, provided effectual care be taken that nothing is omitted, or any thing new inserted, that shall make what you are to sign to differ in any essential point from what you shall have learnt from the treaty sent you, and by these instructions to be the sentiments and intentions of his majesty.

You will, I am persuaded, continue to live in the greatest friendship and confidence with monsieur Dieden, and act in perfect concert with him in every thing wherein his majesty's interests are concerned; and you will employ your best offices and instances with the Imperial ministers, for procuring the most effectual redress and satisfaction to the king, upon the several demands which monsieur Dieden is instructed and ordered to make for that purpose to the court of Vienna. I hope soon to hear of your good success upon all the important matters that are entrusted to your care and management, and that you have concluded such a treaty as may re-establish the ancient friendship and union between the two crowns, and effectually secure the equilibrium and public tranquillity of Europe.

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His majesty observed, that in yours of the 22d of November, you proposed, to save appearances with regard to the emperor, that the king should, in conjunction with the States, use his good offices with Spain to bring them to accept of the pensionary's expedient of 3000 Spaniards and 3000 neutral troops. If, therefore, you find that the court of Vienna is very earnest and pressing to have such a trial made, and do agree at the same time that, if it does not succeed, they will not oppose the admission of 6000 Spaniards; his majesty, to comply as much as possible with the emperor's desires, will use his best endeavours jointly with the States, to induce Spain to accept of that expedient. But, as it is a deviation from the treaty of Seville, his majesty cannot insist absolutely upon a compliance on the part of Spain, if they choose rather to abide by the former engagements; and, therefore, you must not give any countenance or encouragement as to the employing such good offices, unless the Imperial ministers first sign the article about Spanish garrisons, as it is in the project of the treaty; and in such case the king will not fail to endeavour, to the utmost of his power, to obtain the consent of Spain to have 3000 Spaniards in Parma and Placentia, and 3000 English and Dutch, or other neutral troops, in Leghorn and Porto Ferrajo; and will be glad if he can be so fortunate as to answer the emperor's expectations on that head. These your dispatches are sent open to my lord Chesterfield at the Hague, who is desired to forward to you the sentiments and resolutions of the ministers in Holland, to which you will conform yourself in treating with those at Vienna. You will act in the greatest confidence with monsieur Bruyninx, if you find him authorized by his masters to confer with you and the Imperial ministers upon this important subject; and you will employ your utmost credit and endeavours to support and obtain what the States desire of the emperor.

EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Doubts about the conclusion of the Vienna treaty.—Is concerned to find the negotiation clogged with the German affairs.

MY LORD,

Hague, December 19, N. S. 1730.

Weston
Papers.

Apart.

I Am in such a hurry to dispatch the courier to Vienna as soon as possible, that, had it not been for your lordship's commands in your letter of the 4th apart, I should have deferred giving you this trouble till next post. I confess I have my doubts about the success of our Vienna treaty, at least about the dispatch it will meet with there, and I am persuaded it will employ couriers some

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time longer. When I saw the plan transmitted to your lordship by Mr. Robinson I was concerned to find it clogged with conditions which they could never imagine would be agreed to; such as the guarranty of Brunswick, the duke of Holstein's affair, &c. and consequently seemed to be intended delays.

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Prince Eugene's behaviour to Mr. Robinson would naturally give one hopes of success, but when I consider how much that gentleness is out of character, I own, I refine enough to suspect it. The treaty sent to Vienna, as far as it relates to England and the republick, is such as the emperor (I think in prudence) ought to agree to, but considering his haughtyness and obstinacy, and the knowledge he certainly has of the distrusts and jealousys among the allys, I fear it is uncertain whether he will or no.

I hope monsieur Dieden's demands will not prove an obstruction to this affair, but I cannot comprehend what can be meant by an additionall security of the king's electorall dominions; which are already guarantied over and over by all the powers upon earth, and by the whole empire, as being a part of it; so that I suspect additionall security to mean additionall dominions, which can only be by dismembering Mecklenburg, upon a pretence of paying, in that manner, the expences of the commission. And this, I think, the emperor never can, and the empire never will consent to; it being a total subversion of all the fundamental laws of the empire.

I am very willing to stay here till this affair be determined one way or other, and the more so, because should the emperor agree, I foresee there will be some difficultys in finishing here, where, from the nature of the government, every wrong head or heart has a right of opposition, and can do hurt, though not good.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Vienna, Dec. 23. 1730. Monsieur Dieden found by a conversation which he had yesterday with the bishop of Bamberg, that the emperor would make no difficulty to put his majesty immediately into possession of the county of Hadeln, nor even to extend the investiture of Bremen and Verden to the female line.

Grantham
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Copy.
Extracts.

Jan. 3. I expect to be called this day or to-morrow to a conference, wherein the objections of this court will be proposed to me; for objections there are, which turn principally upon the declaration to be given to his majesty's demands as elector.

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EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Requests his advice in what manner he should act, if the court of Vienna should, as he suspects, delay the signature of the treaty.—Mentions the dilatoriness of the Imperial court, and the fatal necessity of trusting to France, should the treaty with the emperor be broken off.

MY LORD,

Hague, December 26, N. S. 1730.

Weston
Papers.

Apart.

YOU will give me leave to trouble you with this letter, to ask your advice both as a minister and a friend. Mr. Finch has writt me word, that he embarks next Monday in the yatch that is to attend me here; and I propose making it wait, till I have some answer from Vienna. If the treaty comes back signed, to be sure I will stay here till I have gott the republick into it. But supposing the answer should be doubtfull and dilatory, and plainly show, that at least it will take up a good deal more time, I begg both your advice and instructions what I should do in that case, which I am apt to think will exist. For having told count Sinzendorf, in generall, that I had forwarded a courier to Vienna, who would one way or other determine affairs, in about three weeks time, he said, that lett it be what it would that that courier carried, even though it were acceptable, yett he knew from the constant dull delays of his court, that they would take at least a month to consider of any thing finall; and that he hoped I should not look upon such a delay so naturall to the Imperiall court, as any design to amuse or gain time. I told him I certainly should, and that, considering the crisis things were now in, it was impossible to see it in any other light. If Mr. Finch should come here before I have received an answer from Vienna, I shall not deliver my letters of revocation till I receive one; but if, when it comes, it should be such a one as I apprehend it will, your lordship will be pleased to instruct me particularly what I ought to do.

I am very apprehensive that the king will have been displeased that I gott nothing to send from hence by the courier to Vienna, but I really found it impossible to do it, with the least degree of security for the secret; and I hope your lordship will contribute to excuse me to the king. I heartily wish this affair may succeed; for if it does not, I think we shall be in a very bad condition. The design of France, to do either nothing or too much, is now too plain to be doubted of, and the jealousys and distrusts among the allys have taken too deep a root to be removed, with any prospect of future concert. And if the emperor is obstinate enough to reduce us to return to France, after this jealousy, we shall be oblig'd to give them fatall pledges of our future fidelity.

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I am persuaded there will be nothing ready for the meeting of the parliament; for even should the court of Vienna approve of the treaty in generall, yett something or other always happens to retard the conclusion of such important affairs, beyond the time one wish'd or propos'd. If accidents don't happen, forms and ceremonys supply their place; and such a court as that of Vienna will undoubtedly make some alterations in the treaty, were it only to say, that they have not subscribed a treaty just as it was sent them. Therefore, in my poor opinion, the parliament should be putt off as long as possible, because, whatever his majesty says at the opening of it, will be of the utmost and nicest consequence.

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EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Justifies himself from an imputation that he was discontented, and requests him to contradict that report to the king.

MY LORD,

Hague, January 2d, N. S. 1731.

I Doubt I grow very troublesome to your lordship with my letters apart, but I trust both to your patience and your friendship to excuse them. I received, by last post, a letter from Mr. Walpole, with an account of a very extraordinary one intercepted from monsieur Hop here to his brother in England; and though whatever passes between the two Hops does, in my mind, deserve very little attention, yett as I know that very slight objects will sometimes make very strong impressions, I thought it necessary, for my own sake, to obviate with your lordship any effects that this silly circumstance might possibly have with you or any body else.

I cannot conceive upon what monsieur Hop founds his assertion, of my being uneasy at being recalled, as he terms it, and of my attributing it to the ill-will of the two brothers, as he is familiarly pleased to call sir Robert and Horace: I am sure not upon any thing I have said to him, for I have conversed with him but once since his return from France, and that was only upon publick affairs, and before I had obtained leave to come back; and it seems very surprizing that a minister who has obtained leave to return to his own country, should rather chuse to have that return attributed to his disgrace, than to his favour, at his own court. Foreign ministers frequently pretend to be better than they really are; but, I believe, I should be the first that ever desired to be thought ill at his court, that was really not so, as I hope I am not.

Your

Weston
Papers.

Apart.

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Your lordship very well knows that, when I came back here last summer, it was declared by their majesties, and understood by me and every body else, that I was to return for good and all, by the meeting of the parliament; so that my writing to your lordship lately upon that subject was only reminding you of a thing fixed, and not desiring any thing new when I came here. I told every body I should return to England after Christmas, and that the employment the king had done me the honour to give me required my attendance in England; so that my return was universally expected here, and is nothing new, nor can consequently be attributed to any of monsieur Hop's surmises. If monsieur Hop interprets my saying, that I am personally sorry to leave this place, to be discontent, I cannot help it. It is true I have said that to every body here, and it is no more than what common civility, and even truth, requires from me. I have all the reason in the world personally to regret leaving this place, but that is no argument for my being discontented at my return.

As I suppose the king has seen this letter of monsieur Hop's, I must desire your lordship will be pleased to sett this matter right with his majesty; who would have very great reason to be offended, if he could believe that, while on one side I begg his leave to return, on the other I complain and am dissatisfied with obtaining it. I should be extreamly sorry, at my return to England, to meet with any ill-will, or suspicions; for I solemnly declare I shall bring none with me. I desire to live in friendship with all that are in his majesty's service; it was upon that foot that I took the employment I have, and upon that foot only will I keep it.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Conferences with the Imperial ministers on the subject of the proposed treaty.—Extreme difficulties in adjusting the German objects of dispute.—Finally proposed ad referendum.

MY LORD,

Vienna, Jan. 16, N. S. 1731.

Grantham
Papers.

I Hope the several facts to be stated in the course of this letter will be so many excuses for my not having ventured to send your lordship a messenger sooner. Gould arrived here the 24th past, about nine at night, and having suffered himself to be carried by his postillon to the gates of the town, which was unnecessary, on account of my living in the suburbs, a circumstance, however, which he did not know, the officers took down his name and country, and notwithstanding the care he had to conceal his being a messenger, it was enough that he came post, for him to be characterised in the list of passengers, as Harry Gould an English courier. There are foreign ministers here, who make

make it their business to be exactly informed of the arrival of all travellers, from whence they draw conjectures. Of this number is Mr. Meerman, the Bavarian minister, who having thought, the next day, that he had discovered the arrival of an English courier, published it with great diligence; more, I believe, out of curiosity to learn what the messenger had brought, in general, than apprehensive that there was a negotiation on foot, that might so nearly interest his master. This minister had taken it into his head, that the king of Spain had accepted of the pope's proposal, to put four thousand Romans into Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia. He imagined my courier might have brought a confirmation of this news, and having missed seeing me at my own house, he went about to the Dutch, French, Spanish, and other ministers, to get some certain intelligence upon that particular, so that the alarm being given, my steps, as I suppose, have been all watched ever since Gould's arrival. As to Gould himself, I desired him to keep close in my house, that his being a messenger of state might not be divulged, as it certainly would have been by the English here, to whom he is personally known: and I resolved to own, in general, that indeed I had received a person from Lord Chesterfield, who was upon his departure from Holland; but to others, whose curiosity and importunities should go farther in questioning me, I would wonder they should be so inquisitive about the private affairs which I might have with a nobleman, who had for many years honoured me with his friendship.

Part of the first night was employed in making myself master of his majesty's commands. The next morning, after communicating my dispatches to monsieur Dieden, and he his to me, I waited upon prince Eugene, and told him the substance of my commission in general. I would have shewed him the papers themselves, but he referred me to count Sinzendorff, to whom he bid me deliver copies, with a short memorial denoting a concise specification of each piece; and as I promised to have them ready out of hand, his highness promised likewise, that no time should be lost in examining them, in making the report to the emperor, and in returning me an answer. It will not be worth while to trouble your lordship with what passed particularly in this visit. If the prince made any objections, they were only the starts of first and loose thoughts. His promises, to do whatever laid in his power to bring the treaty to an immediate maturity, were strong and positive. I had summoned him to exert his power, as I relied solely upon him; as the progress which the negotiation had made was entirely owing to his encouragement; as his insinuations had been so many assurances

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to me; and as the knowledge I had of his honour was the best guide I could follow.

My next visit, in course, would have been to the bishop of Bamberg, but unfortunately he was in the country. I went, therefore, to count Sinzendorff immediately: I found him as highly delighted as I had left prince Eugene, with the arrival of my courier, of my instructions, and of my full powers. Our discourse was much the same as had passed between prince Eugene and me; he confirmed me in the necessity there was to accompany the papers with a short memorial, which, after attempting to see count Staremburg, I went home to prepare, and have the honour to send your lordship a copy, as what may be looked upon to be an abridgement of what I said more extensively, in the fullest and strongest terms imaginable, to all the ministers with whom I conversed, at the first opening of my commission. The rest of the day, and part of the 28th, were taken up in copying the pieces I intended to inclose in my memorial. The copy of the Latin treaty was the same that I received from your lordship, except the insertion, at the pensionary's request, in the fourth article, of the following underlined words: *Abolituram omne commercium et navigationem ad Indias Orientales tam subditorum fuorum Belgio Austriaco, quam cæterarum regionum, tempore nuperi Hispaniarum regis, Caroli secundi, coronæ Hispanicæ subditarum, atque ita demùm facturam, ut nec societas vulgo dicta Ostendana, nec alia quælibet cunque in dicto Belgio Austriaco, aut in cæteris regionibus, tempore nuperi Hispanicarum regis, Caroli secundi, coronæ Hispanicæ subditis.* And afterwards, at the same minister's request, of the words, *et dominorum ordinum generalium*, to follow *subditis regis Magnæ Britanniae* in the 6th article. In discoursing with prince Eugene, I had, upon occasion, produced the French project, as knowing that the Latin tongue is not very familiar to his highness: it was to shew him, upon his mentioning the tariff to be made for the Low Countries, what care had been taken to that effect. When I left him, he hinted to me to give a French copy likewise to count Sinzendorff, and I chose the rather to do so, though I did not specify it in my memorial, as I was desirous the prince should be acquainted more genuinely with his majesty's intentions by my French project, which, in the observations sent to me upon the treaty, is said to be the original, than to trust, for his highness's true information, to the translation of his referendary. I hope I need not acquaint your lordship, that this copy was made conformable to what I delivered in Latin, as well by inserting, in their proper places, the additions made by the pensionary, as by taking particular care to leave out the clause, which stands as part of the second article, in the French project

project, but is left out in the Latin draught, and sent separately to be added upon certain conditions. The separate article in Latin and French accompanied the foregoing copies, with a copy of the declaration desired by the pensionary about Ostfrise, and the specification of the engagements of the treaty of Seville, all which I delivered to count Sinzendorff on the 28th in the evening; which, in effect, was limiting this court to three days for their answer, in the sense of what I desire, in the close of my memorial, to see this affair finished with the old year.

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The next morning, the twenty-ninth, I saw both count Staremborg and the marquis de Rialp: it was necessary to see the latter, though he is not of the conference, as well because the subject of the 6th article is entirely in his department, as that he is esteemed to have more personal credit with the emperor than any other minister whatsoever. I found count Staremborg reading the papers, which had, in so short a time, been sent to him for his previous information before the conference; and the marquis de Rialp had either seen them, or at least talked largely upon them with count Sinzendorff, for I found him full of the objection, which arose originally from count Sinzendorff, when at my first visit he threw his eye over the treaty; I mean as to the pensionary's addition for excluding the rest of the Spanish dominions, besides Flanders, in the possession of the emperor, from trading to the Indies. This they all said (for Count Staremborg had been prejudiced upon the same subject) was a new condition, and would be nothing else, than confirming the interpretation put by the Dutch upon the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty of Munster, whereas the emperor not allowing of that sense, would not be thought to abolish the Ostend company, or to exclude his subjects of the Low Countries from the benefit of trading to the East Indies, but out of pure complaisance and favour to the Dutch, and not by compulsion, or by virtue of the treaty of Munster: and though it never was, nor ever would be the intention of the emperor to erect any new trading companies to the Indies, in those dominions; yet his Imperial majesty was too jealous of his prerogative, and particularly of what related to his Spanish possessions, to suffer a law, which had never been so much as started before, to be imposed upon him. They were all likewise prepared upon the objection of no time being fixed for the commissaries to conclude the new treaty of commerce for the Low Countries, and this objection came originally from prince Eugene himself.

With relation to the pensionary's addition, I told them that, upon the assurances I had given them of the readiness of the states to concur in this treaty,

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it would be an ill invitation to them to strike out the only thing that their chief minister, who may be supposed to be best acquainted with their intentions, had found necessary to put into the treaty in their favour. That that minister's intentions for the publick good were too well known to imagine he had any design by that addition, but to remove every obstacle to the ready concurrence and entire approbation of his countrymen. That, whether the abolition of the Ostend company was in consequence of the treaty of Munster, or out of pure favour in the emperor, neither the one or the other of those considerations ought to hinder the insertion of the pensionary's words. If it was out of pure favour, the emperor might the more easily extend it in restraining his other subjects from trading to the East Indies, as it was owned his Imperial majesty never had or would have any design that they should trade thither; and as to the construction which it was pretended might be given to the 5th and 6th articles of the treaty of Munster, I would be bold to say that, by this article and addition, it would be so far from receiving new force, that it would be left as much, if not more at large than ever, as long as the articles were not mentioned, and the commerce and navigation of those countries were, by this article, excluded only from the East Indies; whereas, by virtue of the treaty of Munster, that exclusion ought to extend likewise to the West Indies, of which no mention was made, out of deference possibly to his Imperial majesty, and not to renew a dispute upon words, when the substance might as reasonably and justly be obtained without it.

As to the point of fixing a time for the conclusion of the tariff treaty, I told them this article went farther than the 26th of the barrier treaty, which last only said that a tariff should be settled *as soon as could be*; whereas the article now under consideration not only stipulates the making such a treaty *without delay*, but likewise the means of doing it, by the nomination of commissaries to be assembled *immediately, and within a time fixed*, and that to *put an end* to that work. Besides, that it would be either impossible for England and Holland to consent to fix a time, or needless, if not disadvantageous, to the emperor to desire it; impossible, if his Imperial majesty should insist, as has been done in former proposals, to enter into his rights as sovereign, in case the treaty was not finished within the time limited, which would give those two powers just reason to apprehend such obstacles on the part of his Imperial majesty, as might at the expiration of the term rehabilitate him in his sovereign rights; a condition much more advantageous to him than that upon which he accepted of the Low Countries; and if the emperor did not, as he could not with reason, insist upon it,

it, it would be needless, if not less profitable to him, to fix a time for the conclusion of an affair which, if not concluded, would only leave things where they are, or perhaps breed discontent, and room for new disputes, which would be the less to be apprehended while the commission existed. But, in short, I desired them to reflect whether the discontents and misintelligence that had subsisted more or less between the emperor and England, or between the emperor and Holland, or between the emperor and them both together, almost ever since the signing the barrier treaty, would not all disappear at the signing of the present treaty, such as it was offered; no apprehensions left with regard to the Ostend company; no umbrage given by a long refusal to concur in the measures of the quadruple alliance; no suspicions of too formidable an alliance between the emperor and Spain, and other innumerable seeds of animosity, which would all give place to a time, when the least to be expected from the future good harmony would be what the emperor had seemed only to desire with relation to Flanders, *viz. de vivre et de laisser vivre*. And I concluded with saying, that I was the more sorry to find those objections, as they fell upon points in which this court might easily imagine I could not be authorised to make any alteration, as indeed I was not upon any other points whatever, having only entered into the matter by way of discourse, as I hoped they would not push their difficulties beyond it.

In the mean while, monsieur Dieden waited upon the several ministers, and will himself have the honour to give an account of his conferences. I shall only beg leave to say, in this place, that till his majesty's demands, as elector, were exhibited, I could only, as I sought the proper occasions, recommend and support them in general to the utmost of my power.

On the 30th the bishop of Bamberg came to town, in order to assist on Sunday at the conference, a day sooner than had been promised monsieur Dieden; and I had persons ready at his house to ask when he would see us. He appointed separate visits the next morning, but with so short an interval, that we found ourselves both together at his levee. Though he certainly had seen, in the country, the papers entrusted with me, yet he read them over with us, made no objection, but, on the contrary, gave us great hopes of success; and after monsieur Dieden had talked to him upon the declaration demanded by his majesty, which was then put into his highness's hands, he prepared to go to the conference, and dismissed us both very well satisfied with his promises to exert himself in bringing matters to a happy conclusion. At night I put myself purposely into prince Eugene's way, at the assembly, to learn

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learn what had passed. He talked to me a long time, though in publick, giving me many flattering expectations upon the success of the treaty, but some discouragement with relation to his majesty's demands as elector. He spoke with great concern at the impossibility which the emperor must be under to gratify his majesty in the very manner desired. He said there were four or five points diametrically opposite to the constitution of the empire; and was the more surpris'd at their nature, as that they could not be granted but on the very principles which his majesty, as elector, had so much exploded and oppos'd by his ministers at Ratisbon. In short, his whole discourse tended to persuade me to redispach a courier immediately to England for new instructions. I told him, very concisely, that there was not time to send a messenger; that the best way would be to confer with monsieur Dieden; that by his knowledge of the laws and constitution of the empire, he might let the ministers see that what was interpreted at Vienna, in one sense, was not that of the rest of the empire; he would distinguish the points demanded; some might depend solely upon the emperor's good-will; others the king asked as a right; and I left the prince to judge whether this was not the most regular, as well, indeed, as the only possible way of concluding in the present circumstances.

I was, however, so much alarmed at these real or pretended difficulties, that I went immediately to count Sinzendorff, and was admitted to his bedside; for he was retired the sooner, as well because the business of the day had not, perhaps, succeeded to his liking, as to calm the uneasiness of his mind at the danger his eldest son's only child was in, a boy of a year and a half old, and who, to the inexpressible grief of the family, did indeed die early the next morning. I expos'd to the chancellor the danger of these difficulties; that if they were real ones, they should have been started sooner, as monsieur Dieden had long since exhibited his majesty's demands; that to desire the delay of the going and coming of the courier would be regarded in England as pure amusement, and only expose monsieur Dieden and me to his majesty's indignation, who would expect to be better obeyed by his servants to whom he had sent his last orders; that, for my part, I should take my resolution, and already inclined rather to send a messenger, with an account of this court's ill disposition, than to wait five days longer, even under the best hopes of an entire success. The chancellor answered with great mildness, and promised to exert his utmost credit with the emperor the next day.

The same night I went to monsieur Dieden; we agreed it was absolutely necessary for him to see the vice-chancellor the next morning: but, when he

sent early, he had the mortification to learn that that minister was setting out to his country seat, and would not return till the Thursday following. Your lordship will easily imagine the concern and surprise we were under, to find the very minister, with whom those affairs were principally, or rather singly, to be negociated, and upon which we were told the only difficulties turned, had left Vienna, at this critical juncture, for four days. While we were reasoning at my house upon this incident, and giving room to all the suspicions and jealousies which could not but naturally take place in our minds, and might probably have determined us to send a courier immediately with our opinion of this court's insincerity, there came to us a gentleman, who is chancellor of Bamberg, from the bishop, to acquaint us how sorry he was to be obliged to go away without seeing us; *that the affair we had recommended to him had been debated at the conference, but could not be finished; that at his return, on Thursday, he would give us an account of all that had passed, and would continue to do his utmost to bring things to a good conclusion.* This civility put some stops to the warmth with which we might have run into some extremity; but not to the vigour and application with which we resolved to put the ministers to the trial in the mean while, and to discover the reasons of this delay, whether necessary or affected. The same evening I saw prince Eugene at the assembly. He continued to answer, with the same mildness as the night before, to what I thought proper to urge with some energy. He said he was sorry and angry that the bishop was gone without speaking to monsieur Dieden, but he assured me his absence would be no hindrance to the progress of affairs.

Common decency demanded that I should spare count Sinzendorff that evening, who had lost his grandchild in the morning. But having observed, by some part of prince Eugene's discourse, that, according to a prejudice, which I may formerly have mentioned to be rooted in him, he would have distinguished between the king and the elector, and even presumed to appeal to me as an English minister; besides what I thought necessary to say to his highness, upon the spot, to convince him of his error, if he imagined there was any other than one and the same interest and cause, I took care by the next morning to have ready a proper translated extract of your lordship's dispatch to me of the 4thth past, O. S.; and beg leave to send a copy of it, as the best model I could take for the direction of my efforts, and one rule by which your lordship may be pleased to judge of my endeavours to eradicate this notion. I have, therefore, ever since carried this extract about me, and have either produced it, or reasoned in conformity to it, or both, upon every proper

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per occasion. I had it with me the 2d instant when I went in the evening to count Sinzendorff. I spoke to him with the same, or more energy than I had done to the prince; he answered with less mildness than the other, or than he himself had done two nights before. I cannot, however, out of good-nature but believe his mind was still embittered, and his thoughts troubled with the loss of his grandchild. The only turn to be given otherwise to his behaviour, is to suppose his majesty's demands had met with great difficulty from the emperor personally, and in such a case this minister will speak to others in the same manner, as to conform himself to the emperor's present disposition, he shall have joined his own good or ill humour to that which he shall have found in his master.

He told me the emperor would not sign the declaration though 100,000 men were at the gates of Vienna. I shall leave to monsieur Dieden to mention the essential difficulties, which the chancellor only touched upon to me in general. He said he did not know what we risked by our obstinacy; that the quadruple alliance itself had lain three months upon the emperor's table, and we expected now the emperor should take a resolution in three days: he added, which offended me the most, what would the nation and all Europe say, if for the particular affairs of the elector of Hanover, all Christendom should be plunged in a war? I answered, that we did not come to threaten the emperor at his gates, but to invite him with the most friendly offers of peace, which as they were infinitely advantageous to the emperor, ought in a lesser degree to be so to those who offered them. That his threatening to divulge what had been offered in case the negociation was broken off, was a return I did not expect to the confidence with which his majesty had opened his mind to the emperor; that the very secrecy which had been demanded, and which was promised on the king's part with regard to the declaration, ought rather to encourage his Imperial majesty to give it. I told him we were of the same opinion, both in England and Hanover, of what was, or was not contrary to the constitution of the empire; and in case of so unparalleled an insincerity, there would not be wanting means to convince England and all Europe, that his majesty's demands were not only just, but such as exacted all the support of Great Britain, as what there would have been no necessity to have made now, but for the griefs of the elector on the score of the king. That to convince him of this truth I would make him a confidence of my orders, that he might see which was the most interested in the satisfaction demanded of the emperor, the king of Great Britain or the elector of Hanover.

Hanover. The chancellor read the extract; and after some heat, with which he denied that what had happened for some years past in Germany, had arisen out of hatred to the measures taken in England, he began to alter his stile; that things would go still well; that notwithstanding his domestick accident, he had been constantly at work for the two days since the conference, in drawing up the report to be made to the emperor, in examining the several papers of his office, and of the Aulick council, relative to his majesty's demands, and lastly, in forming the objections that could not but necessarily be made to serve as materials for a counter declaration. He desired me to let two days pass only with patience, and assured me, as prince Eugene had done before, that the treaty itself would meet with few or no difficulties, especially as to the point of Spanish garrisons.

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Not contented with this, I left the chancellor to put myself again into prince Eugene's way at the assembly, when he spoke to me for a long time, and every word was as good as an assurance of success, if any means could be found to turn the declaration both to the king's and the emperor's satisfaction. Count Sinzendorff had asked me whether Brême and Vehrden, and the affair of Hadeln were nothing, and the prince told me as I have already wrote by the post, that though the emperor's *good-will* and *power* were to be distinguished, yet he would swear to me that the former should be extended to the utmost of the latter to oblige his majesty. Upon which I proposed to him an immediate conference with monsieur Dieden, as the only way to see what could be done; and I again obviated all insinuations for my sending a courier, till matters were ended one way or other. I have already touched, by the post, the indispensable necessity I thought I was under not to give into this snare, for I could look upon it in no other light, till they had explained their objections to the declaration, and their true resolution upon their treaty more authentically than by bare discourse. And your lordship will see, in the following part of this letter, that they were not prepared for the former, and would not do the latter till several days afterwards.

By shewing the least mark of such a facility before the least discussion of the several points, I imagined these ministers would encrease both the number and weight of the objections to be sent into England. That to stay for the return of a courier might give room to unforeseen events, and, what would be the worst, to the Imperial ministers in France sending more than bare suspicions of that court's not being in earnest with all its extravagant bravadoes. That I should fail in endeavouring to get both instructions and full powers for

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monfieur Kinsky in England. It has been but too much the custom of this court not to entrust instructions to ministers of his order, unless a peremptory one, to sign without alteration, and that I apprehended would subject his majesty, for the sake of finishing the treaty at once, to conform his demands entirely to the model sent from hence; which in effect, I feared, would be putting monfieur Kinsky into the same advantageous situation as that which I pretended to be in, of having an ultimatum to offer, from which there was no possibility of deviating. Monfieur Dieden and I were unanimous in this opinion, as what would determine the fate of the negociation, or, at worst, when every thing else failed, it would be a last resource to send a courier with full powers to monfieur Kinsky. But then this hindered me from dispatching a person with our opinion, such as it was all that time, of the success of the negociation. I could have sent nobody so privately but this court must have known of it, and their suspicion of our having wrote for new instructions would infallibly have hindered them from opening themselves at all till the return of the courier upon his supposed errand. Instead therefore of rashly founding our judgment upon conjectures and hopes only as to the treaty, and upon supposed objections to the declaration, we resolved to wait the event, and to ripen it as much as laid in our power.

I demanded an hour of prince Eugene in form on Thursday the 4th instant. Our conversation was long upon the same hopes and the same promises. What was most particular, I complained of count Sinzendorff's rudeness and ill-humour. He said he wondered count Sinzendorff had not entrusted me with a secret, which was, that the occasion of the delay was the difficulty of finding expedients and proper turns for the declaration, so as to lead to his majesty's desires, but not to startle the Aulick council, from whom it was proposed to get a hasty consent, which was necessary, he said, by the constitution of the empire; and added such an epithet to the word *constitution*, as either shewed his little regard for it, or the concern he was under, that the necessity of observing such forms should hinder or delay the work in hand. I told him when this court had a mind to be expeditious, the president, vice-president, and two or three more assistants of confidence were sufficient, to which he agreed, and insinuated to me that that was to be the method.

I went away well satisfied from the prince; with the knowledge I had of his sincerity and honour, I could not be otherwise. He told me by way of discourse, that an addition would be offered to the second article of the treaty relating to the general guaranty. That, as it stood, there would be room left according

according to the future disposition of the contracting parties, to object to the marriage of the eldest archduchess with any prince whatever, upon the pretext of the words *jalousie et crainte*; I told him not, unless those jealousies and fears were *grounded*, to which he objected, by asking who was to be the judge of the grounds. When I explained to him from whence those words were taken, and were in reality the emperor's own, he said Mr. Bruyninx wrote that letter, when the suspicions of the maritime powers were strong, with relation to don Carlos; and that he would take this occasion to assure me, upon his honour, that so far from giving any hopes to the queen of Spain, of marrying the eldest archduchess to don Carlos, the emperor had agreed, by treaty, to give his second daughter to that prince, a truth which he would now declare to me, in this time of confidence, but of which he hoped, in the present situation of things, there would be no apprehension. I told him, that according to his suspicion of future dispositions in the contracting parties, the apprehension of such a marriage might still give more than umbrage, by grounding very just jealousies and fears, according to events; and therefore, the only way to obviate them was, to let the words stand as they are, and that with the greater reason, as any attempt to weaken the force of the restriction proposed, might be of dangerous consequence in Holland, where this treaty must go to be canvassed, and where his highness knew there were so many minds prejudiced with regard to the prince royal of Prussia.

I begged his pardon for mentioning that circumstance, to which I had never given any credit or attention, but I left it to his prudence to consider how necessary it was to avoid every obstacle to the entire concurrence of the Dutch. The prince told me he was no stranger to the extraordinary manner in which that opinion had so generally prevailed in Holland; but he said it was a downright falsehood, and that the king of Prussia himself had never had the least thought of it. He told me this as what I might rely upon; adding, that he knew when not to speak, but, if he did speak, it was the truth. The farther consideration of this addition to the second article was left here, till it should come to be proposed; and I imagined I discovered from the prince's discourse, that it was to guard against any insidious accession of France in time to this treaty, which crown, when once a party to it, might have fears and jealousies otherwise grounded than those of the maritime powers, and might always be starting them to hinder any marriage at all. The prince did not name the duke of Lorrain, but we understood one another to be talking of him; and, upon this principle, that the emperor had no other view but to keep his present

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possessions united, and not to be encreased, as I added, by one foot of ground by any future marriage.

Friday the 5th instant was the day supposed when the emperor would take his resolution. In the evening count Sinzendorff gave me new encouragement; he desired to see monsieur Dieden the next day, of which that gentleman will give an account, and on Sunday the 7th, another conference was held upon the bishop of Bamberg's return. I can only say, upon the absence of that minister, that we had reason to believe, by secret intelligence in his family, that he daily received advice from Vienna as to the necessity of his returning, for which he constantly held himself ready; several mornings he was expected back, which was as often contradicted in the evenings; and we suppose the reason of this uncertainty was, the more or less hopes of the emperor's taking his final resolution upon the report of the last conference. I know from count Windisgratz, in great confidence, that the emperor employed, very assiduously, the first week of this month in reading and examining all the papers, as well those I had exhibited, as those which his ministers had laid before him for his information upon the several demands of his majesty: and though count Sinzendorff said, positively, that the emperor had taken his resolution on the 6th, yet count Windisgratz assured me, on the 8th, that the emperor had still the papers before him; was still full of doubts, which he exposed to the several persons of confidence who approached him; and that his greatest anxiety was, how to preserve his dignity from the appearance of having the law imposed upon him.

We looked, however, upon Sunday the 7th to be the day of determination. The conference was held: the vice-chancellor had appointed monsieur Dieden at seven in the evening, but sent him word afterwards, that the emperor had called for him at that hour, and that monsieur Dieden might come early the next morning. But the chancellor, whom I saw the same evening, told me, in as many words, that the time was come for finishing: monsieur Dieden should see the vice-chancellor on Monday the 8th, and on Tuesday the 9th he should meet all the ministers, at eleven o'clock, in a private chamber in prince Eugene's house; that there they should settle, if possible, the emperor's declaration; and afterwards they would finish with me out of hand; and, in the mean while, I might depend upon it, the emperor would do all that, humanly speaking, he could do to gratify his majesty. Monsieur Dieden accordingly, as he will himself give an account, saw the vice-chancellor on the 8th, and on the 9th went to the conference. But neither his visit of the 6th

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to count Sinzendorff, nor on the 8th to the vice-chancellor, nor even the conference on the 9th, with all the ministers together, had the desired, or, indeed, any immediate effect; when separate, they talked only in general, and when all together, they made their objections to each article of the declaration. They only heard monsieur Dieden's answers, which, for the most part, was to repeat his want of power and orders upon such and such points; and they were so far from declaring the emperor's last sentiments, that monsieur Dieden would have come away in an absolute despair of any success at all, if he had not flattered himself that the ministers, being together, were under a kind of restraint upon each other, when every one only sought how to recommend best his zeal for the master's interests, in the presence of his brethren; or rather, as he believed, by the nature of their discourse, as well in private as when assembled, that their only intention was to discover if he had powers to yield; and if not, that they might give a joint testimony to the emperor of their having gone to the last extremity in reducing us to what they call reason.

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Upon monsieur Dieden's communication to me of what had passed, I saw count Sinzendorff and prince Eugene both that night; I had a long and friendly conference with the former: I employed every argument that his majesty's instructions, and the knowledge I must have of the present situation of things both abroad and at home, could possibly suggest to me. I shall not swell this letter with the particulars; if successful, they will bespeak themselves; if not, they are not worth the remembrance. The result of our discourse was, that as soon as I should leave him, he would read over the *referates* of the conferences which he shewed me laying upon his table; that I should call again the same evening, and then he would acquaint me with what was to be done next; assuring me, in the mean while, no time should be lost both in preparing a draught of a declaration, and in finishing the other matters with me. I returned an hour afterwards, when he left his company to tell me, that he would go early to the prince the next morning, and at his return, he would speak to me. I resolved to be before him with the prince, and therefore, would have put myself in his way that very night at the assembly; but his highness prevented me by rising up very earnestly to take me to a corner of the room. He told me what had passed at the conference; he wondered, and could hardly believe, monsieur Dieden had no farther powers. I told him that minister had done his utmost, and inferred from thence how unprofitable it would be to send a courier; but, to soften the refusal, I told him, that since this court found the conditions of the declaration harsh, and
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the stile of it, as they said, too much like a law, it was to be imputed only to the pressing necessity of affairs, which had not allowed time in England, perhaps, to give it another turn; or, perhaps, that the paper I had last sent into England had given such little hopes of success, and of a proper return of friendship on the part of the emperor, that the declaration might have been sent as a last trial of his Imperial majesty's friendship, of which it was now in his power to give the most essential marks; and I hoped, since this court was resolved to undertake the penning of the declaration, they would not entirely forget his Imperial majesty's true interests in a vain support of his dignity; and I insinuated to him, as I had done before the chancellor, though in the civilest terms I was able, that in five days time I should be obliged, however unwillingly, to send back my courier with my full powers. The prince promised I should be dispatched in two days, and referred me to the declaration to be produced for a proof of the extent of his Imperial majesty's complaisance and regard towards the king.

The next morning, the 10th, I got a time appointed to see count Sinzendorff, after he had been with prince Eugene. He told me that, with incredible diligence, he had got the *referate* of the Tuesday's conference digested into a declaration, and the other papers ready, which would all be laid before the conference on Thursday the 11th, and that evening, or on Friday morning at farthest, I should have my answer. When I left him, I told him coldly that I only desired he would remember his promise as to the time, for, as to the success of the negociation, it had been, for some days past, become very indifferent to me; for all I wanted was to take a party, and it was so much better to take a bad one, than none at all, that at the time mentioned, I should certainly send back the courier.

The conference was accordingly held the 11th, and lasted from ten till two. By five o'clock I was with count Sinzendorff, and had a conversation with him of above an hour. He told me all was ready, except the emperor's last determination upon the pieces projected, but that, to save time, and cut off the tediousness of transacting business with the emperor in writing, his Imperial majesty had consented, a thing very unusual, to see his four ministers that morning, on the 12th, together, in a kind of cabinet council.

I desire your lordship to make a moment's reflection upon the form of proceeding in this court. Since the arrival of Gould there has not past one day, which is not to be marked, more or less, with some particularity; and therefore, by throwing this relation into the stile of a journal, all our motions will be presented in a regular manner to your lordship's eyes. But notwithstanding

ing the communication at first, of the papers to the ministers; the necessity of their being seen by the emperor, and examined separately by each minister before the conference; the conferences themselves; the referates of those conferences to be drawn, to be laid before the emperor, and again to be re-examined by each minister separately, and afterwards, at a joint conference; to which is principally to be added the character of the emperor, who will be informed by himself, a laudable conduct, but leading to much irresolution; I will be bold to say that, under all these lingring circumstances, so much activity has not been seen for a long time at this court. So great a mark of it, as drawing the emperor himself out to his council, gave me some hopes that, after all their usefess endeavours to find, if we could or would make any concessions, they might have formed, or would still form a declaration, such as, in their sense of things, might be the utmost of the emperor's good-will and power to oblige his majesty, and that to determine his Imperial majesty, they had obtained the liberty to see him in a body.

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This opinion animated me to enter into a long and warm discourse with count Sinzendorff, to shew him the necessity of giving such a declaration as might authorize me to finish the treaty within the three days which I had prescribed to myself for detaining the courier. His great, and as he would have persuaded me, only objection, was to the granting the investitures of Brême and Vehrden to the female line, to the exclusion of the branch of Wolfenbuttel, if that family did not agree within a year to the conditions of his majesty. He denied that it was in the emperor's power to give the investiture in that manner, without the consent of the empire; and though it were in his power, it would be too great a hardship upon his Imperial majesty to be obliged to take part against the empress's * nearest relations. The chancellor's whole discourse turned upon finding out expedients for sparing the cruelty, as he said it would be, in the emperor to contribute to that exclusion.

I shall not trouble your lordship with my answers. I had the happiness to find them approved afterwards by monsieur Dieden. He said he could not have done more or otherwise himself. What will be properer for me to say, in a few words, is, that finding count Sinzendorff so obstinate upon that article, I told him the whole negotiation would turn upon it, it being impossible to reconcile principles so opposite, or to persuade the king that the refusal of what his majesty was convinced laid in the sole power of the emperor to grant, was any thing else than a refusal of his Imperial majesty's friendship for ever.

* Elizabeth Christina, wife of the emperor Charles, was daughter of Louis Rhodolph, brother of Augustus William, reigning duke of Brunswick Wolfenbuttel.

That,

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That, for my part, I should declare to him, and this for the last time, that if my courier was once gone, it would be never to return: for the king, pressed on all sides, since so many months, to take the most effectual means for fulfilling his engagements, and during the first six weeks of the opening of his parliament, to remain unactive and speechless, and that upon the precarious assurances of unsigned papers, was as impossible, as for me not to execute my instructions, and discharge my duty to the letter. The courier once gone, I washed my hands of the negociation; and to convince him of the truth of what I said, by the disinterestedness with which I would act, I would only leave this alternative with him, either to give such a declaration as would authorize me to sign the treaty, or to give the Imperial minister at London instructions and powers to do it forthwith there. He said it would be with great difficulty that monsieur Kinsky would be entrusted with such a power. I told him it had been with no less that I had been entrusted with mine, but was sorry to see that the best use I could make of it, was to send it back useless. The chancellor seemed struck at the earnestness with which I pressed this alternative, and after much lamenting and sighing, he bid me talk with monsieur Dieden to see what expedient could be found against the exclusion of the branch of Wolfenbuttel.

We had many bitter and many friendly altercations; but I thought I saw some flexibility in him, and after having obtained a promise, that on Friday I should have an answer good or bad, I immediately gave monsieur Dieden an account of what had passed. It was no difficult matter to persuade that gentleman to repair to the chancellor's apartments, where he would find him at cards, and by outstaying unaffectedly the rest of the company, to give him an opportunity of speaking, if he remained in the humour where I thought I had left him. The advantage which we proposed from this visit was, that the strength and solidity of monsieur Dieden's arguments to shew, from his knowledge of the constitution of the empire, that it was solely in the emperor's power and breast to gratify his majesty in this point, succeeding to the effects, such as they might be, of all that I had said in the strongest and most persuasive manner I could, might possibly improve the flexibility which I had flattered myself I had perceived in the chancellor, into a downright concession, at least furnish him with means to exert himself, if he pleased, at council the next day. Monsieur Dieden accordingly went; the chancellor was the first to lead into a long discourse, of which monsieur Dieden will give an account himself.

The next day his Imperial majesty met his ministers, except the bishop of Bamberg, who was confined at home by a little indisposition. The council
 lasted

lasted till the emperor's hour of dinner. To know their resolutions as soon as possible, it was not long before I saw count Sinzendorff. He told me that, at seven that very evening, the vice-chancellor would deliver a declaration to monsieur Dieden, and when we two should have examined it together, I should return to him (count Sinzendorff) to tell him what was our opinion of it, and to settle the time for proceeding upon the treaty. I told him then, as I had upon several occasions before, that I was surpris'd their whole time had been so much taken up in making objections to the declaration, as not to have found a moment to explain authentically their sentiments upon the treaty. He told me that I had all along been sufficiently acquainted with his Imperial majesty's approbation of the project in the main; that when the articles should come to be discussed, they might perhaps be a little extended, though not in a manner disagreeable to the maritime powers. But as I had let them understand, that I could not conclude any thing without his majesty's having full satisfaction upon his demands, it had been their sole business to settle that matter previously.

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I waited afterwards at monsieur Dieden's house, till his return from the vice-chancellor, when we read together, with the greatest mortification, the declaration offered by this court, and which will be sent by monsieur Dieden himself. The manner in which the vice-chancellor delivered it, left no hopes of any farther success, and we found ourselves at once without any satisfaction on one hand, and without any other but verbal and general assurances on the other; and what increased our concern was, that we found plainly, what indeed we had foreseen some few days before, that they would proportion their future reservedness, with respect to the treaty, to the like or dislike that we should shew to their declaration: an unhappy, though natural, effect of the usual finesse and littleness in this court, and no wise conformable to the frankness and sincerity with which the negociation had been begun and carried on. In this situation we thought it to be of the highest consequence, for his majesty's fullest information, to draw from this court, if possible, though at the expence of a day or two longer, some authentic mark of its sincerity; and we resolved that, at my return to count Sinzendorff, I should tell him, as monsieur Dieden should tell the vice-chancellor the next day, that upon examining the emperor's declaration, and confronting it with the strict injunctions of his majesty, we could only take upon us to lay it before the king for his farther commands; and that no time might be lost, I should insist upon being enabled to let his majesty know forthwith the sense of this court, as to the other points: and to that purpose I spoke to the

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chancellor the same evening, demanding a positive answer, either from him, or at a conference, the next day, upon the treaty, that I might dispatch the courier at night. He pretended to shew the greatest surprise at our being discontented with his declaration; he said we might still see what could be done; monsieur Dieden might reply; and, in the meanwhile, I could not expect to know their final sentiments upon the treaty, till they knew our's upon the declaration. I told him, monsieur Dieden had no power to reply: it was, perhaps, more than we durst, to send such a declaration to his majesty, which nothing could authorise but the full approbation and concurrence of this court, with respect to the other points; and I again demanded their answer against the next morning, which, if refused, would oblige me send away the courier without it. The chancellor bid me speak the next morning to prince Eugene in the same manner, and told me, I might go home and see in the mean while what another courier had brought me. It seemed Brown the messenger was just arrived; the same thing had happened to him as to Gould at the gates, and the news had been already carried to the chancellor.

Upon my return home I found a single short letter from lord Chesterfield, who had only dispatched that messenger to me, that I might have more than one with me ready for the service. I passed the night with much uneasiness, to find that at last I might be reduced to dispatch the first messenger with nothing but this court's disagreeable declaration, and to keep the other for as little purpose, according to the event, as he came. I therefore, at last, resolved to make some immediate use of his arrival, by concealing the true occasion of it, and by supposing that he had only brought me a short letter from your lordship, to command me to re-dispatch him immediately with an account of things, in whatever situation he should find them, as what was absolutely necessary for his majesty to be informed of, for taking his measures, though even upon the uncertainty of my advices; and in this sense I took the liberty to draw the inclosed paper, which I supposed to be a translation of the letter that I should infallibly send to your lordship that day at noon. I shall stop one moment to beg pardon most humbly for this extraordinary liberty; it cost my delicacy much trouble, and I cannot justify it to myself, and much less to your lordship, but by the chicanery and ungratefull manner with which I foresaw this court was preparing to delay matters, or absolutely to refuse to open itself upon the treaty.

I carried therefore to prince Eugene, the next morning, my supposed answer to your lordship. I had a long discourse with him before I produced it; he would have justified the declaration; he said it was all the emperor *could* do, for

for he corrected me when I spoke of what he might do if he *would*. He said it was all the ministers of state could advise him, and those of the Aulick council that had been consulted, could authorise him to do. When I complained of the false hopes that had been given us, especially upon the article of Brêmen and Vehrden, he said that several papers had been found since, and that the emperor could grant no more than what his late majesty had agreed to. I answered, that if his late majesty had made such a concession, it had been neither at the expense of a general guaranty, nor at the breaking out of a war. I then exposed to him the disagreeableness of my situation; I summoned his word and honour as to the treaty, and laid before him the necessity of my dispatching a courier that day. He said he would obtain the emperor's leave for himself or for some other, or for all the four ministers to confer with me immediately. He said he would do it that moment himself, if I would consent to set his majesty's demands apart; that he would assure me, as he had already done so often, that there was nothing to be added or omitted to the treaty, but what was for the farther security and satisfaction of all parties. I told him that then there would be the less danger in communicating to me the sentiments of this court, which he knew to be so much the same with those of the king and the States, and was the least return to be made to the confidence and friendship with which they had, I hoped not imprudently, opened themselves to the emperor. He renewed his promises to obtain, as soon as possible, the emperor's orders for communicating to me his sentiments, which, I said, must be in writing, for his majesty's conviction; and I thanked his highness for having drawn me, by such hopes, out of an extremity into which I was running; and at his request gave him an account of what I had supposed to have been brought by Brown, and, with his permission, I read my supposed answer.

The prince heard it with more patience than I expected: he said that my sending such a letter would be rendring the worst service in the world to the king, the emperor, and all Europe; that the most incredible diligence that had ever been known in this court had been used to finish this affair; that whatever we might think of the declaration offered, it was a step and a length that had never been gone at Vienna; that it was a most unfortunate manner of negotiating to oblige an emperor to sign, in three days' time, so many words, as alone would demand so many months' mature deliberation; that we had given in our demands, the emperor had answered; if monsieur Dieden had no powers, and he had repeated nothing else at the conference, it was

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impossible to bring matters nearer; that in endeavouring to do it, they had neglected to treat in form with me, but I might have been satisfied with what he had so solemnly and so often averred to me; that I was the master to write what I pleased, but he had not thought me capable of giving such a turn to things. He reproached to me, with a downright passion, the words *le peu de cas que l'on fait icy de l'amitié du roy*. He swore upon the honour of a prince, that his majesty was of all the powers in Europe, that whose friendship the emperor desired the most earnestly, and for his own part, that which, for his master's sake, he would promote with the greatest assiduity upon the terms of the present negociation. I told him, he might see by the very communication which I made to him of my letter to your lordship, that I was not a person who sought to make bad things worse; that I had indeed wrote it in the first heat after seeing the emperor's declaration, and finding the answer to be given to me deferred, joined to the pressing instances I had received at the same time from England; but, upon his highness's encouragement, I would not write in that manner, and would defer my courier a day longer, in hopes to hear and receive, from his highness himself, a more authentick proof of the emperor's intentions to agree to the treaty, than I should be able to give his majesty by the most solemn assertions I could make as from myself; and I hoped, after all that had passed, his highness would not expect I should take upon myself, as indeed I should not, to answer for any thing but bare facts and relations.

I shall only add two circumstances more of this visit. In talking upon the affair of Mecklenbourg, the prince told me that his majesty's demands had been worded in a manner as to make a court more suspicious than this, believe that they were only intended to disunite the emperor from the king of Prussia, if his Imperial majesty had been surpris'd into the signing of them. I told him I was sorry to see so much diffidence left at this time of day, and more particularly as so ill-grounded a suspicion as that which he mentioned seemed to have taken place, by the affectionate mention made in the emperor's counter-declaration of the king of Prussia. The prince said, that at all events I might assure his majesty from him, that whatever just regard they had for the king of Prussia, that prince should never put a single man into the dutchy of Mecklenbourg, as long as the king's forces there were not augmented.

The other circumstance is the eager representation with which I accompanied what is said in my supposed letter to your lordship of the instructions and full powers, that I desired, out of a sincere love for the common cause, to be sent to Mr. Kinsky, as what would be the only expedient left to save time.

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The prince said it was impossible for the emperor to trust that gentleman in his first commission with unlimited instructions; so that instead of saving, it would be only losing the time that would be consumed in sending more couriers.

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I shall likewise only mention my having shewn the letter above mentioned to count Sinzendorff. He fell into the most outrageous passions imaginable, through which I thought I discovered an absolute despair of the negociation's succeeding if I sent such an account, and consequently as much fear of losing this occasion, by their own obstinacy, to secure his majesty's friendship. The chancellor was for returning to a negociation with monsieur Dieden; I told him it was absolutely impossible; and indeed in a visit which that gentleman made the same evening to the vice-chancellor, he found, by an unusual sincerity in that prelate, that it was so.

On the 14th I received a message from count Sinzendorff to see him at five o'clock. It was to let me know, that the emperor had consented to let his ministers meet me the next morning, at eleven, at prince Eugene's house. In the mean while the chancellor thought it was the greatest misfortune imaginable, that no means nor expedients could be thought of to adjust the electoral demands to his majesty's satisfaction. The emperor, he said, had offered all that was in his power; even according to the common forms of business monsieur Dieden ought to reply to the emperor's paper; and that it was an unheard-of way of proceeding; at least for thirty-five years, that he had been in business, he had never known, especially in so critical a juncture, that a minister, of such experience and abilities, should, at such a distance, be tied down in such a manner to and by his instructions. I said, that if monsieur Dieden's instructions had been less limited, I should not even then have seen hopes of reconciling principles so different as those upon which the king's demands and the emperor's reply were founded. The chancellor said, the emperor's desires were as earnest and sincere as his majesty's to conclude, and his affairs altogether as pressing; that it would be the greatest happiness if any thing could be struck out; he would not for the world that the occasion should be let slip; and he insinuated some inclination to see monsieur Dieden himself that evening, and me afterwards.

I acquainted monsieur Dieden with it, who immediately repaired to the chancellor: their discourse was much the same as what had passed the evening before with the vice-chancellor; when, as upon this last occasion, monsieur Dieden, to come to an absolute knowledge of the emperor's resolution, had,
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instead of letting them interrogate him as to what was in his power, turned the question by asking, point after point, if the emperor could grant such and such an article; to which he was as often answered in the negative by both those ministers, though not without perceiving in them both an insidious curiosity to know whether I could not be induced to finish the treaty notwithstanding this difficulty. When I returned in the evening to the chancellor, he continued to shew his concern at monsieur Dieden's obstinacy. He said the affair must still be finished one way or other; that it was the most glorious opportunity that ever offered for an Englishman to do his nation, and all Europe, the greatest service imaginable; that I should see the next day what would be offered; and he wished, nay, did not doubt of success.

Your lordship will find, by the following account, with what design the chancellor thought he had artfully adapted his discourse to me. I had not been three minutes at the conference the next day, when I was confirmed in my suspicions. Prince Eugene begun, in a solemn and more pompous way than is agreeable to his phlegmatick character, to set forth the sincerity of the emperor's intentions to make a lasting peace and union with the king; in order to which, his Imperial majesty had gone even beyond his power in some points, and was in the utmost concern that he could go no farther, in gratifying the king; that I had been witness to the pains that had been taken daily to bring those matters to a conclusion, and in the mean while had been constantly told and assured that the treaty proposed would meet with few or no alterations: the preface, with changing a word or two, was entirely to the emperor's satisfaction. His Imperial majesty saw, with great pleasure, an eternal friendship proposed, in the first article, with the maritime powers; and a renewal and confirmation of former treaties; which were looked upon here as the best basis of the tranquility and equilibrio of Europe. He accepted of the offers in the second article with the greatest satisfaction; that if there wanted any thing, it was only to make the security the greater for the maritime powers, by the emperor's obliging himself voluntarily never to marry the eldest archduchess into the house of Bourbon; that in the 3d article, it would be difficult for the emperor to be induced to name, and much more to acknowledge the treaty of Seville; but the engagements of that treaty would be all inserted as an extention of the quadruple alliance, and even corroborated by the specification of the feudality of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia to the empire, the only and surest footing upon which don Carlos could take possession of those dutchies; that in this advantageous situation of things it

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was as much a matter of wonder as concern, that I should refuse to treat and sign till his majesty's affairs, as elector, were finished; and should, out of an obstinacy that did not become an English minister, suffer those of Europe to stand still till the return of a courier, and perhaps run the risk of being more embroiled than ever; that in these circumstances, the emperor would not, nor could it be expected he should, declare his sentiments otherwise to me, upon the project of the treaty, than had been already done verbally; for with what security could he open himself upon points of that importance, which I said I could not sign independently of others? which was the same thing as if I had no powers to treat at all.

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I told him and the company, that my wonder and concern surpassed their's at the supposition of my refusing to treat with them, when the only reason of my being present was, as I was authorised, to treat with them, and to demand of them to treat with me; at which I saw them all, and their referendary Bartenstein, throw their eyes upon one another as surpris'd and disconcerted. The prince asked me, abruptly, if I would treat independently of his majesty's electoral affairs. I told him I had so little to do with them, that my only business was to treat of matters of quite another nature; and, as there was no time to loose, I insisted upon their entring upon them immediately. The prince asked me if I would sign the treaty apart. I said, I must first see and hear their objections or observations upon it: he himself had owned there were alterations to be offered, and it could not be expected that I should know whether I would or could sign before I saw those changes. This led to several insidious questions, to draw from me a confession that, purely upon account of his majesty's electoral affairs, I would not or could not enter into and finish a negociation upon which the tranquility of all Europe, and the particular friendship of the maritime powers with the emperor depended. I answered with all the conciseness and caution, but with as bold a politeness as I could. I told them, that at their request, the king had honoured me with full powers to treat; and if what I treated was brought to its proper maturity, to sign it: that if, in the course of treating, there arose difficulties which were not within the instructions, it was usual to take them *ad referendum*, and to wait for the master's opinion; but even this was so far from being my case, that I had not so much as been yet invited to treat directly, after so many days that I had demanded it. The prince justified that delay by so much time being taken up in endeavouring to adjust his majesty's electoral demands, and summoned me to declare, if, in that interval, I had not asserted, that I could not treat.

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treat or sign till that was done to his majesty's satisfaction; and whether, since the giving the emperor's counter-declaration, I had not insisted, that it was not, and could not be to his majesty's satisfaction; from whence he inferred, that I would neither treat nor sign. I told him, that the moment after my courier arrived, I had begun to treat by a full communication of my papers; that my business, ever since that time, had been one constant solicitation to finish what I had begun; and that I did now, and once for all, insist and demand, solemnly and in form, of them, the emperor's ministers, there present in the council room, to enter into negociation with me, of which I desired the referendary to take notice in his protocol.

This occasioned some discourse amongst them in the German language; after which count Sinzendorff went away, and I understood enough to perceive it was to go directly to the emperor, which I knew to be true afterwards, with this extraordinary circumstance; that he found the emperor at the ordinary council of state, and before all the assistants, desired, to their great surprise and astonishment, to speak to the emperor in another chamber; a particularity that may not have happened for thirty years past, to shew so much impatience and urgency as not to stay till the emperor had finished the council.

During count Sinzendorff's absence, the prince, the bishop of Bamberg, and count Staremburg, continued the conference with me. I shall not trouble your lordship with the particulars of the conversation; it turned upon the interests of Europe and the present circumstances of affairs, all founded upon their common-place notions of things dispersed and repeated in my several relations since my arrival here. I endeavoured to answer, as I hope, in a proper manner, but not without complaining of the turn they were giving to things. I told them, for the future I should know how to negotiate better, and what happened that day would be a lesson for my life. That though I saw their referendary ready with his pen to take down every word that fell from me, yet I would declare to them boldly, that nothing could be so injurious as to tax me, in the quality of an English minister, with so much as interrupting the affairs of Europe for the private concerns of the elector of Hanover. That I might, at different times, have insinuated to them, (for what I said or did, nothing on earth would make me deny;) I might have insinuated, that if his majesty's affairs, as elector, were not immediately finished, I could not sign till his minister had new orders. That the only motif of such an insinuation was my usual frankness and sincerity. Not to have mentioned those demands, to have drawn the emperor's secret from his breast upon the treaty, by a dissembled

sembled readiness to finish it, as the only point depending, and afterwards to have started his majesty's electoral demand, without which I could not finish, would have been deceiving the emperor and my own master, as the most likely method to frustrate the good intentions of them both; but I had never heard that the taking one point *ad referendum*, was a reason to prevent the discussion of others.

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During this discourse count Sinzendorff returned, and after having spoken to his brethren in the German tongue, prince Eugene told me, that the chancellor had been to receive the emperor's last orders, which he bid the referendary Bartenstein read. It was a kind of manifesto to shew no less wonder than surprise, that after all the mutual professions of friendship between the emperor and the king of Great Britain, the minister of the latter should, for the sake of very unreasonable demands made by his master, as elector of Hanover, refuse to put the last hand to a treaty which was so far advanced for the publick good and tranquillity of Europe. Those demands were represented as injurious to the dignity of the chief of the empire, as contrary to its constitution, and as infringing the rights of others. This I took to be the purport of the paper, as well as I could judge by hearing it once read, and as far as my indignation would permit me to give attention to it; so far I was from taking it into my hands, or giving it a reading myself, and much less, as they would have persuaded me, to transmit it to his majesty.

After some pause, and a disdainfull smile, I told them, that I had but just heard enough of it to comprehend its venom. But I would content myself with saying that so far, as it was said in the paper, from suspending the negociation on account of his majesty's electoral affairs, I once more insisted upon it, and summoned them in the most solemn manner to treat with me forthwith; and so far from being desirous, as it was still said in the paper, of breaking off the negociation, I exhorted them for their own sakes, and for the publick good, to send the emperor's instructions and full powers to his minister in England, if they had their reasons for not treating with me here. They then returned to their German language, and, after some time, proposed from themselves, as they said, and without having had the emperor's leave, to treat with me, and sign immediately upon the foot of a mutual reversal, that if the declaration offered to his majesty was not satisfactory, neither party should be bound by the treaty. I told them I could not promise to sign any thing till I knew what they had to propose, and their expedient would be really putting his majesty into the case, where, with so much injustice, they supposed he was, and which I protested, a third or fourth time, he was not.

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I was ready to get up with marks of being tired and worn out with these idle attempts, when they muttered amongst themselves that I was a man of honour; and, after a little more discourse in their own language, proposed to me to see, that evening, the vice-chancellor with monsieur Dieden, and to find out, if possible, some expedient. I told them my courier and my dispatches were ready; they desired a respite of 24 hours only; I answered I would then allow it, if it were only to give them the most convincing proof, that it was not I who sought to break of the negociation: and thus I left them, though conducted civilly enough by prince Eugene, whom I had seen, with great concern, acting this low part, which would have better become their referendary, in whose shop I believe all these little artifices were forged.

I communicated immediately what had passed to monsieur Dieden, and, after concerting our measures and answers conformably to our intentions of abiding by our orders, we went at night to the bishop of Bamberg: he received us with a different air of serenity and affability than I had seen in his face at the conference. He was sorry for what I had suffered in the morning; he said he had been of a different opinion, and had assured his brethren I would never accept their paper; and if he had been at the conference, he would have prevented their concerting so unworthy an artifice. By this confession he discovered a truth of which he was not aware; for the only time he missed a conference was on Friday the 12th, when there was one held before the emperor, from whence it is plain that it was in that prince's presence that this whole scene was laid. The bishop used all his address to see what was our final resolution; he repeated the expedient of the morning, and finding my answers much the same, but something freer than when before their inquisition, he turned his discourse upon the last endeavours which he would use with the emperor, that very night, to order the negociation to be continued with me the next morning, of which he would give me notice early. He spoke in a manner to persuade us of his sincerity, and we are the more inclined to believe he is sincere, as we have reason to think that he hopes, in a time of tranquility, to be able to retire to his bishopricks, as well as that he is apprehensive of their being exposed, as well as other benefices and states belonging to his family, in case of a war, to the resentment of the allies, and particularly of France.

The ministers were that evening, or this morning, all with the emperor, and before nine the bishop of Bamberg sent a gentleman to me to desire I would repair privately, by a back door, to his lodgings. He told me the emperor had consented to my having another conference this morning; he made an extreme merit

merit of what he had done in conquering the emperor's obstinacy, who had been offended at the supposition of the affairs of Europe being to be suspended on account of his majesty's electoral affairs. I told the bishop of Bamberg what I said afterwards at the conference, that I could bear that supposition no longer, for were it as true as it was not, that his majesty's electoral affairs retarded the peace of Europe, the king was too considerable a prince as elector, for more than all Europe not to wait the return of a courier on his single account, and it might be remembered that this present emperor would never have had peace with France, but for the satisfaction that was exacted of him for the house of Bavaria. The bishop then gave me some salutary lessons as to my conduct at the conference, and concluded our discourse, which had lasted above an hour, with advising me to write with caution and management about what had passed; not to expose the obstinacy of the emperor, whose humour, he said, I had been long enough here to be acquainted with. He swore upon the word of a gentleman, a prince, and a priest, that, if his majesty would condescend to be advised by him, to accept, however unwillingly, for the present, the emperor's declaration, he would take upon himself to conduct him with honour through his electoral affairs; that the affair of Hadeln alone would never have been granted but in so critical a juncture; that the business of investitures was at all times litigious, and he should count himself happy to continue long enough at Vienna to serve his majesty in those delicate points, which might meet still with much difficulty from a future vice-chancellor of the empire. I returned his highness all the suitable thanks and compliments for his confidence in me, and assured him I would take the liberty to write in the manner he prescribed.

I left the vice-chancellor to meet him soon afterwards at the conference, whither I went, fully persuaded that it would be still contributing to his majesty's service, to know, once for all, if the emperor, on any account whatever, would agree to Spanish garrisons; a secret which, when once known to the king, might make his majesty more master of his own actions, would be the best obligation upon this court to keep the secret, and foil at once all their little artifices to intimidate me upon the supposed advantage of my being at their mercy. This conference began with renewing the expedient of signing with a reversal; and upon my refusal to give any promise, as being impossible, till they communicated to me their papers, and I should know what I had to sign, prince Eugene asked me whether the points of the treaty should stand so, as not to be altered, in case we agreed upon them; but that if the German points were not agreed upon afterwards, all should be null? I told him I might as well ask him

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first if he would sign the treaty as I had offered it, word for word, which would be the surest way for me to follow my instructions; but in truth I could not but own, with great concern, that I was heartily tired with these affected difficulties; and to put an end to them at once, I would agree to his last proposition. I thought, my lord, and but with too much reason, that it would be impossible for them to offer any thing with so good a grace, as would not authorise me, according to my instructions, and with all the reason in the world, to object against, and take down articles enough *ad referendum*.

Their secretary thereupon drew up the inclosed paper, and I the more readily consented to it, that, with all their finess and equivocation, it can at worst but be a proof of his majesty's being obliged to do nothing, if the German points cannot be agreed upon; and, indeed, as the thing came out, nothing at all was agreed upon; for, in fact, every paper, and almost every word in them, which I have the honour to send inclosed, were in a manner taken *ad referendum*. Their pretext for this ridiculous transaction was, that the emperor might know what to trust to, if he let his secret go out of his hands. But I was told the true reason was to authorise the ministers to let it go out of theirs. They were so little mindful of what was or was not passable, that their secretary took no minute of the objections I made, and without ever asking for my powers, or with what authority I did it, they only desired me to put my name in the margin of the brouillon, without any date, where the words, of which I send a copy signed by Bartenstein, were wrote; so that, as his majesty may depend upon his being obliged to nothing, I shall be the less particular upon the remarks and objections which I made at each article.

My first scruple was to know with what authority I, as an English minister, could, in the king's name, and much more with respect to the States General, confirm and renew his late majesty's treaty of union, in the year 1692, with the house of Austria. I objected this, as a point which I recommended to their reflection, for their own security; and this objection alone would have authorised me in such a manner to suspend the negociation for the return of a courier, as to take off all imputations, had there been the least ground for it, with respect to his majesty's electoral affairs. But, indeed, every article furnished matter enough to be taken *ad referendum*; and I hope, without tiring your lordship's patience any more, you will do me the justice to believe, that I gave the best reasons I could why they ought to have abided by his majesty's project. I wished, but added I had no great reason to believe, that this method of
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acting would either please or succeed. I demanded Latin instead of French projects; they were not ready, but as they offered to have them prepared in a day or two, I would not deny them the second messenger I have here to carry them, were it only to have another opportunity of writing, should any thing new offer; and by this fresh instance of my reluctance to break off the negotiation, to refute any farther attempt to renew their malicious insinuation. But whatever measures his majesty shall be pleased to take, it will not be necessary, with the dilatoriness of this court, to wait purposely for that messenger. At parting they all joined in desiring me to assure his majesty of the emperor's sincerity, of which the papers they entrusted with me were the greatest proof.

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As for myself it is with the greatest contrition that I send back this messenger with so small a one of my success; but if I might be allowed to add my poor opinion, impartially, and this is the first time that I have been able to form one, upon which I can almost venture to rely, it is, that, as far as their pride, obstinacy, and shame, to be outdone in generosity, will suffer, they would still be glad to be forced, as it were, into the treaty: their ill-humour and unbecoming carriage, for these few days past, proceeding mostly out of rage and bitterness that their artifices and flatteries could not prevail upon my obstinate attachment to my duty.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Electoral affairs create difficulties in the negotiations.—The fatal consequences which must ensue, if the treaty is broken off merely on the German demands.

MY LORD,

Hague, Jan. 16, N. S. 1731.

I Was extreamly glad to find, by your lordship's letter apart, that the trouble I had given both you and myself, about monsieur Hop's intercepted letter, was unnecessary: and, indeed, I should never have thought it necessary to have taken the least notice of any of that gentleman's surmizes, had I not found by Mr. Walpole's letter, that, at least, they had made some impression upon him.

Weston:
Papers.
Apart.

Your lordship will have seen, by this time, from Mr. Robinson's letters, that I guessed pretty right as to our negotiation at Vienna, that it would still require couriers, and that monsieur Dieden's demands would create the great difficulties; and this I find has exactly happened, though I am very sure the court of Vienna was resolved to bring all possible facilities to monsieur Dieden's demands.

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I should be wanting to the regard and friendship I profess for your lordship, if I did not lay before you the fatal, but natural, and even necessary consequences that will attend the breaking off of this negotiation upon electorall points, in which you are more particularly concerned, as being in your department.

This negotiation is already known by many, and suspected by all; should it break off, we must be more in the power of France than ever, who then, knowing that we have no resource left, will use us as they think fitt, and insist upon dangerous pledges of our future fidelity: we must either enter into all their destructive schemes, or at best continue, a good while longer, in the disagreeable and unpopular situation we are at present in. But this is not the worst neither; for it is impossible that this negotiation, so far advanced, can now break off, without additionall acrimony on both sides; and in that case it cannot be expected but that the emperor will take the natural advantage of declaring to the nation and to this republick, that the publick tranquillity might have been restored, that he had agreed to all the points that related to England and this country, but that electorall considerations only prevented the conclusion of so desirable a work, and plunged us into so dangerous a warr. What effect this will have, I need not say; our enemies will tell us with pleasure. Nor can I answer that, when the republick shall once know it, as they certainly will know it, they will not conclude a separate peace, or a neutrality upon any terms; such are their apprehensions of a warr, and especially of this warr. The pensionary at first apprehended difficultys from these electorall points, even without knowing them, and only from the outward aspect of affairs in that part of the world, and he thought it would be impossible to adjust them by treaty; but he hoped they would be referred to future negotiations, after the harmony between the two courts should be restored, and that then the emperor might connive at what he could not publicly authorize. But if the whole negotiation should break off, upon any, or all of these electorall points, I think it is impossible to describe the fatal consequences that must result from it, both to the king, the ministry, and the nation.

I find, by the accounts from Berlin, that the king of Prussia is frightened out of his wits, if he ever had any; and wants to be friends with the king; and for that reason desires a minister may be sent there, which, in my opinion, should not be done; for he takes every instance of complaisance to be an indication of fear, and grows insolent upon it; whereas, if he is really frightened, as

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I believe he is, there is no imaginable meanness to which he will not stoop for his security; and I should think it would be better to make him take some of those steps first, before he meets with the least return from his majesty. Grumkow's conversion, I hope, will be cultivated in a proper manner; a sum of money will be well employed there, and putt him too much in our power for him to go back.

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THOMAS PELHAM TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Debate on the address.

MY LORD,

London, Jan. 22, 1730—1.

I Take the opportunity of this messenger to send your lordship another of my troublesome epistles, though I have not so much to say upon what passed yesterday in the house of commons, as a few days ago I thought I might have. There was a debate upon the address, which lasted till nine o'clock, but ended without any division. After the motion for the address was first moved and seconded, a few members made some short speeches to declare their several opinions, though there was no great spirit of opposition, or appearance of any having been concerted by the enemy, till sir W. Windham got up and made a motion for an additional paragraph to the following effect: "assuring ourselves that his majesty would concert such measures with his allies as might prevent a war on the Rhine, or in the Austrian Netherlands, the preservation of which, in the hands of the present possessors, was of such consequence to this nation, and had formerly cost us so much blood and treasure." A motion of this kind, half nonsense, and wholly absurd, your lordship will easily imagine did not meet with great success, but out of complaisance to sir W. Windham it was treated more seriously than it deserved. He was supported in it, though faintly, by Shippen, Plummer, and W. Pulteney, who made a very long incoherent speech, and with no great applause from his friends. He began with condemning all the treatys that have been made since the late king's accession, except one made this last year by the Board of Trade with some Indian kings, which he thought must be a good one, and was liked by the Indians, for that they had, on that occasion, entertained the commissioners with a song and a dance. He declared, in as strong and positive a manner as possible, that it was his opinion, the two dutchys of Bremen and Verden had been the foundation of those bad treatys, all which he would have publickly burnt in the Palace-yard, and were the real source of all

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all the present disputes in Europe. As to the speech and address, he said, they were of a piece with all the others for these four or five years past, and that he could not help comparing the method that the ministry, whom he called a committee of administration, followed in the drawing them up at the beginning of every sessions, to a committee of the house of commons, where the chairman says, that they had made some progress, and asks leave to sit again.

Mr. Walpole, after having very handsomely confuted all that Pulteney had advanced about the foreign negotiations, in answer to that witty simile, said, that as the minister had not yet left the chair, they need not ask his (Pulteney's) leave to sit again. Tom Windham, in order to shew a true spirit of patriotism, proposed that, after the word *engagements*, the words *so far as they relate to the interest of Great Britain* should be inserted; but as they were equally absurd with the first motion, they met with the same fate. This is the substance of the debate, and as much as I can remember worth troubling your lordship with. Whether the enemy had nothing to say, or were not prepared, I know not, but a more pitifull figure they never made, nor greater joy and triumph ever appeared among our friends. It is very probable the enemy have reserved some surprises like the affair of Dunkirk the last sessions, till another opportunity; but whatever their projects are, I am persuaded they will meet with such ill success, that I must beg you would advise Mr. Buckley to lay aside, at least for this year, all the hopes * which he has hitherto thought so well founded.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Undeceives the Imperial ministers, who suppose that lord Harrington does not act in concert with sir Robert and Horace Walpole.

SIR,

Vienna, February 3, 1731.

GOULD the messenger was dispatched with too much precipitation, and I had been in too great an agitation the preceeding days, to find a moment for writing to you, whose good opinion I value more than that of any person in the world. This court gives me now the leisure to linger on for what they intend I shall transmit by this courier. I have been three days waiting for what, perhaps, at last, will not be worth the dispatching; but count Sinzendorf says he will speak to me before my courier goes off. As you cannot but have the greatest share in all that passes, I could wish, sir, if you think proper, to have

* The restoration of the Pretender.

something

something from you more authentick, than all the assurances I can give, of your's and sir Robert Walpole's sincere promotions of, and concurrence in, the measures now on foot with this court; so ill informed of the true state of things, that, persuaded as the ministers here are of lord Harrington's intention, they think that alone a reason why your's should not be the same.

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All that I had said formerly, and upon almost every occasion, of the ministry's being one hand and one heart, and founded upon the same common cause, views, and interests, had been destroyed in one conversation with count Konigsfegg, that great judge of courts and men. He has painted you as one inviolably attached to France: he has given, as a proof of it, an account of some warmth with which he pretends you acted against this court some time before you left Paris, and after things were begun here. I told the prince, who desired to be informed by me of this matter in confidence, that all the assurances I could give him would signify nothing, if not supported by some facts; that I did not doubt of your having acted in France with your usual zeal for his majesty's service, but I was certain of your knowing nothing of what was passing here, which was then entirely in its infancy, and begun boldly of my own head, without any previous concert or order from England, where the good dispositions that are now so evident had arisen and grown only in proportion to those which I had discovered, or thought I had discovered, here; that I had ventured to take upon myself to represent them, and even answer for them, but still fearfull that after some years prejudice, what I said would hardly gain credit. I had likewise hinted the matter to you, as whose friendship I could most rely upon, if I had embarked too far; that thereupon, at leaving France, you had let me understand, that I needed not to be under any concern for what I was doing; so that it was no less upon your encouragement, than upon that which I received from England, that I had continued ever since in the same way of acting; that indeed I had not been honoured with any letters from you since; but I knew in a manner not to be doubted of, that you were the person who was principally concerned in foreign affairs; and that I could affirm, if occasion required, how much you had assisted in drawing up the project, and my last instructions. To which I added, and I assured it upon my honour to be true, though without explaining myself, that it was owing solely to you, that above two years ago, we had not tyed up our hands in a manner, so as not only not to be able to grant, but even to treat at present upon the guaranty; which, I said, was a secret known perhaps to three persons only in the

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* Sir Robert
Walpole.

world, yourself, another*, and me. I concluded with saying, that it would be hard not to allow me to know your intentions, who had lived in your house seven years, who had served you with my hand and heart, and who had been rewarded by you for it, with the honour I had that moment of speaking to his highness as an English minister.

The prince, by whom I have the happiness to be easily credited, said he was glad of what I had told him. That indeed he had not the pleasure of knowing you personally, and it had been his greatest misfortune, when he was in England, not to have seen sir Robert Walpole, but that there had passed civilities and messages enough between them to confirm each other in their mutual esteem and friendship.

If I did not know, sir, that writing to you is the same thing as writing to your brother, I would have troubled him directly with this account, and would have taken the liberty to assure him of my most humble respects and services, if I did not think it was the same thing my expressing what I owe to you. If the friendship is to be renewed between the two courts, it will be as necessary to establish a perfect confidence reciprocally between the principal ministers, and therefore I write with the greater pleasure, as I cannot but look upon this discourse as an advance on the part of prince Eugene towards gaining an equal confidence in him from you and sir Robert Walpole.

I cannot conclude without taking the liberty to recommend myself to your goodness in a more particular manner than ever in my life, when thrown, without my own seeking, into a most difficult situation, of which my last dispatches by Gould were but too evident a proof, when left, without a soul to consult, to the extravagance of my own conceit, and the weakness of my judgement. I have had to deal with a court which is no less difficult in the best hours of its friendship, than in the worst moments of its enmity: I have found a vast charge fallen upon me insensibly. If I endeavour to act with the greater caution, it is because your recommendation of me gives you an interest in all my actions. But I hope they will be all such as shall be found agreeable to the perfect respect with which, &c.

P. S. Since writing what goes before, I have told prince Eugene of the liberty I had taken in mentioning the civilities with which he had spoken of you and sir Robert Walpole, with which he was pleased, and thanked me.

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LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

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The king highly approves his conduct.—Is dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Imperial court.—And refuses to agree to the counter-project.—Sends the ultimatum.

SIR,

Whitehall, January 28th—February 8th, 1730-1.

Grantham
Papers.

AT the same time that I have the pleasure to assure you, that the account you gave in your dispatches of the 16th instant, N. S., of your conduct ever since the receipt of my letters to you of the 4th December, O. S., has met with his majesty's entire approbation; I must not conceal from you, that the king apprehends he has the most just grounds to be highly dissatisfied with the behaviour of the court of Vienna. It would be taking up a great deal of your time, as well as my own unnecessarily, should I go about to set forth to you the wide difference there is betwixt the friendly and open part which his majesty has acted through this whole affair, and the ungenerous and unfuitable returns made to it by the court of Vienna; for as this negociation has chiefly passed through your hands, nobody can be more fully apprised of both than you are already, and I doubt not but you will, as proper occasions shall present themselves, shew this difference in the clearest light to the Imperial ministers. I shall, therefore, without making any observations on what has passed, proceed directly to acquaint you with what I have in command from his majesty upon the subject-matter of your said dispatches of the 16th past by Gould the messenger.

I shall begin by telling you, that the king is perfectly pleased with every thing you did, as also with your manner of doing it; and although what the messenger brought fell very short of what your former letters gave us grounds to expect, the king does not think you went in the least too far in giving the credit you did to the strong and repeated declarations and assurances of the Imperial ministers, and particularly of prince Eugene, whose character and reputation are in too high a light in the world to have his honour or veracity suspected. 'Tis chiefly from the credit given to those professions and promises, that his majesty is induced to make this further and last tentative of the sincerity and good dispositions of the court of Vienna, which, if rejected or even trifled with, must inevitably cut up by the roots any possibility of this negociation being ever brought to perfection: for as the king offers every thing that the emperor can really want, and all that the court of Vienna itself must know his majesty has in his power to grant, any refusal or hesitation to comply with

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the little, that not only the strongest reasons, but necessity itself obliges the king to insist upon in return, must demonstrate to all the world how vain it would be to think of treating any longer.

You will, therefore, acquaint the Imperial ministers that his majesty was extremely surpris'd and concerned to find, after his having given, by the project of the treaty sent to you, such convincing proofs of the sincerity of his good intentions towards the emperor, and after the repeated professions and assurances of the court of Vienna, that no alterations, omissions, or additions should be made to it, but such as should appear necessary for setting and explaining in a clearer light the stipulations contained in it, without deviating from his majesty's sentiments in any essential point; I say the king could not but be greatly surpris'd, that after three weeks spent in constantly repeating the same thing, a counter-project should be offered by the court of Vienna so diametrically opposite to all those assurances, and so impossible as they must know it is for his majesty ever to come into it; such an ungenerous way of proceeding might abundantly justify his majesty in breaking off this negociation. But as the king was, and is still convinced, that the concluding this treaty is the only possible means of preventing an immediate and general war in Europe, he is willing to make this last and utmost effort towards compassing so desirable an end; and for that purpose has ordered this messenger to be dispatched to you with the *ultimatum* contained in the enclosed project of the treaty marked A. You will, however, begin by proposing to the Imperial ministers the treaty which was formerly sent you, inserting only in the place of the 3d article of it, that which you will find in the new one relating to the emperor's succession; but in case you perceive that it will be rejected, you will then produce the said project marked A, as what his majesty can in no wise ever depart from.

You will observe to them, that in forming this new project, his majesty, far from being desirous to give or appear to give the law to the emperor, has followed as close as possible not only the plan, but even the very words of the counter-project; and that no variations, omissions, or additions have been made to it, than what, as you will see, for the reasons given in the enclosed paper of observations, were not possible for his majesty to avoid. As the reasons and motives of the several alterations, &c. are fully set forth and explained in the said paper of observations, I beg leave to refer you to it, as well to enable you to convince the Imperial ministers of the reasonableness and necessity of them, as to direct you how far you may or may not deviate or recede from any of them. I shall, however, make some general observations to you upon the whole. First, that as the
 principal

principal motive that induces the king to guarantee the emperor's succession, is the being enabled, in consideration thereof, to execute without force all his engagements towards Spain in relation to the introduction of Spanish garrisons according to his treaties, whatever shall be offered that can be justly construed by Spain to obstruct or fall short of that end, will upon no consideration whatever be submitted to his majesty. Secondly, that as any further refusal on the part of his majesty finally to adjust and put in execution the proper measures for executing the treaty of Seville by force, must, in the season of the year in which we now are, give Spain the justest grounds to alledge, that we have failed in our engagements towards them, and consequently that they are freed from all theirs towards his majesty, matters must forthwith be brought to a conclusion one way or other; since, otherwise, the king would soon find himself absolutely broke with Spain without being assured of the emperor's friendship.

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As this project of a new treaty has not yet been seen at the Hague, I am not able to inform you of the opinion of the ministers there upon it, but as I send lord Chesterfield a copy of it by this messenger, he will fully apprize you of the sentiments of the pensionary and Greffier, as to the several parties that more immediately concern that republic. You will, therefore, observe such directions as you shall receive from his lordship upon those heads, and use all possible endeavours for procuring satisfaction to the States upon all the points that they shall think necessary for them to be insisted upon.

As it is very possible that the court of Vienna may have been informed of the extraordinary paper lately given to the several ministers of the allies at Paris, by the marquis de Castelar, declaring his master free from all his engagements entered into by the treaty of Seville, I thought proper to send it to you, together with copies of lord Waldegrave's letters that accompanied it hither, that you might be able to set that whole matter in its true light, in case you find that the Imperial ministers have been apprized of it. I also transmit to you copies of what the duke of Newcastle writ by his majesty's order to his ministers in France and Spain upon this extraordinary event. What impression an incident so unexpected will make upon the court of Vienna I cannot tell, but I should believe it must rather hasten than retard the conclusion of the treaty with his majesty and the States. In honour I am sure it ought; since they will see that the suspicions of this separate negotiation with the emperor was one of the principal motives for this extraordinary step; and should also think, that even their own interest would induce them more strongly to close immediately

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immediately with his majesty. For as you will be able to let them see by the explanations given by Castelar to that declaration, that Spain means only to suspend the execution of the engagements entered into by that crown in the treaty of Seville, till the allies shall have actually begun to put in execution theirs towards his catholic majesty, the court of Vienna must be sensible that, in case this negociation with the emperor is not forthwith brought to perfection, his majesty can have no other party left than to give immediately into all the extravagant schemes and plans of Spain and France, for involving the greatest part of Europe into a general and destructive war; no other way being left for his majesty to preserve his own honour, and the trade and interests of his people.

If the Imperial ministers should complain to you of his majesty's having discovered any thing to France or Spain of this negociation, you may, in the strongest manner, assure them, that till it became public, and that even Castelar in his declaration had complained of it, the secret had been inviolably kept on the part of his majesty; but after that it was in vain to deny it; and therefore the king's ministers in France and Spain have been within these few days authorized to own that some endeavours have been used to induce the emperor to consent to the peaceable introduction of Spanish garisons; and even not to deny but that his majesty might possibly be disposed to give his guarantee to the emperor's succession for the obtaining that desirable end. But as to the sentiments or intentions of the emperor to approve, or not, of these or any other conditions, nothing has or will be said by them.

When you shall find the Imperial ministers disposed to conclude matters upon the terms which you shall think yourself authorized by these your instructions to agree to, you will get the treaty signed with as little loss of time as may be. I must recommend to you in the strongest manner the employing your utmost endeavours and good offices for procuring at the same time all possible satisfaction upon the several points that monsieur Dieden is more particularly charged with the negotiating of.

I cannot conclude this letter without repeating to you the absolute necessity which his majesty is under to have this negociation immediately finished one way or other, and that you must not upon any account suffer it to be delayed by consenting to dispatch another messenger for new instructions or explanations. This you will set in a clear light to the Imperial ministers, and convince them that it is necessity and not choice that obliges the king to act

in this manner. You will also make the proper use of the copies that have been sent you of the king's speech and the addresses of both houses of parliament, which I hope will enable you, without appearing to threaten or affecting to give the law to the emperor, to let the court of Vienna see, that if the execution of the engagements entered into by the treaty of Seville cannot be brought about by an amicable negociation, both the king and the nation are determined to pursue, in conjunction with the rest of the allies, the necessary measures for doing it by force.

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LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Instructs him to sign the treaty, and to refer the German points to a future consideration.

DEAR SIR,

London, January the 28th—February 8th, 1731.

NOTWITHSTANDING my being at present more tired than ever I was in my life, I cannot, however, let this messenger return to you without carrying something to you from me as a private friend; and as I hope you will be pleased with what I send you as a minister, I am sure you would not be less so with these good wishes of the friend, if you knew the cordiality and sincere affection with which they are accompanied. I flatter myself with hoping that the instructions and powers now sent you will enable you to bring this great work to perfection, and that without loss of time, for in the present situation of affairs, delay is death to us.

Grantham
Papers.

*Private and
particular.*

You must be sensible of the necessity there is not to let this treaty miscarry, if it is possible to be avoided. It is heartily to be wished that the emperor would be induced to give entire satisfaction upon all the points which monsieur Dieden is charged to negotiate; but when every thing shall be obtained that is possible to be got, you will, I am persuaded, according to your instructions, sign the treaty, insisting at the same time, that all that cannot be adjusted, be finally settled afterwards by an amicable negociation. I heartily wish you all imaginable success, and begg you will be assured of the most warm affection and esteem with which I am ever, &c.

G. TILSON, under-secretary of state, to THOMAS ROBINSON.

Grantham
Papers.

January 28—February 8, 1730-1. I hope you will sign, as, I take it, you are authorized to do; and if our plan is agreed to in the main, I do not see how you

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you can decline putting the last hand to it on your part, for all or any *collateral difficulties*, if there are not any essential ones.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

February 2d, 1731.

Grantham
Papers.

I Expect every day from England a courier, to forward to you his majesty's final resolution. I hope the affairs of the elector will not break off this affair; and if the court of Vienna is wise, they will remove all difficulties relating to England and Holland; and then, for reasons too obvious to mention, it will be impossible to break upon the Electoral points.

THOMAS PELHAM TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Account of the duel between lord Harvey and Pulteney.

MY LORD,

London, January 28th, 1730-1.

Waldegrave
Papers.

AS the present discourse of this town is about a duel that was fought two days ago between lord Harvey and Mr. Pulteney, your lordship may be glad to hear the particulars of it, as well as I have been able to learn them, which is the only reason for troubling you by this post.

Lord Harvey sent a message to Mr. Pulteney, desiring to know, whether he wrote the late pamphlet called *The Reply* to that of *Sedition and Defamation displayed*; in answer to which, Mr. Pulteney said, he would not satisfy lord Harvey till he knew whether his lordship was the author of the *Dedication* to the latter. accordingly lord Harvey sent him word that he was not; and Mr. Fox, who carried this message, asked Mr. Pulteney what answer he would give about *The Reply*; to which Mr. Pulteney said, that, since lord Harvey did not write the *Dedication*, he was satisfied. But Fox insisting upon some other answer with relation to *The Reply*, Pulteney then said, that he might tell lord Harvey, that whether he (Pulteney) was author of *The Reply*, or not, he was ready to justify and stand by the truth of any part of it, at what time and wherever lord Harvey pleased. This last message, your lordship will easily imagine, was the occasion of the duel; and accordingly, on Monday last, between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, they met in the Upper St. James's Park, behind Arlington-street, with their two seconds, who were Mr. Fox and Sir J. Rushout. The two combatants were each of them slightly wounded; but Mr. Pulteney had once so much the advantage of lord Harvey, that he would have infallibly run my lord through the body, if his foot had not slipped, and then the seconds

took an occasion to part them. Upon which Mr. Pulteney embraced lord Harvey, and expressed a great deal of concern at the accident of their quarrel, promising at the same time that he would never personally attack him again either with his mouth or his pen; lord Harvey made him a bow, without giving him any sort of answer, and (to use the common expression) thus they parted.

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There has been no debate in either house of parliament since the first day of the sessions, nor is there any other news to trouble your lordship with.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Surprise at Castelar's declaration.—Condemns the conduct of France.

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, Saturday, 4 o'clock.

JUST as my dispatches were going by Lyng, your servant brought me your letters with Castelar's declaration*, &c. You may imagine how much I must be surprized with them. I have yet seen none of my brethren, but the king will have Lyng go forward, both to France and Spain, and you will execute the orders contained in my several letters, and acquaint both Castelar and the Garde des Seaux, that your courier was not arrived when this messenger came away, and that we knew nothing in England, nor could we indeed suspect it, that Castelar had made this declaration. You will, as from yourself, observe how little reason Castelar had to take this step, since his majesty is willing to furnish 40,000 men for the execution of the treaty of Seville by force, if necessary; and how unjustly both France and Spain have blamed his majesty for negotiating with the emperor, when the view and even condition of all that has been doing was the effectual execution of the treaty of Seville, by which they must understand the introduction of Spanish garrisons; and as to France, (who have brought all these difficulties upon us,) nothing will be expected of them. If we succeed with the emperor, France will enjoy the advantages of peace, and of having performed their engagements to Spain, equally with us, when they have contributed nothing towards it, and be not exposed to the repentment either of Spain or us, for the infamous part they have acted towards us both. They will come off too well, if this unaccountable turn at Paris does not spoil all.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Very private.

I begg you would send me all the lights you can, how farr France is or is not in with Castelar, what the cardinal will do, and whether the informations they

* Castelar's declaration was made on the 29th of January 1731.

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have had about our treating, &c. come from Broglia or not. Will France make warr with Spain alone, when they would not with us and Holland joined to Spain? Will they bear this treatment from Spain, if France is not in it? or will they not rather wish success to our negotiation with the emperor, and endeavour to make Spain easy with it, and try to finish all upon that foot. Pray send Lyng forward to Keen with all expedition; but give him to understand, that when the letters went from hence, we knew nothing of what had passed at Paris. I think you may now communicate your orders to the cardinal, or to Castelar, as soon as Lyng is sett out for Spain: you will hint to Keen, that he is to follow his orders, as you shall do in the manner directed, as if nothing had happened.

EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Apprehends ill effects from the death of the duke of Parma, and from Castelar's memorial.—Insinuates that the German ministers are not sincere in wishing to conclude a peace with the emperor, and that the electoral demands will obstruct the conclusion.

MY LORD,

Hague, February 14, N. S. 1731.

Weston
Papers.

Apart.

THOUGH my thoughts upon the treaty sent to Vienna, and upon the reception it will meet with there, very little deserve your lordship's attention, yett since you command me to trouble you with them, I will tell you that I think the king has gone as farr as he can well go, in this last treaty; and that if the court of Vienna really intends to conclude, they cannot refuse this reasonable opportunity of doing it. But I confess, I very much apprehend the ill consequences that the death of the duke of Parma and the memorial of Castelar will have at that court, that is so easily elated by any favourable incident. Castelar's memorial will give them just reason to expect the utmost confusion among the allies of Seville, and may make them think the opportunity favourable of seizing the tempting morsels, that the duke of Parma's death presents them with. Upon the whole, I fear delays and chicanes, that will be as bad as a refusall. These inconveniencys would have been all prevented, if we had taken these measures when I went to England last, and was charged by the pensionary to recommend them in the strongest manner, which I did, though to no purpose.

I am likewise farr from being perswaded, that our electorall demands are made much more reasonable than they were. For why should not Mr. Hattorf have declared it to you, if they were? And by the way, I think there are some good

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good reasons to suspect, that he is not very desirous to facilitate the conclusion of this treaty. If the court of Vienna has really no mind to conclude, but to break off advantageously, they will certainly lay the whole stress upon the Hanover points, which they may easily do, every one of these points being at best but doubtful; and yett it is certain we shall not recede from them all. If that should happen to be the case, and that case become publick, as it certainly will, we shall be in a fine situation.

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EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Count Sinzendorf objects to the king's electoral demands as impossible to be complied with.

MY LORD,

Hague, Feb. 16th, 1731.

COUNT Sinzendorf having sent me word yesterday morning, that his courier from Vienna was just arrived, and that he was going to forward him immediately to count Kinski in England, I went straight to count Sinzendorf to see what this courier had brought him, besides what Mr. Robinson informed me of. As soon as I came in, count Sinzendorf spoke to me in these words, with a great deal of surprize and concern: "You have kept the most material point a secret from me, and never told me that this whole affair turns upon the king's electoral demands, which are such as it is not in the emperor's power to comply with. The emperor has showed the utmost facility in every thing that concerned himself or depended upon him. He has given up the Ostend trade, by which the Netherlands will be ruined; he has consented to the introduction of Spanish troops into Italy, by which all his possessions there will be in danger; and yett all this is to avail him nothing, unless he engages to do what is not in his power to perform, but depends upon the empire, and to which the empire never can nor will consent. The present king demands ten times more as elector of Hanover than ever the late king did, and yett every thing between England and the emperor is to be deem'd null and void, unless these impossible demands are complied with; as you will see by this declaration of Mr. Robinson's;" and then he show'd me a declaration of Mr. Robinson's, setting forth that, "unless *tous les points Allemands* (those are the words) be settled to his majesty's entire satisfaction, every thing else *doit etre censé nul.*"

Weston
Papers.

Apart.

I told him that the king having a German minister at Vienna to transact those affairs, I was an utter stranger to them, and that was I to know them,

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I was too ignorant of the laws and constitution of the empire to be able to judge how farr they were consistent or inconsistent with them; but that I took it for granted impossibilitys could not be asked. He said, yes, but they were; and rann into a long detail of the several demands; and then concluded with saying, that it was to no purpose for the emperor to explain himself so fully as otherwise he might have done, upon the points concerning England only, since they were to be of no effect, unless these impossibilitys were granted at the same time.

As count Kinski in England will receive the same accounts, I submit to your lordship whether this can be done with any other view than that I have so long apprehended, of declaring to the world that the negotiation broke off only upon electorall points. Whether it really breaks off upon these points or no, or whether for other reasons the court of Vienna should have no mind to conclude it, and what effect this will have every where, but especially in England, I leave your lordship to judge.

I inform your lordship of this affair by this letter apart, that you may make just what use you think fit of it. Count Sinzendorf shew'd me a letter from his father-in-law, wherein he expresses not only the desire, but the impatience of his court, to conclude with the maritime powers. How sincere this is a little time will now discover: I own I can form to myself no opinion of the event of this treaty. In good politicks, I think the emperor ought by all means to agree to it; but whether his ardent desire of the totality of Italy, joyned to some seemingly favourable incidents for him at present, may not make him reject or delay it, which is in a manner the same thing, I cannot determine.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Approves and confirms his assurances that the ministry are cordial and unanimous, and that he and sir Robert Walpole are friendly to the renewal of the alliance with the emperor.

DEAR TOM,

Cockpit, Feb. 9—20, 1731, O. S.

Grantham
Papers.

I Am extremely obliged to you for your favour of the 3d and 6th instant, O. S. and particularly for your having done so much justice to my brother Walpole and me, with regard to the negotiation in which you are at present engaged. The intimacy and confidence with which you lived with me for so many years at Paris; the opportunity you had of knowing my most secret sentiments with regard to the affairs of Europe, as also with respect to the
 cordial

cordial and unalterable friendship between lord Harrington and me, and between our respective friends in the administration, did sufficiently authorise you to convince prince Eugene, that the present ministry is but one hand and heart, and have one and the same inclination for having matters accommodated with the Imperial court, provided they will enable his majesty to execute his engagements with Spain: and I believe monsieur Kinski here must have done, in his relations to his court, both my brother Walpole and me justice on this head; and particularly for the great veneration that we have for prince Eugene, upon whose generous, open, and honourable way of acting we chiefly rely for bringing this affair, so happily begun under his auspices, to a successful conclusion. And it is impossible for you to say too much in my brother Walpole's name to his highness, as to his endeavours to finish and improve a sincere good understanding and friendship between the emperor and his majesty, and to deserve the good opinion of the prince, for whom, on all occasions and in all times, my brother Walpole has had, and will ever have, the greatest respect and veneration imaginable. And as I hope this will find you very far advanced in your treaty, if it be not already signed, you may depend upon it, that my brother Walpole will, upon the first notice of its being concluded, take an opportunity of letting the prince know his great satisfaction in so good a work, and how much his majesty and all Europe is obliged to his highness for being as glorious in peaceful, as he has been in military actions.

As to what may have been represented with regard to my warmth at Paris, you have so fully justified me on this head, that it is impossible for me to add any thing more. I always told the Imperial ministers, that we must in honour execute our engagements with Spain; and it was impossible for us to come to any terms of an accommodation with the emperor, though never so desirous of it, without his Imperial majesty's consenting to the introduction of the 6000 Spaniards into Tuscany and Parma. And I am particularly obliged to you for the justice you did me, in having always endeavoured not to put it out of our power to gratify the emperor in what he had most at heart, when he should be of a temper of returning to the former good understanding with England and Holland. But I have troubled you too much, which you will excuse from one who is so affectionately your's.

It is impossible to do better than you have done.

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Weston
Papers.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Expresses his satisfaction that Mr. Robinson has orders to sign the treaty abstracted from the electoral points.—Is desirous to return.

MY LORD,

Hague, Feb. 27th, N. S. 1731.

I Received last night the honour of your lordship's letter apart of the 13th, by Browne the messenger. I am very glad of the orders your lordship says Mr. Robinson has to sign, abstractedly from the electoral points, and monsieur Dieden to refer them to a future negotiation, and I hope these orders will be executed, though I confess I have great doubts upon that affair: there are too many good reasons for and against the court of Vienna's concluding the treaty, for me to judge which will prevail; but I am sure all reasons concur for us to hope for the conclusion of it.

If Mr. Finch is impatient to come here, I am sure I am not less so to return to England; and if he has a mind to take the trouble of bringing the republick into the treaty of Vienna, in case it be concluded, I will most chearfully resign to him both the trouble and the credit of doing it. I have stay'd here till now, not by choice, but by obedience; and I shall be gladder to see Mr. Finch here whenever he comes, than he can possibly be to come. The cardinal's mistake in the date of the full powers, was too small a one not to give just suspicions that he had better information than he ought to have had.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Difficulty about the affairs of Hanover.—Signs the treaty of Vienna, although those points are not finally adjusted.

MY LORD,

Vienna, March 18th, N. S. 1731.

Grantham
Papers.

Most private.

THOUGH the treaty which I have the honour to send your lordship should be approved, yet I can hardly hope even that success itself can excuse the many liberties I have taken to obtain it. But there is one step which I have had the boldness to make that can be excused by no event, though the treaty might have been irrevocably lost without it, and his majesty's affairs would probably have relapsed into the same dilemma, or worse than when I sent away Gould the messenger with my dispatches of the 16th of January last, N. S. The case was this: Ever since the arrival of your lordship's letters of the 28th of that month, O. S., I have not been wanting upon any occasion, though without making it my principal business, to recommend in the strongest manner

manner imaginable his majesty's electoral affairs; but I soon perceived that this court was as much offended at his majesty's denying his part to the treaty as elector, as they had been before at the interest which I, as a minister of England, had taken in his majesty's collateral affairs. The affected indifference with which they are touched upon in their remarks upon the treaty, shewed but too visibly what was thought: I did not fail to let the conference see how difficult they were to be pleased. However as they always said they would finish with me, I was so far from putting them out of that road, that I looked upon it to be as much a mark of their sincerity, as I had interpreted at the other time their not treating with me at all as the greatest mark of the contrary. In the mean while monsieur Dieden had given in his papers, and seen the ministers as frequently as was necessary, and received from them such encouragement as made us believe his affairs and mine would go hand in hand.

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Your lordship will have seen by my other letter what passed in the first conference upon the paragraphs in the paper *E* with regard to his majesty as elector: and to do this court justice as to keeping its word in one respect, the French project was no sooner settled with me, but while the Latin one was preparing, monsieur Dieden's negociation was revived briskly; and even before the translation was delivered to me the 12th in the evening, his majesty's electoral minister had had a conference in form, upon the few remaining doubts of the emperor, the same day with the four ministers: he himself will give an account of what passed there.

It seemed there remained difficulties, which I began terribly to apprehend would not be removed time enough for me to sign with great tranquility of mind; and therefore the next evening, after I had settled the Latin project with count Sinzendorf, I represented to him in the most lively manner imaginable the ill appearance and effect of such a proceeding. I saw prince Eugene the next day, to thank him for the expedition with which the affairs committed to me had been done. He proposed Fryday the 16th for the day of signing; at which time, I only added, I hoped his highness would likewise put me into a condition of making his majesty's satisfaction compleat in every respect. To have said more, my lord, would, if I can be allowed to have attained some knowledge of that minister, have been ill placed; but I will leave your lordship to judge how monsieur Dieden's and my uneasiness arose proportionably as the hour of signing, which ought otherwise to have given me so much pleasure, advanced, without monsieur Dieden's receiving any satisfactory answer;

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answer; but rather, as it almost appeared to us, that I was destined to be drawn on in uncertainty, till I should be shut up with the ministers to sign, while probably monsieur Dieden should be at the vice-chancellor's, to comply or not, good or bad, with what the emperor would consent to upon the electoral affairs.

I went, however, the evening before, to count Sinzendorf, and in three words told him to take care of what was to be done: the king's affairs had indeed been separated with great condescendance, purely to facilitate matters, from those of the elector; but nothing could separate the honour of the elector from that of the king. The next morning monsieur Dieden, about half an hour after ten, went to the vice-chancellor, when talking with great earnestness upon this subject, and demanding a final answer, that the same courier might carry his majesty a double satisfaction, the clock struck eleven; upon which the bishop of Bamberg said maliciously, "Now Mr. Robinson is with my brethren:" but he was mistaken. I had agreed with monsieur Dieden to delay my going as long as I could, that if possible he might give me advice of what should have passed with the vice-chancellor, in order for me to take my party according as despair or cooler judgement, if I had time for the latter, should in that moment dispose of the fate of Europe. I had even agreed with monsieur Dieden, that if his conference with the vice-chancellor should last longer than I could with common decency make prince Eugene, count Sinzendorf, and count Stahremberg wait for me, who would certainly be assembled at eleven, I would endeavour to amuse them by objections and cavils, and waste the time before the signing till he should send me a billet, to be delivered to me at the conference table, with regard to his transaction.

With these precautions, instead of going directly to prince Eugene's house at eleven, I went round to monsieur Dieden's lodgings, to enquire first if he was come back. He was just returned from the vice-chancellor, and I found him writing the note we had agreed upon; it was to tell me, that all the vice-chancellor had had to say, was, that he had spoken the day before with the emperor, who had still doubts upon the article of Bremen, and particularly with what was demanded now, contrary to what was supposed to have been granted by the late king to the branches of Wolfenbutel, Blankenbourg, and Bevern: that his Imperial majesty was not resolved to accept the condition under which the king, as elector, offered his guaranty and good offices in the empire; that he, the bishop, had advised the emperor to content the king upon the first article, and to rely upon his majesty's generosity with regard to the second; that he

expected the emperor's resolution every moment, but if it did not come, he could not see his Imperial majesty till the evening.

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I humbly desire your lordship to judge of my situation at eleven o'clock and a quarter. What could be done? I rather suffered any resolution that should come itself into my mind to take me, than well thought how to take one myself. When I arrived at the prince's, they had waited for me an half hour. I made an excuse like a person embarrassed, and was willing enough they should judge of the pain in my heart by the concern on my face. We proceeded however to compare the draughts, and when all was collated, a pause succeeding for bringing in the taper and wax, and ranging other matters for signing, I rose up with some solemnity, and drawing my seal out of my pocket, placed it upon the draughts designed for England, and said: "There, gentlemen, is my seal and my honour, look upon the treaty as signed; but I will take this opportunity, while it offers, to disburthen my mind. I already speak and act now as the minister of a great king, who this moment gives a most distinguishing mark of his friendship for the emperor your master. I demand the same friendship, and the same marks of it, from his Imperial majesty in behalf of the elector of Hanover; however separated their affairs may have been in one light, their honour is inseparable." I added, my lord, such things as the emotion in which they saw me could not but excuse. However plainly, I told them, that this new-born friendship, without the satisfaction I demanded, would not outlive the six weeks fixed for the ratifications. That, for my part, I had taken two resolutions, the one to sign, the other not to dispatch the courier, though all Europe depended upon it, till the elector of Hanover could be the first to reap the fruits of the peace, which as king of England he had given to the world. I did indeed receive from them such encouragements as would have made me proceed to sign the treaty, if I had not already given my honour to do it.

The prince did me justice the next day, in telling monsieur Dieden, that it was impossible for any body in the world to have acted in a stronger manner than I had done: and I know that count Sinzendorf, upon the breaking up of the conference, went directly to present the treaty to the emperor, and said, "Sire, here is the treaty; the English minister has outdone us in generosity; it depends now upon your majesty to lett the king of England see the true sentiments you have for him."

I leave to monsieur Dieden to give an account of what has happened since; and shall only say, that whether, to satisfy his inordinate pride, the emperor
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would put England to the utmost proof; or whether his ministers (for not one of them would advise me in this critical moment) abandoned me to the dictates of my own judgement, in order to make a right use, afterwards, with the emperor, of the party I should take, and that to shame him out of his punctilious delicacies; I know now that they all of them say, no man ever took a surer step than I have done to conquer the obstinacy of this prince. Prince Eugene himself is so well pleased with it, that this morning at eight o'clock he has been purposely with the emperor for the third time since the signing, and the other ministers were to relieve him successively, in order to remove their master's scruples: circumstances, my lord, hardly to be believed, but we, who to our misfortune are eye-witnesses of the facts, must beg leave to be credited. The ministers are struck with the phlegm and self-denial with which they see me (vain-glorious, as they imagine, of having signed a treaty, and both anxious and studious as they know me in promoting the publick good) still refusing to publish my good fortune, if it should prove such, and putting a stop to the immediate happiness which must consequently ensue from this treaty. But I tell them it is a point of honour; and, my lord, is it not my duty, if this is the best and perhaps the only means still left to procure his majesty a complete satisfaction?

March 20th. Monsieur Dieden sends me his packet, and as he gives his majesty a full account of all that has passed since the signing, I shall not detain the courier a moment longer.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Signs before the electoral affairs are arranged.—Is extremely anxious to have his conduct approved.

MY LORD,

Vienna, March 20th, N. S. 1731.

Grantham
Papers.

Private and
particular.

Copy.

I Have now the honour to return my most humble thanks for your lordship's private and particular letter of the 28th, O. S.; but am in such pain, as well for what I have signed, as for keeping the courier four days after signing, that I can hardly flatter myself all the goodness your lordship is pleased to express can go so far as to pardon all my errors, or rather boldness, which in some points has been such as not even to be excused by success itself. I will not pretend to excuse the manner in which things have been done; but one thing I am sure of, that, right or not, nothing could have been done in any other

other manner whatever. I signed boldly, before I was sure what the king would obtain as elector, without which there would have been no treaty. I have as boldly detained the courier for four days since, without which the papers now sent to his majesty would not have been obtained. Most of this is certainly to be attributed to the emperor himself: the reason is, the emperor will work himself, and will have something to do. But as his genius is not very extensive, he stops at trifles, and there is no removing his prejudices. From hence arose these delays, these forms, these conferences, and by these his ministers amused him. Your lordship will see these truths through the whole tenor of my letters; and therefore we delayed: he had his forms, we held our conferences, and he was amused into the treaty. He thinks he made it himself; and, in the very ultimatum, he would still have had something to make, to object, to revise; and there must still have been the same delays, the same forms, the same conferences, and the same amusements. Monsieur Dieden has got, by my obstinacy in detaining the courier, more than he expected from the beginning.

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I have the honour to write to your lordship in confidence, and will venture to say, that if the king will suffer his electoral minister to go on calmly and patiently, I am persuaded that, in proportion as the old wounds heal, and the friendship is cemented, his German affairs will, to a single point, work themselves out with honour to his majesty, and to the satisfaction of both courts. It has cost every minister of the emperor more than three visits, to press him to have my courier sent away to the king's satisfaction. Till I have the honour to know your lordship's most sincere sentiments upon my conduct, I will wrap myself up in hopes, that though I may have done ill, yet it will be thought I could not have done better. My lord, I would not pass another month as I have done this last for a kingdom, nor all the kingdoms guarantied to the emperor; and yet, God knows, till I have the honour to hear from your lordship, I have at least as bitter a month to come. The inclosed papers are intrusted to your lordship's confidence, and I hope may be of use.

THOMAS

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Walpole
Papers.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO HORACE WALPOLE

Horace Walpole's letter greatly contributed to the signature of the treaty.—Expresses his own uneasiness at having signed the treaty, although the electoral points were not adjusted, and for detaining the messenger.

SIR,

Vienna, March 20, N. S. 1731.

THE best answer I can make to the honour of your letter, is to send you a treaty to which it certainly contributed much. Nothing was more seasonable, and luckily it was seconded by the faithful reports which a courier about that time brought from monsieur Kinsky, concerning your's and sir Robert Walpole's sentiments. The moment I received your letter, I read it to the prince, and I can only say in one word, he was charmed with it. The business is now done; I will not say well or ill: if well, I desire, sir, you would take to yourself the reputation of it; whatever I have good in me I owe to your example: if ill, I must, as I ought, take to myself the shame of having made no better advantage of what you are pleased, in your letter, to call the intimacy and confidence with which I lived with you for many years at Paris, and of the opportunities I had of knowing your most secret sentiments.

I shall beg leave to refer you to all I write, publicly or privately, to lord Harrington, for obtaining your indulgence upon the whole. I revere your judgement more than that of any man living. The very liberties I have taken to deviate into so many failings, are alone sufficient to exercise all your good nature. What is done is done; they all complain here that I have sucked them to the very blood; and it is certain that I have acted with such warmth and obstinacy in maintaining some points, that being taken with a fever the day of the last conference, Prince Eugene was heard to say, "*Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il s'est échauffé de sang, c'est un honête homme.*" The point that cost them greatest pain, was not even to be able to say in the 6th article, *pour ne pas paroître négliger ses alliés.*

I have only one thing to beg till I know my fate as to your approbation or not, which is, that you will be persuaded, that unless I had boldly signed before we were sure what the king would obtain as elector, and unless I had so obstinately persevered these four days in not sending my courier till the king could have his satisfaction compleat, we should never have had a treaty, or the present papers, which are now sent to the king, and which his minister assures me are more than he himself expected. This too is one of those steps for which

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which I beg your indulgence. It was indeed a bold one, and I can scarce tell how it can be justified, even by the event.

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LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

His conduct highly approved.

DEAR SIR,

London, March 30—April 10, 1731.

Grantham
Papers.

I Am extremely obliged to you for your two private letters of the 17th inst. N. S. and if it was in my power to send you from hence only one half of the satisfaction which we received from you by Gould the messenger, you would be a happy man. Your conduct has met with the universal applause here which it so justly deserved; both the king and all his servants think it would have been impossible for an angel from heaven to have acted better than you have done throughout this whole affair. The present* that the king has been pleased to order you, is the strongest proof of his entire approbation of your conduct; and I dare say you will esteem it upon that account infinitely more than for any other value it may have.

* 1000 £.

I am extremely pleased with the account you give me of the favourable opinion that the ministers at Vienna have conceived of me, which I am sensible I must in a great measure owe to your friendship for me. I had writ as you desired to prince Eugene and to count Zinzendorf; but upon finding that sir Robert Walpole writes to the prince by this messenger, I determined to keep my letters back till the return of the ratifications, at which time I will certainly write to them both; and in the mean time I must desire you will in the best manner assure them of the infinite respect that I have for them, and particularly for the first, to whom you may, if you please, explain the reason of my not doing myself the honour to write to him by this occasion.

As you have now brought to perfection as great a work as ever any minister was charged withal, 'tis time you should think of your own affairs; and as no one can interest himself more sincerely in whatever relates to you, I should be glad to know what would be most agreeable to you, in order to give you all the assistance in my power, towards bringing it about to your satisfaction. If you should like to continue for some time longer where you now are, I dare say I could procure you the additional appointments of 3 l. a day; but if you have any other views more agreeable to you, you may depend upon my utmost assistance in whatever way you shall like best; for no one can be more cordially or affectionately than, &c.

LORD

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LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

The king approves his conduct, but is dissatisfied with the delays of the Imperial court in settling his electoral affairs.

SIR,

Whitehall, March 30—April 10, N. S. 1731.

Grantham
Papers.

Most secret.

I Now come to answer your most secret letter of the 18th inst. by Gould, which I shall begin to do by telling you, that although his majesty is extremely pleased with the manner in which the treaty has been finally adjusted and signed, and as the greatest proof of his being so, sends back his ratifications of every part of it, which you are ordered to exchange against those of the emperor within the term prescribed by the said treaty; the king thinks, however, and with the greatest reason, that the conduct and proceedings of the Imperial court, with respect to his majesty's electoral affairs, are by no means such as, in the strictest justice and reason, he might have expected from them; and has therefore ordered monsieur Dieden to employ all the time from the arrival of this messenger to that limited for the exchange of the ratifications, in making the strongest instances to the court of Vienna for settling to his majesty's satisfaction the points upon which he is instructed to insist; and as he will inform you particularly what those points are, you will employ all the authority and influence of the crown of England, and your own particular credit and friendship with the ministers, in the most efficacious manner, for obtaining, before the term for the exchange of the ratifications is elapsed, all such satisfaction and security for his majesty's electoral affairs, as monsieur Dieden shall inform you he is commanded to insist upon.

I need not, I am sure, suggest any arguments to you in support of monsieur Dieden's demands; the justice and reasonableness of them, especially as they are now reduced, will abundantly furnish you wherewithal to enforce them; but I cannot help expressing my great surprise that the court of Vienna should not be convinced, that the surest and most effectual way to gain and secure to them the affections and support of the English nation, must be the making his majesty easy as to his electoral affairs. The king, out of his paternal affection and goodness to his British subjects, would not suffer the signing a treaty so necessary and advantageous to them to be deferred for the settling his electoral demands, though never so justly founded. What less return then can the nation make for such an unexampled generosity and goodness, than to look upon all his interests as their own, and be equally solicitous about them?

His

His majesty having received information of some disputes that have arisen between the dutchess dowager of Wolfembutte and the present duke, relating to certain donations and settlements made by the late duke some years before his death, in favour of the said dutchess, monsieur Dieden is commanded by his majesty to desire the emperor would interpose his good offices for the adjusting them by an amicable accommodation. You will, therefore, join your instances to those of monsieur Dieden for that end, and you will use your best endeavours to dispose the court of Vienna to protect and support the said dutchess in all her just pretensions.

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Although I have in my other letter of this day assured you of his majesty's entire approbation of all your conduct; yet, as you seem by the letter which I am now answering to be more particularly anxious about that part of it relating to your having signed the treaty before monsieur Dieden had received satisfaction upon the points particularly entrusted to his care, I would not omit repeating to you upon this occasion, that his majesty was in no wise displeased with you for so doing; being convinced that you thought it most for his majesty's service so to do: and the king persuades himself that you will continue to act with the same zeal that you have hitherto done for procuring, before the exchange of the ratifications, all possible satisfaction upon the electoral demands, which monsieur Dieden will inform you still remain unadjusted.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

Difficulty arising from the communication of the secret articles to the Dutch removed.—Emperor relinquishes his old friendship with Spain, and renounces all intentions of forming a navy in the Mediterranean and Adriatic.—Duchess of Parma said to be pregnant.

MY LORD,

Vienna, April 11, N. S. 1731.

I Have received the honour of your excellency's letter of the 29th past, N. S. and I am proud of any occasion to have recommended myself so much to your lordship's notice; but it is not the first year I have had the ambition of being known to your lordship. However happy by bare instances of duty to see my poor endeavours esteemed as marks of friendship, I should almost hope to receive the same comfort from England as I have had from your lordship, if I could impute to any thing but the greatest charity, the approbation you were pleased to bestow on my services, and which the pensionary and Greffier would certainly

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Papers.

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certainly have been less contented with, were it not to shew that there is nothing in which your excellency cannot distinguish the credit you have so happily established with those two ministers.

I immediately waited upon prince Eugene and count Sinzendorf, to lay before them the dilemma mentioned by your lordship of either communicating to the states the treaty without the secret articles, by which the guarantee would be subjected to the imputation of being unrestrained, or of communicating those articles which, by their nature should be so secret, and thereby rendering them as public as the rest of the treaty; which, in such a government as that of Holland, cannot be easily avoided. It is a misfortune that it was not recommended sooner to obviate this objection; though surely it would have been very difficult. I believe the length that this court went at first in proposing the exclusion of the house of Bourbon by a most secret article, was, amongst other reasons, calculated to draw all restrictions whatever to be granted under the same secrecy. To own the truth, this negotiation was begun on the part of this court by demanding the guarantee pure and simple. The article was sent from hence under the title of Secretissime; it was returned as such from England out of complaisance; and certainly this court can never consent to publish at once the destruction of all the hopes with which they may have so long amused the courts of Spain and Berlin. I am persuaded they have no actual engagements with the latter; but with relation to the former, among other singularities of this negotiation, it is to be observed that the emperor has purchased the friendship of the maritime powers at no less a price than the sacrifice of the whole foundation of his old friendship with the queen of Spain, as well as of the growing hopes of a new one upon the arrival of the duke of Liria here.

Prince Eugene has been constantly the most fearful that one time or other these secret articles would get air, and that made his highness both tenderer upon this point than even any of the other ministers, and drew from me solemn promises that these restrictions should be kept more inviolably secret than are usual on such occasions, however more advantageously for the glory and prudence of the king the treaty would appear, were it known that the effects of his majesty's care for the welfare of Europe had been extended to the latest posterity. But then I reflected that the good being secured solidly, the benefit of it might be reaped in silence and with a conscientious satisfaction, while nobody, however little versed in affairs, would imagine the maritime powers
 had

had not taken their precautions, which though not owned directly, might be suffered to be understood in general, and even confided to some few both in England and Holland.

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And now, my lord, that the prince and the chancellor have spoken yesterday to the emperor upon this subject, I am not a little pleased to be authorised to acquaint your lordship, that this court is not averse to this last way of thinking. It is imagined that a most secret committee of the states may be empowered to accede to these most secret articles; while for the public there will not be wanting means, even without undeceiving the world directly, to let it understand, that care has not been wanting to restrain the marriages of the archduchesses. There was, I remember, the same popular objection to the treaty of Seville, wherein there did not appear the same care as was taken by the quadruple alliance for securing the freedom of the port of Leghorn. But that and other articles of a private nature were both passed and kept secret in Holland, while the principal persons there, as well as in England, were not, I believe, left ignorant of there being proper securities taken on that head. I flatter myself, my lord, that the liberty allowed by this court, and which will be signified by this post to count Sinzendorf, of not being so reserved towards certain persons, *là où il conviendra*, words which, I believe, will be the terms of his instructions with regard to the secret articles, will have its proper effect, by placing the confidence to be made of them with that prudence and skill, as are usual both in England and Holland upon such important occasions.

The marquis de Bartholomei is in great pains and alarms since the receipt of his courier, and count Salvatico is no less alarmed at the extraordinary conduct of Spain. The queen treats the duchess of Parma as an impostor, and her ministers as so many rogues. I am apt to believe this court may go so far as to give a decree to appoint certain persons, and particularly the old duchess dowager of Parma, to assist at the delivery. For now it is as credibly affirmed that the duchess of the late duke Anthony is with child, as it was little heeded before; and prince Eugene has told me I might write it as a fact in his name. I can add in confidence, that if the declaration given in the treaty by the emperor, about the succession of Parma, was to be negotiated now, I hardly believe we should find so much facility for the introduction of the troops in case of issue male. The violent behaviour of Spain may possibly create difficulties, but will have this good effect, that it will make all parties,

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except France, join equally in obliging that crown to renew its treaties without a security for its observance at least of the quadruple alliance. This court begins to say the emperor cannot trust don Carlos even in Florence; and without the same security for that treaty as well as for the treaty of Seville, his majesty can no more trust him there, not only on account of the commerce of Leghorn, but on account of all the British commerce with Spain whatever.

Nothing can however equal the pleasure of this court at the approbation given by your excellency of the treaty, and at the favourable hopes that are entertained here of a speedy concurrence of the states; and I have had from all the ministers repeated assurances of the emperor's firmness and sincerity in executing punctually the treaty, and in living according to the strictest friendship with the maritime powers. As a farther proof of the former, besides what I mentioned in my letter of the 4th instant of the documents being sent to the elector of Mentz about the consent of the empire, I have learnt from Ratisbon that the prince of Furstenberg has purposely deferred his departure for the country, whither he was going to pass some weeks, and gives out amongst the ministers of the diet who frequent him, that his presence cannot be spared, as he expects every day to have the treaty to communicate to the empire. And as to the latter, I will acquaint your excellency with an anecdote in confidence, that since the signing of the treaty, the emperor in his good humour has in a manner laid aside all thoughts, however extravagant they may have been, of forming any thing like a navy in the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas. He has the maritime powers to rely on, whose friendship he knows now to be as dear to him as he had felt their enmity to be dangerous. Your excellency may rely upon the certainty of this little circumstance, which has been told me by an unsuspected person, who with joy in his heart came to congratulate me upon the absolute change he had found in the looks, dispositions, and discourse of the emperor towards England and Holland, which that person thought better news to wish me joy of, than the bare signing of the treaty, and for that reason he brought me that particularity though he had neglected to speak to me of the other.

Grantham
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Private and
particular.

Extract.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON*.

London, Dec. 3—14, 1730. Monsieur Dieden will acquaint you with his instructions, by which you will find him directed to obtain a declaration from

* This and the four following letters are, by mistake, not printed in the order of date.

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the emperor, setting forth the particular satisfaction to be given to the king upon all his electoral points, which you will procure to be signed at the same time that you execute the treaty. But if the court of Vienna should obstinately refuse to give such a declaration, you will not absolutely break off the treaty upon that head, but send an account of every thing withall to England. And if you find you are not likely to agree upon those points, I believe you would not do amiss, to dispose that court to send at the same time full powers and instructions to their minister here, to conclude them if possible without any loss of time.

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THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Extreme embarrassments from blending the German objects of dispute with the English demands.—Aversion of the emperor to accede to the German points.

MY LORD,

Vienna, January 16th, N. S. 1731.

I N acknowledging the honour of your lordship's private letter of the 5th past, O. S. I cannot but express my apprehensions, that, in any future favour of that kind, your lordship will not be able in justice to give me the same consolation. I can hardly hope that all my zeal, all my anxiety, and utmost diligence for his majesty's service, will excuse my rashness in having, as far as I may have contributed to it, insensibly drawn upon myself the orders with which I have been honoured. When I wrote on the 18th of November, I did not know what were his majesty's demands as elector, and much less apprehended that they would have been forced verbally upon the emperor without remission. Prince Eugene has said more than once, that he believed every minister at Hanover had thrown in his mite, to make his court to the king. When I first saw them, I was indeed so much frightened as to write my letter of the 22d by the post. God be praised, I have not been long enough here to be so much habituated to this court, and am not so little a devoted servant to the king, as to think that they have had the least shadow of reason in their manner of acting.

But I believe there is one consideration which must be made, and without it his majesty's German affairs will always be far from being remedied; that is, as long as this court will regard the king only as elector with respect to his electoral affairs, and as long as the elector will push them as king of England, and independent of the empire, those two contradictions will thwart the best intentions imaginable. It is a truth which I would mention to nobody but your lordship, and I believe monsieur Dieden has mentioned to nobody but me, that

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that the pride of this court has not been so sensibly touched since the time of Gustavus Adolphus and the next ensuing years. The blood that started in the bishop of Bamberg's face at receiving monsieur Dieden's paper; the reproaches that have fallen from every minister in particular of what they think and have even called an unprecedented manner of negotiation in an elector; their unanimous crying out to monsieur Dieden, at the conference, that it was no less than imposing the law upon the emperor; their retorting upon his demand of the emperor's declaring to administer justice to the states of the empire, that the emperor had never acted otherwise, and only prayed God to give him less disobedient princes; joined to the confidence which has been made me by a fifth person, of the emperor's having been piqued to the quick, as what he would not have dissembled on another occasion; are so many proofs of what they call the offense which has been taken here, that, considering the different principles at Vienna and at Hanover, it is almost as much a wonder that we have obtained this declaration, such as it is, in so short a time, as it will be unexpected if his majesty can content himself with it.

They say they might have given another, if they would, but it would have been only to have deceived the king, and never to have executed it. And indeed of what use would a secret declaration be, which, if not executed, could not be produced but probably to have others produced of a contrary nature from other quarters; the thing of the world which this court will not certainly expose itself to? That they have promised, but how far, by a like secret declaration, I cannot tell, to the king of Prussia, many things with regard to Mecklenbourg, has been long suspected. But I am verily persuaded, their design is to deceive him. All that I conjectured, so long ago as the 22d of July, is now confirmed. We have likewise learnt, now, that this court is under an engagement to the family of Wolfenbutel, never to grant the investiture of Bremen and Vehrden, but with an extension to that line. We have learnt likewise, that even the town of Bremen has obtained something in confirmation of its privileges, much more extensive than what the king is willing to declare; at least, the late king's declaration has been communicated to them, as what the emperor would never go beyond. These are misfortunes. Those powers have taken the advantage of the long misunderstanding between this court and his majesty; and I am afraid little reliance is to be made upon promises towards one, which cannot be performed but with a breach of promises towards another. So that the evil is incurable. Perhaps several lesser points might have been softened, if monsieur Dieden could have negotiated. I know his orders

were strict, but I will do him the justice to say, he used every possible means for succeeding; and God knows how far, for the sake of the publick good, we might have been tempted to take upon ourselves, had there been any possibility of compounding.

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Another reason is to be assigned for this court's behaviour. They can wait six weeks longer, and they know of what consequence that time is to his majesty. I should humbly hope to be acquainted, as what may be of use upon another occasion, how far I might have gone in accepting their project, had the electoral affairs been well finished, or out of the question. I make the fewer remarks upon this project at the end of my letter, as what I said upon the communication is mostly the same with what is dispersed in one or other part of my long dispatch. I am persuaded the emperor will never be induced to name the treaty of Seville. Your lordship will be persuaded, that I am under too much agitation to write with great consistency. They are more angry with me, than I am with them. They reckoned too much upon their address to induce me to sign what they pleased. Prince Eugene is personally touched to find what he wished clogged with his majesty's demands. However, I have this comfort, whatever be the event, not to have been mistaken, when I promised in general 6000 Spaniards for the guaranty. I humbly beg your lordship's pardon and indulgence for this trouble. I am in too great a one to know how far I exceed that respect.

DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Is ordered to communicate to cardinal Fleury the contents of the treaty of Vienna.

MY LORD,

Whitehall, March 26, 1731.

I Received by Randall the messenger the honour of your excellency's letters of the 18-29th, and 19-30th instant. Mr. Robinson's courier, with the treaty, did not arrive here till Sunday the 21st instant in the evening, and his majesty immediately gave directions that the treaty and separate articles should be copied, that I might transmit them to France and Spain, to be forthwith communicated to both courts, which accordingly go inclosed. And I send your excellency a copy of my letter to Mr. Keene, that Crew the messenger may not be detained at Paris, but proceed to Seville with all expedition.

Your excellency will acquaint the cardinal and the garde des sceaux, that you have his majesty's orders to communicate to them the treaty and separate articles.

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articles. This early communication is a sufficient demonstration of the confidence the king places in them; and the contents of the treaty will shew, that the account which his majesty had ordered you to give them some time ago of the transactions at Vienna, contained the substance of what had been doing there; and you will make the proper observations upon the falsity of those reports to which they possibly may have given too much credit, as if his majesty had been entering into engagements contrary to those which he had formerly contracted with France, or any way prejudicial or dishonourable to them. If upon this they should ask you, whether there are any secret articles, and particularly any restrictions upon the emperor relating to the marriage of his daughter, you may assure them, that the emperor is not under any obligation not to marry his daughters to any prince that he shall think proper; but that there may be some exceptions out of his majesty's general guarantee in cases that may affect the balance of Europe.

You will then let them know, that as, by this treaty, the emperor is obliged to consent to the full execution of the treaty of Seville, and that there is nothing contained in it to the prejudice or dishonour of France, the king is persuaded they will not be displeased with it, and therefore his majesty hopes that they will, for the satisfaction of Spain, concur in the measures that may be agreed upon for the peaceable introduction of Spanish garrisons, according to the treaty of Seville; and you may assure them that his majesty wishes nothing more than to maintain the union and good correspondence that have so long subsisted between the two crowns. That the conclusion of the negotiation at Vienna shews, that it was set on foot with no other view but the preservation of the general peace and tranquillity of Europe, upon conditions honourable and advantageous to all the allies; and that therefore the king hopes, that if the manner of transacting it, or any ill-grounded suspicion of what was doing, had occasioned any coolness between us and France, that now they know there is not one article that can give them the least cause to complain, that coolness will be removed, and the correspondence between the two crowns go on as it did before any thing of this happened. And, as an instance of his majesty's desire to procure satisfaction for France, as well as for his other allies, you will let them know, that Mr. Keene has the strongest orders to insist upon the delivery of the effects of the flota.

If they should continue to object to you our not having early enough communicated to them what was doing, you will in answer let them know, that as the success of the negotiation depended absolutely on the secrecy of it, and that
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his majesty was determined not to consent to any thing that should in the least be to their prejudice, his majesty was persuaded that, when this came to be known, they would not be uneasy at what they themselves can pretend only to be an omission in point of form, and of which some instances for his majesty's justification could be produced from their own conduct, if it was thought necessary : and as the guarranteeing of the emperor's succession by the two maritime powers was the foundation of this treaty, and the only inducement to the emperor to give his consent to the execution of the treaty of Seville, it seemed the less necessary to acquaint them with a condition which it was very well known France would never come into, though it might have been hoped that, for the sake of procuring a general pacification, they might not be averse to other powers doing it, whose reasons for avoiding it might not be the same with their's, especially if they have not, which his majesty is persuaded is the case, any view of disturbing the balance of Europe, as it is settled at present.

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You will, if possible, make the first communication separately to the cardinal, and besides saying every thing that you are above directed to say both to him and monsieur Chauvelin, you will also observe particularly to his eminence, that his suspicions of our having concealed some material conditions from him now appear to be entirely groundless, and that the treaty comes out to be almost the same in every point with the project you left with him. For as I remember the only alterations, at least of any consequence, are in the article about the guarantee, which being to be given by England, and the emperor's own affair, his majesty let them prepare it in the manner they lik'd, and in return that relating to the introduction of Spanish garrisons is exactly what was sent from hence. The declaration about Parma is entirely new, and was necessarily so by reason of the alteration of circumstances by the duke's death ; but it is as full and complete as possible, and what must be entirely to the satisfaction of Spain.

You will then endeavour to convince the cardinal of the regard which his majesty has had in this negociation for all his allies, since the performance of their engagements was the original motive of his undertaking it, and is now the end and basis of the treaty ; and you will leave it to his consideration whether a step attended with such success ought to produce any coolness between England and France, and how difficult, if not impossible, it would have been to have satisfied Spain, and have executed the engagements we had entered into towards that crown, if his majesty had not taken this measure. For though all the allies might have agreed to make war, experience has sufficiently

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ciently shew'd they must, and would have differed in the method and manner of doing it; and in that case it plainly enough appears, by the duke of Liria's behaviour at Vienna, what part Spain would have acted, and how blindly she would have flung herself, notwithstanding all that we could have said or done, into the arms of the emperor; and we should then have been upon the same or a worse foot than we were when the treaty of Hanover was made, and before the treaty of Seville was concluded.

You will make his eminence all the personal compliments that you shall think proper of his majesty's confidence in him, and dependance upon him; and you will conclude with hoping that the union between the two crowns, which he in a great measure first fix'd, and has lasted through the whole course of his ministry, will not now be lessened or destroyed by groundless jealousies or insinuations, that may come from those who may now hope to succeed, though they have hitherto been disappointed. When you have made your communication to the two French ministers, you may then communicate the treaty and separate articles to monsieur de Castelar, and you will talk to him in the manner that Mr. Keene, by my letter to him, is directed to do to the court of Spain. I cannot conclude without congratulating your excellency upon the success of our negotiation at Vienna. The honour and credit which our royal master has so justly acquired by having singly given peace to all Europe, and the particular advantages which his majesty's own people will receive by it, are too great for his majesty's faithful subjects or servants not to take all opportunities of expressing their gratitude and acknowledgments for it; and if your excellency can be so happy as to satisfy the court of France, the work will be complete indeed; and therefore I most heartily wish you success in it.

His majesty, thinking that there is now no farther occasion for colonel Armstrong's stay at Paris, has commanded me to signify his pleasure that he should return home, which I have accordingly done by this messenger.

P. S. His majesty has just now an account from Mr. Robinson, that count Kinsky at Paris may probably receive directions to conform himself to the orders your excellency shall have from hence, as to the manner of communicating the treaty to the court of France. You will acquaint him in general with the directions that are sent you to communicate the treaty, &c.; and if he should offer to join with you, you are not to decline it; but in that case to take an opportunity of saying separately what you are directed, to the cardinal and the garde des sceaux.

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THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

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Court of Vienna not sincere in their offer of the marriage with don Carlos.—Count Sinzendorf dupes cardinal Fleury on that subject.

MY LORD,

Vienna, March 28th, N. S. 1731.

I Will not pretend to determine whether the duke of Liria's conversion proceeds only and entirely from the true sense he has of the service rendered to Spain by his majesty, or whether it may not, in some measure, have been promoted with other assurances from this court: but I can hardly think that, at this time of day, the emperor will condescend to amuse Spain with the hopes of the marriage, and much less effectuate it; which would be undoing with one hand what he has been establishing with the other. It has been owned to me that the marriage was never intended, if it could possibly be avoided. Count Sinzendorf's journey to France was only to amuse Spain, under pretence of getting the cardinal's consent to the marriage. When it was objected to him here, that the cardinal would certainly give into it, and he would be the dupe of his own refinement; he answered, that he would take upon himself to satisfy the queen of Spain of the sincerity of this court, at the same time that he would find means to prevent any consent on the part of France to the marriage; a point too delicate to be entrusted with any third person: and that was all the motif and mystery of his journey; and the good cardinal is now laughed at here, as one who acted unwisely in not giving into count Sinzendorf's dissembled readiness to effectuate the marriage. These confessions, my lord, besides all that has passed in the last negotiation, may serve as so many proofs that the thing is not so much as thought of; and I am apt to believe that Spain itself will confine all its ambition to the bare settlement of don Carlos in Italy. I humbly leave to your lordship to reflect whether, in case the duke of Liria should have powers to accede, it will not be necessary for me to have another full power; my former one being in the hands of this court, and not extending, as well as I remember, beyond the Imperial and Dutch ministers.

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THOMAS ROBINSON TO THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

Mentions his embarrassment on the electoral affairs.

MY LORD,

Vienna, April 7, N. S. 1731.

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Copy.

I Dare not wish your excellency success in your negociation, till I know whether what I have sent be a proper foundation for it. No moments of impatience which your lordship can have passed lately to hear from me, can equal those of uneasiness and anxiety with which I wait for your answer. I need not say they are principally founded upon what has passed with regard to the electoral affairs. When I had my first instructions not to give the king's guarantee without procuring satisfaction for the elector, I boldly, out of honour and duty, suspended the affairs of all Europe. When afterwards I found myself more at large under my instructions, I as boldly suspended his majesty's electoral affairs for the sake of Europe. The elector's hands are still free, if he does not like the emperor's last offers; and if his majesty does like them, the emperor will execute them notwithstanding the events at Wolfenbutel. Monsieur Dieden says the king has obtained more than ever he expected to procure for his majesty; and he owns that without my behaviour before the signing, and without my obstinacy in detaining the courier after the signing, his majesty would either have less or nothing at all. But how, my lord, to inculcate all this rightly in England? The honour of this employment was forced upon me; and even if I have met with any success, I may say with Pyrrhus, "Such another victory would ruin me."

THOMAS ROBINSON TO THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

Good effects of signing the treaty with the emperor before the electoral affairs were adjusted.—The king of Prussia complains of being neglected.—Promising situation of the electoral affairs.—Desires instructions on the offer of an audience with the emperor by prince Eugene.—Exchange of the ratifications.

MY LORD,

Vienna, May 5, N. S. 1731.

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Most secret.

Copy.

I N acknowledging the honour of your lordship's most secret letter of the 30th March, O. S. I can not but revere the king's goodness in pardoning my signing the treaty before his majesty's electoral affairs were adjusted, the king being convinced that I had thought it most for his majesty's service. How much it may have proved so I shall humbly leave to your lordship's judgment, when you shall be acquainted that those affairs came out better, as I am assured
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by monsieur Dieden, than he or I had been given to expect. He tells me there are points of consequence agreed to now and added to the emperor's decree, which this court made great difficulties to grant before. Out of twelve, I think there are nine new ones obtained. I shall leave to monsieur Dieden to do me justice upon the manner of my executing his majesty's orders in his presence, and if the influence and authority of the crown of England were never so strenuously applied, so surely were they never employed with greater reason and justice. But if I am afraid that the whole will not answer his majesty's expectation, yet I am persuaded your lordship will think that nothing more could be done. In a point of honour there is at least one singular circumstance, which is, that the emperor writes the first to his majesty as elector, and I believe the letter will be found to be very handsome and cordial.

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The king of Prussia complains that this court neglects him, since the signing of the treaty. I do not in the least doubt but in a little time to see all his majesty's electoral affairs in the most flourishing condition, and the king, as elector of Brunswick, in the highest esteem, and of the greatest importance of any prince of the empire, by the credit of his majesty's prosperity and present situation with this court.

When I acquainted prince Eugene with the arrival of the ratifications, he asked me if I would take an audience of the emperor; but finding that I declined it, he said he would himself acquaint the emperor, and had only mentioned it that I might have the first honour of informing his Imperial majesty of the agreeable news. Besides that your lordship had given me no orders to take an audience, I thought, notwithstanding the prince's encouragement, it was by no means proper for me to take that liberty while there remained so many things still to be adjusted before the ratifications; but I suppose if it be necessary that I should have an audience, your lordship will instruct me both when to take it, and what to say when I shall take it. Though every thing was settled as far as it could be with relation to the king's electoral affairs in the conference monsieur Dieden had on the 24th with the ministers, yet all the instruments were not ready till yesterday evening. However, the treating of that matter in the cordial and sincere way as was done in that conference, leaving no room to suspect a faithless execution of what was agreed upon, I made no difficulty to exchange the ratifications on the 1st instant; and the event has shewn that any diffidence would have been very ill placed.

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SIR CHARLES WAGER TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Requests to succeed lord Torrington in the place of first lord of the admiralty; and encloses a genealogical account of his family.

SIR,

Namur, at Spithead, the 12th July 1731.

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* Lord Torrington.

HOPING you will have a little more leisure in the country, I take leave to trouble you with this letter. You are sensible that our chief* at the admiralty can last but a little time longer, and I believe you are sensible that we shall not like to have a man put over us, that must be instructed in what he must say when he goes to court; and what mistakes he may make would fall upon us.

There are two objections against my being at the head of the admiralty, if I should chance to outlive the present head: one is, that it is necessary the head should be a lord, (not an Irish lord,) for which I may be said not to be qualify'd; but when I look upon many that have been made so, I think I may, without much vanity, look upon myself as well qualify'd as some of them. As to my family, I send you, inclos'd, the copy of a letter I receiv'd some years ago from colonel Colchester relating to it. My grandfather was a younger brother of that family, and came from thence many years since; and sending my father to sea, he became a captain in the navy, and dy'd at Deal, captain of his majesty's ship the Crown, then in the Downs, in the year 1666. My mother's father, whose name was Goodson, was a vice-admiral in the navy in the time of the parliament, and was a vice-admiral at the taking of Jamaica, and was left there with the command of those ships by Pen, who came home and was put in the Tower; that was in Oliver's time; so that on both sides I am related to the navy. Indeed I have no estate suitable to that dignity; but a man that is an officer does not like to have any body put over his head, and if that can be prevented, I shall be very well content without it.

The other difficulty, and which I think is not easy to be got over, is, that I cannot go over Mr. Cokburne, nor can he bear it; and I really think it would be a misfortune to the admiralty to have him remov'd from thence, where he is a very good commissioner: I must therefore leave these difficulties to you, who is so well able to overcome any; but I could not be quite easy, without letting you know my mind upon this affair, since it is very possible something may happen in my absence. I ask pardon for making this memorandum

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random longer than usual, but you may not have another a good while; so I hope you will excuse it from, &c.

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Enclosed in the preceding letter.

" SIR,

Westbury, October 29th, 1711.

" You were, about a month since, enquiring of me at Berkley for one
" Cooper, whose wife was a Wager: I did not presently remember such a
" person, but have since enquired, and have the following account given
" me. Mr. Samuel Cooper, of Charlton King near Cheltenham, in this
" county of Gloucester, married Jane daughter and heiress of Richard Wager
" of Charlton aforesaid, descendant of Thomas Wager, whose ancestors have
" been standing there near 200 years. I thought the giving you this account
" was the least I could do to a person for whom I have so great an honour.
" If you have any farther service in this country, none shall be more ready
" to serve you than," &c.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Highly approves his conduct, and congratulates him on having concluded the treaty.

DEAR SIR,

Hampton Court, July 25—August 5, 1731.

BEING in London when Baudry the messenger arrived here, I was deprived of the opportunity of congratulating you by last post, as I now do most heartily, on your having put the last hand to so great and glorious a work, so much for the public advantage, for his majesty's honour, and for your credit and reputation; two of which considerations sensibly affect me in common with the rest of the king's servants and subjects: but a long and intimate acquaintance and friendship with you entitle me to a particular pleasure and satisfaction with respect to the last; though I must own that your prudent conduct, zeal, and address in the management of such important negotiations, have been so generally approved by all his majesty's ministers, that they are all equally your friends, and are all equally desirous of serving you; and lord Harrington will acquaint you with the effects of his majesty's great satisfaction with your behaviour.

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I cannot omit on this occasion, although you will learn more properly and fully on that subject too from his lordship, to let you know how much
both

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both his majesty and all his ministers were transported with prince Eugene's letter to lord Harrington; and I can assure you, that my brother Walpole and all of them will endeavour to act conformably to the just sentiments of his highness with respect to the publick interest of Europe, as well as to answer, in every respect, the good opinion he is pleased to entertain of them, and more particularly for preserving and improving the good understanding and confidence between the emperor and his majesty, so necessary for their respective interests, as well as for maintaining the peace and balance of Europe. I am, &c.

DELAFAÏE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Is glad that the cardinal has explained himself.—Motives for the respective conduct of England and the emperor.—Prudence in not admitting France into the negotiation.

MY LORD,

Hamp:dn Court, August 16th, 1731.

Waldegrave
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I Never read any letter that gave me more pleasure than your excellency's most private one in your own hand to my lord duke of Newcastle, of the 6—17th instant; first to see that you had brought the cardinal to explain himself, which had been so much recommended to you, and at the same time appeared to me so difficult a task, that I almost despaired of your ever being able to do it; and secondly, that he has told you his grief, which seems to me a plain indication that he is disposed to be well with us: a lady that parlys, your excellency knows, is not very far from surrendring. I must own I was not a little surpris'd at the point upon which he puts it: our coming into engagements with the emperor for entering into a war for the sake of obliging France to guaranty the pragmatick sanction, would have been so monstrous a conduct, that I cannot imagine how any man of common sense, and that is the least acquainted with our constitution, could give a moment's attention to so absurd a suggestion. Such a step would have given a fine game indeed to the Craftsman, &c.

The cardinal knows the king has no money of his own to go to war with, but whenever that misfortune comes upon us, must apply to the parliament. Now the nation may be brought into a war to keep out the pretender, to do justice to our merchants and preserve and protect our trade, to maintain Gibraltar or any other of our possessions; but it would have been a notable story to have told them, that they must raise five millions a year to force France to guaranty the emperor's succession.

I hope

I hope your excellency will be so good as to forgive me, if I could have wished you had in your answer to him left out the word *believe*. You have, I think, seen every thing that has past that is at all material; you have read our friend Robinson's long dispatches, where he sets down every word that is spoke in all his conversations with the Imperial ministers; nay, describes even their looks and gestures; and I am sure I do not remember the least syllable in them that would give one a suspicion that the court of Vienna so much as intimated to us a wish, that we would propose to France to guaranty their succession. They know we would not undertake it, and that it would be to no purpose if we did. But the emperor's consenting to Spanish garrisons, after standing out so obstinately, and at such an expence upon his troops in Italy, is what amazes the politicians. Some say we have purchased his consent at the expence of 1,200,000 *l.*; others make different conjectures: the cardinal puts it wholly upon the pragmatick sanction, and that nothing less could bring in the emperor than our agreeing to make it secure by forcing France into it.

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My lord, nothing seems to me more plain and rational, than what should have been the emperor's conduct. The great powers of Europe have for several years been bullying one another, and yet none in a disposition or capacity to fall to blows in earnest. However, the keeping in a posture between offensive and defensive has been a burthen to them all. We have groaned under the *uncertain posture of affairs*; but it has fallen heaviest upon the emperor: it has almost, if not quite, broke his bank at Vienna. In short, I need not tell your excellency how his finances have suffered: but he saw us and France in a close combination against him; he saw England desirous to get, at any hazard, out of this *state of suspense*. An Englishman will still be for making a hog or a dog of it; shilly shally is what we cannot bear; and though he depended much on the cardinal's pacifick temper, and on our maxim not to overturn the balance of Europe, and consequently not to suffer the house of Austria to be demolish'd; yet this was not a sufficient security against accident. Spain might force us into a war to execute the treaty of Seville, even without France, for the sake of our trade; so that he must continue armed, and he found he could not bear the expence. What could he do better than by drawing us into a seperate negociation to break our close union with France; and what other game had we to play than to get out of our *uncertainty* by fair means, since we found plainly France would never join in doing it by force?

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It were to have been wished that the negociation had not been separate, or at least that it could have from the beginning been communicated to the French court. Opinions were divided here about it; but I still think the right measure was taken, let what will be the consequence. Chauvelin would never have been at rest till he had had a finger in the pye; and I am sure he would have been one cook too many, and would have spoilt the mess. As to the pragmatick sanction, was not that too a sufficient inducement? The weight and influence the king must have, to bring the empire into it; another gate object than a French guaranty, that might prove of equal validity with a French renunciation, or a partition treaty.

In short, my lord, we have done nothing but what is plain and intelligible; we have nothing behind the curtain; no secret articles against France, or any other power. The cardinal may be as well with us as ever; and however fond the rest of the French ministers and their generals and petit-mâtres might be of a war, if I have a right notion of their troops and finances, they would grow weary of it as soon as their neighbours. Peace and good neighbourhood is the best for us all; and I heartily wish that your excellency, by establishing it where you are, may have the glory of crowning this happy work.

DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Desires him to assure the cardinal, that there is no article in the treaty of Vienna hostile to France, for the forcible guaranty of the pragmatic sanction.

MY LORD,

Hampton Court, August 16—27, 1731.

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 Papers.

Most private.

I Have had the honour of your lordship's most private letter of the 17th instant, N. S. in your own hand, giving an account of what had passed in the greatest secrecy with the cardinal in the two last conferences you had with his eminence, and I have acquainted his majesty with it.

The king was extreamly glad to find that the cardinal had opened himself with so much candour and freedom to your lordship, as well with relation to the present situation of the two courts, as to the apprehension that seemed to remain with him, "that his majesty had entered into engagements with the emperor to oblige France by force to guarranty the emperor's succession;" and that his eminence had allowed your lordship to mention it to me, in such a manner as might give his majesty an opportunity of entirely undeceiving him upon this head. This open and generous way of proceeding, so agreeable to the cardinal's known integrity and honour, and to the desire that his eminence

has always shewed to preserve the good correspondence between the two crowns, could not but be very acceptable to the king; and your lordship may, in consequence of it, assure his eminence with the utmost truth and certainty, that there is not, nor ever was, the least foundation for any surmise of this kind: and as a proof of it, I do in the most positive and solemn manner, and by his majesty's express order and command, declare to your lordship, as you will be pleased to do to the cardinal, that his majesty has neither directly or indirectly entered into any stipulation with the emperor, or with any other power, to oblige France by force to guaranty the emperor's succession; or taken any engagement wherein the guaranty of France to the said succession is so much as mentioned; nor was any such thing ever proposed or thought of.

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The cardinal will by this be convinced of the sincerity with which his majesty acts towards him, and of the desire the king has to preserve his good opinion and confidence: and as a farther instance of it, your lordship may not only communicate this whole letter to him, but allow his eminence to take a copy of it, if, for his greater satisfaction, he should desire it.

The assurances which his eminence gave you, "that he neither directly or indirectly had so much as a thought of hurting us; and that he never would be concerned in the pretender's affairs," is what his majesty always expected from his friendship, and from the most christian king's exactness in the observance of his treaties; and the king is persuaded that his eminence, being now convinced that there is not the least foundation for what has with so much confidence been suggested to him, will for the future arm himself against the insinuations of those who may wish confusion, and who may be industrious to suggest any thing, though never so false, to the prejudice of his majesty, and to the interruption of the good correspondence between the two crowns. I shall only add, that if, in obeying his majesty's commands upon this occasion, I shall any way have contributed to his eminence's ease and satisfaction, and to the preventing any future misunderstanding between the two crowns, I shall esteem myself extreamly happy; and must begg the favour of your lordship to assure his eminence of my most sincere and humble respects, and to be yourself persuaded of the truth and regard with which, &c.

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DELAFAVE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Prosperous situation of public affairs.—The duke of Lorraine (afterwards the emperor Francis the first) arrives in England.—Presented, and entertained by the king and queen.

MY LORD,

Hampton Court, Oct. 15th, 1731.

Waldegrave
Papers.

* Chauvelin.

I Am to thank your excellency for the honour of your letters of the 20th and 21st instant, N. S. The paquet which came with the last from Mr. Robinson gives hopes that we shall save our distance, and that both possession and introduction may be compleated within the five months mentioned in the declaration of June 6th. But how do we fetch it out of the fire! What strange creatures are the Spanish ministers at Seville and at Florence! Had the duke of Liria been cast in the same mould, their own purposes would have been defeated by themselves. Patino is, I think, the counterpart of your shuffling friend *, whom I am glad you have disappointed in the affair of the four insisted men; as I hope the others will be in our grand affair; for God is above the devil still. Old secretary Johnston, who has been in Scotland, finding upon his return all things in so fair a way, ask'd sir Robert Walpole "What he had done to God Almighty to make him so much his friend?"

The last account your excellency sent about the affair of the court of Sardinia seems to me to be a true one. It should at least pass for such with your court: what have they to gain by meddling one way or other?

The duke of Lorrain is come at last, under the travelling name of count Blamont. Count Kinsky brought him hither. They came to court in chairs (having alighted at baron Hattorf's lodgings upon the Green): the guards took no notice of them, I mean by the way of being drawn up or saluting. They alighted at the first gate and walked through the court, up stairs, through the guard chamber and the next room, into the cartoon gallery, at the door of which the housekeeper was placed to keep every body else from going in. My lord Harvey (vice-chamberlain to the king) waited in the cartoon gallery, and carry'd him that way into his majesty's private apartment. Then I saw my lord chamberlain conducting his highness through the admiral gallery to the queen's apartment, where he saw (in private) her majesty and the royal family, except the prince of Wales, to whom he afterwards paid a visit, being carry'd also the private way. I imagined count Blamont would from thence have slunk away, but he was more gallant; went to the queen's circle, and saw

saw the dining in publick, standing behind their majesties, or rather in some measure between their chairs. After about a quarter of an hour's stay there, he went and dined at count Kinsky's at Isleworth, and so back to London to count Kinsky's house there, whither all the ministers went early this morning to pay their court to his highness, before they came to the king's levy here. The duke of Lorrain was not here this day; but to-morrow he is to meet their majesties and the royal family at the hunting in Windsor forrest, and they are to dine together, as I hear, at Cranborn lodge. The duke of Newcastle will give his highness a great entertainment next week at Claremont. They talk of count Blamont's going to Newmarket at the end of next week, and that we shall then remove to town; but that is not certain.

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Hampton Court, Oct. 18th, 1731. The hunting was last Saturday, as I wrote to your excellency was intended, but the dinner was here. There sate at table the king, the prince of Wales on his majesty's right hand, and count Blamont on his left, and the ministers and great officers, and such others as his majesty was pleased to appoint, who sate *pêle mêle* without any distinction. They were about fourteen in all. It was in the beauty room next the privy garden. A play is now acting here, to which count Blamont is come from count Kinsky's. To-morrow the duke of Devonshire entertains his highness at supper in town. Wednesday is to be another hunting, and another dinner here. Thursday count Blamont goes to see a ship launched, and will be entertained by the admiralty. Fryday he dines with my lord duke of Newcastle at Claremont, and is to be at a ball here at court. Saturday another hunting. This day sev'night his highness goes to Newmarket, and comes back to town for the birth day; after which the duke of Grafton will entertain him, as is said, some days at Euston, and sir Robert Walpole at Houghton.

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Extra.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Desires him to assure the cardinal that there are no secret articles in the treaty of Vienna hostile to the French—and no intentions of harassing them.

MY DEAR LORD,

December 8—19, 1731.

Waldegrave
Papers.

I Am honoured with your excellency's letter of the 8th instant, N. S. and doe not doubt but the haughty and peremptory proceedings of monsieur Chauvelin in all the courts of Europe, in points in which France has no manner of right by treatys to exact and complain, will have the desired effect of disappointing him in his negociations. All that we have to doe is, to act in a friendly and moderate manner; to shew the impartiall powers the fatal consequences of having the emperor's dominions distracted and torn in pieces, in case his Imperiall majesty should dye without issue male; and from time to time endeavour to convince the cardinal, that we have not, as we really have not, any views to disturb or distress France at any time whatsoever, nor that we never have nor ever will enter into plans that can have any tendency that way, as long as France acts with the same regard for us; and perhaps the taking an opportunity of reminding his eminence, in a familiar and friendly manner, of the many false insinuations that have been suggested to him with respect to our designs, without the least foundation, may make an impression upon him, and hold him back from entering into the violent measures of others. Our having, by the treaty of March the 16th, entered into fresh articles to the prejudice of France, had no colour, as the cardinal must have been convinced, of truth; that our preparations for the execution of the treaty conceived some secret designs against Dunkirk, was a false and malicious insinuation; that we had, by a formidable treaty between us, the emperor, Ruffia, and Prussia, consented to a marriage between the familys of the two last, was the greatest of chimæras; that we had taken secret engagements with the emperor to oblige France to guaranty the pragmatic sanction, was as strongly suggested, and with as little reason as the rest; and the intelligence of our having agreed to grant the subsidys for the Hessian troops to his Imperiall majesty; and likewise that Mr. Keen had industriously endeavoured to prevent the delivery of the effects of the flota, and was very uneasy at its being done, was a poor and malicious assertion of count Rotenbergh's, as you may see by the inclosed translation

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translation of an extract of a letter from Mr. Keen to me on those subjects.

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These, and many such false insinuations as these, have been made from time to time to his eminency, and he has as often been undeceived in them; but as they have made for some time an impression upon him, it may not be amiss for your lordship to remind him of these false impositions, and of the evil intentions of those that suggest them, when any new suggestion of this nature shall have had any weight with him, and afforded you an opportunity of doing it.

1732.

DELAFAVE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Prosperous state of the finances.

Whitehall, March 3, 1731-2. I know not what representation may be made to the French court of our finances: the sinking fund gradually pays off our debt, and the farther we proceed, the faster we shall go on. Half the land tax taken off, and no more remaining than 1 s. in the pound, which was never known before since the revolution, must be popular in the country, let the Pulteneyans say what they will against it in the house, and must be of service against the next election; for no doubt it will be known who voted pro and con. The salt tax is scarce felt; it is an equal tax, and the practice of all nations pleads for it; and then it is a fund to borrow a good sum of money upon in an emergency; so that, with monsieur Chavigni's leave, the administration is not in the low, desperate circumstances that he imagines. The government can borrow what sums they please at less than 4 per cent.; and so far are the creditors from pressing for their payments, that 100 l. a year in South-sea annuities will cost 2750 l., and in the 3 per cent. annuities 3233 l.; which difference of 483 l. in the purchase can, as far as I can learn, be accounted for no other way, but that the South Sea annuities will be first paid off. Is this a sinking credit, or a decaying government? Let the opposers say what they will, the generality of people must have a good opinion of that government whom they are so desirous to trust with their money; there cannot be a more cer-

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Extract.

tain

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tain sign of it. But I am wasting your excellency's time, in explaining to you what you know and understand much better than I do.

THE DUCHESS OF BUCKINGHAM TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

States the cause of her departure.—Excuses herself from various imputations.—Requests him to make an apology to the queen.

SIR,

Boulogne, June the 6th, 1732.

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I Hope you'll excuse the liberty I take of troubling you, on account that I could judge of no one so proper for me to adrefs to as yourself. I left England, sir, with no other kind of precipitation than was occasioned by my having some accounts to state and pass with Mr. Athbornott, in a manner I wanted to prevent any inconveniency could hereafter arise, in case they were not all settled to my satisfaction with Mr. Athbornot; and as I heard he was imbroil'd somehow with the care of certain papers relating to the charitable corporation, and which I being uncertain how he might behave herein, and what effects might happen to his fortune or himself about his affairs, I was unable to judge any way of the consequences of, I resolv'd to hasten a journey to Paris which I always design'd to make, as many people have heard me mention, in order to part with a house I kept on there till I saw whether the English air, after having been in Italy, might agree with my son.

I know there is a usual form as I take it only to be esteem'd, of any peer's asking permission of the king (or queen in the present circumstance) to go out of the kingdom; but even that ceremony, I thought, reach'd not to women, whose being in or out of their country seem'd never to be of the least consequence: and as I had not of late had the honour of going to court, I really thought troubling her majesty with any trifling motions of mine would have been more an impertinent thing than a respectfull one in me. It has happen'd, sir, that I have fallen very ill in this place, consequently have continued in it, till I receiv'd advice from Dr. Mead, my physician in England, or found myself enough recover'd to pursue my journey. This has given me the lucky opportunity of hearing, something quick, the silly reports, somehow spread, concerning a thing done by every body at their pleasure, I mean taking a journey to Paris: that I went away out of some apprehensions, makes one almost laugh to hear: that I had receiv'd mony in the corporation affair, and I fear'd the discovery of it: that I had papers among some of the late bishop of Rochester's
that

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that I wanted to get again; and that I was affraid of being in England now. As to the first matter, how improbable 'tis any body should find any reason to give me any private mony advantages, is, I think, very obvious to people of common good judgment (and that made by other sort of people I never did nor ever shall regard), and 'tis full as plain, to my thinking, that I am not capable of taking any that ought to be conceal'd. The report as to the bishop's papers is as false; and the last a reflexion, I make no question is the same. If I had design'd that my son should have staid abroad above three weeks or a month, I would have sent him to the queen to take his leave, and have the honour to kiss her hand, had his age suffer'd him to sitt in parliament.

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I thought this detaill, long as it is, not improper to trouble you with; and I desire the favour of you to take notice of it, or not, to her majesty, as you in your judgment, sir, shall decide; I mean, in case any of these nonsensicall storys, or any others, have reached her ears; or whether my coming away in the manner I did, has happen'd to be represented or taken in a light any way requires being sett right; which is a justice I begg the favour of your doing for me out of this account I give you, and which, I flatter myself, you'l be pleas'd to do. Though I have not the pretence of any acquaintance with you, so as to give me much claim to the favour I ask, or the trouble I give, yet I hope you will excuse both, and believe me to be, as I am, &c.

REPLY OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

MADAM,

Hogmagog, near Newmarkett, July 1st, 1732.

YOUR grace's letter overtook me at this place, at the end of my first day's journey into Norfolk, whither I had obtain'd the queen's leave to go for a fortnight, to take care of my private affairs. This distance from London, the scene of all businesse, I hope your grace will thiak a sufficient excuse for my not giving you any further trouble than to assure you that I am, madam, your grace's most obedient humble servant.

Copy.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Incloses the preceding letters, and desires him to lay them before the queen.

DEAR HORACE,

Hogmagog, July 1st, 1732.

A Messenger just now (eight at night) brought me the inclosed letter, which he said he received from the duchess of Buckingham's steward, just come from her grace at Boulogne. As I thought she deserv'd no regard at all, or at least

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least that it was not necessary for me to explain to her whether I thought it proper or not to trouble the queen with the contents of her letter, I made my absence the excuse; a dry one indeed, but free from incivility, and return'd her by the messenger the inclosed answer. Pray lay this choice parcell before the queen, with the tender of my most humble duty. I have been very uneasy about her majesty's head-ach.

1733.

DELAFAVE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Death of lord Torrington.—To be succeeded by sir Charles Wager.

Waldegrave
 Papers.

Extract.

Whitehall, January 18th, 1732-3. My lord Torrington dyed yesterday morning. He had been several years subject to an asthma; but this last illness was but short, for he was with me at the office no longer ago than last Fryday, seemingly as well as I had seen him for a long time past. A man of 72 years of age, who has had his share of business and pleasure, reputation and wealth, makes no ill composition in quitting this life without pain or sickness. Every body looks upon sir Charles Wager as the person who will now be at the head of the affairs of the navy; as indeed I may say he has been some time, for tho' lord Torrington had the name and the appearance of it, sir Charles, by giving way in some things not essential, and by suggesting matters in such a way that the other imagined the first thought was his own, kept all in order, without ever having any squabble. The deceased lord, however, must be owned to have had few equall to him in his way. The lord chancellor and the speaker are ill of this cold, which few escape; and both houses are on that account adjourned till next week. We have had little debating as yet; when the address was moved in the house of commons, the beginning of which, about their *satisfaction* with the situation of affairs at home and abroad, which I expected would have been battled, sir Thomas Aston, member for Leverpoole, stood up and exprest his *dissatisfaction*; but he was not supported, and so the matter dropt. As to the amendment offered to the address, about the revenues, &c. that was of such a nature that nobody could oppose it.

LETTERS

LETTERS FROM DELAFAYE AND THOMAS PELHAM TO THE
EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.Period V.
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On the subject of the excise, and the parliamentary debates.

Whitehall, March 15th, 1732-3.

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IT is with the greatest pleasure that I am now going to give your excellency an account of the success of yesterday's debate, which is perhaps one of the most important that has happened since the revolution. It was opened about a quarter before one, by sir Robert Walpole, who spoke two hours and a quarter, explaining and shewing the advantages of his scheme with such perspicuity and strength of argument, that every body that heard him allows that he never made a better speech in his life. After him spoke alderman *Perry*, then sir William Yonge, sir Paul *Methuen*, Mr. Attorney-general, alderman *Barnard*, Mr. Winnington, Mr. Henry Pelham, Mr. *Shippen*, sir Joseph Jekyll, Mr. *Heathcote*, Mr. Solicitor-general, Mr. *Pulteney*, sir William *Wyndham*, and then sir Robert Walpole closed the debate; and about half an hour past midnight the question was put, and carried by 265 against 204; the fullest house that has been known this long time; to these must be added the two tellers, and there are besides 11 members in town that were prevented by sickness, and one, viz. sir Robert Furnese, dyed yesterday: so that your excellency sees this matter was well attended. Indeed I look upon it to have been the sheet anchor of the disaffected; and by a particular circumstance that happened without doors, it looks as if nothing can hardly equal the rage of the disappointed cabal.

The debate was carry'd only by those who spoke for the question, with all the temper and dignity that was ever known upon such an occasion. Those whose speeches were most admired were sir Robert, who possess himself, and was in as high spirit at the latter end of the day as when he first set out; the attorney and the solicitor-general, and sir Joseph Jekyll; which last, though most firmly attached to the royal family and to the constitution, yet, from a particular turn of his own, seldom votes with the king's servants. Two other gentlemen have been named to me who went to the house determined to vote against the question, yet voted for it upon conviction; their principles and the company they keep being such that this was not in the least expected. As for sir Joseph, he solemnly protested that he came undetermined, but perfectly free and resolved to take that part which upon the debate should appear to him the most just and reasonable; and that having heard the strongest arguments on one side, and none on the other but what were trifling and evasive, of all

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which, on both sides, he made a very handsome and fair recapitulation, he was for the question.

I must own that, though I did not doubt but the thing would be carry'd, yet the majority was greater than I expected, considering the artifices that had been used to inflame the corporations, and engage a majority in several of them to write to their members to oppose the scheme, which could not but have an influence upon many of them with regard to their future elections, which are not very distant. Besides the abolishing of frauds, perjury, &c. which have been too much practised in the customs, and other considerations with respect to the duty itself, (for tobacco only was the subject, wine being reserved for another debate after Easter,) your excellency will easily see the happy effects of this event. Among others, it will shew the malecontents, that neither the ministry nor the parliament are to be intimidated by popular clamour from doing what is for the king and country's service. And then it will give room for taking off the land-tax intirely, which will be a fund of two millions, and much more if it could be equally laid, ready for any emergency; and which tax will in such case be more chearfully paid by the landed men, when they see that they are not to be eternally loaded with it; but that it is laid upon them (if the misfortunes of the times should require it) out of meer necessity, and to be taken off again when that necessity ceases. Your excellency will forgive my indulging the satisfaction arising from these comfortable reflections, by mentioning what you, from your own observations, will feel much better than I can pretend to explain it. I come now to obey my lord duke of Newcastle's commands, by making his excuses for not answering your last letters, which he will do very soon.

I must add a word about the multitude that crowded the Court of Requests, Westminster-hall, and the other places and passages adjoining to the house of commons. It could not well be otherwise, where two such numerous trades as the tobacconists of all ranks were, and the vintners of all denominations apprehended themselves to be concerned; but there happened nothing like a tumult; and the precaution that had been taken as usual on like occasions, to have justices of peace and constables ready in the neighbourhood, proved quite unnecessary. As to the dissatisfied vintners and shopkeepers in country corporations, if any should continue so, their neighbours that have estates, and by whose custom they subsist, will be eased of the land-tax, and being pleased with it, will be able to bring their tradesmen soon into temper.

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The names under-lined spoke against the question, the others for it. I omitted doing justice to fir William Wyndham, who made the most of a bad argument, and spoke extremely well. Perry's speech was the next. The rest of that side were not applauded; nor did they speak so well as some of them have talked upon other occasions.

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Whitehall, March 19th, 1732-3. When the report was made in the house of commons last Fryday of what had been done in the committee of the whole house the Wednesday before, it occasioned, as usual, a fresh debate, which lasted almost as long as the former; and in the conclusion, the house agreed with the committee by a majority of 249 against 189. So the main labour of that affair is over, though it must be carefully attended in all its steps through both houses, for the opponents will most probably dispute every inch of ground. We shall see how it will fare hereafter with the scheme upon wines. Notwithstanding all the racket this makes at present, when the excise is once settled, and another session is over, and people see that no new one is attempted, but that they may eat their bread and cheese, and their mutton if they have any, without paying any excise for it, they will be easy; and the present clamours will be as much forgot as those that were made about excising tea and coffee and chocolate, which has improved that revenue to 80,000 l. a-year more than it was before.

Waldegrave
Papers.
Extra.

Whitehall, April 12th, 1733. I have already acquainted your excellency with the scheme of turning the customs upon tobacco and wine into an excise, and with the progress which a bill for this purpose, so far as relates to tobacco, was making through the house of commons. Nothing certainly could be better calculated for a considerable improvement of the revenue, without laying any additional duties, but only by preventing the frauds (and perjury) too frequently practised by dealers in those commodities, which at the same time would have given an opportunity to take off the land-tax intirely. But the misrepresentations of this design, artfully spread over the kingdom, had raised so much dissatisfaction, that the sheriffs of the city of London, accompany'd by some of the aldermen and many substantial merchants and traders, attended the house with a petition from the common council against it; and there was reason to expect like deputations from many other corporations; so that, considering the trouble it would have given during the sessions, and the clamour that had been raised, it was thought advisable to drop it, in the man-

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ner that such propofals have ufually been as were intended for the publick good, but, from unforefeen accidents or other circumftances, proved unfeafonable, or difficult to be put in execution.

It was accordingly moved yefterday, by thofe who brought in the bill, to adjourn the fecond reading of it to the 12th day of June next, before which time, in all probability, the parliament will rife; upon which the oppofite party, taking courage, propofed the rejecting the bill. Yet, though the bringing this to a queftion met with encouragement inftead of any oppofition, they did not think fit to put it to the vote, being fenfible how great a majority would have appeared againft them in fo full a houfe as there was upon this occafion: and fo the firft motion, for putting off the reading of the bill, was carry'd without any divifion. There will no inconveniency arife from this incident to the fervice of the current year, the neceffary funds for it being already fettled in the ufual manner, which will always fuffice for the expences of the government, and for leffening gradually the publick debts; and a nation fo wealthy, and whole commerce is in fo flourishing a condition, can never want means of raifing fuch fums as will anfwer any extraordinary occafion that can happen, as the experience of days paft has fufficiently fhewn. In the mean time, this inftance of lenity, and of the regard that is had to the voice of the people, even in cafes where they do not judge fo right for themfelves, cannot but have a very good effect, by increafing the univerfal affection and gratitude of the nation towards his majefty and his government. And your excellency may be affured, that what has paffed in this affair will occafion no alteration of any kind in the adminiftration and courfe of publick bufinefs.

THOMAS PELHAM TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

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London, April 26, 1733. After waiting thefe three weeks paft for the difpatching of a meffenger from hence, I have taken back my letter to your excellency which has lain fo long in Mr. Delafaye's hands. The chief part of it related to what was paffing here at that time, but as things have taken a different turn fince, 'tis unnecelfary to trouble you with what I had then wrote. Your lordfhip has had accounts from the office of the manner of dropping the excife bill, and of fome particular circumftances that attended it: the enemy, not fatisfied with fuch a conceffion from the miniftry, were ftill endeavouring to overthrow our friends, but to our great joy we have at laft gained a noble victory, and putt a flop to any farther attempts this feffions at leaft. A petition from the drug-
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gifts of London for the taking off the excise upon coffee, tea, &c. was rejected by a majority of *one hundred*; and we have since carried in a ballot the court list of twenty-one persons appointed to examine into the frauds of the customs by almost as great a majority. Our success in these two points, added to the king's declared support of the present ministry by the examples his majesty has already made of some who would obstruct their measures, has effectually disappointed the views of the opposers in the progress of this session. I shall reserve the private circumstances of affairs here till I've the honour of seeing your lordship, which I reckon may be in a fortnight. His grace has a mind I should be here at an entertainment he proposes to give at Claremont the latter end of next week to some of the foreign ministers; and as monsieur de Richelieu is expected here in a few days, I imagine he will be one of the company. Monsieur de Montmorin I hope has done justice to his reception here: I saw but little of him, for at those places where I was most likely to see him, he did not seem willing to accept any invitation; I only din'd with him once at Chavigni's. I am desir'd by Mr. Elliot, a member of our house, to recommend to your excellency's favour and interest with colonel Rothes, for the discharge of a man in his regiment, the case of Peter Lobb, which is sett forth in the enclosed paper. If any money is necessary for the recruiting another foldier in his room, Mr. Elliot is very willing to pay it. You have likewise enclos'd a letter which I received from Marseilles about a month ago to deliver to your lordship. I beg to add my compliments to lord Chewton, Mr. Waldegrave, and Mr. Jacobs; and to assure your lordship of my being ever with the greatest respect and sincerity, &c.

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DELAFAVE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Whitehall, April 26, 1733. I have already given your excellency an account of the proposal made in the house of commons by the opposite party for a committee to be chosen by ballot, to inquire into frauds in the customs. They thought they had thereby brought the court into this dilemma: if the motion had been rejected, it would have been said, that the ministry durst not stand the inquiry into facts they had laid down as the principle upon which the excise bill was to be founded; if it was carry'd that a committee should be chosen by *ballotting*, the gentlemen in opposition have given out so often, that those who voted for the court did it against their real sentiments, meerly for self-interest, that they had talked themselves into a belief of it, and had great hopes that a committee, chosen

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chosen in this manner, would have been to their mind; and then it is easy to guess how this inquisition would have been managed, and that they would have carry'd it higher than to the merchants and the officers of the customs, who have so near a relation to the treasury.

On Tuesday the ballot came on; a matter indeed of greater consequence than even the excise bill itself. Every member was to give his vote, as it were in the dark, left intirely to follow his own natural inclinations, or if you will have it so, the opinion he might have of the duration of the present ministry, after such a shock as the affair of the excise might be thought to have given it. Both sides acted a manly part in one respect; their respective lists did not contain names of any whose affections either way might be doubted, but all stanch men and the chief of their party, such as Mr. Pelham, Mr. Walpole, Mr. Attorney and Mr. Solicitor General, on one side; sir William Wyndham, Mr. Pulteney, Mr. Sandys, and sir John Barnard, on the other side, who did not even leave out alderman Perry, though his concern in the tobacco trade might make him be lookt upon as not a very proper examiner in such a cause. The event was, that the court list, as it was called, was carry'd by a majority of 85. And so well did those who voted it stick by one another, that of the 21 chosen, he that had most votes for him (which were 294) had but 10 more than him who had least. The highest number of the opposite list was 209, and the lowest 191; so there were 18 men of their party, and but 10 of the court, that did not put into the glass plum-lists, that is, vote for every one of the persons recommended to them. As this committee will now literally answer the end of their being appointed, there are materials ready for them, which had been collected on account of the excise bill. Wee now look upon all the troublesom part of the sessions to be over, and hope for a speedy conclusion of it.

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Whitehall, June 18th, 1733. We are now at last got through our session of parliament, which has been but a sower untowardly one, and has given the ministers full occupation. The project of an excise upon tobacco and wine, was, I think in my conscience, an honest, just design. The buyers of those commoditys pay the same price for them as if every pound of the one and every quart of the other had paid the full dutys; and why part of the revenue, which the people actually pay, should be diverted from the service of the publick to enrich a parcel of knaves, is what cannot be accounted for. However, the world, that is, the lower and more numerous part of it, were made to believe,

lieve, that next sessions of parliament something else would be excised, and so on till we should have a general excise upon every thing useful or necessary for life; and by this method of raising taxes, every man's house must at all times be open to the officers of the revenue. I was always of opinion, that even if it went so far as a general excise, and few or no customs, as it is in Holland, we should by this means become a wealthy nation. However, these misrepresentations prevailed, and the excise was dropt.

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But I must own I was surpris'd that the turning out of three lords for their activity in so unreasonable an opposition, could put matters upon such a foot in the house of peers, that upon a motion to call for the South-Sea accounts, (which had been made and scarce heeded in the other house,) there should be an equality, and as the question was put, it was, by the forms of parliament, carry'd by a *præsumitur pro negante*. Those accounts had already been canvass'd by inquisitors of the company's own, who, if they had any byas, it must have been on the wrong side, and found fair and just; and the effect of so unnecessary a repetition of this inquiry could only be to hurt publick credit. However, some out of pique, some out of popularity, and some perhaps out of meer curiosity, made up half the house. My lord Scarborough's being for the inquiry gave no little weight to those of that opinion: his lordship declared himself satisfied as to the application of the money arising from the sale of the forfeiting directors' estates, and only found fault with its having been done without the formality of a general court as the act of parliament directed. So the managers of the South-Sea company's affairs came off with reputation, and the value of the stock has risen upon it. But the very angry lords would not let it go, and made the most scandalous protest that I think ever was: I am sure had I been the greatest enemy sir Robert Walpole ever had, I should not have been for such a paper's being in the journals for the sake of the dignity of the house. Every body knows that these oppositions are meant against a minister, let the question be what it will; but it has not been usual to record it in words at length. This last step has cost the duke of Montrose and lord Marchmont their employments; and they have but one session more to oppose in, for very probably they will not be of the number of Scots peers returned upon the next election. There is now a summer for the ministers to look round them, and make their *arrangemens* against another session of parliament.

It has happened luckily enough, that, during these domestick bustles, foreign affairs have not required immediate help. I am much mistaken if matters are made up between the emperor and Spain, till one sees, whether

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the affair of Poland will not create troubles, which may make the emperor willing to make up with the Spaniards at any rate: that is certainly what they wayt for, and I cannot say but it is right policy. In the mean time should king Philip grow impatient and abdicate, that will open a new scene. Your court blusters and threatens, makes encampments, and marches their militia; but I take them to be mere bullies, at least during the cardinal's life, whose business at his age should be to keep and leave the kingdom in peace. When he is gone, it cannot be Chauvelin's interest to go into a war, and give some military man an opportunity to get into the saddle. There can be but one reason for them to desire a war, which is the hopes it would divert the minds of their people at home from their attention to affairs of religion that give them so much trouble. The time for France to go to war is, in my mind, when the emperor dyes without heir male, in order to have his succession decided; and so the house of Austria, their rival, brought to nothing, and France remain the first power in Europe. Till then, they should save their men and their money, and endeavour to grow rich by trade. And now your excellency has all my politicks, foreign and domestick.

Hampton court, July 19, 1733.—Sir Robert Walpole is expected in a day or two from Norfolk, where he has been received with such marks of respect and affection by the gentlemen in those parts, as shews the rule of no man's being a prophet in his own country not to be without exception. Indeed whatever endeavours the opposite party has used to make him the object of the people's aversion and resentment, and whatever boasts they may make of their success in it, the ferment they had raised in town, and in some corporations, either did not reach other places, or is quite subsided.

At Oxford, where there had been some riotous rejoicings by the townsmen, on account of the excise being dropt, in which a very few of the young scholars joined, the vice-chancellor, who, under a fair outside, is much suspected of being not only what he professes, a tory, but even a rank Jacobite, would have discouraged the speaking, in the publick exercises at the theater, of any thing but what was merely scholastick, under pretence that it would not be prudent to venture upon any complements to the king and the royal family and present government, lest they should be hurt; yet as he was obliged to give way to it, I had the pleasure of hearing several copys of verses professedly on those subjects, in which were some very strong lines, that one would have thought, by the general notion given out of the way of thinking

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at that university, would not have been well heard there; and they were universally clapt, there not appearing among an audience of above 3000 people the least sign of dislike. This instance shews how little credit ought to be given to the representations spread abroad by the malcontents of the nation's being generally uneasy and disaffected. I am, &c.

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THE REV. MR. MEADOWCOURT TO DELAFAYE.

On the rejoicings at Oxford for the relinquishment of the excise scheme.

Merton College, April 16, 1733. The spirit of Jacobitism that for some years has slept at Oxford, has been rowz'd up again on the late foolish occasion. The night that the news came here that the excise bill was dropp'd, bonfires were made, moppets with stars and blue garters were burnt, and the university bells, with the bells of the parish churches, were rung all night. The next night the mob was entertained again with bonfires and moppets: great numbers of gowns-men appear'd openly in the streets, throwing money amongst the rabble, and reviving the old cries of Ormond, Bolingbroke, king James for ever, &c. On the third night the same cries were repeated, and the same pranks were begun to be plaid, till the vice-chancellor thought fit to send to the mayor to keep his towns-men in order, and the proctors ventur'd abroad and dispers'd the academical rabble. As I am sorry to see a return of that foul, malignant spirit, that I once resisted almost unto blood, so am I convinc'd from hence that the same measure of leaven is still fermenting in this learned lump, that the high ecclesiasticks are not to be reclaim'd by generosity and indulgence, and that nothing will satisfy the tory-clergy but the recovery of those church-lands and that church-power of which they think themselves sacrilegiously robb'd. What was done here, was done by the youth of this place. But the great boys at the university, like the lesser boys at school, would be void of all sorts of prejudices, were they not instill'd into them by the masters in one place, and by the tutors and governours of colleges in the other.

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Papers.
Extrakt.

HORACE WALPOLE TO BARON GEDDA *.

On the opposition to sir Robert Walpole, and to the excise.—Interference and intrigues of Chavigny with the opposition.

* Swedish
Minister
at Paris.

YOU would doe me great injustice if you did not attribute my long silence to so good a friend to the multiplicity of affairs in parliament, and particularly at a time when things have been carried on both sides with soe much spirit

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spirit and vivacity. But I can assure you, that notwithstanding the artfull representations, and hopes of our enemys to gett the better, I was never under the least uneasiness for the consequence of these troubles; for as it is well known, that the king our master has never had any designs, and never will have to attempt any thing against the liberty and laws of this nation; and his minister never did, and never will give any advice contrary to the constitution of the country and the well-being of the people; it is impossible that the false insinuations of the disaffected and discontented should have any greater effect, than to delude the ignorant and misguided people for the present, till things should be putt into a clear and just light. The affair of the excise, although calculated to no other purpose than to procure an honest and fair collection of the duties on tobacco and wine, which are really paid by the people, but lost in a great measure to the publick, on account of the variety of frauds in the collection, occasioned a more than ordinary convulsion in the nation, on account of the groundless suggestions of our enemys, as if every thing necessary for life was to have a new tax upon it, which were artfully stired up by the multiplicity of merchants that would loose by the correction of frauds, and promoted by the malcontents disappointed in their views. However, as this matter was in an honourable manner withdrawn, and the country gentlemen were convinced that the intended excise was founded on an honest principle to prevent frauds, and with a view to ease them of the burthen of the land-tax, which they had borne so many years, the design of the enemies of the administration, by his majesty's resolution and courage, have proved entirely abortive; and things, I think, are, notwithstanding the industry used to keep the nation in a ferment, upon as quiet and firm a foot as ever.

I am persuaded from what you write to me, as well as from the experience I have had of the cardinal's integrity and discretion, that his eminence gave orders to monsieur Chavigny not to concern himselfe any ways in these disturbances. But I can assure you, that notwithstanding these orders this minister has been as industrious as possible, by a most notorious conduct not only to foment these troubles, but alsoe to make them appear abroad much greater than they are, in order to give the worst impression and opinion of his majesty's affairs; and for that purpose on one side he has constantly frequented those persons that are most inveterate against his majesty's government and administration, acted in a strict confidence with them, and especially with lord Bolingbroke and his particular intimates; has received his intelligence from them, given the most malicious turns, in prejudice of those that serve his majesty,

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to every thing that has passed in parliament ; and constantly alarmed the rest of the foreign ministers, as if the government was in the greatest danger, or at least the administration could never stand. He lives, eats, and drinks with the enemys of the king's government, and after a bottle, carries his liberty so far as to joyn with them, as we are informed, in talking treason.

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No sooner has any body felt the disgrace of the court, but he immediately finds a kind welcome from monsieur Chavigny. Lord Stair, with whose character you are well acquainted, and whose haughty intriguing character hath drawn upon him the displeasure of the king, was immediately upon it extremely caressed by and taken into the friendship of this minister, notwithstanding his lordship's known antipathy and inveterate aversion to the French nation ; and others that have found the same fate from their opposition to the king's measures, have met with the same kindness from Chavigny, as if by their behaviour they had done what would be agreeable to the French court. In short, he is, as I hinted before, the creature of lord Bolingbroke, his devoted admirer and disciple, describes him as the ablest, the honestest, and the best of men ; and every body that is no friend to that lord is a knave, a fool, or the weakest of men in monsieur Chavigny's eyes.

In concert with this lord, this French minister has, as we have good reason to believe, undertaken to foment a convulsion in this government, and a war in Europe. In order to bring about the first, he encourages all persons and practices against the court ; ridicules, blames, and decrys all the English ministers ; paints them on all occasions as having lost their parts as well as their credit, as being so odious to the nation, and in so tottering a condition that their fall is inevitable ; extolls their enemys as able men and good patriots, and as having concerted such measures as cannot fail of success. He has undertaken in concert with lord Bolingbroke, as we are informed, to engage to foment a war, as far as is possible, as what may embarrass this nation, and in consequence the ministry extremely. For that purpose, in conversation with his confidants, he describes us as well as Holland to be exhausted, and in so weak and divided a condition, as not to be able to take any vigorous measures in defence of ourselves, and much less to support our allies if called upon. But to remove all objections he artfully suggests, that in case a blow is struck that does not immediately affect this nation or the Low Countries, he flatters himself that we shall keep at a distance ; shall, in effect, on account of our divisions, the small credit of the ministers, and the little resource which he pretends

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tends we have in our finances, abandon our allys, and be glad to keep our neck out of the collar.

This is a language that he is so fond of, that he does not only hold it to particular persons in confidence, but ventures to talk to the same purpose even to the face of the king's servants; and in case he is contradicted in his vain and extravagant surmises, he represents the persons that presume to have so much courage, as enemys to France, and as such as only putt on a good countenance in a bad cause. In case he is suffered to talk thus impertinently, and without an answer, and with a silent contempt, he immediately plumes himself upon it; thinks himself all triumphant, and looks upon such a silence as a certain concurrence in his opinion. Then he struts and looks big, swells with the thoughts of a noble war, and of supporting the glory of France, which he says cannot be done without an immediate war. All this while he continues a certain suppleness and grimace towards some of the ministers, of which I am one, pretends he avoyds importuning them, while he is night and day with their enemys, because they are so taken up with parliamentary and other affairs, that he would not incommode them. Thus while this poor creature, as you know he really is, (any otherwise than as he represents so great a monarch,) is acting the part of a Charlatan, a part entirely unworthy of the character he bears, and I am persuaded both contrary to the inclination and orders of the cardinal; monsieur Chauvelin looks upon himselfe as the most refined, the most capable, and the deepest politician, as being able to create a flame in Europe, and a civil war in England.

In the mean while his artifices and little tricks are thoroughly known and equally despised, neither will any notice be taken of him by way of complaint to his court or rebuke to himselfe; and if he has that mighty power he assumes, and does not doubt of effecting to bring on a war in Europe, we shall patiently expect the blow, but not without being prepared to defend ourselves, and to make our engagements good with our allys. But what is most extraordinary in this unaccountable conduct, is that while he every day of his life acts a part which ought to send him from hence, and make us insist upon his being recalled, I am lately told he has complained of Mr. Pelham, as having held a discourse to the disadvantage of France, and made such an impression on your court to Mr. Pelham's prejudice, as if they had some thoughts of demanding his recall. This matter having been founded, is found to be entirely false with regard

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regard to the pretended discourse of Mr. Pelham *; and indeed it is impossible for any body, on all occasions, to express himselfe with more regard than that gentleman does towards the French court, where he has met with particular civilitys, and is dayly proud of them, with more attachment personally towards his eminence and monsieur Chauvelin. But is it not amazing that such a creature as monsieur Chavigny, who observes no measures here, who even is often very free with the person of the cardinal himselfe, as being the author of all the disgraces which France, according to him, suffers by his meek and pacifick temper, should intimate any thing to the prejudice of a young gentleman that is, by his comportedment, agreeable to every body in all places?

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THOMAS PELHAM.

Opens a correspondence with one Martin, a Roman catholic priest.

SIR,

London, November 10th, 1733.

THERE are many secret intelligences which I have troubled you with; and although none have hitherto turned to any great account, I cannot but think, in this time of general commotion, all offers are to be entertained which can possibly tend to any discovery. Among the rest, I think I sent you a letter from one, who then signed *Ed. Hungate*, from Compeigne, and directed him to correspond with you. I have since received another letter from the same hand, but signed *Ed. Martin*, which I take to be the person's true name, and he is one that I formerly knew in England, and, from former correspondencies, not altogether uselesse. I remember and knew his hand-writing; he is a popish priest, of a good family of that name in Suffolk. He now offers service of great consequence, as he represents it, and his proposal is to come over directly to England, if I will send him wherewithal to bear the expences of his journey. His present addresse is *A Monsieur Martin, chez les Jacobins au Mans par Paris*; and from thence his letter is dated: and I observe on the cover to his letter there is a post stamp, *du Mans*, and wrote on it *Franc, Jusqu'à Paris*; and this letter directed to me, I should fancy, could not passe through so many hands unobserved. However, sir, I know no way of corresponding with him, with any degree of safety, but through your channel. I have, therefore, here inclosed a letter to him, open for your perusal, to be sealed and forwarded to him, and directed him to come privately to you as you shall appoint; and pray give

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* Thomas Pelham, secretary to the embassy at Paris.

him

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him all assurances of secrecy, and safety, and reward. If, upon talking to him, you find it material, and he insists upon it, pray give him what he demands, and send him forward for England. If he is willing to open and explain himself to you, it will be of the same use, and I should like it better, for it will not be the first time that I have been drawn in, under these kinds of pretences, to bear the expences of their couriers both to and from foreign parts.

As for your second, Mr. Sempill, I agreed with him for 200 l. per annum as long as he should render service to satisfaction, which I forgot to desire you will pay him, and lett him know you have such orders, and whatever mony you disburse upon these accounts, pray draw upon me for. I paid this week a bill of 50 l. drawn by our old friend Sample; pray lett him know no more will be accepted or paid. I think he should not quite starve; and if you will lett him know you will pay him about 50 l. per annum, and no more, it is but justice: and 'tis wonderful how the fool could think to draw bills upon me by the common post, and with his own hand, and not be discovered.

Let Mr. Martin know, whatever he thinks of sending me must come through your hands by a courier. It is strange such men should think of venturing such correspondences by the post.

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London, November 15, 1733. On Sunday last I had wrote the letter to you which accompanies this, and waited for the going of the messenger. I have since received another letter this morning from the same person, transmitted to me by lord Walgrave; but as I had already taken the liberty to give you the trouble of this correspondence, and as lord Walgrave is often at Fontainebleau, and may be absent from Paris when the gentleman comes, I chose rather to continue it with you, than trouble his lordship unnecessarily. You will be pleased to acquaint lord Walgrave with this, with my humble respects. Be pleased to seal up the letter to Mr. Martin, and convey it with your proper orders in the safest manner to him.

Mr. Martin in his last letter to me mentions one *Courteville*; I know the person he means; desire him in particular to explain himself upon that subject.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

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Desires that Martin may be sent to England.

MY LORD,

London, January 31st, 1733-4.

I Have waited for the sending of a messenger to return you my thanks for the trouble your lordship has had in relation to Mr. Martin's correspondence. By his last letter, he is so very pressing to come over to England, and promises such services, that I think he had best be sent over. I beg, therefore, your lordship will immediately send to him, order him to come over to England, and be pleased to furnish him with 50 l. for his journey, and draw upon me for the money.

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It is not improbable that this Martin may have been the same person who, in the following anonymous letters, announced the design of a lunatic Roman Catholic to assassinate Sir Robert Walpole. They are without the date of the year, directed to Sir Robert Walpole in Arlington-street; which proves that they were written after 1725, when the minister was made knight of the Bath, and before 1730, when he transferred his residence from Arlington-street to Downing-street. The minister observes, in one of the preceding letters, that he knew Martin and was acquainted with his hand-writing.

Monday, April 24. What I am now going to tell you will very much surprise you; and though it is a matter in which I am to be very tender and circumspect, as far as the station of life in which I am, and my conscience will permit, I will render you all the service I can. I am a priest in the church of Rome, and have a penitent who has suffered lately very much in the charitable corporation, even to the ruine of his fortune: this, with some other losses, has made him so desperate, that he has often owned to me, in confession, that he is under frequent temptations of laying violent hands on himself, being unable to struggle with poverty. I severely rebuked him, and gave him all the good advice I could, by using arguments to deterr him from so impious a design. On Saturday last he was with me when the publick printed papers came in; and upon reading the letters of the persons who hanged themselves last week in Southwark, he very much admired their resolution and bravery, and seemed even to justify the cruelty in the killing a child. We argued very warmly on the matter, when he declared, with unusual vehemence and passion, that, if he

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should come to a resolution of killing himself, he would not dye alone. Surprised with this extravagance, I asked him what he meant; he replied, I will take that dog W——e with me, and said he had as much resolution as any Felton whatever. Amazed at this declaration, I told him, that if he would be so wicked as to kill himself, he had no right to take away another man's life. To which he answered, If I am to be damned, as you say, for killing myself, I can be no more for any body else, and I shal render very great service to my country. To which he added, If I had been under the same misfortunes last summer I could have killed him twenty times a-hunting; and you may be sure, as I should doe it with a resolution of dying myself, I would not be taken alive. I conjured him with tears in my eyes to lay aside those impious thoughts, and to submit himself to Providence.

After this he parted in better temper, and I was pleased with a promise he made me of endeavouring to struggle with his temptations; however, being very uneasy on this account, I made him a visit last night, when, to my mortification, I found him relapsed, and strongly posselt that it was lawful to kill himself and any body else whom he should judge an enemy to his country. This principle makes me remember a question of conscience, which he put to me about a month agoe: whether or no it was not lawful to kill a tyrant or publick oppressour, when he could not be brought to justice by ordinary means. I told him, that though the Greeks and Romans, who were heathens, admired what they called tyrannicide, that christianity had abolished all sentiments of revenge; that the same religion which had commanded us to forgive our enemies, would not permitt us to kill them. He seemed for a little while to acquiesce to these arguments, but immediately resumed his former sentiments. The man is in his temper reserved and melancholly, but withall very cholerick, and in his notions of government a very great republican; of which principle there are too many in England of our communion. He seems to me to be a little touched; and if this disorder of mind should increase, he is the most likely person I know to doe such a desperate thing, being one of the most determined and resolute men with whom I was ever acquainted. This affair has broke my rest to-night, and made me come to a resolution of letting you know this matter: this is all I can doe without naming the person, which woud be a crime in me equal to sacrilege, and for which the laws of our church have provided no less a punishment than burning alive. Thus, sir, I have done all I possibly can to serve you, and I humbly hope, in return, you will be so good as to keep this advise secret;
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for if it should come to be talked of, the party wou'd know that I had betrayed him, which wou'd be very fatal to my reputation; because all what has past between us, was either under the immediate seal of confession, or related to what he had confest before, which is the same thing, upon the trust and confidence he reposed in me as being his confessor.

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A. O.

P. S. I must once more conjure you not to lett this letter be known: it would be a very great satisfaction to be informed by some publick advertisement that this is come to your hands.

Fryday, April 28. My being very much afflicted for two days with the stone, is the reason that I have not sooner thanked you for the satisfaction you gave me, as I was under the last uneasines till I had given you notice, so it wou'd have continued, if you had not been so good as to advertise that you had received my letter. As to my having the honour of seeing you, it can be of no consequence either to you or me; there being nothing that I cannot tell you by letter, as well as by word of mouth; so that my not waiting on you proceeds not from any distrust or apprehension that you woud take advantage of my putting myself in your power, the cruel laws of queen Elizabeth being still in force. No, fir, such a thought cou'd not enter into my head, that my good intentions to serve you cou'd be so requited; nor is it any distrust of myself. I thank God he has given me the grace to be above any temptation, though life itself were at stake; but I am at the same time sensible how natural it is for you to press me to let you know who the person is, which in my case is impossible. I wou'd sooner bite out my tongue than break the sacred obligation I lye under of not revealing the person of my penitent, in which wee are to be so very cautious, as to say or doe nothing which can possibly, by making a discovery, bring him into peril or trouble. The least indiscretion or inadvertency, which should have that consequence, woud be equally punished, though no design appeared with a voluntary commission of that crime: of this we have many instances in our church; so that the uneasines of being prest to a thing with which it is impossible to comply, I hope will be a just excuse for my not waiting on you. If wee can divert him from this madness and secure you, it is all that is necessary; that being done, there can be nothing left on your side, fir, but curiosity, which I am sure you wou'd not gratify at the expence of my soul and body, who have no design but to doe good to you, and all mankind. In order to this I have acquainted his friends with the dangerous disposition of mind under which he

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labours, and have warned them to take care of him; so that he is narrowly watched to prevent his doing mischief to himself, and I hope to others. This is all I cou'd doe in this case; I cou'd not tell them of his design on any body else, that being permitted only to be communicated to the party immediately concerned; and for your further security, I am now perswading him to make a tour into Flanders this summer, where he has some very near relations in orders. It is a journey which he has had a mind to make for some years past, and I perswade him to it now on pretence of diverting his melancholly, which seems to grow stronger on him. If I can effect this, I design to goe with him, and will undertake to prevent his doing any mischief on this side the water this summer at least, being in hopes that the good advice he will meet with there, and time, will cure this disorder of his mind. You were pleased, sir, in your advertisement, in case I should come to you, not only to promise safety and secrecy, but satisfaction, by which I suppose you wou'd have me understand a reward. If you will believe me on the word of a priest, that was the least of my thoughts when I did myself the honour to write to you; what I did was purely out of a principle of conscience and humanity. Alas, sir, I am a poor old man, under vows of poverty, and have nothing to doe with money myself, beyond the necessities of life. My chief buisness here is to beg charity for others, the distressed families of catholics here, and the poor religious of both sexes abroad; on that account alone I shou'd be very thankful for any bounty you shal think fitt to give: the desire of doing good, especially to the distressed, being the only passion I have left, after having renounced the world so many years.

A. O.

P. S. I hope the account I have given will make you easy, and that you will be so good as to keep secret what has past between us.

May 8. If it will be any satisfaction to you, I can now inform you, that the person, of whose dangerous disposition I thought it my duty to give you an account lately, is at last perswaded to goe over into Flanders. I have taken a great deal of pains to bring him to consent, and I will hurry him away for fear he shoud change his mind, being resolved to goe on Fryday. It is my profession to beg, and I am obliged to ask whomever I think will give to the relief of the distressed. If you, sir, think I have done you any service, and are pleased to give any charity for the distressed, if you please to direct any small bill in a cover to Mr. Robert Osborn, at St. Margaret's coffee-house, King-street, Westminster, you will have the prayers of many good people, and particularly, &c.

A. O.

REMARKS

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REMARKS IN THE HAND-WRITING OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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On the part which Great Britain ought to take in the present situation of affairs.

1733.

December 24th, 1733. In considering what part it is most adviseable to Great Britain to take in the present situation of affairs in Europe, it will be necessary, in order to avoid prolixity and confusion, to reduce the whole consideration to as few points as possible; which I think may very properly be done under the following heads:

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Papers.

First, Whether we ought to comply with the demands of the emperour, and admitt the present war carried on against the emperour to be a *casus fœderis* upon our defensive alliances, and upon that foot enter into the war.

Secondly, How far the dangers that may threaten the liberties of Europe, and in consequence our own interest and security, call upon us to putt a stop to and oppose the progresse of the arms of the three crowns.

Thirdly, Whether the mediation of the maritime powers will prove effectual in putting an end to the present war; or, if that does not succeed, which of the two measures that seem now to offer is the most eligible to be pursued; viz. Whether we should endeavour to detach the king of Sardinia from France and Spain, by securing to him the Milanese; and then, in conjunction with the Imperial troops and the troops of Sardinia, endeavour to drive both branches of the house of Bourbon intirely out of Italy. Or, whether, if necessity and the circumstances of the emperour should compel him to think of complying with what has seemed all along to be the view of the queen of Spain, of dividing Spain from France by a marriage with don Carlos and one of the archduchesses, we should not rather choose to acquiesce in such an accommodation, than enter into an open war against France and Spain for the recovery of Italy, and for preventing the dangerous and ambitious views of the house of Bourbon.

As to the first article, it seems already to be determined for the present, by the measures we have enter'd into with the States General; and it is sufficient for my present purpose to say, that the resolutions taken jointly by the maritime powers may be very well justified when that is the question.

As to the second head, what part it may be incumbent upon us to take, exclusive of our engagements with the emperor, in defence of the common cause, and our own interest and security, it must be consider'd, at what time, and in what manner we shall enter into a war, if it becomes unavoidable. And here it must be allowed that Great Britain can neither with safety nor prudence enter

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ter into this war but in conjunction with the States. Lett us admitt that it is a common cause betwixt us; as they are more nearly and more immediately concern'd, it will be expected that they should go hand in hand with us, and unite in our common defence. I will not enter into the consideration of the advantages and prejudices that must attend our being ingaged in a war against France and Spain, and the Dutch continuing in a state of neutrality; they are too evident, and we must conclude it is what this nation cannot, will not bear.

What then must be done in this case? The Dutch still decline taking any part. It is to be hoped, that, although they would not suffer themselves to be forc'd into a war by the emperour, nor to be drawn into it insensibly by us, of which they conceived very great though groundless jealousies; if the common danger becomes very evident, and it shall appear that the views of the house of Bourbon are truly formidable, that the Dutch will be convinc'd by the common enemy to do what they could not hitherto be prevailed upon to think of. In the mean time it must be confess'd, that the maritime powers have acted very prudently and justifiably in the part they have hitherto taken.

But if the Dutch, from an incapacity of bearing the burthen of another war, of which, when once begun, no man can foresee or determine the conclusion; or not enough alarm'd with the views and engagements of the confederated powers, and lesse apprehensive of the common danger than it may reasonably be thought they ought to be, should persist in a resolution to try all means rather than ingage in a war, what part will it be advisable for Great Britain to take, separately or jointly with the Dutch, to putt an end to the present war, and at least to make the dangerous consequences as little fatal to the liberties of Europe as is possible? And I cannot but take it for granted, that in whatever measures are to be pursued, the maritime powers should endeavour to act in concert, that they may have greater weight in any accommodation, and be better able to support themselves in case of extremity.

MEMORANDUMS IN THE HAND-WRITING OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

On the marriage between an archduchess and the infant of Spain.

Orford
Papers.

IT must be admitted that the Imperial court has been all along divided upon the question of the marriages; and it may be supposed, that a deference for the opinion of Great Britain has had great weight in postponing that affair; and from the beginning of this year to this present time, the menaces of the

the Imperiall court have plainly tended to this single point. There seems likewise at present to be no doubt, but that the court of Spain is now dispos'd to make some overtures to us upon this head, if we show'd the least inclination to hearken to them. This will make us in some measure answerable for all the consequences; if, by dissuading, or at least diverting the emperor on one hand from the only expedient that he seems to have at present of extricating himself; and on the other hand, by slighting the offers of the court of Spain, we should be the principal authors of bringing things to an extremity, and of continuing the war.

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To the emperor we shall be inexcusable, if we obstruct this only measure of saving himself from destruction, and do not at the same time assist him in what he calls his just demands. To Spain our conduct will be thought most provoking, if we defeat their most favourite scheme, and rather choose to enter into a war against them, than submit to their terms of reconciliation with the emperor. And as to the court of France, I cannot see the least reason to conclude that they are at all inclin'd to this marriage, and therefore it ought not to be looked upon as a scheme concerted for aggrandising the house of Bourbon. As little it is to be apprehended, that if Spain was thus detach'd from France, that France would look upon it as a sufficient cause to carry on the war against the powers that would be united to support this scheme.

If the chief apprehension is, that such a marriage would tend to aggrandise the house of Bourbon, and make them hereafter upon future events formidable to all Europe, lett it be consider'd how great and imminent is the present danger, if the success of the arms of France and Spain should be carried much farther by continuing the war; and whether, unlesse it can be shown that there will be a sufficient power to resist them, united and allied, the course of another year's successful campaign may not make the house of Bourbon immediately masters of all Europe; in which case we should bring immediately upon ourselves the mischiefs which we only apprehend may happen in future times. If the danger to Europe arises from the union in the house of Bourbon, the separating them answers that apprehension. If the emperor and Spain had been reconciled before the war was declar'd, the war had possibly been prevented, at least had been lesse formidable.

All that we have lately seen is very expresse upon the concern France was under least Spain should have made up with the emperor. This marriage is mentioned in a most emphatical manner as an argument to induce the king of

Sardinia

Period V. Sardinia to submit to the hardships he so loudly complained of. It is said the
 1730 to 1734. marriage is carrying on *par l'entremise de l'Angleterre*.
 1733.

On the same subject.

Orford
Papers.

Don Carlos and the pragmattick sanction have been the cause of all the troubles in Europe for near twenty years last past.—Can they be reconciled, and how?—Has consanguinity or relation by marriages ever among princes outweighed the present interest of the princes concerned?—What has been hitherto the case between France and Spain?—What regard has France shewn to the court of Turin but for interest?—What effect has the alliance between the houses of Hanover and Berlin?—Would another marriage in those families make the friendship more certain and of longer duration than the ties of interest kept them together?—If Spain and don Carlos are brought to guaranty the pragmattick sanction, may not that prevent the troubles that are threatened by France upon that event?—If this marriage is to be looked upon as the cause of the house of Bourbon, what gave the alarm to France upon the first treaty of Vienna, which occasioned the treaty of Hanover?—The first point, to strengthen and secure ourselves at home.—The emperor distress'd but by his own neglect.—The allies exhausted at a great expence of men and money.—We continue in a state of mediation.

1734.

SIR CHARLES WAGER TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Approves not entering into the war until the new parliament is chosen,—but enforces the propriety of being prepared.

SIR,

January 7th, 1733-4.

Walpole
Papers.

GIVE me leave to make a remark or two. And first in relation to England's not entering into a warr till a new parliament is chosen; which is certainly very right, if it can be avoided; but will it not be necessary for us to make such preparations, especially by sea, as may prevent our being surpriz'd by a fleet of 50 or 60 French and Spanish men of warr in our chanell, who may be tempted, if they find us unprepar'd, not only to insult us, and block up all our trade, but to make a descent, if encourag'd by our malecontents at home with an insurrection;

furrection; and for which purpose they may send over by degrees great numbers of men to joyn with them? And I am told, that above 300 Irish have been not long ago landed at Harwich, who said they were deserters from the French army (and perhaps they were so); wherefore, I fear it will be necessary to have a good fleet equip'd as soon as the season of the year will admit, though there will be very great difficultys and very great expence in doing it. And in case a warr does not ensue, it will be said, as usuall, that we are at the same expence as if we were in warr, without doing ourselves or allies any service; and the discharging such a great number of men, after a few months service, would be attended with great inconveniencies and discontent: but, nevertheless, it seems to me necessary to be done. But if a warr can be avoided by any project of accomodation, in conjunction with the Dutch, so as to put a stop to the hostilities against the emperor by the confederate princes, we shall no doubt, by such delay, be more ready, should there be a necessity to enter into the warr, than we can possibly be without it. But, except the emperor, by his troops coming into Italy, (which I hope still is practicable,) can put a stop to the progress of the confederate armys, will they not be so elated by their successes this campaign, as not to hearken at all even to reasonable terms of accomodation? Therefore the third proposition of endeavouring to divide the allies, by bringing the Spaniards to consider what is really their truest interest, viz. to gain that by an accomodation which they are endeavouring to gain by force; and with the addition of so advantageous a match for don Carlos, without running the hazard of loosing what he has already; which should the emperor be successful (which is not impossible) may be the case, and by that means loosing the match too which has been so long desired.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Suggests to the Imperial ministers the best mode of proceeding.—Thinks that the emperor may be again induced to make a distinction between the king and parliament.—Imprudent conduct of the Imperial court.

DEAR TOM,

January 8—19th, 1733-4.

I Am afraid my application to you at this juncture may not be so successful as I most earnestly desire it might; because I am informed that the Imperial minister here, amongst a great variety of indiscretions which he daily discovers, though with a good view, but mistaken as a means to serve his master, is pleased to express himself much discontented with me, because I talked frankly and honestly

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honestly to him; and seriously desired, that however unfortunate the situation of the emperor's affairs might be at present, and however unable we might be to serve him in a manner suitable to his desires and necessities, yet, I say, I seriously desired that our friendship might continue; and that the emperor would not, in any expedients necessary to extricate him out of his present difficulties, do it in a manner to disoblige the maritime powers, who must in the end be of use to him, if he would not absolutely break with them, or settle his affairs without them, which must prove at last destructive to the house of Austria.

I heartily wish, for the emperor's own sake, that despair and false pride may not precipitate them in the wrong measures formerly pursued here by monsieur Palm, of distinguishing between the nation and the ministry, the parliament and the king; which, as experience has shewn, will not turn out to their account. They may indeed find encouragement enough from some sort of persons here, as they did before, for that distinction; but it must come from persons that mean to serve their own particular views at the emperor's expence, being persuaded that their situation is such, that they have nothing to lose, if they are not able to gain any thing.

* Dutch ambassador.

I shall only add, that his majesty's speech has met with universal approbation; and that although I could wish that the Imperial court would use them better than they do, those severe expostulations by papers given to monsieur Bruyninx*, which are laid before all the States, may intimidate, but they exasperate at the same time, and will fling the Dutch into the hands of France, which I am sure was not the intention of the Dutch when I came away. One word intimated to monsieur d'Uhlfeldt, to be said to the pensionary in private, by way of expostulation, but in a friendly manner, would do more good than ten thousand deduced in strong rescripts that are to become publick. But the truth is, the Imperial court never did know, or will never condescend to know, how to manage the republic of Holland. I have preached, but preached in vain, to many of their ministers, the plain art of keeping a credit with the States. But I ramble too far.

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LETTERS FROM DELAFAYE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

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On the debate for 20,000 seamen.

Whitehall, Jan. 31st, 1733-4. I have nothing new to write to your excellency, but what you will see in the papers sent you from the office. I dined this day with a friend of mine, who is an experienced member of the house of commons; and talking of the good hours they keep, for we sat down to table before three o'clock, and that it lookt as if things went smoothly on, he told me the opposite party seems disconcerted, and not to agree among themselves; to which the behaviour of Sir John Barnard may have contributed, who, in the debate upon the 20,000 seamen, made a long speech to the very same effect as Sir Robert Walpole would have done, which was not expected from that gentleman, who is lookt upon as one of the contrary party. Sir Robert, I am told, never spoke better in his life than he did in the debate about addressing his majesty for a communication of the instructions to Mr. Woodward, &c. If the proceedings in parliament go on in this way, we shall probably have but a short session.

Waldegrave
Papers.*Extracts.*

Commends the king's speech.—Remarks on foreign affairs.—Mr. Keen's conduct highly approved.—Appointed envoy and plenipotentiary.

Whitehall, February 5, 1733-4. We are now, at last, dispatching our messenger, with a very nice negociation for your excellency to undertake, and I heartily wish you well through it. I should not think it to be the business of the French ministers to exasperate the maritime powers, by receiving their pacifick wishes in the same haughty manner that one of them writes about it. They are strange people: one day the cardinal advises, as it were, our being armed, and the next monsieur Shuffling * and his eminence are uneasy about it: we shall, however, go on our own way, and put ourselves into the posture becoming our own dignity; and as the king's speech seems to hint we must shew those, who, seeing and hearing at a distance, may be imposed upon, that we are not quite insignificant. All the world, I believe, agrees with the Garde des Sceaux, that this speech is a masterly piece: nothing was certainly ever better guarded, and yet has enough in it to shew that we shall not fit idle spectators, and let the balance of Europe be overturned. The king of Poland did not time his death right; he should have lived a twelvemonth longer, that we might have had a new parliament sitting.

* Chauvelin.

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I do not see how the French will ever lay down their arms, if they are not to do it till king Stanislaus is fixt on the throne of Poland: Dantzick, I doubt, will hardly stand a siege for his sake; and when he is quite fled the pilt, the elector of Saxony will fix himself: and I believe, by their silence at your court about those affairs, they are of that opinion. I see by your excellency's last letter, that they now own the Turks have been beat: this will make a paragraph in our dispatch a little out of season, and I doubt your excellency may find more of the like kind; the delay of it is the cause, for which you will be pleased to make allowance.

Mr. Keene may want a messenger at this critical conjuncture. So Wiggs goes on to Madrid, and carries to him the agreeable news that the king intends to appoint him envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, and that his allowances are to commence from this time: but this is only in a letter from me; for his credentials and instructions, which had been prepared, are not sent, because it may not perhaps at this time be proper to make an eclat at the court of Spain, (by which nothing will be meant,) by his taking a new character upon him. This mark of favour, which he coveted and deserves, will I hope give him fresh spirits, and he will not be displeased neither at Mr. Castres's succeeding him as consul general, of which, I am told, he has for some time past done the duty, and Mr. Keene generously gave him the allowance. Methinks the court of Spain should not know what is intended for Mr. Keene, else they may speculate upon his not appearing in his new character.

Your excellency sees that our parliament goes on very well; and I hope we shall not have much bustle this session.

On the motion against removing officers without a court-martial.

Whitehall, February 14th, 1733-4. Your excellency will find by the minutes of what past in both houses of parliament yesterday, that there was in each a brisk attack, upon a motion in which one can scarce think the opposite party could be in earnest, or have the least hopes that it could pass. It shews they do not value the censure of acting inconsistently with themselves, who one day will vote against keeping up any troops, and the next will in a manner be making those troops a durable part of our constitution, by establishing the officers in the possession of their commissions as it were for life. This motion in the house of commons was rejected without a division, and then several members, who were against it, thinking this matter was quite done with, went away;

away; otherwise your excellency would have seen the subsequent motion for an address thrown out by a greater majority; though that which appeared upon the division is sufficient to make us easy as to any further attempt the opposite party may think fit to make during this session.

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Corrects misrepresentations made by Chavigny, as if sir Robert Walpole had declared France to be the aggressor.—Account of his speech.

Whitehall, February 21st, 1733-4. It was a satisfaction to receive a relation of what had passed in your excellency's and monsieur Van Hoeye's joint conference with the cardinal, and we expect the further account you promise. I doubt not but the manner in which you executed your instructions has met with entire approbation here. It is a good step that it should be owned that the honour of France is satisfied, for nothing is so difficult to settle as a point of honour. The demands of the allies to be talked with, will, I fear, still make it no easy task to bring matters to an accommodation.

Decyphered.

Another obstruction to so good a work is the disposition of the ministers abroad. If it be from monsieur Chavigny, as is most probable, that the cardinal had his intelligence, that one of the ministers declared in the house of commons that France was the aggressor, monsieur Chavigny must have been imposed upon by a misrepresentation from his friends of the opposite party, or have willingly misunderstood the report that was made him of what had passed in that house in the debate about addressing for the instructions to Mr. Woodward, &c. Some of those gentlemen declaimed upon a favorite topick of theirs, that by a multiplicity of treatys we have entered ourselves into difficulties. We have treatys with France, by which we are to furnish them succours; and we are by treaty under the same obligations to the emperor; so that to fulfill our engagements, we must now give succours to both. To which sir Robert Walpole answered by making a very just and true distinction, that our alliances being only defensive, we were not to give succours to the aggressors; but he did not say who was the aggressor: and your excellency will easily believe that, after the answers given to count Kinsky, and what the king has said in his speech to his parliament, sir Robert could not be guilty of such an indiscretion, not to call it by a worse name, as to take upon himself to determine what his majesty has left undecided; which is so plain a proof of the falsity of this story, that it must convince the cardinal, if you should find an opportunity of making that observation to him.

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The other assertion of our having pushed on the czarina to what she has done in Poland is equally groundless; but if his eminency gives credit to reports and even to the relations of such ministers as France has here without weighing the probability of them, he will never be able to form a true judgement of things, nor consequently take right and proper resolutions. Supposing it true that an Imperial minister should have talked of the Dutch as the cardinal mentions, and perhaps of us too in the same way, is it not natural that an Imperialist should give out such hints, whether he had any foundation for it or not, to put the best face he could upon the condition of his master's affairs, in order to encourage his friends, and make others not so ready to take part with his enemys? It is from the words and actions of the party themselves, and not from others' discourse that a man ought to form his judgement.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Opposition disconcerted.—Cabals and misrepresentations of Chavigny.

MY LORD,

Cockpitt, February 11th, 1733-4.

Waldegrave
Papers.

THINGS goe extreamly well in parliament; the opponents are very much disconcerted among themselves, and the prospect of success in our future elections is as hopefull as can be desired. You will have seen by the votes the papers and instructions that have been called for and denyed: I shall only hint to you that severall insinuations, flung out by members of parliament, relating to the election of Stanislas and other matters, must have been suggested by monsieur Chavigny, and is the same discourse he has held formerly to me. He lives, eats, drinks, and dayly instructs the adversarys: but we are resolved not to complain; only I will say thus much, that as monsieur Chavigny has no instruction but from the adversarys, and the adversarys will never consider whether they tell him true or false, but as it serves their own immediate purpose, it is impossible that his court can depend upon what he says; and if they doe, they will be deceived, whether he intends to deceive them or no. For my own part I have had noe conversation with him upon the present state of affairs these four months, and when I doe see him, which is seldom, I talk of indifferent matters, being perswaded that every thing that I should say he will give a wrong and disadvantageous turn to it, and so he certainly will doe of any thing that falls from sir Robert or myselfe in parliament, so great is his
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attachement to our ennemys, and inveteracy, although unprovoked, against us, as we are informed from all quarters: but I ramble too much.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Warns him not to be deceived by the artful conversations of cardinal Fleury.

MY LORD,

March 28, 1734.

IN answer to your's of the 17th, you will excuse my troubling you with some few observations on the publick affairs. In the first place, I am fully persuaded (although some doubt a little) of the truth of the intelligence of the treaty signed the 7th of November last between France and Spain, and that what we have procured, which was sent your excellency, is an ample and substantial extract of it. I make as little difficulty to believe that the continuation of that correspondence is equally true, and that although some things have not exactly fallen out, though most of them have, agreeable to that intelligence; yet that has in my opinion chiefly arisen from certain incidents on account of the different views of the two courts, and not from the uncertainty of the information. From hence it follows, that my old friend the cardinal does amuse and abuse you in his protestations with regard to no engagements being contracted to our prejudice; whether opportunity or reasons of state, with respect either to the designs of France or Spain, will carry them into execution or not, I can't tell. It is (you will pardon me, my lord, on this occasion) observed, that the cardinal, by his seeming cordiality and confidence, stops your lordship's enquiry, and pressing him (though it should be done in a friendly manner) soe much as may be necessary, which is ascribed to your lordship's natural *suppléssé* and good breeding, for fear of offending. I don't find in your lordship's letter you have ventured to name Gibraltar, but content yourselve with assurances about our dominions and their dependencys, as if you was glad to be soon satisfied. You should not indeed provoke, but you should not let the French ministry think you are duped by a few fine words, though you are the best judge upon the spot.

Waldegrave
Papers.

It is this complaisance and good nature which, I apprehend, makes you conclude in one of your last dispatches, that the cardinal's explanation, though directly opposite to the answer given in form in the name of France and her allys, to our offer of good offices for peace, is to be look'd upon as the real answer. The answer itself says they will accept of our offers, as soon as they are in a condition to judge of our impartiality; which plainly implys they can't

yet

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yet judge, or conclude that we are impartiall, and consequently decline to accept our offices; and yet the cardinal says our present conduct is impartiall, and we are to proceed on that foot. How is this possible, if the answer is given really in the name of all the allys? Can this contradictory explanation be the rule for going on without the allys being again consulted? Or if it is Chauvelyn's answer only, will he lett the cardinal abide by this explanation? At least that minister's statements should have been known too, who can make his eminence, by gaining a little at a time, say and unsay as he (Ch—yn) thinks fitt. Your lordship's friendship and confidence should be cultivated with the cardinall as much as possible; but, believe me, it should not allways make you believe all he says: he has a mild, but a short, hasty, and friendly way of getting over a thing when he has no mind to discover, or rather has a mind to conceal, his thoughts; and for that purpose he often runs into a seeming confidential discourse on other matters, and avoyds the question. You should, in my opinion, hear that confidentiall discourse, and not interrupt him, but take an opportunity of returning to the charge, and not lett him think that what he does tell you should give satisfaction as to what he does not tell you, and is more materiall to know. Your excellency will pardon this free and friendly letter from your's most affectionately, &c.

P. S. The foregoing letter was wrote before the receipt of your last letters with a further explanation of the French answer; however I will venture to send it your lordship as a friend.

Nine o'clock at night. We have carried the address for giving his majesty power to augment his forces by sea and land, &c. by 248 against 147.

* Charles
Emanuel.

THE KING * OF SARDINIA TO GEORGE THE SECOND.

Au roy de la Grande Bretagne, monsieur mon frere.

States his reasons for concluding an alliance with France and Spain.—Haughty conduct of the emperor.—Objects to a marriage between an archduchess and the infant of Spain.—Places implicit confidence in the king.

MONSIEUR MON FRERE,

A Turin, ce 27 de Mars, 1734.

Walpole
Papers.

Copy.

AVANT d'expliquer à vôtre majesté le sujet de cette lettre, je dois la prier avec toute l'instance de vouloir bien selon son equité ordinaire, suspendre son jugement sur la resolution que je pris l'automne passé, et sur la démarche que je fais présentement dans la certitude, où je suis, de justifier auprès de

vôtre

vôtre majesté, et de tout le monde, mon constant attachement à son amitié et aux loix les plus rigides de la droiture et de l'honneur.

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1730 to 1734.
1734.

Vôtre majesté se souvient certainement que lorsque les affaires de l'Europe, encore mal affermies malgré les multiplicité des traités agitées de plus par des mécontentements particuliers, et chancelantes par l'attente prochaine de ces grands événements qui devoient en déterminer le cours, me firent penser aux précautions que je devois prendre dans des circonstances aussi critiques. Ma première résolution a été de m'attacher uniquement à votre majesté par un traité particulier que je luy fis proposer, animé à ce projet moins par les intérêts et les raisons politiques de ma maison, que par la ferme confiance que j'ai toujours eu dans la droiture et la probité de votre majesté, dont je me proposois de suivre les conseils et le sort.

Vôtre majesté trouva mieux de travailler elle-même à m'unir avec l'empereur; je luy confiai tous mes sentiments, et j'eus lieu de croire qu'elle les trouva raisonnables; mais le mépris bien marqué que la cour de Vienne affecta à mon égard dans tout le cours de cette longue négociation m'en firent enfin désespérer le succès. Je fis représenter aux tems et aux occasions mes justes plaintes à votre majesté sur l'irregularité de la cour de Vienne, et enfin avant que d'entrer en aucun autre engagement, je lui fis réitérer par mon ministre qu'une pareille conduite devant être regardé comme un refus absolu de mes demandes; je me regardois désormais comme dégagé de la négociation entamée, et libre à pouvoir prendre tel parti que j'aurois crû me convenir.

La mort du roy de Pologne, la vivacité des déclarations qui la suivirent, l'ardeur des engagements, les liaisons, les traités que cet événement produisit, faisoient voir la guerre inévitable, à moins que par quelque nouvel arrangement général on ne changeât essentiellement le système de l'Europe, et je ne crus pas devoir en résistant aux instances de la France m'exposer en cas de guerre à sacrifier dès le premier jour une bonne partie de mes états et de mes revenus pour la défense de l'empereur, qui refusoit manifestement de m'en faire aucun gré; ou bien dans l'autre cas à me voir encore une fois la victime de quelque nouveau traité, qui seroit fait sans mon concours et à mes dépens. C'est ce qui me détermina à m'unir avec la France dans la guerre qui étoit résolue contre la maison d'Autriche sans rien oublier dans la négociation, ni dans le traité de ce qui pouvoit mieux prouver mes sentiments toujours égaux et constans envers votre majesté, comme je suis en état de la convaincre par le traité même.

L'amour

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L'amour de v^{otre} majesté pour la paix, et les soins indéfatigables qu'elle s'est donnés pour la conserver pour le bien général de l'Europe et pour la tranquillité de ses sujets, lui ont fait voir avec chagrin le commencement de cette guerre, et la font penser sans doute à tous les moyens possibles pour l'étouffer dans sa naissance ; et v^{otre} majesté vient de donner un témoignage public de sa bonne volonté pour l'office de médiation, qu'elle a fait faire à la cour de France conjointement avec les états généraux des Provinces Unies. J'ai même d'affés bons fondemens pour croire que son empressement pour prévenir les suites dangereuses de la guerre, pourroit aller jusqu'au point de consentir, et de moiennner le mariage d'une des archiduchesses avec un infant d'Espagne, comme l'unique expédient pour détacher l'Espagne de la France, et mettre celle-ci dans la nécessité de faire la paix.

Je ne prétends point d'aprofondir les sécrets de v^{otre} majesté, ni me mêler de luy donner des conseils ; mais la parfaite amitié dont je ne me suis jamais départi, m'oblige à lui communiquer des connoissances que j'ai, et qu'elle ne peut pas avoir, qui lui feront voir que ce projet bien loin d'opérer en éffet, qu'elle en pourroit attendre, seroit au contraire très funeste à la liberté de l'Europe, et directement opposé au bien, aux avantages, et à la tranquillité de ses peuples. La probité de v^{otre} majesté ne me conseille de prendre aucune précaution pour luy ouvrir entièrement mon cœur que celle de sa parole roiale, qu'il luy plaira de donner, qu'elle ne fera ni maintenant ni dans la suite aucun usage à mon préjudice des sécrets, que je luy confiai en égard sur tout à la situation où je me trouve présentement.

Sur cette assurance mon envoyé extraordinaire luy communiquera les pièces authentiques qui la convaincront de la verité, de tout ce que je viens de luy avancer, et lui proposera en même tems un autre expédient, dont il pourra de même luy prouver l'utilité et la justice.

Il dépend donc entièrement de la parole que je demande à v^{otre} majesté de l'assurer de la realité de mes propositions ; je le souhaite particulièrement pour luy donner une preuve solide de ma parfaite et constant amitié et de mon entière confiance. Je suis avec toute la cordialité, &c.

M E M O I R S
OF
SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Original Correspondence and Authentic Papers.

PERIOD THE SIXTH.

From the Dissolution of the Parliament to the Death of
Queen Caroline.

1734—1737.

1734.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

*Ineffectual inquiry whether the emperor had ever promised to give the eldest
archduchess in marriage to an infant in 1725, and to place the pretender on
the throne.*

MY LORD,

Vienna, February 23d, N. S. 1734.

I Have attempted, but without any great appearance of success, to bring about
what was hinted to me in your lordship's letter of the 25th past, O. S.
The person from whom I might possibly get the best lights was not then in
business, and it is not improbable but the best hopes which Spain had, espe-
cially with regard to the eldest daughter, arose more from the promises and
assurances of one particular minister, than from any thing that the other mi-
nisters, or even the emperor himself, ever engaged for. But whatever those
hopes or engagements were, Spain absolutely insisted upon a yes or a no, as
to the eldest archduchess, in February 1728. This court answered that they
could not give a positive promise till the issue of the congress of Soissons was
known,

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known, as it was necessary to satisfy the allies of Hanover first in other respects. But when afterwards the issue of that congress was known, and Spain was separately upon the point of satisfying the allies of Hanover by the treaty of Seville, the queen renewed her instances again for a positive yes or no, which occasioned monsieur Koinsegg's memorial, and the marquis de la Paz's answer, just before the signing of the treaty of Seville.

It has been always denied here, that there was ever any article or engagement whatever about the pretender; and though the plain tendency of the articles which have been printed about trade, was to fortify and support the Ostend commerce, yet it is said that in no articles, secret or public, was that company mentioned: so that, my lord, though I will not presume to say that notwithstanding the many evidences and presumptions which amounted to moral certainties, as to the evil intentions of the courts of Vienna and Spain in 1725, that their engagements were less pernicious in fact than the world had reason to believe, and they themselves gave out, particularly Ripperda, to make matters desperate for ever; yet I am humbly of opinion, that whatever this court should of itself publish, as to those times, would not come up to the expectations of the world, unless all the wild thoughts and personal transactions of monsieur Sinzendorf were to be made known. I am rightly informed it would be doing pleasure to the emperor himself to let him know them, and as a proof of it count Kinsky has the most positive orders to desire a communication from England, of what may be come to his majesty's knowledge of that minister's supposed late transactions with Spain through the canal of Bolza.

It is said no bad use shall be made of such a communication; but I humbly leave your lordship to judge how far it may be adviseable for one court to enter into the private factions and particular views of the several ministers of another. I shall not, however, loose any opportunity of pushing the animosity of this in such a manner, as to obtain, if possible, the publication of any thing that may be for his majesty's service; but I must again observe, that it will be very difficult, unless Spain shall think proper to make an answer to the reply of this court to the Spanish motives. If the queen had any positive engagement, she would surely have published it; but conscious, as it may be imagined, of her having been made to believe by Ripperda, and he by Sinzendorf, more than could be performed, she dares not to produce any thing; and, indeed, it is not well to be supposed, that this court, and particularly the chancellor,

cellor, would care, unless she did, to shew the world in what manner she had let herself be deceived for four years together.

Your lordship in being pleased to throw your eyes upon the map, will find a place called Altenburg, between the country of Tyrol and the Grisons, which will point out the passage through which the prince of Savoy may, as I mentioned in my last letter, possibly fall with a detachment from the army upon the Rhine, according to exigencies, upon one side of the Milaneze, while the enemy shall be taken up by count Mercy on the other.

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Substance of the principal information derived from the dispatches of Horace Walpole, on the real temper and situation of the Dutch in this important crisis. In the hand-writing of sir Robert Walpole. Superscribed "Horace's Letters."

BROTHER HORACE'S JOURNALL.

April 9—20th, 1734. In the 7th sheet.—What was said by the States with respect to the emperor was necessary for their own justification against the peremptory and haughty behaviour of the court of Vienna; what was said with respect to England, was necessary on account of our silence and backwardness to explain ourselves upon the preservation of the neutrality, and the Low Countries our common barrier.

Walpole
Papers.

8th. They confesse, that the marriage of the prince of Orange had given great umbrage to the States of Holland, but no influence upon their determinations. And that a notion was entertained, that the king as elector was too much biaised in favour of the emperor, and might be induced to draw the maritime powers into the war, and will not be persuaded, but if the king had exerted in a proper manner, he might have prevailed upon the emperor to agree to the neutrality, and to have given some attention to the accommodation, without peremptorily insisting upon their going into the war, and resolving not to give up any part of his dominions which had been so basely lost, &c.

9th. The king's forwardness to declare as elector, and readiness to send 5000 men, with other indications, had made great impressions upon the minds of the States, who did not understand their being forc'd into a war, while they plainly perceived that the emperor was resolved to take such steps, as should putt them into immediate danger, and engage them in such a manner, that the chief burthen of the war must fall upon the maritime powers, untill the emperor was undeceived in these hopes. He (the pensionary) was at a losse

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to know what steps could be taken, or what could be said to any purpose to France, whilst the emperor would not hear of good offices for an accommodation.

10th. The Greffier frankly said, they were neither able nor willing to go into a war, complained of the conduct of the emperor, but was more reasonable with respect to England, thought we ought to act more in concert, did not approve the weak proceedings of the States, but could not be alter'd upon account of the emperor.

11th. The pensionary insists upon credentials for the satisfaction of others; monsieur Buys insists upon the king's coming into the neutrality.

12th. The haughty behaviour of the emperor, and giving no satisfaction upon severall accounts, has created a great aversion to the emperor. The specious declarations of France has extremely diminish'd the antient jealousies and hatred, and dispos'd them rather to trust to the promises of France, for their present security, than be plung'd into a war.

13th. They are of opinion that the emperor should be undeceived in his views and expectations, and given to understand, that since the war began from the Polish election, in which the maritime powers have no concern, and since the losses in Italy arose from his own weak and defenceless condition, it cannot be expected that England and Holland should go into a war to recover dominions for the emperor lost by his own neglect; and, consequently, that he should think of losing something to save the whole, whilst he is in no condition to withstand so formidable an alliance.

14th. Upon the principle of not being forced into the war by the emperor or drawn in by England, their last resolution was taken (with a jealousy from the message and Horace's journey). At the same time they are at a loss to know what to do, and spin out the time with long resolutions, to avoid giving a direct refusal to perform their treaties, but seem determined not to go into a war at present. The pensionary acquainted with our proceedings at the courts of Denmark and Sweden. Monsieur Luisius, the Prussian minister, presses from monsieur Grumkow the reconciliation of the two families by intermarriages. If the negociation began, a military man to be sent. Some regard to Berg and Juliers. Pensionary had twice mentioned this affair.

In the 16th sheet. The French ambassadour had made the pensionary a visit, inquir'd into the business of Horace's journey. The general answer agreed upon given him. The pensionary then discours'd him upon the propos'd accommodation, and upon Mr. Fenelon's making a merit of the good disposition

fition of France: the pensionary told him, great part of the emperor's dominions had been taken from him, they push'd matters with too great violence, that France should lett the maritime powers know the extent of their engagements, what would satisfie their honour, and content their allies, and how far they were resolv'd to push the war.

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17th. Count Uhlfeld desires a copy of the last resolution of the States. The substance told him. Inquir'd into what had pass'd; had not heard that he had press'd a declaration of war against France; insinuated as if the fault lay as much at our doors as of the States. Was told such insinuations were vain. He must be sensible they would not come into a war untill the emperor agreed to the neutrality, and consented that the maritime powers should first use their utmost endeavours for accommodating matters. Count Uhlfeldt grew more calm, and said, if the emperor could be brought to acquiesce in the neutrality, the declaration must be made by Mr. Finch. St. Saphorin's scheme for taking in 6000 Suisse communicated.

18th. Monsieur Wassenauer d'Opdam's conversation. Unalterably fixed for the present form of government, but no influence upon their present conduct. Inveighs against the emperor's provoking France in so defenceless a condition. Declares for a good understanding betwixt the States and England; our jealousy of them for France; their jealousy of us for the emperor carried too far. Declares against a war. We must act together, but at a loss for a scheme.

19th. A conference with monsieur d'Hallewyn, pensionary of Dort. Declares the same good disposition towards England as monsieur d'Opdam had done; but stronger diffidence for France. Imputes the sharpness of their expressions to the pensionary's temper and illness. Obstinate for preserving the neutrality, and wishes his majesty would be guarantee for it. Upon the question what was to be done if the emperor broke the neutrality, were we to make war upon him with France, was silenc'd. The question was, whether England and Holland should continue in their present situation, without taking any part at all, but expect the issue of this campaign? Whether they should by their mediation endeavour to bring matters to an accommodation? Or whether they should enter into the war? But he discover'd he had not the least design to enter into the war; and thought little was to be done by the maritime powers untill the success of this campaign should be seen.

21st. Count Sinzendorff propos'd as an expedient, that the emperor should consent to the neutrality, and the maritime powers in return furnish their contingents in money or troops, without declaring war against France or her allies.

This

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This proposal mentioned to the pensionary, but disregarded. Upon the whole, he thinks they are resolved to do nothing; but to avoid the fault's being laid upon them, they will insist that the emperor should consent to the neutrality, and that the maritime powers should try an accommodation, to spin out the time till they see the event of this campaign. Our care to avoid disputes, and proceed rather by verbal conferences than by writing. As this will be disagreeable to the emperor, it is submitted, whether it should not be said to the emperor, since others will not, England cannot alone bring the alliance upon her back, to the great expence and prejudice of the nation. To exhort him to consent to the neutrality; to keep up the appearance of agreement with the States; to allow the maritime powers to try the accommodation, in order to discover the intentions of France; and if their demands are exorbitant, thereby to engage both nations to take vigorous measures. If this cannot be, should not the emperor think of some private resource?

April 9—20th, 1734.—Demand that his majesty will declare to France his resolution to agree to the convention of neutrality. Emissaries of France suggest from the king's message and Horace's journey, that we were coming to a resolution to force them into a war. Greffier said, all things would still go well, provided we had no design to force them into a war.

April 10—21st, 1734.—Long memorials and answers in writing only increase the difference. Jealousy in the regents upon his coming. Credentials demanded. He came to learn the pensionary's and Greffier's sentiments in the present juncture; to clear up and explain any jealousies on account of the marriage, or other uneasiness from false representations. Their last resolution of the 16th inst. concerning the measures to be jointly taken, for preserving the neutrality and the barrier of the Low Countries. His majesty had no thoughts, by marrying his daughter, by any intrigue to meddle with the form of their government. The pensionary suggested, that it should be given out among the regents, that Horace came to learn the plan and sentiments of the States, with regard to measures to be taken for preserving the neutrality and the Low Countries. The answer being given, his commission was at an end, but stayed to hear what further orders from hence, but could be of no use without credentials.

The face of the country extremely altered. Jealousies relating to the prince of Orange. The haughty behaviour of the emperor. Strong apprehensions of a
 byasse

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byasse in favour of the emperour to their disadvantage. If credentials are sent, not a word of the princeesse royal and prince of Orange.

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In short, nothing will bring the republick into a war, and there is nothing they will not do to keep it out of the Low Countries.

1734.

HORACE TO THE QUEEN.

April 16—27th, 1734.—Our suspitions of their preferring France to his majesty, and their suspitions of our partiality to the emperour in their prejudice, are both carried too far. They will not take any part untill the emperour consents to the neutrality, and untill his majesty and the States have tried an accomodation, and untill then they will not say any thing to disoblige France, and will suspect we are not in earnest.

Count D'Ulfeild sees it is in vain to presse them to act a vigorous part. He thinks they have taken no resolution to act with France separately from his majesty, and are willing to come to a good understanding with us, if they find we are not resolved to encourage the emperour to force them into a war. The States of Holland separated till the 4th of May, N. S.

BROTHER HORACE'S LETTER.

April 19—30th, 1734. Vice-chancellour's of the empire representation to monsieur Bruyninx. Attributes the deplorable state of the emperour's affairs to the act of neutrality and renewal of it, by which the French, besides the great army upon the Rhine, had been enabled to form another of 30,000 men upon the Moselle, whilst the emperour's troops are lock'd up, &c. and therefore demands in the strongest manner they should fulfill their engagements. These instances make the States more determin'd, if possible, to adhere to the neutrality. The pensionary very much piqu'd that the emperour gives attention neither to the neutrality, nor to the offices of accommodation. But all protest they have no further concert or understanding with France, but will neither act nor talk with France in a proper manner as long as they have this diffidence and disagreement with the emperour.

SIR CHARLES WAGER TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Favourable state of the elections.

(Parson's Green, 6th of May 1734.) The news-papers which you have give you as good an account of the elections as I can do, and distinguish them as right

Walpole
Papers.

Extrah.

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right for the most part. We cast 'em up t'other day at fir Robert Walpole's, and then we had gained nine upon the ballance more than we had in the last parliament; and I have reckoned three gain'd since, and I suppose we shall still gain, so that your majority will be rather too great than too small.

DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

State of the elections.

DEAR HORACE,

Claremont, May 24, 1734.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

WE are returned very victorious from Suffex, and you may imagine are not a little pleased with it, considering the violent and strong opposition we mett with, and the bad success of our friends in other counties, as Kent, Cheshire, Hampshire, Yorkshire, Gloucestershire, Essex, &c. Norwich has done purely; I most heartily congratulate you upon it. Norfolk is by this time over, but I know not the event, but am not in much pain about it. The duke of Devon has done gloriously in Derbyshire, and Jennison and Middleton in Northumberland. Our parliament is, I think, a good one; but by no means such a one as the queen and your brother imagine. It will require great care, attention, and management to sett out right, and keep people in good humour. You do your part towards it by the great success in Holland. I told the queen the other day, that I was *tout à fait Horatien*; and indeed it is surprizing, without a compliment, how farr you have brought the Dutch. You will see my thoughts by my letter to lord Waldegrave. I hope you approve it; it has had great approbation from his majesty and my brother Harrington, who desired a copy of it before he had finished his own. I hope it will please our friends in Holland. Should you, during this negotiation, be disposing the States to declare, or att least to resolve amongst themselves, that if either power be unreasonable, by which the balance of power may be essentially asserted, the Dutch will in conjunction with the king take the proper measures to preserve it. This possibly would have a good effect both at Vienna and Paris. It is a thought of my own, and so you have it. I have ordered Delafaye to send you a copy of my lord Essex, and of one I have received from Tyrawley. Could any thing be done with Portugal, or how farr may we trust them with our applications to the emperor and France? I expect fir Robert in a few days, and am, monsieur le Trente, mon bon ami, ever yours.

MONSIEUR

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MONSIEUR DE LOSS * TO COUNT BRUHL.

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The prince requests permission to serve on the Rhine, an increase of his income, and a wife.

1734.

* Saxon minister.

Orford Papers.

Copy.

In cypher.

Translation.

TEN or twelve days ago the prince of Wales went to the antichamber, and requested an audience, which he obtained as soon as sir Robert Walpole, whom the king had sent for, was gone out of the closet. This audience is much talked of, and turned, as is said, on the following points :

1. To have permission of serving a campaign on the Rhine.
2. To request an augmentation of his income, the prince insinuating that he was in debt. N. B. Of 100,000 l. granted to the prince by parliament out of the civil list, only 36,000 l. is paid to him, the remainder is appropriated by the king.
3. He represented the necessity of a proper marriage.

To the first, the king made no reply. In regard to the second, the king is said to have given some hopes, on condition that he would behave better to the queen. It is reported the king was displeased with this step. Many persons suspect that the opposition advised the prince to act in this manner. *Relata refero.*

M. JOHN † TO M. VON HAGEN.

† Danish envoy.

The queen and sir Robert Walpole exhort the king to moderate his anger against the prince of Wales.

London, July 16, 1734. The queen strives to prevent the ill consequences likely to result from the late conversation between the king and prince of Wales. Hopes are entertained of satisfying the prince by a sum of money for the payment of his debts. But as the article of his marriage is that which most interests him, and as it is precisely that which will not be granted, it will be extremely difficult to prevent the business from being laid before the ensuing parliament. Those who advised the prince to take this step probably calculated that an irreconcilable quarrel would have been the consequence. But sir Robert Walpole, whom the king consulted before he admitted the prince, disposed his majesty to moderation on so delicate an occasion.

Orford Papers.

Copy.

In cypher.

Translation.

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THE EMPEROR TO COUNT KINSKI.

1734.

*Accuses the Walpoles of being the cause that he is shamefully deserted by England.—
Threatens to publish throughout England a justification of his measures, and to
appeal to the nation against them.*

Walpole
Papers.
Translation.

Vienna, July 31, 1734. I have been confirmed, by your's of the 13th, in the opinion which I before entertained of the sentiments of the English court. You are better acquainted than any other person, with how much sincerity I have desired to renew the ancient and natural system with the two maritime powers. I had good reasons to mistrust the conduct of the Walpoles after the conclusion of the treaty with England on the 16th of March 1731; but the strong and repeated assurances which I received that it was intended to fulfil the guaranties, took away my doubts and fully satisfied me. From that time I have never failed in paying a due attention to the king and the royal family, and doing every thing which could be agreeable to the present administration.

As soon as the king of Poland was dead, my first care was to communicate to the king of England the principles on which I acted. I took no step without making a previous and confidential overture to him, and I followed in every instance his advice. In conformity to his representations, I entered into an accommodation with the present king of Poland. In deference to his counsels, I sent no troops into Poland; and I consented to every measure which the king of England recommended in regard to don Carlos; and while my conduct has excited jealousies in others, I have no reason to be satisfied with the manner in which I am treated. When the discontents against the Walpoles were carried to so great a height, and when Chavigni and Montijo endeavoured to increase them, you, on the contrary, exerted all your efforts in favour of the court, although even at that period I was apprised that the Walpoles would return my services with ingratitude.

England has never failed to give me promises, both before and since the commencement of the war; but instead of fulfilling them, she has even favoured my enemies. This behaviour, however, has not induced me to address myself to the king of England otherwise than in the most amicable terms, and to represent to him, in the most affecting manner, the imminent danger which threatens to overwhelm not only the house of Austria, but all Europe, and more particularly his royal family, as well as the honour and prosperity

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prosperity of the English nation: but these representations have not hitherto had any effect.

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This fatal inactivity has now continued for eleven months; and although the evil might have been easily prevented, yet the whole is left exposed to the most dangerous extremities. These very extremities, of which England is the occasion, are made a pretext to palliate and excuse the want of assistance, and this want of assistance is urged as an inducement to compel me to accept an unjust and dishonourable peace.

It is not easy to conceive any measure less equitable and more pernicious; and it must appear evident to every impartial observer, that the English ministry, in direct contradiction to the good intentions of the king, has made overtures to me, with no other intention than to suffer my hereditary states in Italy to fall under the dominion of Spain; and I am fully convinced that those who persuade the king to act in this manner are not better inclined to the king and to the nation than to me.

What affects me most sensibly is, that, (as I see by your secret relation,) with a view to conceal these sinister intentions, many falsities are circulated against me. However averse I may be to adopt measures, which, although derived from good motives, may be misrepresented to the king, I may still find myself compelled to act in that manner; for it can never be expected that, in addition to the losses which I suffer, I ought also to bear the blame of being the cause of them; and that I am indifferent to the attempts made to prejudice against me the English nation, for which I entertain so high an esteem.

Having, therefore, many reasons to believe that the Walpoles have, for some time past, prevented the good intentions of the king in my favour, my views have been always directed on one side not to do any thing of which the king could complain, as if I were endeavouring to excite the nation against him, until I was sufficiently acquainted with the situation of affairs; and on the other side, if the private interests and intrigues of the Walpoles should prevail over the obligations of the English nation, and the security and glory of the public good, to be prepared with sound and vigorous answers to all the arguments advanced in justification of such an infamous proceeding. With this view I have been ever ready to refute the objections drawn partly from the bad situation of affairs in the Low Countries, and partly from the private and unjustifiable negotiations of Boltza. I have considered it also as no less expedient not only to employ every effort in my power for the purpose of shewing, that the maritime powers do not lie under the necessity of employing as many forces

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as they maintained during the last war, and I have collected all the representations made to Robinson before and since the rupture, that if it should be thought proper to lay before the public the whole series of affairs, the ill conduct of the Walpoles may be made manifest. For the same reason, I unwillingly consented not to publish all the pieces which relate to the answer to the Spanish manifesto, and I now evidently perceive the hidden and perfidious views of the English ministry in opposing the publication. *****

I have therefore strictly ordered all my ministers to be extremely reserved towards Robinson, Hamel, and Bruyninx, to insist on the execution of the treaties, not to make any verbal explanation, but, on the contrary, to declare positively that no business will be transacted with them except in writing.

You have therefore acted right in having counteracted, *there where it was necessary*, the insinuations of the Walpoles against me, and in developing to all the real state of the question, and by whose means affairs have been brought into their present dangerous situation. I also entirely approve your resolution to address yourself to the king himself; and to convince him of the extraordinary attention you have always shewn not to do any thing which might be disagreeable to him; and at the same time to represent to him the necessity which you are under of no longer permitting the circulation of those ill-founded reports, which are not only contrary to my interests, but also to my honour, and at the same time no less destructive to the true prosperity of his royal family.

The king himself will have no difficulty in judging whether I or the house of Bourbon are most inclined to court his friendship. Let him know that I never will consent to the plan of pacification now in agitation; that I had rather suffer the worst extremities than accede to such disadvantageous proposals; and that even if I should not be able to prevent them, I will justify my honour and my dignity, by publishing a circumstantial account of all the transactions, together with all the documents which I have now in possession.

If all these representations produce no effect, and if the Walpoles continue their unjustifiable conduct, means must be taken to publish and circulate throughout England our answer to the offer of good offices which was not made till after the expiration of nine months. You will concert with count Uhlfeld the best method to effect that purpose, and contrive that the answer shall appear to have been first published in Holland without our concurrence. But should the court of London proceed so far as to make such propositions of peace as are supposed to be in agitation, you will not delay a moment to publish
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and circulate throughout England a *pro memoria*, containing a recapitulation of all negotiations which have taken place since 1718, together with the authentic documents, detailing my just complaints, and again reclaiming in the most solemn manner the execution of the guarantees.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Thinks it necessary that France should be induced to propose terms of pacification with the emperor.—Will write to baron Gedda to that purpose.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, August 6, 1734, N. 3.

I Have little to add to the inclosed letter * to her majesty, left open for your perusal, besides that I am persuaded, that as the disposition of persons and things are here, there is no other means of getting into a tract for putting an end to the present troubles, than by bringing upon the *tapis* a scheme to negotiate upon, which I am afraid can only be done by inducing France to open the conditions for making a peace. It is very possible that those conditions, when proposed, will not be reasonable, or such as can be at first accepted by the Imperial court: but when his majesty and the States shall have once layd them before the emperor, the consequence of that step may be, that altho' his Imperial majesty will not give into them, yett as he will begin to be undeceived in his expectations that the maritime powers will be obliged to enter into the war to recover for him all he has lost in Italy, he from thence may naturally be induced to turn his thoughts to some expedient in earnest for an accommodation; and that of a reconciliation with Spain, by means of a marriage, will most probably occur, as what he has certainly often meditated, and threatened us with. This being the case, I see no ways of getting France to explain herself, than by appearing to shew towards her an equall confidence with that she professes towards us; and, to encourage her favourable disposition for peace, letting her apprehend at the same time the danger of a generall war if matters are pushed to extremitys.

Besides the letter I have now drawn to be wrote by me to monsieur Gedda for that purpose, I think you should hold the same language to Chavigny; and therefore I hope you will promote the sending this letter; for it seems to me ridiculous to continue any longer in this disagreeable situation, that the emperor should reproach us on one side for not fulfilling our guarantys by making war, and the French at the same time reproach us for not being cordially disposed to make peace. If we can persuade France to speak, I will open by degrees

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Private.

* This letter
is missing.

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degrees my thoughts more fully to you, as the scene shall open. At present I shall only add that I am, &c.

You will consider whether it is better for us that France should open herself to the pensionary about the terms of peace, or to his majesty's ministers: perhaps in this case it may be best for him to take the lead.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Endeavours to follow his lordship's orders to procure a cardinal's hat for the bishop of Namur.—Intrigues of the bishop, who obtains the protection of the empress and an audience of the emperor—and is deputed to England.

MY LORD,

Vienna, Sept. 8, N. S. 1734.

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In cypher.

IN consequence of what your lordship did me the honour to write on the 17—28 March 1732-3, I have been attentive in giving the bishop of Namur the best advice and assistance I could in carrying on the scheme which he proposed, for obtaining a nomination to be a cardinal. I found him inclined, at his arrival, to break the matter gently, and by degrees, through the canal of the marquis de Rialp, all alone. At his own desire, I spoke to that minister of the king's recommendation; I did not fail, however, to acquaint the bishop that the surer way, in my opinion, to succeed was to go roundly to work with all the ministers, in which I promised to second him; and it was probably upon his not caring for this method that it was not long before he perceived there were great obstacles, from one quarter or other, in his way. He then, upon discovering that the marquis de Rialp had some personal distast to cardinal Cienfuegos, thought of procuring for himself the Imperiall embassy at Rome; which I too, at his instance, after having obtained his majesty's permission, seconded; and at the same time gave count Sinzendorff, as the bishop desired, a copy, though not a literal one, of your lordship's letter abovementioned to me, and I send a copy of it separately under cover to Mr. Weston. The bishop thought that his majesty's recommendation, given in this way, might, if it failed of the hat, get him at least the embassy, which might lead in time to the other. But count Sinzendorff had other views: he wants the embassy, if not for his son the cardinal, at least for count Plettemberg, and the hat for the bishop of Passau, whose vote, as canon of the church of Saltzbourg, he hopes, by that means, to secure in favour of himself, or of his son the cardinal, to be archbishop of Saltzbourg; and the bishop of Namur found that the marquis Rialp gave, himself, into this scheme for the sake of promoting, by count Sinzendorff's

Sinzendorff's means, count Harrach, auditor of the German nation at Rome, to a good bishoprick in Hungary, which would make a vacancy of that auditorship for the count's son.

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The bishop, finding himself thus disappointed in those two quarters, had the address, by his assiduity, and attention towards the governesses of the archduchesses, to insinuate himself into the good graces and opinion of the empress, and that, if I am not mistaken, at the expence of both the chancellor and the marquis de Rialp, by heightening the danger, as is the common opinion here, of those gentlemen's favouring the marriage of don Carlos with the eldest archduchess, and by insinuating to her Imperial majesty the use that he, (the bishop,) if promoted to the dignity of a cardinal, might be of to her future interests. All which he inculcated so well in several private audiences that he had of her, and enforced his insinuations with such remarks as he made upon the mismanagement and ill government of that part of the ministry in particular, that he induced her Imperial majesty to get him likewise a private audience of the emperor; to whom he presumed, upon encouragement, to present several schemes in writing, the materials of which were furnished him by count Rosenberg, for the amelioration of the emperor's domestick affairs. This, and his disinterestedness with respect to the administration of his own bishoprick, procured him such a credit with the emperor, as to order monsieur Bartenstein to cultivate an acquaintance with him, and to talk to him upon affairs in general.

Thus matters stood, when the bishop desired me to give monsieur Bartenstein the copy abovementioned of your lordship's letter, in a manner as if it were to inform myself only whether Sinzendorff had ever made a report of such a paper. I did so; and finding that some report had been made of it, desired him, at the bishop's farther request, to speak himself of the nomination to the emperor. Soon after the bishop acquainted me with a project of obtaining leave from the emperor to go to England, as a person equally devoted to both courts, in order to bring them to a better understanding than they, he imagined, were.

I must own, my lord, from the very manner in which he opened this matter to me, I judged it was less a project of a thing to be done, than what was actually agreed upon; and upon the bishop's saying farther that his promotion would be the sure effect of such a mission, and then he might not be without hopes of being employed in affairs of state here, I told him very plainly that, as I knew of no misunderstanding, as he imagined, between the two courts, which made me think such a mission was unnecessary; so likewise, if there were

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any, it could not be but on account of such impossibilities, which it would not be in his power, or in that of any man alive, to remedy; and that if his design was only to get into the management of affairs of state here, I could not well tell how far that would be looked upon as agreeable to the king's intentions in advancing his promotion, which had proceeded from the service his majesty thought it would be to have a person of his character at the court of Rome.

He appeared disappointed at this explication: however, a few days after, he returned to my house with great satisfaction, to acquaint me that he had gained his point; that the next day (the 6th instant) he was to accompany the chancellor to his country-house, to celebrate there the marriage of one of that minister's grandchildren; that there he was to receive, though unknown to the chancellor himself, and the marquis Rialp, the emperor's nomination; and from thence, under pretence of returning upon his own private affairs to the Low Countries, proceed to England in order to thank his majesty for it. What private instructions, if any, he shall have, is more than I can presume to tell; but I am apt to believe, that his great skill in procuring the nomination has consisted in the merit he has given himself with the emperor, of his credit in England, as far as he could authorise any opinion of it from your lordship's letter, and as what he may have made the emperor believe would not be useless to his Imperial majesty's interests in the present juncture.

Your lordship will, therefore, be expecting him in England, and will have an opportunity of making the best use imaginable of his overtures, if he shall have been authorised to make any. The great difficulty will be to distinguish between what he may be really authorised to say, and what a certain turn of his genius for intrigue may furnish him with. What he has told me in general he should have to say is, *that the emperor cannot reproach himself with having been wanting in any thing towards the king, and that he only desires to know in what he could farther shew his complaisance and friendship towards his majesty.* This looks like leading to something of a concert. He has assured me farther, that the empress let drop to him, that there would be no insurmountable difficulties in sacrificing some distant countries, though of a greater revenue, for others, whose contiguity to the rest of the emperor's dominions might serve as some equivalent. This is not impossible in the last extremity; but the great obstacle to it will lye in the Spaniards here, who, not to lose their Italian revenues, are for giving Naples and Sicily to the king of Portugal's second son with the second archduchess, seeing that there are no means for them to have any footing

footing otherwise in those countries, not even by the marriage of that princess with don Carlos of Spain; the insufficiency of which last towards making a solid peace is what the marquis de Rialp, two days ago, explained to me as his opinion, of his own accord, and not with a little emphasis.

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I have entered into this digression for the sake of giving your lordship all possible lights, as they occur to me, with respect to the sentiments of this court. But to return to the bishop of Namur. He will at all hazards have obtained his nomination; and his principal ambition, if I am not mistaken, will be to change his bishoprick for one in these parts, and to slip himself, by one means or other, into some share of the ministry. How far too he will succeed in that, I shall not presume to tell, no more than how far it will be for his majesty's service; which as it would not become me to presume to determine, so I have the honour to give your lordship this early advice of the possibility of it; contenting myself, till I shall be honoured with his majesty's orders, with doing him no ill offices as to that respect, though extremely happy, if I have been any ways instrumental in the other in advancing, according to my instructions, his promotion to be a cardinal. All which I humbly submit, as a summary, though exact account of every thing that has passed through my canal, with respect to the bishop of Namur during his stay at Vienna for seven months past.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Overture from cardinal Fleury for opening a secret negotiation.—Warmly recommends accepting it.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, September 8, 1734. N. S.

CREW the messenger carries with this letter a copy of one that I have received from monsieur Gedda in answer to what I wrote to that gentleman the 8—19th of last month: I think it of the utmost consequence; and, if a right use be made of it, more likely to putt us in the way of putting an end to the present troubles, without being engaged in the war, than any other method that can offer. It is certain that the cardinall is disposed to peace, and offers to open himself in the frankest manner upon conditions that are neither haughty nor grievous. I think I might have ventured to give him the assurances he desires by monsieur Gedda; but I wait for his majesty's orders, which I beg may be sent me without loss of time; for if we should boggle or delay, and miss this opportunity, I don't know when we shall have such another. It is

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possible that some may make difficultys of having a confidential overture from France. I must own, I see no harm in it, especially when we have no choice; others may be against keeping the negociation here. For my own sake I desire it to be carried on some where else; but for the sake of my king and my country, I think it must be here, unless 'tis resolved to goe into a war, or to negotiate without the States, either of which I think ruinous to his majesty's interest.

Wherever this letter shall find you, I desire you will loose noe time to see my Lord Harrington, and my dispatch to him, and immediately take the proper steps for preparing her majesty, that I may have Crew dispatched, or some other messenger, with orders for pursuing this great work without the least delay. I think the time is too precious to loose it by writing too long a letter to you. You have the ball before you, and doe not lett it be taken from you. Couriers constantly sent from England to Spain, Savoy, or Vienna, upon vain, distant, and chimericall projects, will serve only to make us loose time, and keep us in constant movement, exposed to the ridicule of some, and at last to the mercy and contempt of every body that will insult us. I am sorry my thoughts sent to you some time since deserved so little attention, as to have remained so long without an answer. The answer to this letter must determine whether I must goe on here, I think in a good way, or goe home for good and all.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Approves his endeavours in favour of the bishop of Namur.

Grantham
Papers.

Extract.

Sept. 17—28, 1734. His majesty approves very much the services you endeavoured to do the bishop of Namur towards obtaining the emperor's nomination in his favour. With regard to the design of sending him hither, as I find he had actually left Vienna, I can now say nothing, but that upon his arrival the best use that is possible will be made of the hints you give me concerning him; and when the king sees the part that he acts there in the execution of any commission he may be charged with, his majesty will then be best able to determine what orders he shall give you with relation to his views of getting into the ministry at Vienna.

HORACE

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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Prudent to satisfy the elector of Bavaria by giving the second archduchess to the electoral prince.—To engage the empress and the bishop of Namur to forward the scheme.—King of Prussia in danger.—His son will obtain a divorce, and is inclined to marry the princess Amelia.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, October 8—19, 1734.

Orford
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I Desire you will consider attentively my dispatches of last post, and this day to lord Harrington, by which you will see the pensionary, altho' he will not be named, has chalked out a way for a negotiation with Spain, and is entirely fixed upon reconciling that crown with the emperor; and I really think, that if his Imperial majesty would consider his own interest and situation, he would not be averse to something of that nature, which, by an understanding with Spain, may make him as considerable in Italy as he was before the rupture, tho' Naples and Sicily would indeed after his death be separated from the succession of the rest of his dominions. What the pensionary proposes about the elector of Bavaria is indeed, in my opinion, a noble thought; for Europe will never be quiet untill that prince is satisfied; and if he can be satisfied, it will cutt up by the roots all the vast projects of France upon the death of the emperor, when perhaps this government will be as little able to help the house of Austria then, as they are unwilling to do it now.

You will see that I have hinted, instead of don Carlos marrying an archduchess, the giving him a princess of Lorrain, and the 2d archduchess to the electorall prince of Bavaria. If that would satisfy the queen of Spain, and the emperor would consent, the plan would be compleat; if not, don Carlos must have the 2d archduchess. How to make the proper insinuations to the emperor, with the reasons suggested by the pensionary, and others that may occur, I can't tell; it must be done with secrecy and discretion, soe that France may not be offended, nor Spain despair of a negotiation with the emperor. I can't tell what turn the bishop of Namur takes, nor what confidence may be putt in him; but as the empress has most at heart the marriage of her eldest daughter with the duke of Lorrain, and as this scheme supposes such a marriage, may not the empress be engaged to press and support this scheme as the means to secure her own point? and may not the bishop of Namur be a proper person to be employed for that purpose, by an intimation to be given him, not by any of the ministers, but by somebody else thro' the means of the queen;

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of the project which I have transmitted? letting the Imperiall court by the same canall see there is no other possible remedy for him but what is hinted there, or something like that, by his consenting that we should try a negotiation with France first, and if that does not succeed, to have recourse to Spain. This is what, in my opinion, should be sett on foot without loss of time, and all his majesty's ministers should sett their shoulders to it for the king's consent, leaving at the same time the emperour no manner of hopes of his majesty being att all concern'd in a negotiation for reconciling him with the king of Sardinia.

The king of Prussia will not escape this illness; the gaining the prince royall may be of infinite consequence, he will immediately send away his wife, and by what I hear, the evidence of force upon him for fear of his life to make him consent to that marriage will be so strong, that there can be no difficulty in an absolute divorce with power of remarrying, and his thoughts are entirely fixed upon the princess Amely. Having since my last consider'd of a proper nobleman to be sent to Berlin, I must own to you I don't know any body that would doe better than lord Cholmondeley in all respects. I am much out of order, tho' better than I was yesterday; but my head-ach will not let me add any more, but that I am, &c. Service to his grace. I think the SS paper that he sent me by Mr. Couraud in the main admirable. I hope I have worked up this affair of Spain to please you; but we must try France first. The man of confidence is not yett come, nor no letter from the cardinall.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE QUEEN.

Orford
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The substance of this letter is thus given in the hand-writing of sir Robert Walpole, in the inside of the cover which inclosed the letter:

Queen's letter very good.—The emperour to be dispos'd to let his best friends do best for him. Had he accepted good offices, &c. would he now lett us negotiate, a better event than possibly from a war?—His expectation that the progresse of the French will bring in the Dutch is vain. Will rather trust to a cardinal of 84.—If the new king of Prussia were well dispos'd; if the princes of the north would take a part, they must have subsidies. Holland would pay none. England must pay all.—Nothing can save the emperour but a negotiation with the maritime powers. He will be drove out of Italy. Turks will invade him.—French and Bavaria may march to Vienna.—To reason from the successe of the last war is unjust.—Miracles.—The Dutch ow'd then but 5 m.; they owe now 50 m. sterling.—The Dutch cannot with us; we cannot without them.—The king and queen should let the emperour know his true state

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state in a confidential way. He should be undeceived in his vain hopes, that the English nation and king and queen are for him, ministry only against him.—The maritime powers must keep a countenance to make the cardinal apprehend a war. The Imperial court, no hopes of a general war in their favour. A door open for peace. France apprehends it.—Circumstances alter things; distant and eventual must yield to present dangers.

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MADAM,

Hague, October 11—22, 1734.

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MY duty to my king and country, my concern for maintaining the balance and libertys of Europe, and that by preserving the house of Austria, as well as the security of his majesty's crown to himselfe and his family, are all motives that oblige me to take the liberty earnestly to recommend to your majesty, the imagining and pursuing some early measure for disposing the emperour to lett his best friends use the best means they can to bring him out of his present great and dayly encreasing misfortunes, by a pacification, to be compassed by their treating with such of the allys as may appear to them best disposed to make the peace most advantageous to his Imperial majesty. It is demonstration to me, that if the emperour had accepted of our good offices when they were first offered, he might immediately have been brought out of the war, and been upon as good a foot even in Italy for convenience and power, tho' not exactly with the very same dominions, as he was before the rupture.

It is demonstration to me, that if he would now lett his majesty and the States negotiate for him, that he might still have a solid peace, and an honourable one, if compared with what he must unavoydably suffer if he persists in going on with the war; for I cannot foresee any possible event in his favour. His expectations, that the further progress of the French arms next year on this side will oblige the States to take a part in the war, are vain and ill-grounded. The worse things shall grow, the more will this govenment be afraid to stir; and sooner than be forced into a war in their present condition, and against their will, they will take for their only security and protection the word of a cardinall who is 84 years old, and who, when he finds he can run no risk, can dissemble too.

Supposing the present king of Prussia to be dead, and his brave and active son should be never so well disposed for the libertys of Europe; supposing the princes of the north be inclined to putt a stop to the progress of the French arms; yett as they will furnish no troops without money, this State can never second those good inclinations; they have it not in their power, and conse-

quently

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quently not in their will, to doe it; and it will be impossible for Great Britain to pay those necessary subsidies, without the States taking their share in it. I can therefore see no event that can happen to save Europe and the house of Austria, but the emperour's immediate condescension to a peace to be negotiated for his best advantage by the maritime powers; otherwise he will be driven next spring out of Italy. The Turks will invade him at the same time in other parts, and altho' it may seem chimericall, what shall hinder France from carrying the elector of Bavaria, if they and he please, directly to Vienna?

To reason about what the maritime powers may doe from what they have done, is, if I may so say, very absurd. Some miracles in a manner happened in their favour after the last war was begun, but there is no room for those miracles now. The best and greatest of those miracles was the vast subsidys payd, and numbers of troops maintained by the maritime powers. But have they now the power of that miracle in their hands? The Dutch owed in the beginning of that war about five millions sterling. They now owe, would your majesty believe it? 50 millions sterling; and they doe not know which way to turn themselves to lay a new tax upon their people, already so grievously loaded, without a convulsion in the state.

Great Britain certainly, comparatively speaking, is in a much better condition than the States are, and has some resources still. But if Great Britain should venture to goe into this extensive, expensive, and ruinous war, without the Dutch, I say, in that sense we are in a worse condition than they are; that is, they are better able to goe into a Gallic war joyntly with us, than we are without them. The consequences of which would be, if we engaged in it without them, an immediate ruin and stagnation of our trade, to their great advantage; the loss perhaps of our best colonys, the greatest sources of our riches; destitute of all friends and allys but those that can neither help themselves nor us; a condition which our envious and our enemys heartily wish us in, as what must ruin the nation, and in consequence the present happy establishment.

For these reasons and innumerable others that may occur, as the emperour must be convinced of his majesty's reall affection for him even in his own * were it in the king's power. The king and your majesty, if I may be so bold as to say it, should take the liberty to lett his Imperial majesty see by some private and confidential way the state of things in the true light, and not lett him vainly flatter himselfe, that it is possible to help him by any other way but by that of good offices, or at least till that is tryed where it is most likely to bring about the soonest the most honourable peace for him. And his Imperiall majesty

* A word
omitted.

jeſty ſhould be undeceived in thoſe idle notions by which he is encouraged by count Sinzendorf and others to believe, that little prating emiſſarys, and manifeſtoes printed and diſperſed, will have an effect upon the Engliſh nation to engage them in a war for him. He ſhould be undeceived in thinking, as I am told he thinks, that their majeſtys of Great Britain are for him, but that the Britiſh miniſtry is againſt him; and therefore he will attack them. A noble ſcheme indeed to beat the French with, and to recover Italy, ſuppoſing he ſucceeds in it! He ſhould be told, that if the maritime powers were to embark in the war, there is not the leaſt proſpect of their recovering for him ſo much in Italy, as he may in all likelyhood ſtill preſerve and recover by an immediate peace.

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As good a countenance as is poſſible muſt be held by the maritime powers to make the cardinall apprehend a war, that he may be brought to be more reaſonable in his terms for peace; but the Imperiall court ſhould be made ſenſible by ſome private means, that there is no hopes of a generall war in their favour. What ſhall be the conditions of peace, I cannot pretend to determine. When we are once permitted to negotiate, that will ſoon appear. That there is a door open for peace, all the world ſees, and France apprehends; and yet the emperour will not lett us lead him that way.

I ſhall only make one obſervation, which I believe, tho' coming from me, is a true and a prudent one; that circumſtances muſt determine the reaſonableneſs of things; and that which in a calm might be unneceſſary and unreaſonable for fear of future contingencys, may become even reaſonable and neceſſary in a ſtorm, becauſe the immediate danger of the ſhip and crew is firſt to be conſidered, and they are to be ſaved by means that may occaſion ſome future inconvenience: but as that inconvenience is only eventual and contingent, it may be prevented by meaſures after the great danger ſhall be over. But I am afraid I have taken too much liberty, and troubled your majeſty too much; which I hope you will pardon, as coming from the ſincerity of my heart, and from my zeal for his majeſty's ſervice.

I am, with the moſt profound veneration and reſpect,

MADAM,

Your majeſty's moſt dutiful, moſt faithful, and moſt obedient humble ſervant.

HORACE

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

*Compliments lord Harrington's behaviour.—Negociations of the Dutch with Spain.—
Views and cabals of the bishop of Namur.*

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, October 11—22, 1734.

Orford
Papers.

I Am favoured by Gold the messenger with your's of the 4th and 8th instant, O. S. If you would but condescend to answer my letters regularly it would save time and trouble, and confusion in our correspondence. What I say to you about myself, whether I am pleased or displeased, is equally between ourselves: as to my private conduct towards a court, you and I entirely differ about what is right and what is wrong, and therefore we must go on our own ways; and perhaps I think business has been more spoiled by yielding than persevering in what was right; and as to the queen, I have infinite obligations to her; but I think it would have been impertinent for me to have wrote again to her majesty, after what I had received from her, untill she called upon me for it. The princess royall* now complains to my wife of me for not writing to her; I can't tell how to do it, because I don't know what is offensive and what is inoffensive; this I know, what is most for their interests is not most agreeable to their minds, and I have not ill-nature enough to advise any body, when they ask my opinion, to act against their interest.

You don't read carefully lord Harrington's letters and mine, to think me in the wrong for having layd in my claim for not being answerable for the consequences of a measure, taken privately between himself and the king, before your opinion was asked, and the ill success of it afterwards must have been laid at mine, or rather at your door. It is wonderfull, that the very thing which I thought would have pleased you most, is disliked by you; I won't quarrell with my lord Harrington, but I won't have undeservedly wraps on the fingers without showing that I feel them, nor a train lay'd for making me a dupe, without letting him see that I know what is meant. There are some expressions and some turns in his letters more cold and ungracious than I ever had in seven years during my embassy in France. As to the disposition to give a wrong turn to what comes from me, I am prepared against it; that shall not prevent my providing in my dispatches for my own, or rather your security. I thank you for the power you give me about Gedda.

* Ann, married in March 1734, to William the fifth prince of Orange.

In

In relation to our negociation with Spain, it was impossible for the ablest head to have worked with soe much pains, and with such unexpected success, as I have done in that affair. The pensionary, and in consequence the greffier, was at my first coming entirely averse to it; they were for preferring a negociation with France, and are still for that, for reasons obvious: but as they begin to think France will chican and amuse, they are going on as fast as they can to prepare for a negociation with Spain. But in all your letters about reconciling Spain with the emperor, you think the matter very feasible by the apparent disposition of the first, without saying one word how the emperor is to be gained, as if any alliance or a marriage was to be made without the consent of both parties. I don't think we have been so deaf to Spain, because Spain has never offered to speak out, and declares, that she cannot speak plainer, untill we can gain the emperor's consent for employing our good offices. But with regard to this country in this affair, surely I have gained great ground in bringing them to such lengths, as you will see I have done by my late dispatches, and by what I write this day, where you will find a resolution of the whole states, showing a disposition to treat with Spain, although not yett so decisively, on account of the present juncture with France, as were to be wished, (that is) not in such decisive terms: but I could see by the deputys that they don't dislike the thought.

Turn your thoughts, therefore, to make the emperor better disposed; but I doe not think, as I hinted before, that is to be done by the bishop of Namur. His is an errant fiddle faddle, prittle prattle intrigue amongst women. The case I take to be this: he has, for the sake of making himselfe cardinall, made the empress and other women believe, that he has by his last voyage to England, gott such a credit with the queen, that he can doe any thing, dispose her majesty, by the help of proper materialls, to have an ill opinion of the Walpoles, and in the mean time, by imparting such things as the court of Vienna could furnish him with, so instruct the opponents, that the nation shall be in a flame, the parliament called to meet, the ministry shall be changed, and a war declared against France; and desires, for these great things, the first nomination to be a cardinall. The empress speaks to the emperor, and the emperor to count Sinzendorff; all is immediately fixed, and the bishop must be dispatched with great hopes of obtaining what he asks by performing what he proposes. He is to have it, on the other side, understood in England, that he is to be the emperor's first minister, can turn out all the rest, and that is to gain him credit at our court. In the meantime the Imperiall court gives him a sort of credentiall, founded upon the

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† Illegible.

regard the king had formerly shewn him. A letter is sent after him to tell him he cannot have the first, but is to have the second nomination, but * * * † if he can effect what he proposed, can be recommended by the king for the first nomination; can, in short, change the ministry in England, and get the nation into a war, the emperor will make such removalls in his counsellors as shall be desired by the king.

In short, now his back is turned from Vienna, the Imperiall ministers will spoyl all his great views, unless he can procure from his majesty a recommendation for the precedency of the hat, which if the king does grant, he will putt all things into the utmost confusion, and if the king does not favour him, nor recommend him, I will lay lord Harrington 100 guineas, that the bishop will be no more of the conferences at Vienna than you or I shall be: but if he be used as he should be by the king, and the queen, and the ministry, he will never gett farther back than to Namur in his way to Vienna, or to Rome for the cardinal's hat. He is an errand cheat, and had he not had the emperor's letter, ought to have been treated immediately as such, being little better in my opinion, except he has something more reasonable to produce than a mere Charletan's, that is playing two great courts against one another to serve his own private views.

But I am a little surpris'd that his letter, if a credentiall, was so easily received. If I mistake it not, he was born in England, and went away, though little, at the revolution, with his father in the service of king James. Is this a person fitt to be credited by the emperor to the king? If, when he had delivered a copy of his letter, it was to be looked upon as a credentiall, I think he should immediately have been told, that the king will hear any message that he may have from the emperor, out of respect to the emperor; but that his Imperiall majesty must have been impos'd upon in granting him (one in his circumstances with regard to England) letters of credence as a minister: it is a most dangerous precedent, &c. But I have sayd too much on this head; I think no management hardly should be shewn him, after the way he has already talked to you, and I wonder at your patience.

His whole project is, for the sake of his being a cardinall, a direct war by England, a separation between us and Holland, and the forcing of a stadthoulder upon the Dutch. Good God! what a scene of villany and confusion is he come upon! A-propos, I doe apprehend that, when the prince of Orange arrives, that he has been so flattered by the Germans, that I shall be put upon things here, that will be very prejudiciall to his majesty's service. I desire for

God's sake, and his majesty's interest, that we may have no warm recommendations at this critical juncture, which was the meaning of what I sayd in my letter to the queen; if we have, all will goe back again, *Ex illo fluere*, &c.

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Mr. Johnn's project, I believe, is originally his own; which having been conveyed to his court, and approved by some there, and secretly intimated here, he thought fitt at this juncture to broach: he never mentioned any thing like it directly to me, but I remember that the last time I saw him, he talked of the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. This government never will come into this scheme, and we never can without them. I wish you may be right in beginning your correspondence with Berlin, by the Hanover minister. Monsieur Dieden is a very able and honest man, but notwithstanding the constant allyance by blood between the houses of Berlin and Hanover, they have never otherwise agreed. Such is the eternall jealousy in the neighbouring courts of Germany, that they most cordially hate one another; and this prince royall of Prussia will sooner hear a young sensible English nobleman of his own years and temper, than a wise Hanoverian minister; nay, a minister of Berlin, in whom the prince royall shall putt his confidence, will sooner receive any intimation from an Englishman than an Hanoverian. But it is done; there can't be any great harm in it, unless with regard to foreign politicks. I am afraid an Hanoverian able minister, that has resided at Vienna, and was respected there, will hardly endeavour to make the same impressions upon the prince royall of Prussia, with regard to the present state of affairs in Europe, as you and I shall doe. This is wrote in a vast hurry, and a most violent headach, and so you will excuse blunders, &c. I have numbered the pages that you may not mistake by the disorder of the sheets.

EXTRACT OF CARDINAL FLEURY'S LETTER TO HORACE WALPOLE,
WITH OBSERVATIONS BY SIR ROBERT WALPOLE, IN HIS OWN HAND-WRITING.

On opening the secret negotiation with Horace Walpole to settle terms for a general pacification.

Oct. 24th, 1734. This letter proves his confidence in Mr. W.'s* and P.'s† probity, unknown to every person without exception but to the K. alone. The secrett to be inviolably kept. He consults not the ordinary rules of politicks, but in things that regard the publick good: he makes no difficulty to putt himself in his power.

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* Walpole.
† Pensionary.

The king and cardinal sincerely desire peace, but the whole councill is not of the same opinion, believing it necessary to preserve the union with their allies,

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and especially with Spain. England and Holland press them to discover their engagements, which demand is not just, because they cannot do it but in concert with their allies, and not reasonable, unless the emperor and his allies do the same. Nevertheless, to prove his confidence without reserve, he will say in general, that their treaties *roulent* upon the two Sicilies in favour of don Carlos, and upon the Milanese *in statu quo* for the king of Sardinia. No stipulation in regard to the other estates of the emperor, not even Mantua; have already explained upon what regards England and Holland.

In regard to themselves, the affair of Poland is the only thing in which they are interested. No pretension nor desire to aggrandise themselves. They are infinitely against the pragmatic sanction, as prejudicial to their interests and the liberties of Europe; but it makes no part of their engagements namely and expressly.

This being supposed, the question is to find means to reconcile such opposite and complicated interests. He readily agrees that the present state of Poland gives little hopes of re-establishing king Stanislaus upon the throne, which may depend very much upon knowing how far England is engag'd with the emperor, or czarina, or elector of Saxony. If England has no such engagements, and this negotiation succeeds, there may be ways to save the honour of France, which it is not yett time to explain. The great difficulty regards the affair of Spain, as well in respect to the inflexibility of the emperor, as of the queen of Spain, who will never consent to see herself stript of two realms, of which there is little wanting to complete the conquests.

The first and most obvious expedient would be, to give the second archduchess to don Carlos, to give the two Sicilies as her portion, with the reversion to the eldest daughter, upon failure of children of the second. But besides that this may not be agreeable to our court, it is very certain, or at least very probable, that the emperor will never consent to it, whether for his hatred to the house of Bourbon, into whose hands, it is possible, his whole succession may one day fall, or that he will never consent to give the least atteint to the indivisibility of his estates, of which Italy is the principal and favourite object.

On the other side, although the queen of Spain infinitely wishes the marriage with the second archduchess principally from the vast hopes which she conceives from this marriage, he doubts whether either she, or the king of Spain, will ever consent that the two Sicilies, which will come to them by the right of conquest, shall ever, upon the failure, go out of their family, which although immaterial,

immaterial, may give great uneasiness likewise to the Spanish nation; and it is very probable, that all the powers of Europe may be very much alarmed to see that it is possible that all the dominions of the emperor may be united in a prince of the house of Bourbon; and so much the more, because it is not impossible but that don Carlos or his descendants may inherit the crown of Spain. The cardinal would not consent to this at the congress of Soissons. Altho' France and Spain shall be possess'd by princes of the same house, all experience shews that the alliance of blood has no influence upon their councils. Instances in Spain.

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These reflections he touches but slightly, persuaded that Horace and the pensionary are better able than he is to weigh the solidity of them. Politically speaking, he is convinced that the most sure way to establish a perfect tranquillity of Europe, is not to leave the emperor one foot of ground in Italy, because he will always desire to recover what he has lost, as likewise Spain to gain upon the king of Sardinia, and that prince on his side to aggrandise himself.

The only reflection that he shall add is, that however things turn, it appears dangerous to have Leghorn either in the power of the emperor or Spain. That being a free port, open to all nations for the liberty of commerce, ought to be possessed either by a republic or some prince little powerful, who shall not be able to abuse a port that is the center of the commerce of Europe.

The favourite view of the emperor has been to establish a marine. He has already great advantages by the privileges granted to him by the Port to trade by land to Constantinople, that he may insensibly make himself master of the whole. The same apprehensions from Spain, which he concludes from the injustices committed in the commerce to America. An observation in regard to Holland relating to the town of Embden.

He thus runs through the particular affairs of Europe, and reasons as private persons might do, talking together, that they may reflect upon them, and see the impartiality with which he considers every thing which may be the occasion of new troubles. He does the same in regard to what nearly touches themselves, and he shews all the difficulties, that he may open to them a large field to choose the means which they shall judge the most reasonable to come to a solid and general pacification. He lays aside for a moment their own particular interests, that he may know what we and Holland think of to facilitate the peace of Europe; and if they can agree, the most difficult part is still behind, to bring in our allies. In this we must act mutually and help one another,

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another, without appearing to act in concert and with an understanding. He does not touch the article of the king of Sardinia, but if we can agree upon the rest, it is but just that his interest should not prevail over the publick and generall good; and we endeavour to make him hear reason.

The sieur Jannel* will go soon away. He will have only a letter of *creance* from the cardinal, without any power to treat; because the negotiation is not yett come to maturity, and his mission extends no further than to agree with their excellencies upon the preliminaries and means to begin this important work; and the less time he stays the better. He sends this before by a courier, that they may be prepared before the arrival of monsieur Jannel; and if they want any further explanations, he may have time to add them. He hopes he will answer to this entire confidence of his with the like confidence, which alone will putt them in a condition to putt in motion a negotiation, upon which the peace of Europe depends.

He adds in a paragraph in his own hand, he desires two letters may be wrote, one to be read by others, the other for himself alone, in answer to this, and says, *car encore une fois, hors le roy, personne n'en a connoissance*. A postscript, relating to the measures at Constantinople, denies any attempt to make war upon the emperour, and confines it to Russia. He concludes, that every report to the prejudice of France being so easily believed, and the actions of others disguis'd or justified, is a bad omen of successe: but they shall have nothing to reproach themselves with.

In sir Robert Walpole's hand-writing; containing *remarks on a letter from cardinal Fleury, and hints for Mr. Walpole's answer*.

Orford
Papers.

THE cardinal is returning again in a great measure to his first proposall. But having enter'd into the measure of sending monsieur Jannel, from which he could not now depart, he is satisfying both purposes, writes this letter to acquitt himself without Chauvelyn, which must be admitted to be true. His letter far exceeds our late expectations, and as such should be accepted. For our own security and information, we must not leave unobserv'd the art and skilfull parts of the letters, but I think not retort them upon the cardinal, unlesse we intend to break off the correspondence, and give the cardinal reason to conclude that we do not wish peace. If we reject these overtures, we putt an end to all

* The confidential agent whom cardinal Fleury sent to the Hague to carry on the secret negotiation with Horace Walpole.

negotiation

negotiation for peace, unless we choose rather to depend upon monsieur Jan-
nel, or will take upon ourselves the reconciliation of the emperor and Spain,
exclusive of France, which I always looked upon as a material objection to
that separate treaty; and France will afterwards make it exclusive of us, and
leave us in the lurch. And if we receive the cardinal's letter with marks of
dissatisfaction, we drive him back to Chauvelyn, and the council of France,
whom the cardinal has expressly told us are averse to the pacification, and par-
ticularly inclined to preserve the union with Spain.

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This declaration is a mark of sincerity; and thus informed, we are rather to
manage the cardinal, and assist him in proceeding further, and lead him gra-
dually to further explanations, which cannot be done but by a civil reception
of what he has done. The two points that the cardinal promis'd to speak to
at first were, their engagements, and the conditions of peace. He has touched
upon both, and, if it be examined, in a manner that we may tie him down,
if we will take him at his word. He has affirmed their engagements rou-
le upon the two Sicilies for D. C.*, and the Milanese for the K. of Sardinia, and
states the affair of Poland as what most nearly concerns them, and by this he
seems to reduce their engagements; these are three. And negatively declares,
they have no stipulations that regard any other estates of the emperor, nor
England and Holland. No pretension or design to add to France, and an
expresse declaration, they have no engagements namely and expressly against
the pragmattick sanction, altho' most averse to it.

*Don Carlos.

Why not thank him for being thus explicit both in his affirmative and nega-
tive declarations, and take it for granted that these are all the engagements
that can run counter to a pacification? This being suppos'd by the cardinal,
he comes to consider the possible means of reconciling these opposite compli-
cated interests. This must be understood of the conditions of the pacification
relatively to their engagements, and in order to comply with them.

As to the engagement concerning the two Sicilies, he suggests the match as
the means to ensure that engagement, as the most obvious expedient, and this
may be consider'd as offer'd as one condition of the pacification. He then
inforces all the difficulties and objections, which are, it may not be agreeable
for our court, the emperor, for several reasons, may be averse to it, altho'
the ministers wish it, the K. Q. and Spanish nation may have objections to it,
and all Europe may be alarm'd, &c. Not one objection on the part of
France, and answers the generall objection arising from the house of Bourbon,
and submits all to Mr. W. and the Pen.

Why

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Why should not this proposition be stated and recited in the words of this letter, observing the difficulties and objections, and desiring the cardinal to consider and determine, whether the mischiefs of a generall war in Europe are of greater weight than these objections; and whether we should not mutually assist one another in bringing our allies into it, if that is wanting? I think Mr. W. ought to suppose that the cardinal has no objection to it in the present circumstances of times, altho' he had at Soissons.

What follows is written on another paper of the same size, and probably at the same time.

As to the 2d engagement with the king of Sardinia, as the engagement is from France, the cardinal must be desired in a friendly manner, and it is but reasonable to explain what he proposes to satisfy that prince. The affair of Poland can only be explain'd by France. We have already said we have no engagements relating to the crown of Poland, which should be repeated with regard to the emperor, Muscovy, or Saxony, when that is known to the cardinal, as he confesses, the state of Poland gives but little hopes of placing king Stanislaus upon the throne; and that, if we have no engagements, there may be ways of saving the honour of France, which he does not think it yett time to explain after our declaration; he, who only can, must be desired to explain the means of saving the honour of France.

The affair of Leghorn must be explained. Is it to be separated from Tuscany? or is don Carlos to part with Tuscany, and to whom? If a prince puissant is to have it, and it cannot be the emperor or Spain; France, or a dependant of France, is equally dangerous.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE QUEEN.

Represents the propriety of insinuating to the emperor to accept the interposition of the king and States.—On the mission, character, and intrigues of the bishop of Namur.

MADAM,

Hague, October 15—26, 1734.

Orford
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I Took the liberty to trouble your majesty by last post with my thoughts for disposing the emperor, if possible, to consent to the good offices of his majesty and the States for bringing matters to an accommodation, by such means, and by treating with such powers as shall appear disposed to come to the most reasonable terms. If what I then offered deserved your majesty's attention, I am

am sensible that great address should be used in making the proper insinuations to their Imperial majestys on so nice a subject. All reproaches and expostulations must be layd aside; it must not be done from minister to minister, but in an amicable and familiar way, by a private canal.

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The dispute whether his majesty and the States should employ their good offices before they declare themselves with respect to the succours demanded by the emperour; or whether they should give their assistance to him at the same time, and without employing their good offices; that dispute, I say, should be waved at present; the point of honour is too far engaged on both sides. But their Imperial majestys should be desired to consider, whether this time of inaction, and proper for negotiation, should be entirely lost, and slip out of our hands; whether, considering the situation of the allies, who perhaps are not as yett united by one treaty, should have different views, and different interests, we should not be permitted by the emperour to take the advantage of this situation, by treating with either of them, and, by discovering their views, endeavour to make use of them for the service of the Imperial court, and for preserving the balance of Europe? And if it be ask'd in what manner and to what degree; it is impossible to tell without trying and treating. And whether, in case some steps of this nature be not taken during this naturall armistice, there be any prospect of the emperour's affairs being in a better condition in the spring than they are now; and whether the strongest reason and prudence does not directly point out such a conduct, as what directly leads to serve the emperour more than any other that can be suggested?

If the Imperial court should reply, We are ready to concert measures for acting vigorously, send your assistance according to treaty, and lett us have the effect of our guarantys: such an answer as this will only draw on the old dispute, whether good offices should not be employed before the declaration about succours should be made, in which each side will adhere to their own proposals; and in the mean while the time that is so precious will slide away. Nothing will be done before the spring, and the emperour will be encompassed on all sides with the strength of the ennemys he has already felt this year, and with new ones, perhaps no less formidable; particularly with the Turks, in whose quarrell the maritime powers can have no manner of concern, altho' they continue all possible means to prevent a rupture there. If the emperour will suffer it to be insinuated on his part, that he is willing that his majesty and the States should employ their good offices where they think it may be of service to him; or if indeed he should still persevere in not condescending to such a step, yett I should

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think, when his majesty will seriously consider what is like to be the terrible situation of affairs in Europe at the opening of the next campagne, and how impossible it will be for him, tho' never so desirous of doing it, to secure the balance of Europe, which will be at the mercy of France, by any other ways than that of negotiation; he will, I flatter myself, turn his thoughts to lay hold of the most favourable opportunity that may offer from any of the allys to forward proposals for an accommodation. For I doe not at present see any hopes of the States being frightened by France, or the power of France, as long as the Low Countrys are spared, and promised to be spared, to come into any vigorous measures for their own or the security of Europe.

Since as long as the emperour persists to refuse all ways to save him, but that of force of arms; and as long as France and some other of the allys cry direct for a pacification, the Dutch will attribute all future dangerous events that don't immediately affect them and England to the stubbornness and haughtiness of the Imperiall court. And this remark is to be made on this occasion, that the impression of the same danger is different, and affects in different ways, according to the different motives from whence it comes. For example, should the emperour persist in refusing to give his consent for offices to be employed by the maritime powers for obtaining a peace, or to hearken to any proposals that may be made to him in consequence of offices employed without his consent; and should the French next year, upon such refusalls on the part of the emperour, penetrate further into the empire, and even the hereditary dominions; I much question whether the States would be sufficiently alarmed to take any measures to stop the progress of the French arms, as attributing all those misfortunes to the conduct of the Imperiall court. Whereas had good offices been employed by the consent of the emperour; and had the French and their allys appeared unreasonable in their terms of peace in consequence of these good offices, and afterwards should carry their arms so far as is mentioned in the other case, I am persuaded the States would take new spirit and vigour, would think of concerting measures, as attributing these attempts to the dangerous views of France. And altho' indeed in both cases it is certainly true, that the hazard to the libertys of Europe might be the same by the same progress and success of arms; yet as the causes are different, or will be thought different, they will have a different effect upon the minds of this people. And yet the emperour will not suffer good offices to be employed by the maritime powers, because he looks upon them as allys, and will not let them act the part of mediators; which is a question not yett determined, and can be determined no other way

way than by employing our good offices, and from thence judging what the designs of the allies are.

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But my excursions are too long and troublesome; and as what I write now is only a continuation of what I wrote to your majesty by last post, I hope you will give the same indulgence to them both, as if it was but one trouble and one fault. If I proceed any further on this subject, it will be to consider with which of the allies it may be most advisable to close, as their offers are like to be most reasonable, and to have the greatest tendency for a pacification: for I don't see how it is possible to have a war by the manner of proceeding of the Imperial court, that appear so desirous of a war, and have taken the most effectual means to prevent it. If I was to say, in one word, where the negotiations would at last center, and where it is most likely to obtain the most reasonable pacification, I think it must be with Spain; and I will explain my reasons for thinking so in my next, if I find what I have already said is not too much.

By what I see of the bishop of Namur's credentials, and what I hear of his conduct, he is acting a very dextrous part for answering his own views. He lets the Imperial court believe he can do wonders in England, and he probably will endeavour to make your majesty believe that he can do wonders at Vienna; and under these notable persuasions you are both to conspire to make him a cardinal: and in fact, if his majesty will make a little alteration in his ministry, the emperor will make a little alteration in his too; perhaps recall Boltza from Spain. The parliament of England may be easily called immediately, a war declared against France and her allies, and by that means all misunderstandings and uneasyness between the two courts will be removed, and things go on as happily and smoothly as can be by this spiritual transubstantiation of temporal affairs; by the *hocus pocus* tricks of this extraordinary bishop. But I am afraid I grow too free with a person that is to be first minister at Vienna, when I shall be pope at Rome; and crave your majesty's pardon for this great liberty which your last most gracious letter has drawn upon you, and which I am afraid your majesty begins to repent off. The king of Prussia is not dead, as reported; but the news of his death is daily expected. He has ordered his youngest daughter to be married immediately.

I am, with the most profound veneration and respect, &c.

MEMOIRS OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Writes to lord Harrington about the bishop of Namur.

Hague, Oct. 15-26, 1734.

DEAR BROTHER

I Will trouble you with butt a few words. I think you should, without affectation, endeavour to gett John to putt his plan in writing; and it will be easy, if you send a copy of it to me, to shew the impossibility of the execution. This you should doe without giving him any encouragement to his journey, or hopes of success. I believe the thought is his own, but that he may have found some access to have it recommended elsewhere.

I have wrote a few lines to lord Harrington, relating to the bishop of Namur, founded upon something he sayd to me in his dispatch; but mine is a private letter.

I entirely agree with you about the affair of Spain, and that there is no likelihood of getting out of these troubles but that way; however, the pensionary, that seems to think soe too, would see the man of confidence first. When he will come, I know not; we have noe news of him yett; and what he will say when he comes, I am afraid will not be very edifying. Could the emperour be brought to lett us speake to Spain, his consent might be procuring in the mean time that we negotiate with France, and some encouraging words might be lett fall to Montijo.

Mr. Spoch, who married the pensionary's daughter, should now have a bounty warrant for 300*l.*: it would be taken very kindly if you can gett it done.

HORACE WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Remarks on the credentials of the bishop of Namur, and on the recommendatory letter of the emperor to the king.—Views and objects of his mission.—Danger of his continuing in England.—Severe reflections on his character.

MY DEAR LORD,

Hague, Oct. 15-26, 1734.

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Private.

YOUR lordship having sent me a copy of the bishop of Namur's credentials for my information only, and given so short an account of his conduct since his arrivall, I shall not pretend any otherwise than as a private friend to give you my sentiments and observations upon his errand and views.

If the letter from the emperor to the king, brought by him, is to be look'd upon as a credential, I must own, considering the circumstances of the bishop's life

life and his religion; being at the same time, as I imagine, a subject of England, I should make some question whether such a credentiall should have been received; and the hesitating about receiving it on a very good pretence, might have given an opportunity to judge by his conduct whether he should be suffer'd to continue in England or not.

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As to the letter itselfe, joyned with what Mr. Robinson sayd of him before he left Vienna, I think it appears to me, (unless you find the contrary,) by his behaviour, that the whole is a contrivance of his own, to play his pretended confidence and credit with the respective courts in such a manner against one another, as may make both contribute upon false principles and perswasions to his being made a cardinall. The emperor tells his majesty in this letter, that the *bishop, having insinuated to him his design to take a turn into England, and knowing that the king had some goodness and confidence for him, &c.* that is to say, the bishop of Namur had made the court of Vienna, or the ladys there believe, that he is extreemly well at the court of England, and that he could, if the emperor would give him a sort of credit, doe wonders there, to answer the sentiments and wishes of their Imperiall majestys at this great juncture; and now he is England, he is to make the king and queen of England believe that he has the confidence and credit of their Imperiall majestys; and from this foundation, if he is to be believed, he is to obtain new strength and credit in England, to promote and forward his views at Vienna; and therefore he says he comes *fully instructed in the emperor's sentiments and the motives of his conduct*, the sense of which will, as I apprehend, prove to be, that he is furnished with pieces to justifie the conduct of the Imperiall ministry; and considering how different that has been from what his majesty has desired, the same pieces will serve to lay the blame on the conduct of the English ministry; and if these motives of the emperor's conduct should appear satisfactory to their majestys, the consequence I think is plain, and then it will be no hard matter to guess in what manner *the uneasyness of either side is to be removed*.

These are, as I take it, the views and meaning of the bishop's errand with regard to himselfe and the publick; and I don't wonder that he does not intend to stay upon the foot of a minister in England: his business is of another nature, though sometimes practised by Imperiall ministers; and therefore I look upon the credentiall letter as calculated only to gett him admittance and protection, that he may continue in England for purposes that can't be long hid. But it will be a cruell thing, if, under the privilege of a minister, without being so, he should be suffer'd to doe all the mischief he can to the administration of
a court

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a court who gives him that protection. My dear lord, give me leave to say, that I have known this gentleman perfectly well for many years, and did not care what preferment he had at Rome, which is his chief desire, but is not the only business of his present mission. Believe me, he is a mountebank in politics, and does not care where nor how he dispenses his poison, if it will but answer his own ends. This is sayd with all due respect to a minister credited by the emperour, and with a readyness to retract my opinion, if bishop Stricklandt's behaviour should prove different from what I imagine, as I heartily wish it may.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE QUEEN.

Intrigues of France against the emperor.—On the mission of the bishop of Namur, and his cabals with opposition.—Recommends his dismissal.—Hints at the secret convention.—Illness of the king of Prussia.

MADAM,

Hague, Oct. 18—29, 1734.

Orford
Papers.

SINCE I troubled your majesty by last post with some reflexions on the present state of affairs, the king will have received from Mr. Robinson a paper delivered by the Imperiall ministers to him and Mr. Bruyninx, accompanyd with others, all tending to shew the intrigues of France in various parts of Europe as well as in Turkey, to distress the emperour, and confound him by the next campagne; by which it appears that the Imperiall court, far from being moved by these apprehensions to condescend to our employing good offices during the present vacancy of action to obviate these mischiefs, is pleased to make no other use of the discoverys of these intrigues, but to desire that our ministers at the Porte should lett the Turk know, that they are *authorisés à déclarer nettement à la Porte que les deux puissances maritimes ne pourront pas se dispenser de mettre des justes bornes aux progrès des armes de la maison de Bourbon.* Certainly nothing should be left unsayd that is proper for his majesty and the States to say to divert the Turks from coming to a rupture with the Christians. But it is impossible that the Imperiall court can hope, untill they shew a greater condescension to the offer of good offices than they have done, that his majesty and the States should goe such lengths; especially when, in the very same paper where they make their request, they cannot forbear upbraiding us in very disagreeable terms, by saying that the former representations of the emperour have only served *à lui attirer des reproches, et de l'aigreur, au lieu du fruit qu'il en attendoit*, accusing us at the same time with having *annoncé à l'empereur l'impossibilité de le secourir à moins qu'il ne veuille se departir d'avance du droit acquis par les*

les traités, which is indeed a very false suggestion; and consequently these ungracious expressions are but very bad ingredients and motives for procuring assistance. And therefore, when I consider, madam, the whole conduct of the Imperial court, in being so fond of delivering, from time to time, such a variety of papers, I do not think they are calculated with a view of obtaining what they seem to desire; for they are by no means wrote in a style proper for that purpose: but the chief view of them is to make them serve as proofs to a manifesto to be dispersed in England, and also as materials to the patriots; being flattered that by this means they shall be able to influence the parliament so far as to force the king and the ministry into a war in favour of the emperor. And I look upon the chief errand of Strickland, as talking English, and having a general acquaintance, is for him to be the principal actor in this scene; and under the notion of having a credential letter from the emperor, (which for a person of his circumstances seems a very extraordinary thing to me,) he is to be protected in carrying on a scheme in opposition to his majesty's measures and ministry. If I wrong him (of which your majesty by this time may be a judge) I heartily beg pardon.

You will pardon me, if I tell your majesty on this occasion what has lately been hinted to me by a very intelligent person, which is, that when a courier arrives at Vienna from count Kinsky, it is observed that the court behaves there as if they had received some good news from England; and on the contrary, the same court appears extremely out of humour from their conferences with Mr. Robinson; from whence it is inferred that they constantly receive encouragement from the patriots; and some go so far as to say they have, or that Kinsky pretends to have, from better hands than the patriots, such hopes and countenance as to exhort his court to talk of nothing but war, and to push that point at the meeting of the parliament; which will necessarily occasion a dispute about the Imperiall and English ministry; and how that can turn to the service of the emperor, and the ballance of Europe, I cannot see. How it is to be prevented, I submit to better judgements. But I am persuaded that no person, whatever his character may be, will receive so much countenance at court as may encourage him in such an extraordinary proceeding; and if the bishop of Namur has nothing more to do than to create disturbances in England, and procure himselfe, even by the credit of England, a cardinal's hat for his reward, I should think the sooner he was sent away with civill answers to his civill letters, without any other recommendation than that he was admitted because he came from the emperor, the better it would be for his majesty's service.

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service. I say all this by guess; and therefore, if I am mistaken in father Dominick's views, I hope I shall be forgiven.

As to the secret negotiation to be had with the cardinal's man of confidence, I must own I have little hopes of good success from it. He is expected here on Sunday; and we must hear what he has to say; but as the cardinal is possessed, unless we could cast Chauvelyn and Peckett out of him, who possess him by turns, no good can come of it. The spirit of the answer lately come from France will be transfused into the instructions of the man to be sent hither; and although he be (as his eminence tells me) a relation of the bishop of Meaux, (God bless my poor old friend for his wise reflections!) he will act as if he was the spawn of Chauvelyn. This being the case, I submit it whether it may not be time to begin to consider in what manner a more cordial negotiation may be carried on with Spain, and what means may be used to bring, if possible, that court and the emperor to a better temper with one another. But I will trouble your majesty no more on this head at present, because I may perhaps be able to be more explicit about the necessity of such a negotiation in my next, unless I shall, before that time, be informed that I have taken too much liberty in writing so freely to your majesty already.

The letters from Postdam, of the 23d, say that the king of Prussia had slept better than usual the night before, had no fever, and that a great moistness constantly ran from his legs, without the breaking of the skin; which were look'd upon as good symptoms: but the same letter concludes at last, that the physicians agree that they have no hopes of his recovery, altho' he may still hold out some weeks.

The pensionary has a letter in cypher from Berlin of the 23d, by which he is acquainted, that the king of Prussia, since his illness, declared, in the presence of several of his ministers and of the prince royal, that he received his fatal blow at Beyex, (a place some miles from Postdam,) from the hands of Seckendorff; and turning at the same time to Gromkow, sayd, *Gromkow, you know this to be true*; and then casting his eyes upon his son, he bid him beware of evil counsellors. There was no explanation of what this meant in particular; but it is thought it related to the marriages. Gromkow fancys himself to be well with the prince royal; but I am told it is very doubtful. Nothing of the humour and views of that prince will be certainly known until his father be dead; but every body believes that the queen of Prussia will have great credit and interest with her son even in matters of great moment.

I am, with the most profound veneration and respect, madam, your majesty's most faithful and most dutiful and most obedient humble servant.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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Illness of the king of Prussia.—Passion of the prince royal for music.—Writes to the queen.—Emperor's intention to overturn the ministry.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, October 18—29, 1734.

THE mayl due this day not being yett arrived, I have none of your favours to acknowledge. I have little trouble to give you, besides acquainting you that I am told the prince royall * of Prussia's chief pleasure is musick, although he was obliged to hide it from his father. I think lord Cholmondeley as good a person as possible to be sent with a compliment at his first coming to the throne; and supposing your son Edward went with him, and stayd afterwards as envoy.

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Papers.

* Afterwards
Frederick II.

I am now to tell you, that I have wrote with what I write by this post, three posts together, long letters to the queen upon our affairs: but I did not mention it to you, that her majesty might not think it was done by concert between us; which if she speaks to you, as without doubt she will, you might safely say you knew nothing of them; but I always write in the dark as to knowing what will or what will not be agreeable.

I desire you will lett me know whether you ever have had any conversation with Mr. Bock the Prussian minister, and whether you talked to him against Mr. Quintius, who is employed here by the king of Prussia. As to the Prussian court, you must not mind one word what your friend Diemar says about it: he is a friend and a dupe to Seckendorff, who has certainly acted in that court a most wicked part; and will not, I believe, goe thither in hast. I am most affectionately your's.

Should you not think of acquainting the cabinet councill with the state of matters; and of securing Dorsett, lord president †, and others, before the patriots influence them; and of having a deduction made of all forreign transactions; for I apprehend that the Imperiall court is determined to attack the British ministry.

† Lord Wil-
mington.

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FROM LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Intrigues of the bishop of Namur in England.

DEAR SIR,

London, October 22—November 2, 1734.

I Was pleased to find in your private letter to me of the 26th instant N. S. so perfect an agreement with the notions we had entertained here of the bishop of Namur, as well with respect to his personal character as to the occasion and purpose of his mission; and I think I may venture to assure you, that his own private views, and those of his court, will be equally disappointed; for I don't find the least disposition in the king either to recommend him for the cap, or to change his ministry. The only mischief to be apprehended from him is his furnishing matter for the opposers to declaim upon; for which purpose he has been supply'd by the court of Vienna with all the informations and materials which they were able to give him; but whether he will venture to play so desperate a game as that must be for the emperour, is very doubtful. He seems already not to flatter himself with hopes of success, and is sending a messenger to Vienna to give the emperour an account of the situation in which he finds things here, and will set out for the Bath in two or three days, where he proposes to stay a month in order to wait the time till he may receive an answer; and as I expect the king's commands to write to Vienna upon his subject by the next post, I hope to do it in such a manner as may make his stay here after his return from the Bath of very short duration.

The dispatches which we have just received from you by Money the messenger open such a new* field for speculation and reasoning, as makes me think it unnecessary to trouble you at present (as I had proposed to do) with my notions of matters as they appeared to me before those important letters arrived. I am sure you won't expect I shou'd give you any opinion at present upon the cardinal's letter, which there has not been time as yet even to read carefully over; but I hope in a few days to dispatch a messenger to you with his majesty's commands, and full instructions thereupon.

* He alludes to a proposal made by cardinal Fleury to open a secret negotiation for the purpose of arranging the preliminaries. The letters which relate to this secret convention are too numerous to insert in this publication: the most interesting will appear in the Walpole Correspondence.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

On the intrigues of the bishop of Namur in England.

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DEAR TOM,

Hague, Nov. 5, 1734.

I Never troubled you about the bishop of Namur's journey to England, which seemed, upon your first mention of it, to be a very extraordinary step to me: but as you wrote it in such a manner, as to persuade me it was then already determined, I thought it would be an useless and unnecessary undertaking for me, by a friendly hint, to putt you upon endeavouring to prevent what I imagined, from the circumstances of the man's life and character, could not be agreeable to their majestys, or of any service to the emperour. But I can now tell you, in the greatest confidence, that what I then suspected has proved true; and that both the king and the queen are very much shocked, that a native and subject of England, and at the same time a popish priest, should pretend to continue his residence there, under the protection of letters from the emperour and emprefs; taking upon him at the same time a feigned name, (for he calls himself Mr. Moseley,) without any character, or having proposed in a fortnight's time any thing of business, either to the king or any of his ministers, but is constantly busy in intrigues and correspondence with all sorts of people. I can assure you this conduct is soe offensive, as to be a question, whether the affront be greater to the dignity of the great personages that wrote the letters, or of those that received them; and I don't know what may be the consequence of the bishop's staying long in England on this foot.

I have thought fit, as a friend, to give you this hint, that you may give a proper intimation of it, if you please, to count Staremburg and monsieur Bartenstein. What I say is wrote to yourself alone as a friend, who has no direct authority for it, but does it upon good grounds, and with no other view than to preserve a good understanding between the two courts.

Grantham
Papers.

*Private and
particular.*

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THOMAS ROBINSON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

*Apologises for his own conduct in regard to recommending the bishop of Namur.—
Explains the bishop's views and intrigues, and accounts for the influence which
he obtained over the emperor.*

SIR,

Vienna, Nov. 13, N. S. 1734.

Grantham
Papers.

Private.

Copy.

I Received last night by the post, the honour of your excellency's letter of the 3d inst. N. S. and this morning count Sinzendorf sent me that of the 5th. The inclosed dispatches to lord Harrington contain the answer to the first, and will let your excellency see in what an exact conformity to your thoughts I have written to lord Kinoul.

The other letter demands a fuller, and the most immediate, answer, that not a moment's time may be lost in softening as much as can be done, consistently with truth and justice, the unhappy incident of the bishop of Namur's perverting the letters, which, for his private interests, he has surpris'd from their Imperial majesties; and as your excellency has written to me in confidence, and with your constant view of preserving a good understanding between the two courts, I am the readier to enter into this matter, as I am verily perswaded that the intentions of both their Imperial majesties were so perfectly pure and innocent, that they will themselves be the first to resent the indignity done to their recommendations, by the ill use which the bishop shall have made of them.

As, with your usual penetration, you will have discovered by my letter of the 8th of September, the delicacy of my situation, with respect to the strong orders which I received about the bishop of Namur, and my private opinion of him, it is unnecessary to enter into any farther description of it here. It will appear sufficiently, by your turning to that letter, how far only I literally observed my instructions, that is, consistently with the true intention of procuring him the nomination to be a cardinal, in order for the king to have a proper person at Rome. But when the bishop hinted to me his other views, and particularly his going to England, which you will have observed was only a few days before he departed, I spoke to him in the severest manner, at which, in my letter I say out of respect, he appeared only disappointed, but for which he would have killed me, if he durst; for in fact I explained to him his imprudence in thinking of any such thing as it deserved. I thought I had even put a stop to it; but on the 5th of September, the very night before he set out, he told me the thing was done; when I again explained myself to him, in a manner that would even then have
diverted

diverted him from going, but that there was no receding after the marvels which he had promised to the emperor, and to himself, from his journey to England.

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I never spoke of him at all to prince Eugene, because he never desired it, and I believe he hardly saw the prince all the while he was here. It has been the same thing with respect to count Staremborg. He courted at first the marquis de Rialp and count Sinzendorf, and then he left them; but with them I had endeavoured to do him the good offices which were consistent with the paper that I gave them in his favour. When afterwards he came to insinuate himself into the opinion of the emperor, and monsieur Bartenstein was ordered to talk to him, I told the latter, that the man had a kind of intriguing wit, but no judgment; and that the memorials he presumed to draw were furnished him by count Rosemberg; a man like himself, of more wit than judgment. I added, by way of a friendly information, that by his intrigues he seemed to be getting ground in the emperor's esteem; but as my design was constantly, according to my orders, *to assist him in carrying on any scheme which he proposed* for his nomination only, *and which I might myself think practicable and proper*, I did indeed, while I was sick, send my secretary to monsieur Bartenstein, at the bishop's request, to know if he had spoken to the emperor upon the paper which regarded the nomination, and added a kind of a recommendation of the bishop, which he suggested himself, by assuring monsieur Bartenstein, that persons of honour, the higher they were raised, the greater gratitude they had towards the promoters of their fortunes. Monsieur Bartenstein sent me word back, that he had spoken to the emperor, and had found his Imperial majesty well disposed, and that he would talk to me more at leisure upon that affair: but from that day to this he never mentioned the bishop to me; perhaps, because he thought I had a littleness of mind enough to be jealous of the other's going to England, according to the turn which the bishop might have possibly given to my disapprobation of his journey. Seeing then the silence of this court towards me, and that the thing, when I came to know it for certain, was past all remedy, for the bishop spoke to me at 9 of the clock at night, and set out the next morning at five, I contented myself with sending an account of the whole to England, leaving the rest to work its own way, after the insinuations, which I could not forbear making, with respect to the precautions with which the bishop was to be listened to at London.

It was only last night that I knew, and that from England, that the bishop of Namur was there with a credential from the emperor, which was confirmed to me this morning by your excellency. But upon the whole I am persuaded,

I

that,

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that, without scarce knowing prince Eugene; that, without daring to know count Staremberg, on account of different opinions about the question of Jansenism; that, for the same reason, not being well with the emperor's confessor; that, without having any confidence in the chancellor, and without the chancellor's having any in him; and lastly, that, with having as little confidence in the marquis de Rialp, for as to any acquaintance with monsieur Bartenstein, they saw, I believe, one another but three times at most; this man has had the art to make the emperor believe he has great credit in England, as he may have hoped to make it be believed he had as much here, and with as much sufficiency as to his opinion of his parts, as little judgement with respect to his conduct, that, upon the pretext of returning to England to thank the king for obtaining the emperor's nomination, he might serve his Imperial majesty in other matters, of which, as to the state of what had passed, he procured the emperor's orders to monsieur Bartenstein to inform him. But I know now, that, before he went away, he made an entire confidence of his whole intrigue to his only friend and counsellor here, count Rosenberg, who is not the most reserved and discreet person in the world, so that the news of his going to England was not long a secret; and when, upon the arrival of monsieur Waffanaar's courier, count Tarouca told me he supposed this court had received letters from Strickland, and I shewed my surprise how the emperor could send such a person with any commission at all, the count answered, *Que voulez vous que l'on fasse, quand on est prête à se noyer, on s'attache à tout.* This I mention, as leading to the part which I am persuaded the emperor and the empress have had singly and innocently in the whole affair.

It would demand a long conversation with your excellency, and you have known my ardent desire for more than a twelvemonth to be indulged in one, to explain all the interior of this court. But be pleased to imagine for a moment, a prince of the emperor's temper and in his circumstances—to say no more—an artful priest comes under the sanctified pretence of reforming his diocese, in the direction of which he is certainly very exemplary; he has strong recommendations from a court in friendship with the emperor, and the minister of that court is to lend him his good offices in another affair of a high nature: but he quits by degrees the domestick affairs of his diocese, to enter into those of the emperor's administration, and instead of the bishoprick he will reform the government. He produces his recommendations, which were to be subservient to one point only, as so many proofs of the regard which those who recommended him may have for him in all points. He imagines complaints between

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tween the parties, where there are none, and by proposing himself as a kind of a mediator, he makes real complaints. I represent to him that I know of no mis- intelligence, as he imagines, between the two courts, which makes his mission unnecessary, and that, if there are any, it cannot but be on account of such im- possibilities, which it is not in his power, or in that of any man alive, to remedy. He persists, however, in deceiving the emperor into a belief of his being capable of doing him service in England, singly possessed as he is with the hopes of his nomination or future grandeur in another way, according to the success of his mission; for I do not find after all, that his nomination is any other than that precarious one of Poland, if the elector of Saxony remains upon that throne; and I will be bold to say that his future grandeur, as to any immediate share in the administration here, is very imaginary.

In a word, sir, the emperor has been personally deceived by him; and I will answer for it, that, upon the first hint I shall give in a proper place, of what your excellency is pleased to acquaint me with, as to the ill use he makes of his recom- mendations from his Imperial majesty, he shall have orders to save himself out of England, faster than he procured his being sent thither.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Thanks him for the information respecting the bishop of Namur, and approves his conduct.—Farther accounts of the bishop's proceedings in England.

DEAR TOM,

Hague, Nov. 27, 1734.

I Had not time, on account of yesterday being my post-day to England, to re- turn you my particular acknowledgements for your private letter relating to Strickland. I think your behaviour, with regard to that gentleman's views and intrigues, was very prudent, and, considering your's and his situation, you could not have acted otherwise than you did. I have heard nothing about him since my last private letter to you, mostly in cypher, on his subject; but there is news here, that, instead of going to the Bath, the place of intrigue and resort of all sorts of people, for politicks as well as love, the bishop thought fit to take a private lodging, without making much noise or parade, and waits, as is given out, only for answers to his dispatches, which he has some time since sent by a safe conveyance to the Imperiall court, in order to leave England. How far this is really true, I can't tell; but it is generally believed, that his first coming was calculated to change the ministry and influence the parliament. Sir Robert Walpole has left the door at court open for him, having been gone into the country

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country for a fortnight, where I suppose, as usual, he will stay a week longer. The meeting of the parliament is fixed for the 25th of Jan. N. S., so that the bishop has free liberty and advertisement for managing his intrigues, or staying in England, as he shall think fitt. But I must desire that what I say to you on this subject, may be between ourselves only; for I don't care to commit myself, although I am never ashamed of what I write or say, publickly and personally, with any body.

The news from Portugal of the 26th past, positively affirms, that a marriage is actually agreed upon between Don Pedro, the second infant, and an arch-dutchess; that monsieur Wassenaar was sent to bring it to a final conclusion. A propos to Portugal; Mr. , upon his first arrival here, brought me a letter dated the 11th of August, from prince Emanuell *, desiring my credit in England for his majesty's good offices with the king of Portugal, to pay him the arrears of his revenues, sequestered during his absence. I wrote accordingly, and have returned a civil answer in the king's name, expressing his majesty's readiness to do him pleasure and show him marks of his affection in any thing, and on any occasion that was proper; but that his request relating to an affair purely domestick between the two brothers, the king could not intermeddle in it. When I consider the date of the prince's letter to me, which was above two months before monsieur Notwiz arrived, and the nature of his pretended errand, (for he brought a letter of the like nature to the pensionary,) it is impossible to think but that he had some view in his journey. He often carries the man of importance in his countenance and discourse; hints of his having a commission, but for what or from whom he does not declare; lets fall some times his having thoughts of going into England; and, with a sneer, he is called by some the *Strickland* in Holland. But there is enough of this stuff; the post is going, and I am, with the greatest esteem, your's, &c.

DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Queen indisposed.—Lady Suffolk retires from court.—King and queen pleased with his letter.—Requires instructions, and presses his return.

DEAR SIR,

Newcastle House, Nov. 13, 1734.

Sidney
Papers.

YOU cannot imagine how happy your kind letter has made me: the expressions of goodness and friendship to me in it, I shall never forget; and

* Son of John V. king of Portugal. He departed from Lisbon without the knowledge and consent of his father, and resided during several years abroad.

as I can most sincerely say there is nothing I value so much, so it is, and ever shall be, the study of my life to deserve the continuance of them.

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I am sorry to acquaint you that I found the queen much worse in her health than I expected. I have seen her three times in a little while: she told me she never had been so ill in her life, but that she had been let blood four times; that she was now much better, and indeed she is; but she owns she is so weak that she sweats in going cross the room. Her fever is quite gone, but her cough continues, and is still very troublesome, and she seems to have an oppression on her breast. I have not seen her to-day, but she continues to mend. She promises to take great care of herself, and I hear the king now begins to think it necessary.

You will see by the newspapers that lady Suffolk has left the court. The particulars that I had from the queen are, that last week she acquainted the queen with her design, putting it upon the king's unkind usage of her. The queen ordered her to stay a week, which she did; but last Monday had another audience; complained again of her unkind treatment from the king, was very civil to the queen, and went that night to her brother's house in St. James's-square. Every body is silent upon the subject; the only consequence it has yet had is, that there are few or no opportunities of seeing the queen; but I beg you would mention these particulars only to Harry.

Your letter to Horace was, in my opinion, the best I ever read. I have kept a copy of it, for I intend to observe it as exactly as I can throughout this negotiation. I hope you will not take it amiss that, after having weighed every paragraph in it, I sent it to the queen, and by her order shewed it to the king: I found it absolutely necessary, from the conversation I had with my brother Harrington, and the king and queen approved it extremely, and I believe intend to follow it. You will see by the copy of my letter to Horace, what passed between Lord Harrington and I. I endeavoured to conform myself entirely to your way of thinking, though I find Horace is for going faster. Sure it is time enough when we know what France asks of us. Lord Harrington is, as usual, very fond of his own plan. I am not sure whether it is the most likely way to make the negotiation succeed, and I much question whether the manner proposed by him (though to be sure the most eligible for us) will be agreeable to the cardinal, I mean as to suffering them to force the emperor by attacking him only in Italy. You will find that the emperor consents to our good offices, which is a lucky incident; and by a short letter I have received this day from Lord Waldegrave, you will see the cardinal is very well pleased with Horace's letters and

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Jannel's report. I send you Horace's letter to me; he is very uneasy at your being in Norfolk, and indeed I wish you would hasten your return to town, at least so as to be here some time next week. The king, I find, would be glad to see you, though he will not say any thing that may necessarily bring you from your diversions, and the place you are with so much reason fond of. I foresee, till you come, the best we can hope for is, that we shall have nothing done; for I despair of being able to do more than prevent any thing that I think you would not like. I will do my best.

The king and queen are both very good to me; but, without a compliment, I am always afraid, when I have not your assistance and advice. I hope you will let me have your thoughts upon the draught of Har——n's letter to Horace, and upon mine to him. My compliments to all your good company, to my fellow sportsmen, and particularly to my benefactor, my lord Walpole, who has learnt from his father to do obliging things to me. I must not conclude without giving you the pleasure of the princess Amelia's compliments and good wishes. If, as I fear, we shall not have you before your time appointed, I must beg you will send me ample instructions upon every thing; what orders, if any, to Waldegrave; what should be done with Har——n's draught; what answer to the emperor's offer of good offices; and, in short, upon all other points of consequence that may occur to you.

P. S. Remember me to Harry. I conclude Harrington has wrote fully to you. Horace asked me to send the letters; but when he said he would send you his draught, I desired him to write to you.

LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Instructs him, by the king's command, to renew his instances to the States General for an augmentation of forces.—The king promises 10,000 men for the defence of the Netherlands, if the Dutch will furnish the same number, and will endeavour to prevail on the emperor to send a large body of troops for the same purpose.

SIR,

Whitehall, November 5—16, 1734.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

THE king having reflected with the greatest attention upon the present critical situation of affairs of Europe, and having maturely weighed the vast difficulties which are so justly to be apprehended in our scheme of putting an end to the war by means of a secret negotiation either with France or Spain, together with the danger of a private concert between those two crowns for

amusing

amusing the maritime powers by overtures of peace, in order to prevent their taking the necessary precautions against such ambitious and fatal designs as they may be preparing to put in execution : and his majesty having likewise taken into his consideration, that even though the apprehension of such a concert should be groundless, and there should be a real disposition to peace, either in the cardinal or the queen of Spain, or both, yet our negotiations may be still in great danger of failing, by the impossibility that we may find ourselves under of complying with such preliminaries as may be exacted of us, or by the exorbitancy of the terms that might be insisted on. In which case, nothing is more natural to suppose, than that his eminency, notwithstanding his private wishes to be rid of the war, might be forced to embark still deeper in it : and as it appears to the king, that, either upon that supposition, or upon the former one of a secret understanding between France and Spain for ruining the house of Austria, though they should not think it expedient to alarm the maritime powers so early as to begin the very next campaign by the seizure of the Netherlands, yet that one of the steps to be justly apprehended, in consequence of such designs as those above-mention'd, must certainly be their putting themselves in possession of those countries sooner or later, as it will always be in their power to do it, whilst things remain in the present situation ; and that this, together with the open declaring of the three electors on the side of France, would not only put the emperor and empire, but his majesty likewise and the States General, and in a word all Europe, at the mercy of that crown, and especially if the Turks should be prevailed on to fall upon the hereditary countries. Upon all these considerations, to which may be likewise added the particular and imminent danger to the republick from the French being put in possession of Cologne, pursuant to the secret advices communicated by the court of Vienna, the king is every day more and more convinced of the necessity there is for his majesty and the States to be prepared against all events, by not neglecting to put themselves betimes into a proper posture of defence and safety, and by providing in the first place for the security of the Austrian Netherlands, that important barrier, upon which their own preservation, and that of the ballance of Europe so greatly depends.

His majesty has himself a very considerable fleet ready for service in his ports ; he is raising near ten thousand additional landmen, has already contracted for six thousand Danes, and is negotiating the same number, not without hopes of success, in Sweden.

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In the same views of safety and self-defence, the king has constantly recommended to the States General to resolve upon a speedy augmentation of their forces; and your excellency has, with great zeal and strength of reasoning, labour'd and inforc'd that necessary point with the principal members of the republick. But, tho' all the arguments that have been hitherto employed have failed of success, his majesty is not yet willing to give it up entirely, (and especially as your excellency did not yourself look upon it to be absolutely desperate,) but, on the contrary, would have you continue to press the said augmentation with the greatest warmth; and his majesty hopes that an expedient which he has thought of for taking off what seems to be one of the principal objections, may produce the desired effect.

To explain this to your excellency, I am to acquaint you, that monsieur Hop having frequently intimated in his conversations with the king's servants, that one of the chief difficulties which has hitherto prevented the States from coming to a resolution of augmenting their forces, was an apprehension least, upon the first preparation they should make for that purpose, the French ministers might conceive a jealousy of that step's being taken with a view of employing those forces in Flanders, and might immediately endeavour to prevent them, by taking themselves possession of those countries. It has therefore occurred to his majesty, that in case he could be enabled in private to give proper assurances to the emperor that the States General, upon seeing the Austrian Netherlands put in the mean while into a sufficient posture of defence, to prevent any sudden surprize, would join with his majesty as soon as their troops could be ready for that purpose, in providing for the future security of the said countries in conjunction with such forces as should be left there by the emperor; the king would not find it difficult to prevail upon his Imperial majesty to march a body of his troops immediately into the Netherlands, under pretence of changing their winter quarters, to remain there till such time as they should be joined by those whom his majesty and the States General should determine to send thither. And this method of proceeding the king thinks might serve to quiet the apprehensions of the States with regard to the umbrage that might be conceived by France at their augmenting their forces, and the steps that might be taken by that crown thereupon.

What goes before contains his majesty's plan for procuring if possible an augmentation of the Dutch forces, and for ingrafting on it afterwards the necessary measures for the defence of the Low Countries. These steps, if once taken, would,

would, in the king's opinion, either make the allied powers more reasonable in their terms of accommodation, or very much lessen our pain as to the consequences of their acting in another manner. And the king does not see that either one or the other of those measures could justly draw upon the States that resentment which they may apprehend on the part of France. As to the former, it is a domestick transaction entirely, not subject to the censure of any foreign prince; and the States have an instance before them in what his majesty has done of that kind, by which they may see how little risk they will run by coming to the same vigorous and necessary resolution.

Neither does it appear to the king that France could, with any colour of justice, pretend to quarrel with the States for what they might do with regard to the Netherlands. They have an undoubted right to make what provision they think proper for the security of their barrier, which is at present so ill defended by the precarious stipulations of the late convention of neutrality, an engagement that may be set aside upon the most trifling pretences, tho' never so strictly observed on the part of the States. Their concurring in the plan above-mentioned could not possibly be taken as a contravention to that treaty, as they did not in the least preclude themselves thereby from taking any such additional precautions for the defence of those countries.

Nor could it be justly alleged by France that this was giving the emperor an indirect assistance, since the plan itself supposes the emperor's continuing to have a body of troops there likewise; and since it is evident by the experience of the last campaign, that a great part of his Imperial majesty's forces would probably be withdrawn from thence, tho' the places of the Netherlands were still to be left in the same defenceless situation. So that, upon the whole, any resentment that should be shewn by the French court upon such an occasion, would be a plain proof that they did not otherwise propose to adhere to the above-mentioned convention of neutrality farther than might be for their own convenience. But as his majesty is satisfied that such a proceeding on the part of that crown would be unjustifiable in the eyes of the whole world; so he is not less convinced that the French ministers would by no means, even exclusively of that consideration, think it adviseable to force the maritime powers into the warr, by attacking them upon so slight a pretence.

It is therefore his majesty's pleasure that your excellency should lose no time in renewing your instances in the strongest manner, as well with the pensionary and greffier, as with such other persons of weight and authority there as you can entirely confide in; and endeavour to persuade them by all the arguments mentioned

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mentioned in the beginning of this dispatch, and such others as may occur to you, to recommend to the States General, whom it is impossible from the nature of the thing itself to consult in form thereupon, without risking an untimely discovery of the secret, the making a proper augmentation of the forces of that republick, as soon as they shall see the Low Countries secured from all danger of being seized upon by France. And that they may know in what the said provisional security for those parts is intended to consist, you will acquaint them with the expedient which I have before explained to you, and let them know, that in case they will in secret authorize the king to assure his Imperial majesty of their design of raising new forces, and to give him hopes of their sending a body of them afterwards into the Netherlands, his majesty has reason to believe, from the great readiness which that prince has always expressed to contribute to the defence of the said countrys, that he should be able to prevail with him to march a sufficient number of men thither from the Rhine immediately, under the pretence above-mention'd. And in case, in reasoning upon these points, any of the persons you apply yourself to should seem to apprehend, that the king is throwing the whole burthen upon the States, and should insist upon being informed what part his majesty will himself take towards the security of a frontier, which, tho' of more immediate consequence to the republick, is yet extremely important to the welfare of these kingdoms, your excellency will then inform them that his majesty will be ready on his part to furnish ten thousand men to be thrown into the Netherlands, in conjunction with an equal number of Dutch troops, whenever their High Mightinesses shall make the necessary requisition for that purpose according to the tenor of the treatys in that behalf.

The bringing the emperor into a proper concert for the security of the Netherlands is what the States have been from the beginning extremely desirous of; and his majesty cannot think of any other method, which, in the present circumstances, is so likely to effectuate that design. As to the point itself, of defending those countries immediately, against all events, it seems to be acknowledged by all to be of so great consequence, that it is scarce necessary to enforce it by any observations whatever; yet I cannot avoid just taking notice to your excellency, as an addition to what I mentioned to you upon the same head in the beginning of this dispatch, that the paragraph in the cardinal's letter of the 20th inst. N. S., wherein he tells you, "That it could not be hoped that, in case our present negotiation proves ineffectual, our great armaments would be employed against the emperor, and that all Europe would certainly look upon them as designed to force France into a peace; which idea would be

no

no less injurious to their nation than to the French king." This paragraph, I say, seems to imply an indirect menace, as if they would be obliged, in case of the failure of this negotiation, and the continuance of our armaments, which are so much magnified, to do something for the vindication of their honour; and nothing appears more obvious to be apprehended in such a case, than their preventing us in the design of taking possession of the Netherlands.

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P. S. This dispatch was prepared to be transmitted to your excellency by the last post, but the arrival of Robson with your letters of the 9th, the same morning, occasioned his majesty's deferring to let it go till now; and it is at present sent to your excellency, that you may be acquainted with the king's sentiments upon an affair of so much importance, though you will consult with the pensionary and the greffier, as to the time when it may be most conducive to the common interest, that these commands from his majesty should be put in execution.

LORD HARRINGTON TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Regrets that the draught of the letter on the Netherlands is disapproved—And will not send it.

SIR,

London, November 8—19, 1734.

BY the return of a messenger from Houghton with the two packets of Mr. Walpole's letters, I was honoured this evening with one from you, dated yesterday, and was sorry to find by it, that the draught which I had sent you, of what I proposed to write to Mr. Walpole concerning the Netherlands, had been so much disapproved by you. The letter itself never went; nor shall I now stir that matter any more; what I therein suggested was what I apprehended to be right and agreeable to what you told me were the king's sentiments.

Sidney
Papers.

The letters that were due yesterday from Holland, are not yet arrived; however I send you copys of what I write this night to Mr. Walpole, by which you will see that I suspend sending him any orders from the king, upon the subject of his late important dispatches, till we shall have learnt your sentiments upon them, of which I hope to be fully informed by the return of the duke of Newcastle, since you are not pleased to send them to me yourself, which I was in hopes you would have done, and which I should have most earnestly desired of you by letter, had not the duke of Newcastle told me I need not do it, he having the king's commands to desire it of you.

I wrote this to you to-night, being to set out early to-morrow morning to hunt in New-park.

LORD

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LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Without date, but indorsed "Sent by Chandler, 13th November 1734, to Sir Robert Walpole."

Sends a plan for the preliminaries.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

I Have now received and laid before the king your excellency's most secret letters of the 16th and 19th instant, N. S. which, as they relate almost entirely to the preliminaries that may be exacted of us by France upon our settling a plan of pacification with that crown, I shall likewise confine this dispatch principally to the same subject. You have already, by mine of the 1st instant, seen the king's way of thinking in general upon the other points of the negotiation, and I hope still to be able, before monsieur Jannel's return, to send you his majesty's precise and positive orders upon every part of the plan proposed by that gentleman.

Your excellency may remember, that in my first most secret letter of the 8th past I acquainted you that it did not appear to his majesty that the maritime powers could ever consent to see the arms of France in the heart of the empire, and in the emperor's hereditary countries, or that any sufficient security could be given us for her not making an ill use of such dangerous advantages. The king continues still in the same opinion, not thinking that any the most solemn stipulation can authorise our putting so great a confidence in that crown. The cardinal might indeed contract an engagement of restoring every thing to the former foot, with a sincere intention of fulfilling it, but nobody knows how soon *the scene might be altered at the court of Paris, should the administration of affairs fall into less moderate hands, and the old French maxims of conquest and aggrandisement come again to prevail.* Besides that in case of our allowing them to attack the emperor's hereditary countries, *they must have new allies to gratify, who would in all probability, either in pursuance of engagements with France, or by taking themselves advantage of that prince's weakness in order to push their own pretensions, be soon in possession of part of his spoils, so that the emperor's succession, the keeping which united is so justly thought of the greatest importance to the ballance of Europe, might by this means come to be torn in pieces; and though France should indeed retain no conquests for herself, yet by the extreme diminution of his Imperial majesty's power, she would soon grow an overmatch for the rest of Europe.*

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The king, therefore, does not see how it can be possible for him, either as a prince of the empire, as king, or as one of the powers in general concerned in the preservation of the liberties of Europe, ever to consent to *such a preliminary as that of suffering France to force the emperor to compliance by attacking him in his hereditary countries, under any declarations, assurances, or promises whatsoever that might be offered by that crown.* And therefore his majesty was sorry to see your excellency of opinion that people in Holland would be tempted to rely upon the *bonne foy of France* for the execution of an engagement, and that even the pensionary's plan is built upon that foundation. The punctual observance of the convention of neutrality by the French ministers is indeed very commendable. But then the difference of the objects ought to be considered, and that France, however she may have had the Austrian Netherlands at her mercy, yet could not certainly have attacked them without the apprehension of forcing the maritime powers into the war; whereas in the other case, after having made use of our concessions for oppressing the emperor and empire, she could have no restraint nor bounds set to her but her own disinterestedness; and it deserves reflexion, as I have before hinted, whether that spirit of moderation upon which the States seem willing to depend, may not be *personal to the cardinal*, and the product of his ministry only.

At the same time, however, that the king cannot but think the abovementioned preliminary by far too hazardous to be complied with, his majesty is not the less convinced of the necessity of our endeavouring to give France a reasonable satisfaction upon this head, and especially as in case the cardinal does not disavow monsieur Jannel, either in what he has actually offered, or given us hopes of, and will throw in the *dutchy of Tuscany*, and agree to *reasonable conditions in favour of the younger branches of the family of Lorrain*, the king might possibly look upon such terms of accommodation as safe and honourable for the emperor; and his majesty being therefore desirous of going as far as possible in his concessions towards the re-establishment of the publick peace, has ordered me to authorize you, if the pensionary is willing, and impowered to concur with you in it, to offer the following preliminaries, which are however only proposed upon the supposition of the cardinal's concurrence in the reciprocal engagement with respect to the allies of France, mentioned in mine of the 8th instant, and of our agreeing together upon a certain plan of pacification, of which it is necessary that I should acquaint your excellency that the *guaranty of the pragmatick sanction by that crown* is understood by his majesty to be one unchangeable condition.

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The said preliminaries are as follow :

1. That in case of the emperor's refusal to accept the plan so settled between the maritime powers and France, his majesty and the States will not give him any assistance against that crown and her allies, provided France engages that the war shall be solely confined to the limits hereafter mentioned ; that the king in particular will recall the troops he has sent, over and above his contingent as elector, to that prince's assistance, and will be so far from opposing the negotiations of France for detaching other princes of the empire, as proposed in your excellency's letter of the 16th, by treatys of neutrality, that his majesty will even concur therein by his own example and influence.

2. As Italy is the part in which the ballance of Europe seems least to be concerned, and as by the plan supposed to be settled with France the maritime powers would, in case of the emperor's acquiescence therein, have obtained very considerable possessions there for his Imperial majesty in lieu of Naples and Sicily, the king will therefore concur with the states-general in giving proper assurances, that in case of the war's continuing upon account of that prince's refusal, and provided France engages to confine it wholly to Italy, they will not oppose his being deprived of some of the advantages in those parts which would have been secured to him by his joining at first in the plan. But even in this case, his majesty thinks we should labour to fix the forfeitures upon his refusal, at as low a rate as possible, and with an absolute exclusion of any acquisitions to the crown of France; his most Christian majesty engaging at the same time not only to forbear all hostilities in any other part, and particularly in Germany and Flanders, against the emperor, and not to encourage or excite any other power to attack him in other parts, or to assist them directly or indirectly in so doing, but likewise to restore fort Kehl and Philipsburg, and whatever else may have been taken on that side during the war. If it be objected by France that, in case of their being tyed up from making any diversion on the side of Germany, his Imperial majesty might be too powerful for the united arms of the allies in Italy, it will be easy to shew them, *that as their restriction in this point is supposed to be kept entirely a secret, the declaration of not assisting being to be made in general by the maritime powers to the emperor, and as his majesty's actual withdrawing his forces, which will doubtless be followed by other princes, will prevent the court of Vienna from turning their whole strength to the side of Italy*, there can be no question of the superiority of the allies continuing as great as ever in those parts. I have touch'd above upon the point of France's guarantying the pragmattick sanction, and am now to acquaint your excellency

excellency that what I there said concerning it arose from the first article, as inserted in your's of the 19th, of the pensionary's plan of preliminaries, which begins by these words, *altho' the French king cannot, on account of the behaviour of the emperor, agree to the pragmatick sanction.* This the king, however, hopes will not be the case, for his majesty is firmly of opinion that we ought never to agree to the continuance of the war against the house of Austria, unless France will engage herself irrevocably to the maritime powers to guaranty that succession as far as it shall remain unaltered by the present plan of pacification, and by the preliminary articles to be settled as abovementioned. Nor indeed does his majesty see any just foundation for apprehending that France will refuse to adhere to this part of the plan, in case of the emperor's refusal, *since that would be departing from the very principle upon which this negociation is grounded, viz. the settling the essential points towards a general pacification amongst ourselves, in a manner not to be receded from so far as they may depend upon the contracting parties, altho' our system might not be acquiesced in by the allies on either side.* Besides that this article of the pragmatick sanction is offered by France, as monsieur Jannel declared, purely out of consideration for the maritime powers, who look upon their own security as so much interested in it; and it is not therefore to be imagined that it either will, or indeed can, with any shew of reason, be retracted by France, because the emperor may decline to come into our plan of accommodation.

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The second article of the pensionary's plan, relating to the Netherlands, is entirely approved.

As to the affair of Berg and Juliers, the king will be very ready to join in concerting any proper measures for preventing the ill consequences to be apprehended upon the opening of that succession.

But before I finish this letter, I must just tell your excellency that I am sorry I explained myself so ill in mine of the first of November, as to leave room for your supposing that I meant the dedommagement to the king of Sardinia to be made out of the *Milanese*, tho' the words immediately preceding were *Parma and Placentia*, and I had made no mention at all of the *Milanese*, nor intended at that time to enter in the least into the question out of which of those countries the allowances to his Sardinian majesty were to be taken.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Disapproves the plan for the preliminaries, and gives his opinion on the most proper mode of proceeding.

MY LORD,

Houghton, November 15—26, 1734.

Walpole
Papers.

Copy.

THE messenger that brought me the several packets and dispatches did not arrive here till near nine o'clock last night, which I hope will satisfy your lordship, that it was impossible for me to dispatch my answers time enough to be of any use for the Dutch mail of this evening.

I discoursed so fully with the duke of Newcastle when he was here, upon the subject of the papers that came down relating to monsieur Jannel's conferences, and having no hand here that I thought proper to trust in taking copies, I have not all the particulars so perfectly before me as to enable me to go thro' with them; so that I must desire leave to refer myself to the duke of Newcastle, who is able to inform your lordship, if it will be of any use to you, what is the substance of my thoughts upon this important affair.

As to the affair of Poland, the court of France must be sensible it will be impossible for the maritime powers to obtain what monsieur Jannel at first proposed; but as he did receive, in a very reasonable way, and in all appearance in an encouraging manner, the suggestions of the ministers of the maritime powers, it is very much to be hoped that France will be reasonable upon that head; and altho' there may be some alterations offer'd, that they will not be such as to make a breach upon that article: but it will be very hard to come to any conclusive engagement about it, until the terms and conditions are known.

As to the affair of Italy, the difference was upon the first proposal as wide as upon the affair of Poland. A total loss of all Italy, and a new division or distribution of the several parts, are such different things, that if monsieur Jannel had not himself enter'd into the distribution of it, the affair had been desperate. But it is now with the court of France to say how far they will comply with the suggestion that monsieur Jannel has charg'd himself with; and in this, I confess, I conceive very great hopes as far as it relates to the court of France.

But I should be sorry that positive instructions should be sent to my brother to insist upon any one part, as a condition *sine quâ non*, which it may be neither in the power nor inclination of France to procure: for example, Tuscany. There is no doubt but that would be a great and very valuable addition to the emperor; but if he can recover the Milanese, preserve the Mantuan, and obtain

Parma

Parma and Placentia, I should be unwilling to advise the breaking this negotiation for the want of Tuscany.

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In this case, I should therefore think, orders should be sent to my brother to contend for all that has been demanded: but it is reasonable to expect that abatements and concessions may arise, where a discretionary power must determine.

I am very sensible how hard it is upon my brother to be left to judge upon particulars, where there may be such different opinions, and where such different interests are concerned; and therefore, for his sake, should most heartily wish that he had explicit orders given him upon every particular. But as I imagine the second conference betwixt monsieur Jannel and our friends in Holland cannot be final, the pensionary and my brother might express their approbation upon any undetermined point, subject to the approbation of their masters. At least I cannot but be of opinion, that if they come near to a conclusion, they may be authorized to make some draught, or *précis*, or whatever you please to call it, of heads or articles to be signed by them, as approved by them respectively, which may serve (in the stile of the last *précis*) as *points généraux qui seroient propres à avancer la négociation d'une paix générale*; and this, for mutual satisfaction, they may declare they believe to be the sense of their masters upon the several articles, to be sent to their respective courts for confirmation.

My experience in these matters is not very great; but to the best of my observation, these sorts of negotiations have always been attended with so many delays, from the natural and necessary discussions of the points in agitation, that I never saw any danger of being surprised by a hasty conclusion; and therefore I cannot but be of opinion, *that the plan of pacification should be settled previous to the plan of execution.*

I am sensible that our friends in Holland are of opinion, that the French will insist that *the plan of execution shall at least accompany the plan of pacification, if not precede it*; but I cannot be so clearly of that opinion. The French must expect, that whatever engagements they exact of us with regard to the emperor, in case he shall refuse upon the acceptance of France and her allies, will be made mutual in common justice; and that France must equally engage to compel a compliance in Spain upon the acceptance of the emperor, as the maritime powers must be to enforce the same with the emperor, upon his refusal and the acceptance of Spain. Will France think it a desirable thing previously to engage, not only to dispose of the dominions of don Carlos, very probably without

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We seem to chalk out the method of compelling the emperor, by leaving him naked and destitute in Germany, with a provision that he shall not be attacked by France in Germany. What is to be the method of executing this engagement on the part of France with her allies? Suppose the emperor to accept the terms of pacification, and Spain to refuse them, will France make peace with the emperor, become neutrals jointly with the maritime powers, and leave Spain to make good their ground in Italy against the emperor? This consideration may be shown in various views; but not to enlarge upon this topick, to me it seems *apparent that neither party will choose previously to engage to compel their allies to accept of terms not even settled and agreed to by themselves; for if this negotiation finally fails, we shall be liable to the reproach of having engaged to impose terms upon our allies without their consent, where they have valuable interests concerned, and such terms as will be found impracticable, and become abortive.*

As these considerations are mutual, I think they will occur on both sides; and, if they appear to have the same weight with others as they have with me, may be properly made use of to divert France from insisting upon what they apprehend. And moreover I think it is not eligible for us to make engagements so offensive, as what is under consideration may be thought to be by Spain, till we see a probability of success. To dispose of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany, from don Carlos, and to engage to compel the execution of it, will not sound well in the ears of the queen of Spain, if that part of our secret negotiation should be the first that reaches the court of Madrid; and perhaps I am singular, but I think there is more reason to apprehend the refusal of the allies of France upon the first opening of this affair, than of the emperor.

I should with great pleasure see a plan of pacification settled between France and the maritime powers, and the execution, or other good consequences, will certainly follow from it. But I fear the plan of execution will very much encumber the pacification; and the pacification, well settled, will facilitate, I had almost said effectuate, the execution.

If my reasonings deserve any regard, it makes it almost unnecessary to trouble your lordship very particularly about the preliminaries, which you will perceive *I wish may be postponed for the present.* Not but that I think, upon a supposed refusal of the emperor, and a compliance on the part of France and her allies, these preliminaries must be the ground-work of our proceedings, if an incredible

obstinacy and infatuation in the court of Vienna should make it necessary to concert such measures.

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But if I may take the liberty to make an observation or two, I should think, in the second preliminary article, where it is said the king will not oppose the emperor's being deprived of some advantage in Italy, which might otherwise have been obtained, it will not be proper to mention the king's wishes that the forfeitures upon his refusal should be fixed upon as low a rate as possible. I am afraid, if Germany is to be preserved untouched, and the emperor will continue the war in Italy, the allies will expect to be left to themselves in Italy, to be determined by the success of their arms there, and the fate of Italy must be decided by arms, not by treaty: at least I see no good in making some restriction a condition, when none can be ascertained.

By what I have said before, your lordship will see, I think the cession of Tuscany should not be made an absolute condition. I am likewise afraid, if we agree on all other points, it cannot be expected that the French will give a positive guaranty of the pragmatick sanction, if the emperor shall at that time be in actual war with France. If France will agree in no manner directly or indirectly to oppose the pragmatick sanction, considering the powers that are already engaged in that case, will the difference between France's engaging to guaranty, or not to oppose, when there are no other considerable opponents left, be considerable enough to defeat this negotiation?

I have now troubled your lordship too long in making use of the liberty you were pleased to give me, to give you my thoughts upon the papers you were pleased to send me, which I return by this messenger. I have treated them with that freedom you are pleased to allow me, and in a stile proper for draughts prepared by your lordship, subject to examination, and that had not yet passed the approbation of his majesty. If I thought I had been observing upon the king's sentiments, I should have expressed myself with that deference and submission which my duty requires me to observe; but your lordship's goodness will excuse my freedom.

LORD

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1734 to 1737.

1734.

LORD HARRINGTON TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Without date, but indorsed "Sent the 13th November 1734 by Chandler to Houghton."

Encloses the preceding letter to Horace Walpole—And requests his opinion and instructions in regard to the preliminaries.

Sydney,
Walpole,
and Weston
Papers.

I Send this messenger to you with the inclosed dispatches from Mr. Walpole, which are the last that I have received from him, and all that has not been transmitted to you. You will see that he presses extremely for his majesty's orders upon the point of *the preliminaries*, without which both he and the pensionary are convinced that *France will not go any farther in the negociation*. I have, therefore, prepared a letter upon that subject, which was ready for last night's post; but as it relates to an affair of so great importance, I would not let it go without your opinion upon it, which I must accordingly beg you will let me have with all possible expedition, that I may be able to send Mr. Walpole the instructions, which he waits for with so much impatience, by the next mail, which will go from hence on Friday.

It were certainly to be wished that this great work of a general pacification could be finished and compleated without our being obliged to burthen ourselves *with any preliminaries of this nature*, which may be ill interpreted by some people, if they come to be known, and raise jealousies and apprehensions in others: but that consideration must however, if we are determined to go on with France, yield to necessity, since there are no hopes, according to Mr. Walpole's and the pensionary's notion, of the cardinal's continuing to treat with us upon any other foot. And indeed, since it is impossible we should tie up France by any other means than by laying ourselves under some reciprocal restrictions, I think it deserves mature reflection, whether it would be for our interest or not to proceed with that crown *without some such preliminary engagement*.

This negociation is carried on upon the supposition of the cardinal's being sincerely disposed to restore the publick peace upon moderate conditions with security to the equilibre. If his eminency have not really those dispositions, but is on the contrary only seeking to gain time by his present transaction with us, in order to prevent our putting ourselves in a condition to oppose such ambitious designs as he may be preparing for execution; it seems to be very indifferent

indifferent as to the success of the negociation, *whether we enter into such preliminaries or not.* In the first case, he may, after the conclusion of the preliminaries, still *protract affairs till the time of entering again upon action, by chicaning upon the terms of the plan itself;* and in the second, tho' he should have actually agreed with us upon a certain plan, he will be at liberty to fly off from it when he pleases, under pretence of it's not proving satisfactory to his allies, or either of them. But if, on the other hand, France is really sincere, may it not be look'd upon as an advantage to the maritime powers to have fixed the execution, as far as it may depend upon that crown, of a plan which they are supposed to approve, by means of such preliminaries; since, without an engagement of that nature, she would be always at liberty, either out of complaisance for her allies, who might disapprove it, or out of resentment against the emperor, who might be equally unreasonable, to set the whole that should have been agreed on betwixt us aside, and to push the war on in all parts as vigorously as ever, and that without any breach of faith towards his majesty and the States. Whereas in the case of our having enter'd into the preliminaries abovementioned, and settled a plan of pacification with the French king, as the emperor's refusal to accept our plan will not disengage us, so the disapprobation of Spain or Sardinia will not release France from the engagements she will have contracted towards the maritime powers.

But tho' it should be allowed that such a restriction upon France would be a real advantage to his majesty and the States in the negociation, it is still to be considered whether it would or would not be too dearly purchased by the concessions on their part contained in the two preliminary articles, as you will find them proposed in the inclosed draught which I have prepared, as I before acquainted you, for Mr. Walpole. Upon all which, as also upon the answer which his excellency should be authorized to give upon the several points of the conferences with monsieur Jannel, I hope to be honoured with your sentiments by the return of this messenger.

LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Attributes the delays to the absence of sir Robert Walpole.—Encloses the preceding correspondence between himself and sir Robert.

DEAR SIR,

London, November the 19—30, 1734.

AS you will have had great reason to be surpris'd and uneasy at our dilatoriness, as well as at our dryness in the orders and instructions which have

Walpole
Papers.

been

Private and
particular.

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been sent you of late upon matters of such great importance as are at present under your management, I can't help telling you that your brother's absence occasion'd it; I being unwilling, in affairs of such importance, not to have his opinion upon what I shou'd write to you; and as it often happens that people who mean the same thing differ in their sentiments as to the best manner of bringing it about, it is a hard matter to come to a right understanding in such cases without talking to one another freely upon them. Of this you will see an example by the inclosed copys of letters that have passed betwixt your brother and me upon the subject of the preliminaries: but as he is expected in town in a few days, I hope, and don't in the least doubt, but we shall perfectly agree in our sentiments, and that consequently you will for the future receive your instructions quicker, and with more clearness and preciseness than formerly.

I send you these papers in this private and confidential way purely to let you see that I have no secrets or reserve with you; and altho' they can be of no use to you, yet I can't tell but that you may not be displeased with the communication of them; and if it wou'd not be too much trouble, I shou'd be desirous to have your sentiments in the same private and confidential manner upon them. I joyn to them the draught of a letter which I had prepared for you some time ago upon the subject of the Low Countreys, which your brother not approving, I also let drop. At the time of my writing that letter, I own I had but little hopes of seeing what was propos'd in it agreed to in Holland; however, tho' that shou'd have been the case, I thought it possibly might have been of use to us hereafter, in order to the justifying the measures we are now taking with France, by enabling us to convince the world that all other means of saving the emperour and the equillibre of Europe were become impracticable, by the impossibility of engaging the Dutch to take any vigorous measures for that purpose. I am, &c.

LORD HARRINGTON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

The king waits for lord Waldegrave's answer before he sends full instructions.

SIR,

Whitehall, November 19—30, 1734.

Walpole
 Papers.

Most secret.

AN express arrived the day before yesterday from lord Waldegrave, by which his excellency transmitted a copy of what he wrote to you on the 23d N. S. by Avison: and as the king found by those dispatches that the cardinal had sent an answer to your ostensible letter of the 4th and 12th instant, N. S. and was preparing one likewise to your confidential letter of the 12th, his majesty has therefore determined to wait for those answers before he sends you

you his instructions at large upon what has already passed in the negociation, since it may be of great use towards forming such instructions, that his majesty should first see how the cardinal will have taken the relation of monsieur Jannel's conferences, and what farther explanations he may intrust you with. All therefore that I can at present write to your excellency, by the king's order, is to acquaint you, that it is his majesty's pleasure you should inform the cardinal of his approbation of all that you have advanced as from yourself in the conferences with monsieur Jannel, so that from henceforth his eminency may look upon what you then said in relation to the several heads of the negociation to be agreeable to the king's own sentiments; and that as new occasions for knowing his majesty's pleasure may arise in the progress of this transaction, care will be taken to furnish you with instructions for your conduct without loss of time.

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In the mean while, however, though I cannot as yet, for the reason above-mentioned, enter more particularly into the several points of the negociation than I did by my letter of the 1st instant, wherein I gave your excellency some general account of the king's sentiments, I must not omit to inform you, being a thing which his majesty has very much at heart, that, when you come to treat upon that part of monsieur Jannel's overtures which relates to France's guarantying the pragmatick sanction, the king would have you be as careful as possible of the interests of the house of Lorraine. By what dropt upon that head from monsieur Jannel, one might conclude that the cardinal would not only exclude the reigning duke, in case of his becoming emperor, from that succession, but his younger brother likewise, and all the cadet branches of that family. This his majesty looks upon to be a very hard and unreasonable treatment of those princes, who would reap no benefit, that might compensate such a loss, from the duke of Lorraine's advancement to the Imperial dignity. And therefore as the king, out of compassion for the said princes, is extremely averse to such a scheme, his majesty hopes that France will not rigidly insist upon that condition of her guaranty; but will, on the contrary, be ready to accept any proper expedient that may be thought of for removing the jealousies and apprehensions of that crown, upon the succession to Lorraine being still left to the present ducal family, notwithstanding his highness's marriage to the eldest archduchess, and his being hereafter chosen emperor, if these events should ever take place. My lord Waldegrave will be also directed to declare the same things to the cardinal, as your excellency is hereby authorised to write to him.

As to the point of the preliminaries, which makes the subject of your two most secret letters of the 16th and 19th instant, N. S. the king thinks it will

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be time enough to send you his particular commands when we shall see whether France will insist or no upon our entering into such previous engagements; and if she does, in what specific terms they will consist. Your excellency will therefore please to continue to send constant and exact accounts of all that may be proposed by France; and his majesty particularly desires that nothing may be agreed on or concluded of any kind till such time as you may have had his instructions and orders upon it.

I acquainted your excellency, in one of my last letters, that the king would give you a general full power, as you desired. That instrument is prepared, and ready for his majesty's signing; but the king thinks it will be best, before it is actually expedited, that we should see what sort of authorisations the pensionary will procure from the States, and monsieur Jannel will bring from France, that so the powers which are respectively given may be conformable. And in the mean while the cardinal will find, both by what your excellency will write, and lord Waldegrave will declare to him, by his majesty's order, that you are apprized of the king's sentiments as far as is for the present necessary, and are accordingly in a condition to proceed in the negotiation.

DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

King displeased with sir Robert Walpole's letter.—Difference of opinion with lord Harrington.—The king brought over to sir Robert's opinion.—Lord Harrington draws up a plan in conformity to the sentiments of that minister.—The queen's confidence in him.

DEAR SIR,

Newcastle House, November 19—30, 1734.

Sidney
Papers.

I Should not trouble you so soon, and so often, if what pass'd yesterday did not really require it. I received on Sunday morning the copy of your letter to lord Harrington, and sent it immediately to the queen, as lord Harrington did the original to the king. I must own I thought it was clear and strong, and not liable to the objection that was afterwards made to it. The queen told me, she could by no means agree with her friend about Tuscany; that she thought we went too fast with France. Upon which I told her, that you was against any previous preliminary; that as the negotiation was of the greatest consequence, and the success of it so desirable, we ought to forward it as much as we could. Her majesty told me, I should speak to the king; which I had an opportunity of doing soon after alone.

The king was at first much out of humour, not pleased with your letter, and understood it as if you proposed that Horace should have a latitude or discretionary

tionary power as to the terms and conditions to be agreed on. This made the greater impression from a paragraph in Horace's letter which came last Friday, and will be sent you by this messenger; wherein Mr. Walpole desires he may have a latitude for his future proceedings, even, I think, to depart from what may be the king's sentiments. This enraged his majesty to a degree that he declared he would disavow them; ordered Har——n to send immediate orders to Horace to conclude nothing without his express direction; and, in short, you may easily imagine what discourse we had upon it.

I heartily wish, knowing the king's temper, Horace had not wrote in that way. But I told the king, that he could not think of agreeing to any thing without his majesty's order: that I really understood your letter in that sense: that I thought you was against any previous preliminary, was for approving what Mr. Walpole had already said to Janel, and, if any thing new was proposed, that Horace should write for instructions upon it. He seemed at first disposed to send lord Harrington's letter which you saw, and said, orders must be sent to Horace that he must not be at liberty, &c. But when I explained your letter in this manner, and told him that lord Harrington's draught seem'd to imply a treaty with France, and contained an assurance to that crown that his majesty in those circumstances would give no assistance to the emperor, which might possibly prevent his Imperial majesty from accepting conditions which otherwise might be very advantageous for him; and that particularly the first question the emperor would undoubtedly ask when we made proposals to him, would be to know whether we had entered into any engagement or not with France relative to those proposals; this startled him; and as my lord Waldegrave (as you will see) had sent an account of the cardinal's letter to Mr. Walpole, and that Janel was to stay till the cardinal had an answer whether Mr. Walpole was empowered or not to treat, &c.; I then proposed that, for saving time, I should write to lord Waldegrave, as I have done, and the same orders should be sent to Mr. Walpole, which his majesty very readily agreed to. This was the only way I had left to prevent either lord Harrington's letter going, or no orders at all being sent to Mr. Walpole. I have taken what I wrote to lord Waldegrave out of your letter to Mr. Walpole, and I hope that Harrington will write to the same purpose.

His lordship is much mortified at his letter not being approved, thinks your letter cool and formal, and asked me if you was angry with him. I told him not that I knew; but he knew very well you was strong in opinion against the project of our sending troops to garrison Flanders. Lord Harrington told me the king was embarrass'd at the difference of opinion amongst us; that he told him he had at first approved his letter; but that your letter, and some things that,

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† A word
omitted.

that, I think, I happened to suggest, had made him doubt about it, or inclined him to alter his opinion. Harrington, as usual, retains his own; but professes we all mean the same thing, and that it is right for us to tell our opinions. He has desired me to write to Horace to explain the order he is obliged to send him of restriction, which I intend to do; and indeed I must do Harrington the justice to say, it was the king's own * * †, and repeated so often and so strongly, that it could not be avoided.

I send you two privates that I have had from Horace, by which you will see he is very angry with Harrington, and still desires a discretionary power in conjunction with the pensionary; that it is so far from mending the matter, that the pensionary will be an obstacle to it. Hitherto, I think, if I understand you right, you have no notion of Horace's having a latitude to agree to terms and conditions without previous order and approbation; but if, in the course of the negociation, any such power should be necessary, you and only you can get it. I can do no more than I have done.

I do not like things. The more the cardinal seems reasonable and sincere, the backwarder we go; and I doubt, in the progress of the negociation, we shall never think of what we can do, but of what we wish to do. We go too fast, they say. Has there been any precipitate measure proposed but that of the preliminary, which the king certainly gave into? The queen is against giving up Tuscany. Does she know yet whether she shall be obliged to give it up, or not? She has more than once mentioned to me, that our application to the emperor must be made alone, and without the Dutch, to give it the greater weight. But notwithstanding what passed at Houghton, I always have told the queen that nothing of that kind could be done, till we had agreed with France. Can one be sure Kinsky will know nothing of this? Hitherto, I dare say, he does not. The king is now renewing his old pretensions of arrears due from Spain to the elector of Hanover. I think I have touched it in a manner to Waldegrave to do no hurt.

In short, upon the whole, so many new incidents arise every day, from king, and queen, and brother secretary, that I can't pretend to do any thing without you. God grant that this negociation, which seems the only thing we have to depend on, may not by some hasty order, or perhaps for want of proper orders, be at once broke off. You will see the confidence the cardinal treats Waldegrave with; you will see Horace thinks it may be of use, and has sent Waldegrave some accounts; you will see how necessary it was to get Janel back immediately to the Hague; you will see how Waldegrave's hands are tied up;

and for these reasons I hope you will approve the orders sent him. I have done for the best, without passion or prejudice of any kind. I have endeavour'd through the whole to follow your scheme; and if I have erred, I have done it ignorantly. The only way to prevent it for the future is for you to come back; which I once more beg most earnestly, and that you will not fail to be in town early next Monday morning. By the inclosed paper you will see what has pass'd with Oforio, and the intelligence he has communicated to me. My compliments to lord Walpole and all the good company, and believe me, dear sir, ever most sincerely and affectionately, &c.

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P. S. Since writing what is on the other side, I have been at court. The king approv'd so much my letter to Waldegrave, that he ordered my lord Harrington to write in the same manner to Mr. Walpole; and immediately his lordship produced a draught wrote quite in our way, and agreeable to what I had suggested to him last night, which his majesty entirely approv'd. I look'd over the *précis* very carefully this morning, and I find every point in it answered, and directions sent upon it, by the king's approving what Mr. Walpole said, except the proposal about Lorrain, which I mentioned last night to Harrington, and he has wrote very well upon. So that we may truly say Mr. Walpole is instructed upon the points that have hitherto pass'd in the negociation. So far is well; but yet my friend has not laid aside his favourite project of a previous preliminary with France, which he thinks desirable for us, tho' France should not insist on it; and in that I widely differ with him.

There is one circumstance which seems odd: lord Harrington told me the queen had ordered him to come to her. Her majesty says, he desired to see her, and pressed her very earnestly to speak to the king for the project about the preliminaries, and that this letter might go. She talk'd not very clearly; said the king was against it. I repeated to her what I had before said upon that subject, and only wished she would read and consider his letter. The more I reflect upon it, the more I am against the measure. Should our negociation with France miscarry, which is very possible, and depends intirely upon France, what a figure shall we make, to have concluded a previous preliminary, engaging on such conditions not to assist the emperor, &c. and then those conditions never come to any thing? What a breach this may make for ever between us and the emperor, and how will it sound in the world when it comes to be known? And yet my brother, as I told you, is very tenacious. I shall be able to stave off any thing till you come, if you come soon. You will see by Keen's letter things don't look very hopeful in Spain. I hope you will not think I have

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have been too forward in writing to Waldegrave. It was the best, if not the only way for procuring the same orders to be sent to Horace; which orders I almost copied out of your letter.

The queen continues to mend but slowly: her cough still hangs upon her; and she told me this morning she had a straitness upon her breast. She is not quite right, and nothing but your presence can make her so in rebus publicis. I made this short recapitulation to her to-day—that our negociation in Spain seem'd not very hopeful; that that with Sardinia depended on a war; that a war could not be made without the Dutch; that the Dutch would not come into one; and consequently that we had nothing to depend on but our secret negociation with France: to all which she seem'd to agree.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Brief account of the attempt to settle with Jannet the preliminaries.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, December 19—30, 1734.

Orford
Papers.

I am extremely concerned to learn by the last letters from England that you have had a severe attack of your old distemper; tho' I am flattered with the assurances that it is quite over again. The man of confidence has been here, and behaved as well as could possibly be desired, and as he durst doe, being under the apprehensions of the secret envy and malice of Ch. * and his imp, notwithstanding the cardinal's influence and protection, who will believe no ill of the *Garde des Sceaux*, who by that means keeps every body in aw. However, he must be managed, and I have made him vast compliments in one of my letters to the cardinal.

* Chauvelin.

As to the prospect of success, good or bad, I will not hazard my opinion upon so great an event; tho' I am apt to believe that the whole depends upon one article, which is the securitys demanded by us for preserving the ballance of Europe, in case we consent to the continuation of hostilities, and to our remaining neuters upon the emperor's persisting to refuse the plan of accommodation. In this case, we demand that France should abandon, in like manner, her allies, if they refuse it. Monsieur Jannet made no objection to that. We farther demanded at first that France should likewise during the hostilities not oppose the emperor's pragmatick sanction, directly or indirectly; but should not only acquiesce in it, but rather favour it. Mr. Jannet represented the absurdity of this proposition in a strong light; which made us, as you will see by the

the papers, reduce that demand to France's agreeing, notwithstanding the emperor's refusal, to give her guaranty to the pragmatick when the peace shall be made. Monsieur Jannell did not say much against that; but seemed to think that any demand relating to the emperor's succession, in case he perseveres to refuse our proposals after a certain time, will meet with difficulty. But the other demand, that France shall agree (if we agree to be neutrals, and hostilities be continued on account of the emperor's refusal) to restore what has been and shall be taken to the emperor and empire, excepting what by the plan of accommodation is to be given to the allies of France, met with great opposition from monsieur Jannell, and admitted of great debate on both sides to the very last: he insisting that it was unreasonable on account of the emperor's behaviour, and we insisting that it was necessary for the balance of Europe, which we must not suffer to be destroyed notwithstanding the emperor's behaviour. I am apt to believe that it will be proposed by France to compromise this matter; that they will consent to restore, in the foregoing case, all that is and shall be taken in Germany and in the hereditary Low Countries; but that they will not promise that the emperor shall have the same conditions in Italy, the equilibrium of Europe not being concerned in that, if the war is continued by his fault.

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I must own to you freely, that the people here are so indifferent about the disposition of Italy, as having no relation to the equilibrium, whoever possesses it except France, that the pensionary will certainly be disposed to close with this expedient; and I really think we should not break upon this point, if the question relates to Italy only. I have wrote to lord Harrington for instructions upon this point, which you will see fully discussed in the papers, and particularly upon the *temperament* I have mentioned, and therefore you will be attentive to it; and I think that the emperor, having something more or less in Italy, when the difference proceeds from his own fault, should not hazard or loose so great a work, tho' I will endeavour to gett all I can for him in spite of his demeritt.

If things shall be so favoured by Providence, that the plan shall be approved in France, and that we shall sign here, the proposals will soon be made by a resolution taken here in concert with me to the parties at war; which I reckon may all be done by the 4—15th of next month, and then I may easily come away for England; and consequently a yacht should be desired for me immediately to come over and wait my motions. You may depend upon it I will not stir from hence, if I find my stay necessary; and I will return hither whenever his majesty shall think it necessary. But considering the hurry that I was in when I came over, that Mrs. Walpole will expect to come soon hither, if I continue, or to come back with me, when I return to this place; and that I shall

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consequently have a great many things to manage and arrange with respect to my family; a journey, tho' a short one, will be, if possible, absolutely necessary; and Mr. Onslow will never think that any thing could be of importance enough to absent myself when I should vote for him, or rather for the service of my king and country. What are you doing with Montijo? For God's sake goe not too fast; I dread many conferences with a Spaniard and new projects, while we are so far advanced in a good one. I am most affectionately, &c.

M. JOHNN TO MONSIEUR DE HAGEN.

Praïses sir Robert Walpole.

Orford
Papers.

Extract.

Copy.

Londres, ce 24 Decembre 1734. Tout est occupé icy à l'heure qu'il est avec les préparatifs pour l'assemblée prochaine du parlement, et il paroît déjà fort clairement dès à présent que les mesures du ministère sont si bien prises que la cour pourra être assurée d'une grande supériorité dans tous les débats qui surviendront pendant la séance: aussi ménage-t-on le terrain pour cet effet avec une attention au delà de toute imagination. Et quelque chose qu'on puisse dire contre monsieur le chevalier Walpole, amis et ennemis doivent convenir unanimement que pour la direction des affaires du dedans, jamais l'Angleterre n'a vû son pareil. Quant aux affaires du dehors il est le premier à avouer qu'il n'en a pas toute la connoissance qu'il souhaiteroit d'avoir. Cependant on a tous jours observé, que lorsqu'une affaire luy est expliquée nettement, il en juge ordinairement beaucoup mieux que bien des gens qui prétendent connoître à fond les affaires étrangères. Ce ministre est incommodé depuis quelques jours de la gravele, et c'est pour cette raison que l'affaire du présent destiné par sa majesté à la chancellerie Angloise n'est pas encore entièrement réglée.

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LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Plan of a general pacification.—Justification of the cabinet of England for not entering into the war.

SIR,

Whitehall, 15th January 1734-5.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

YOU have been acquainted from the beginning with the several steps taken by the king and the States General in relation to the offer of their good offices to the respective powers, to the time of the acceptation thereof by all the parties concerned; and the joint declaration of the maritime powers, made the

17th

17th past, N. S. that they would then immediately proceed in their endeavours towards an accommodation of the present differences in Europe; which last piece, I find, by your's of the 1st instant, that you had received, and that your court were in earnest expectation of seeing what would be done in consequence of it. I am now therefore to acquaint you, that since the said acceptance of the several parties, the king has been endeavouring to fix and settle, in concert with the States, some such plan of accommodation as might be proposed by them jointly, in pursuance of the admission of their good offices at the respective courts. Which way of proceeding appeared to his majesty to be more suitable, as well to the urgency of the occasion, as to the nature of the present disputes, wherein so many various and jarring interests are concerned, than that of demanding of the several powers at war a declaration in form of their respective terms of reconciliation, in order to convey it to the opposite parties; and as the king for these reasons preferred the former of these methods, his majesty had at the same time the satisfaction of seeing, by some of your last letters, that it was the way in which the court of Vienna seemed to wish and expect that we should proceed.

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You will easily imagine, that a considerable time must have been necessarily spent in examining and preparing the several articles of the plan which has been, as I before told you, under deliberation, as the affairs, to which it relates, are of so complicated, extensive, and difficult a nature; and I cannot indeed now inform you that it is entirely fixed and adjusted. But as the resolution of proceeding in this method has been taken, and the most essential points, of which the said plan is to consist, are now in a manner settled, his majesty's perfect friendship and affection to the emperor would not suffer him to lose a moment's time in communicating to that prince an affair of so much importance: and I am therefore commanded to acquaint you, by this messenger, with the principal heads of what is intended to be afterwards proposed to the several courts in form, that you may previously sound such of the Imperial ministers as you may judge proper upon them, in order to give his majesty the most early information of the emperor's sentiments, and that you may be at the same time furnished with such arguments as may perhaps be necessary to be alledged, both for the support and recommendation of the plan itself, and for justifying our conduct in proposing such terms to the emperor.

The principal and essential parts of the said plan are these that follow: King Stanislaus to renounce the crown of Poland, and the elector of Saxony to remain in possession of it; and neither of those princes to be obliged either to declare, or in any manner to acknowledge his own election to have been invalid. Stanislaus to reserve to himself, for his life, the title and honours of king of Poland,

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Poland, as was practised in the case of the present elector's father, upon his abdication. His estates in Poland to be restored to him. A general indemnification for both parties; and the liberties and constitutions of that kingdom to be guaranteed by all the powers. All that has been taken from the emperor and empire, out of Italy, to be restored. Naples and Sicily to remain with don Carlos, in exchange for the immediate cession to the emperor of the duchies of Parma and Placentia, and the reversion of that of Tuscany, excepting only the town of Leghorn, which is to be for the future a free port, and independent. Every thing else that has or shall have been taken from the emperor in Italy to be restored, particularly the Milanese, excepting Navarra and the Navarrese, with Tortona and the Tortonese, which are to remain to the king of Sardinia. The emperor's pragmatick sanction, excepting the alterations above-mentioned, to be guaranteed by all the powers now at war with his Imperial majesty, in the same manner as it is already guaranteed by the king and the States, viz. exclusive of future acquisitions.

You will immediately upon the arrival of this messenger communicate in the utmost confidence, and under the strictest ties of secrecy, the several propositions above-contained to your court, as the chief points of the plan to be proposed to them afterwards in form. And as it may be apprehended that, upon the first communication, you will meet with objections on the part of the Imperial ministry, together with the topicks of reproach upon his majesty's not assisting the emperor in pursuance of the supposed obligations of his treaties, but, on the contrary, proposing new sacrifices to him for the sake of peace, the observations that I am now ordered to make to you upon those subjects may, as the king hopes, be sufficient to answer all that may be said to you of that kind.

I shall be so much the shorter in stating these observations to you, as your own sagacity and experience in affairs will abundantly furnish you with materials for reasoning with the Imperial ministers upon the points above-mentioned.

Upon recollecting the contents of some of my former dispatches, you will find the reasons for our having deferred entering into the present war so fully set forth, that the repetition of them here is unnecessary. However, without entering at all at present into the question of the *casus fœderis*, it may not be improper to take a short view of what has passed, and to shew you in a few words by what steps, and how unavoidably, his majesty has been led into his present method of proceeding.

As the war was, as you know, from the beginning declared in all parts to have been occasioned purely by the conduct of the emperor with regard to king Stanislaus, it was generally treated, both here and in Holland, as a Polish quarrel

quarrel only; and it was not possible for his majesty to have removed that first impression to the disadvantage of your court, or to have brought this nation, without the concurrence of the States, to enter chearfully into a war, the foundation of which was supposed to be owing to interests so remote from those of the maritime powers. The defenceless state in which the emperor's possessions in Italy were found, and to which the rapid progress of the allies in that country were imputed, had likewise very much alienated the minds of people, who did not otherwise accustom themselves to look upon those dominions as extremely concerned in the balance of Europe; and the repeated declarations of France, that she would make no conquests for herself, had taken off great part of the apprehensions that were inculcated by your court from the proceedings of that crown against the house of Austria. In this situation the States General, who had openly and often declared that they would take no part in the consequences of the Polish affairs, and had engaged themselves likewise thereto by their convention of neutrality with France, proposed to the king their offering their joint good offices to the several parties, in order to try, if possible, to set on foot a treaty of accommodation, before they should be obliged to explain themselves as to the *casus fœderis*. This was an offer which, in the circumstances affairs were then in, had such a plausible appearance, and the future harmony between his majesty and that republick depended so evidently upon his consenting to it, that there cannot want much reasoning to convince all impartial persons of the absolute necessity of its being complied with. The result of this was, that the allies accepted, and the emperor declined the good offices, which occasioned a great loss of time, and prevented his majesty and the States from obtaining so soon as might have been wished, even for the emperor's service, such an insight into the views and intentions of France and Spain, with respect to an accommodation, as might have determined their future conduct.

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That difficulty being at last got over, the maritime powers are now using their utmost endeavours to bring affairs to a precision. They are forming a plan which they flatter themselves may be acquiesced in by the several parties, and think they have projected it in as favourable a manner for the emperor as could possibly be done, consistently with the present posture of the affairs of Europe.

To begin with the part of Poland: the king is persuaded your court must readily acknowledge, that he undertakes a great deal, in proposing to France to give up, in a manner, the cause of his most christian majesty's father-in-law; and, by so doing, to disavow, in great measure, the principles upon which she
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consequently have a great many things to manage and arrange with respect to my family; a journey, tho' a short one, will be, if possible, absolutely necessary; and Mr. Onslow will never think that any thing could be of importance enough to absent myself when I should vote for him, or rather for the service of my king and country. What are you doing with Montijo? For God's sake goe not too fast; I dread many conferences with a Spaniard and new projects, while we are so far advanced in a good one. I am most affectionately, &c.

M. JOHNN TO MONSIEUR DE HAGEN.

Praises Sir Robert Walpole.

Orford
Papers.

Extract.

Copy.

Londres, ce 24 Decembre 1734. Tout est occupé icy à l'heure qu'il est avec les préparatifs pour l'assemblée prochaine du parlement, et il paroît déjà fort clairement dès à présent que les mesures du ministère sont si bien prises que la cour pourra être assurée d'une grande supériorité dans tous les débats qui surviendront pendant la séance: aussi ménage-t-on le terrain pour cet effet avec une attention au delà de toute imagination. Et quelque chose qu'on puisse dire contre monsieur le chevalier Walpole, amis et ennemis doivent convenir unanimement que pour la direction des affaires du dedans, jamais l'Angleterre n'a vu son pareil. Quant aux affaires du dehors il est le premier à avouer qu'il n'en a pas toute la connoissance qu'il souhaiteroit d'avoir. Cependant on a tous jours observé, que lorsqu'une affaire luy est expliquée nettement, il en juge ordinairement beaucoup mieux que bien des gens qui prétendent connoître à fond les affaires étrangères. Ce ministre est incommodé depuis quelques jours de la gravele, et c'est pour cette raison que l'affaire du présent destiné par sa majesté à la chancellerie Angloise n'est pas encore entièrement réglée.

1735.

LORD HARRINGTON TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Plan of a general pacification.—Justification of the cabinet of England for not entering into the war.

SIR,

Whitehall, 15th January 1734-5.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

YOU have been acquainted from the beginning with the several steps taken by the king and the States General in relation to the offer of their good offices to the respective powers, to the time of the acceptation thereof by all the parties concerned; and the joint declaration of the maritime powers, made the

17th

17th past, N. S. that they would then immediately proceed in their endeavours towards an accommodation of the present differences in Europe; which last piece, I find, by your's of the 1st instant, that you had received, and that your court were in earnest expectation of seeing what would be done in consequence of it. I am now therefore to acquaint you, that since the said acceptance of the several parties, the king has been endeavouring to fix and settle, in concert with the States, some such plan of accommodation as might be proposed by them jointly, in pursuance of the admission of their good offices at the respective courts. Which way of proceeding appeared to his majesty to be more suitable, as well to the urgency of the occasion, as to the nature of the present disputes, wherein so many various and jarring interests are concerned, than that of demanding of the several powers at war a declaration in form of their respective terms of reconciliation, in order to convey it to the opposite parties; and as the king for these reasons preferred the former of these methods, his majesty had at the same time the satisfaction of seeing, by some of your last letters, that it was the way in which the court of Vienna seemed to wish and expect that we should proceed.

You will easily imagine, that a considerable time must have been necessarily spent in examining and preparing the several articles of the plan which has been, as I before told you, under deliberation, as the affairs, to which it relates, are of so complicated, extensive, and difficult a nature; and I cannot indeed now inform you that it is entirely fixed and adjusted. But as the resolution of proceeding in this method has been taken, and the most essential points, of which the said plan is to consist, are now in a manner settled, his majesty's perfect friendship and affection to the emperor would not suffer him to lose a moment's time in communicating to that prince an affair of so much importance: and I am therefore commanded to acquaint you, by this messenger, with the principal heads of what is intended to be afterwards proposed to the several courts in form, that you may previously sound such of the Imperial ministers as you may judge proper upon them, in order to give his majesty the most early information of the emperor's sentiments, and that you may be at the same time furnished with such arguments as may perhaps be necessary to be alledged, both for the support and recommendation of the plan itself, and for justifying our conduct in proposing such terms to the emperor.

The principal and essential parts of the said plan are these that follow: King Stanislaus to renounce the crown of Poland, and the elector of Saxony to remain in possession of it; and neither of those princes to be obliged either to declare, or in any manner to acknowledge his own election to have been invalid. Stanislaus to reserve to himself, for his life, the title and honours of king of Poland,

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Poland, as was practised in the case of the present elector's father, upon his abdication. His estates in Poland to be restored to him. A general indemnification for both parties; and the liberties and constitutions of that kingdom to be guaranteed by all the powers. All that has been taken from the emperor and empire, out of Italy, to be restored. Naples and Sicily to remain with don Carlos, in exchange for the immediate cession to the emperor of the duchies of Parma and Placentia, and the reversion of that of Tuscany, excepting only the town of Leghorn, which is to be for the future a free port, and independent. Every thing else that has or shall have been taken from the emperor in Italy to be restored, particularly the Milanese, excepting Navarra and the Navarrese, with Tortona and the Tortonese, which are to remain to the king of Sardinia. The emperor's pragmatick sanction, excepting the alterations above-mentioned, to be guaranteed by all the powers now at war with his Imperial majesty, in the same manner as it is already guaranteed by the king and the States, viz. exclusive of future acquisitions.

You will immediately upon the arrival of this messenger communicate in the utmost confidence, and under the strictest ties of secrecy, the several propositions above-contained to your court, as the chief points of the plan to be proposed to them afterwards in form. And as it may be apprehended that, upon the first communication, you will meet with objections on the part of the Imperial ministry, together with the topicks of reproach upon his majesty's not assisting the emperor in pursuance of the supposed obligations of his treaties, but, on the contrary, proposing new sacrifices to him for the sake of peace, the observations that I am now ordered to make to you upon those subjects may, as the king hopes, be sufficient to answer all that may be said to you of that kind.

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has hitherto proceeded; the consequence of which, if this article be accepted, must certainly be, that the honour of having carried his point must remain, in the eyes of the world, to the emperor, as well as all the advantages which he proposed to himself, by placing the elector of Saxony upon the throne, and fixing him in the quiet possession of that kingdom.

As to the cessions proposed to be made by the emperor in Italy; and first, that of Naples and Sicily to don Carlos, in exchange for Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia; his Imperial majesty will indeed suffer a diminution thereby in his revenues, but it appears that that loss will be in some degree compensated to him by the accession of real power that must accrue from the situation of the countries to be yielded, and their contiguity with the rest of his hereditary dominions; in which respect they seem far preferable to those distant kingdoms, which could not but at all times be liable to sudden invasions, and required a maritime force, which is not the emperor's natural strength, for their defence. Besides which, it ought to be reflected on by your court, that, considering the present circumstances of Naples and Sicily, already in the possession of Spain, the reconquering of them, even with the assistance of the maritime powers, must, if at all possible, which may be fairly disputed, take up a very considerable space of time, and leave the emperor in the mean while exposed to vast expences, by the continuance of the war, and to the most imminent dangers in other parts, and perhaps to the loss of new dominions.

The portion of the Milanese proposed for the king of Sardinia will, I suppose, be much exclaimed against by the Imperial court; but they will consider, that his Sardinian majesty is already in possession of the whole, and supported therein by the powerfull assistance of France and Spain; which is a reflexion that seems to make the sacrificing some part, for the immediate restitution of the remainder, adviseable at least, if not absolutely necessary, in the emperor's present circumstances. But the chief and most weighty argument, both for justifying the maritime powers in making this proposition, and for inducing your court to accept it, is the consideration, that without proposing something that might save the honour of France, and have the appearance of being given as an equivalent to that crown for the compliance, which is expected of the French king in the affair of Poland, and for the guaranty which is demanded of him, as well as of Spain and Sardinia, for the indivisibility of the emperor's succession, the king could entertain no hopes of his most christian majesty's concurrence in those important articles: the great power of that crown is known by repeated experience; and, as the king of Sardinia cannot be supposed to have
 been

been drawn into the French quarrel, without assurances even of much greater advantages than what are proposed by this plan to be yielded to him, you will exhort the Imperial ministers to consider very maturely, whether if France, in the midst of her present superiority, will content herself with obtaining such terms as those for his Sardinian majesty, it will be for their master's interest to refuse absolutely to enable her to gratify him with them.

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As to any accession of power to the king of Sardinia, which may be apprehended by the Imperial ministers, in consequence of this disposition of the Italian dominions, the king cannot but be of opinion that any such accession will be entirely overballanced by the much greater proportion of additional strength, which is supposed to accrue to the emperor by the new acquisition to be allotted to him in the neighbourhood of his Sardinian majesty. For it is evident that the emperor, when put in possession of Tuscany, Parma, and Placentia, together with so much of the Milanese as is by the plan reserved to him, will be in a far better condition to prevent or repel any invasion which the court of Turin, after they shall have become masters of the Navarrese and Tortonnese, may be induced, contrary to the guaranty to be exacted of them, to make upon his dominions, than he was before, whilst the king of Sardinia's possessions were confined to their former bounds, and the emperor had no other footing in those parts, besides the duchies of Mantua and Milan, and whilst those of Tuscany and Parma, being in a manner at the disposition of Spain, might encourage and facilitate any such attack upon his Imperial majesty.

The last and greatest point is that of the guaranty of France to the pragmatic sanction, the vast benefit and importance of which to the emperor and his family are so obvious, that it is hardly necessary for me to enter in the least upon that subject. The king is persuaded that his Imperial majesty will give the greatest attention to this part of the plan to be proposed to him; and will acknowledge, that nothing can be a greater proof of the zeal of the maritime powers for his interest, than their determining to make that guaranty one of the conditions to be demanded of France, who has hitherto shewn so great an aversion to it. The emperor's favourite view has constantly been to fix the indivisibility of his succession, and to leave the quiet enjoyment of it to his posterity. The pretensions of the two houses of Saxony and Bavaria, who have been always supposed to be encouraged therein by France, have been hitherto the chief obstacles to this design; but if the present plan comes to take place, all apprehensions from thence are, as much as possible, removed, the elector of Saxony will have the obligation

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tion for his crown to the court of Vienna, and remain in the peaceable possession of that equivalent; in return for which he was induced, not only to renew his renunciations to the Imperial succession, but even to guaranty it himself to the emperor's descendants: and as to the elector of Bavaria, it is evident that, without the assistance of France, the house of Austria will have very little to apprehend from that quarter.

Having thus gone through the several principal points of the plan of accommodation, I shall finish my remarks upon it, by observing to you in general, that when the loss and advantage to the emperor is thus fairly stated and compared, throwing into one scale the cession of Naples and Sicily, and of Navara, and Tortona, with their districts; and into the other the immediate peaceable possession of Parma and Placentia, with the right of succeeding, after the death of the present duke, to the duchy of Tuscany, to be secured to the emperor and his descendants; the renunciation of Stanislaus to the crown of Poland, and the establishment of the elector of Saxony in that kingdom, together with the guaranties of Spain and Sardinia; but above all, that of France to the pragmattick sanction; the whole account being, I say, in this manner balanced, the king cannot but think that the Imperial court will have a very good equivalent for their compliance, and especially when it is taken, as it must be, into consideration, how extremely different the emperor's present situation is from that of the powers with whom he is to treat; both what is to be yielded to him, and what he is to yield, being already in their possession, and the means in their hands, according to all human probability, of extending their conquests a great deal farther; so that it might not, after a few months, be possible, if it is so at present, to obtain such conditions of his enemies. But the king cannot allow himself to suppose that, after a due examination of all that is proper to be represented upon this subject, his Imperial majesty will be prevailed on by an imaginary point of honour, or for the sake of gratifying any ill-timed resentment, to abandon and reject such solid and permanent advantages to himself and his posterity, as are hereby proposed to his acceptance; or that he will look upon the conduct of the maritime powers, in endeavouring to procure them in his favour, in any other light than as one of the strongest proofs of their sincere attachment to his family, and zeal for his real interests.

It is therefore the king's pleasure, that you should exert your utmost credit, and endeavour, by the most earnest and serious exhortations, to prevail on the Imperial ministers to obtain their master's acquiescence in the above-mentioned propositions.

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I am to acquaint you before I conclude this letter, that his majesty having thought fitt that count Kinsky should be informed in general of the heads of the plan, that he might be induced by that complaisance to write favourably of it to his court; that communication was accordingly made to him verbally, a few days since; and I am since acquainted, that he dispatched a courier upon that subject, on Friday last, to Vienna; so that you will find the Imperial ministers already prepared upon it.

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These orders are sent you by his majesty, in the utmost confidence and secrecy; and you will understand, that they are for yourself alone, and not to be executed in concert with monsieur Bruyninx, or communicated to him, there not having been time to concert this previous step with the States General.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The emperor should be persuaded to accept the armistice.—Dismal situation of affairs.—Enforces the necessity of putting the West Indies in a state of defence.

DEAR SIR,

Hague, April 18—29, 1735.

IN answer to your's of the 8th, I am to acquaint you, that I suspect the difference between the cardinal and monsieur Chauvelyn's opinion, whether the suspension, or the new plan of a treaty between the maritime powers and France, should take place first, to be a perfect trick of Chauvelyn's to disappoint both; as I have explained it in one of my dispatches to lord Harrington, although the cardinall does not apprehend, nor will be made to apprehend, any such thing.

Walpole
Papers.

I entirely agree with you that the points of concession that should induce France to make a peace, and agree to the pragmattick sanction, must come from them; but I am not so clear that lord Waldgrave should be ordered *to ply and press the cardinall to bring his system to perfection*: but, pursuant to the resolution of the States, which I lately transmitted, we must seem to support and justify our own plan, but to insist chiefly upon the suspension of arms. This you will find by my dispatches the Imperial court opposes: they insist upon the allies declaring their sentiments upon the plan, having lodged with his majesty and the States their secret acceptance of what relates to the port of Leghorn; and if count Ulfeldt speaks the sentiments of the emperor, they are resolved not to accept the armistice, without knowing their enemy's minds upon the conditions, or rather the minds of the maritime powers about helping the emperor, in case the

allys

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allys will not agree to their plan ; and from thence I think the Imperiall court will take their last resolution, and have some scheme in view, in case they have no hopes of his majesty and the States assistance, should the plan be rejected by the allys. For otherwise, taking things according to their appearance, by which it is plain that the emperour cannot be in a condition to act offensively, neither upon the Rhine nor in Italy, he should be glad to have an armistice. However, according to your desire and my own opinion, and indeed agreeable to the opinion of every body here, I have strongly insisted with count Ulefeldt, that the emperour should accept the armistice, although the allys doe not explain themselves upon the plan. I have wrote to that purpose to Vienna, as I doe by this post to England ; and I don't doubt but you will support the same opinions ; and as I have received orders this night, to concur in the late resolution of the States on that subject, I shall not fayl of doing it, although I foresee that count Ulefeldt will be out of humour with me for it.

I hope you are satisfyed with the manner in which I have pressed the States to come to some vigorous measures ; it is impossible for me to go greater lengths than I have done, without, I own freely to you, the least hopes of success. I have often putt the pensionary out of humour with me on that account, although I am perswaded he has a personall kindness for me ; and I have, you will have seen, drove him to open his mind, by the paper I sent you last post, which lays a foundation for a particular reconciliation between the emperor and Spain ; but I think that must not be pressed, untill we see what turn the affair of the plan and armistice are like to take, as well on the part of the emperour, as of the allys. But I am apprehensive that, when the emperour shall find himselfe destitute of all hopes of being succoured by the maritime powers, whether through the fault of Holland's backwardness to a war, or of England resolving not to act without Holland, he will equally be incensed against both, and not think of making what he will call a forced and dishonourable peace, through our means, by a particular reconciliation with Spain.

I heartily wish it may be an inactive campaign ; but if the armistice does not take place, the cardinall is not master of the fate of arms ; that will be in the power of others. Therefore the present thing that we are to aim at is the armistice, and the emperor's not accepting of that, will putt him as much in the wrong, as if he had made no favourable declaration for the plan. On the other side, should he accept the armistice, his having agreed to every thing we have desired, will make our not assisting him, in case the allys should be unreasonable, lye more heavy upon us : so that I must own I doe not see the situation of our affairs

affairs in so favourable a light as you doe; we must rub on and doe as well as we can. My health is good, and as we have done nothing blame worthy, my heart is whole; but the danger of the libertys of Europe affects me much, and this unlucky incident of Portugall is very embarrassing. For we cannot abandon that crown, if Spain should carry things to extremitys, and to answer to their instances in a faint manner, and by the offer of good offices only, will, I am afraid, drive them to have recourse to France for her intervention, which may be attended with bad consequences to our trade, and make us make a very contemptible figure. In the mean time, this republick, far from having any concern in favour of Portugall, have been for some time incensed against that crown. So that I own I see nothing but black clouds gathering on all sides; I don't see a ray of light to disperse them, and I never was so puzzled in my life; and therefore I will say no more at present, but that I am ever your's most affectionately, &c.

P. S. I think it not impossible, that if France should push their conquests on this side, (although I agree with you it is not likely, while they endeavour to praise the Dutch, that they will doe it this year,) but that the States may be forced to take arms, and although we can't goe without them, we must goe with them; or if we should be obliged in case of necessity to support the Portuguese (in which case I am afraid the Dutch will not goe along with us); I say, whatever may happen to engage us in a war, I tremble for the West Indys, the source of all our riches, and which preserves the balance of trade in our favour; for I don't know where we have it but by the means of our colonys. Therefore, for God's sake, think of the West Indies, and if you could, before the parliament rises, procure a credit of 100,000 l. to be layd out there, accountable to parliament, it would be the rightest thing in the world. For the house of lords having published the Board of Trade's report upon the situation of our colonys, must make all nations apprised of our weakness there, and consequently some provisions necessary: for the establishment of Georgia, and the expence voted on that account, will not contribute in the least to secure our sugar plantations, nor Nova Scotia, nor our fishery; they are all in danger from other quarters. Pray think of this: I have hitherto preached in vain; but any misfortune there will hurt you more than any other thing in the world. Loose noe time in talking to sir Charles Wager, Mr. Bladen, and one Coram, the honestest, the most disinterested, and the most knowing person about the plantations, I ever talked with.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

An accommodation between the emperor and Spain the most probable means of putting an end to the war.—Ill conduct of the emperor.—Propriety of enforcing that accommodation, and recommending the marriage between an archduchess and don Carlos.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, May 2—13, 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

MY dispatch to lord Harrington has employed soe much of my time, that I am not able, before the departure of the post, to write so fully to you as I intended.

I am perswaded these people will be contented with any conditions that doe not immediately affect the Low Countrys, rather than make any farther expense; and if we should represent against the unreasonableness of those conditions that France may offer, they will make such unreasonable demands of the emperor and of us to carry on a war in proportion to their weakness, that it will be impossible to grant; so that there seems no way to putt an end to the war, but by an accommodation between the emperor and Spain; and the pensionary, as you will see by my dispatch, is of the same opinion: but I doe not think it a very easy matter to sett this on foot, notwithstanding what you may think of the disposition of the queen of Spain.

What the pensionary hints of his majesty whispering to the emperor that he sees no other resource for him, will be difficult to doe without exposing himselfe to the emperor's reproaches, or, at least, without laying so much blame upon the States, as will put them too much out of humour with us. I must own that there is a great deal to be sayd in our own justification, from the conduct of the emperor, in pursuing his views in Poland; in leaving all his dominions, both in Italy and Flanders, exposed to the immediate attack and surprise of his enemys, without having the ordinary provisions and ammunition necessary for their defence; in his having refused to accept the project of accommodation with Spain, untill it was too late; and in his having given no attention to our insinuations for his coming to an alliance with the king of Sardinia, before the troubles began; and at last in having refused to accept our good offices this time twelvemonth, before the allys had gained such successes in Italy, at a time when they all seemed disposed to a pacification; and lastly, the Dutch being equally engaged in the same treatys with us, would make it very difficult, as well as of little use to the emperor, for us to have undertaken a war without them,

them, besides the risque we should run ourselves with respect to our trade, &c. These things may be sayd, butt may certainly as well be lett alone, if they can possibly be avoyded. On the other hand, the emperour having constantly given manifestos or *papiers raisonnés*, which we have avoyded (tho' contrary to my opinion) to answer, that we might not exasperate matters, it is possible that he may be provoked, when he sees no hopes of our assistance, to make and publish a deduction of the whole.

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How, therefore, is it possible to make the secret insinuations to the emperour, to induce him to come into an accommodation with Spain, in such a manner as not to provoke his resentment, and at the same time to preserve our own dignity, and not confess we have been in the wrong in our proceedings, which I think we have not, and therefore cannot by any means allow it?

As his majesty and the States must say something upon the respective answers now delivered by the Imperiall and the French ambassadours, it is very probable that the Imperiall court being informed of the answer from France, may take an occasion, from what he shall say to them and to France, to demand our succours, or a declaration of what we intend to doe with respect to that point. Such a demand may give us a handle to insinuate to count Kinsky or Ulefeldt, or to any body else belonging to the emperour, what was said to them in February was twelvemonth; which was, that if the emperour thinks himself obliged to make up matters some other way, unless he is succoured immediately by his allies, he may be told in a friendly manner, that his majesty has so great a regard for his interest, that he shall not oppose his doing it, provided it be in such a manner as shall not be detrimentall to the interest of the maritime powers. And that occasion may be made use of to desire him to explain himselfe about his intention of marrying his daughters, in order to consider from thence the best manner to secure the pragmatick sanction; which will likewise naturally lead to the question of giving the second to don Carlos, for settling his affairs in Italy, as what his majesty will make no opposition to, since it may be for the service of the emperour; and as we shall find such a hint may be acceptable to the emperour, we may goe farther, and promise underhand to promote such an alliance with Spain, and after it is concluded, to guaranty it in conjunction with the States. And as the pensionary seems doubtfull whether the States will in the first instance be brought to take part in such a negotiation, and therefore, as you will find upon reflection, thinks his majesty should begin alone to sound the emperour on this subject, we shall not be so constrained in negotiating it privately with the emperour and Spain, as I apprehended we should have

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have been, if we were to take the consent of the States with us; since there will now be no occasion to do any thing else besides communicating from time to time to the pensionary, and perhaps to one or two more who may be in the same sentiments with him on this head, the steps we shall take.

Monsieur Arloun, who on some accounts has some credit with the pensionary, has told me, that he will promote underhand, whenever I shall give him notice of it, amonge the deputys, the approbation of such a step as a reconciliation between the emperour and Spain; and I don't doubt but others, out of resentment to the behaviour of France, will do the same thing. The town of Amsterdam will, I'm afraid, have a constant itch after a negociation with France; but in a point where the States are to be at noe expense, and which is a matter of prudence only, I hope even Amsterdam must yield to the necessity of the times, and the only expedient that is left, since they will not be brought to take vigorous measures. I am in haste, your's affectionately, &c.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Overtures from the king of Sardinia.—Motives of his conduct.—Enforces the necessity of pressing the Dutch to augment their forces.—Situation and views of the emperor.—Policy of England in regard to her conduct toward the emperor, France, and Prussia.—Cardinal Fleury alarmed lest the secret correspondence should be published.—Inconvenience of the king's journey to Hanover.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, May 9—20, 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

I Received by last post orders from lord Harrington to present a memoriall to the States with heads for that purpose; but these orders by the postscript were to be suspended untill I could hear from his lordship again, on account of some extraordinary news to be communicated by Ossorio to the duke of Newcastle. What that news can be, or what good it can doe at this juncture, when the king of Sardinia has concurred in the answer delivered by the French, I cannot imagine; because as the plan is rejected, and the suspension of arms mentioned in such a way as makes it impossible to take place, that prince must goe on with his friends to act. If he has agreed with Spain, it must be to drive the emperour out of Italy: if not, the emperour, by a continuation of the war, will be soe exhausted as not to be able, without our help, to subsist his army next year in Italy; and I see no reason he will have to hope for that; and therefore, altho' Mr. Ossorio will affect to place great confidence in his majesty, yett if he takes noe step, in consequence of that confidence, that will immediately

immediately tend to a pacification, we must not hearken to him; for his court, if possible, is the falsest court of all; and it is certain that without their perfidiousness in letting France into Italy, the war would never have been undertaken; and therefore they have no great merit any otherwise than by affecting a seeming friendship towards his majesty, they hope for his credit not to be undone. But good words may be given them, to prevent, if possible, their union with Spain, upon a foot of driving the emperor out of Italy, which the king of Sardinia will hardly consent to; because it is almost impossible for him to have sufficient security that, as soon as the emperor is out of Italy, Spain will not take the Milanese from him, the king of Sardinia.

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I think, all things weigh'd on both sides, it will be absolutely necessary, that I should present in form a memorial for the augmentation of forces here, for the reasons you alledge, altho' there may be inconveniencies in it. I have already hinted to the pensionary that I expected such orders. His reply was that, if I must do it, they must manage it here in the best manner they can, that I may do as little harm as possible. But I do not expect that it will dispose them to take a resolution agreeable to it: however, it will be a justification to the world of our past and future conduct, and it is necessary for that purpose. I expect to be invited this morning to a conference, to have the project of a resolution of the States communicated to me, in answer both to the French and Imperiall papers relating to our plan; and I suppose they will both be spoken of in such a manner as not to be satisfactory, because they neither of them seem to agree to the suspension of arms, and that the conclusion will be to press that point with the ministers of both the emperor and the allies in the strongest manner. I shall take this resolution, without giving my opinion, *ad referendum*; and the consequence of that may be, if I do not receive them before, that his majesty will agree to concur with the States in that step, but send me orders at the same time to press an augmentation of their forces, as what the dangerous state of affairs makes absolutely necessary for our common safety.

I am sorry the paper, *Pensées particulières*, mett with no better success: it would have been, believe me, the same thing whether I had or had not communicated it at the same time to lord Harrington. What effect my subsequent particular letters to the q—n, as well as my dispatches relating to that point, will since have had, I can't tell; but it must come to bear sooner or later, either by our motion or the emperor's own motion, or from a particular understanding already concerted between Vienna and Spain; perhaps by a negotiation of count Conigsegg at Mantua, and Patino's son-in-law, minister at Venice, which

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

An accommodation between the emperor and Spain the most probable means of putting an end to the war.—Ill conduct of the emperor.—Propriety of enforcing that accommodation, and recommending the marriage between an archduchess and don Carlos.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, May 2—13, 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

MY dispatch to lord Harrington has employed soe much of my time, that I am not able, before the departure of the post, to write so fully to you as I intended.

I am perswaded these people will be contented with any conditions that doe not immediately affect the Low Countrys, rather than make any farther expence; and if we should represent against the unreasonableness of those conditions that France may offer, they will make such unreasonable demands of the emperor and of us to carry on a war in proportion to their weakness, that it will be impossible to grant; so that there seems no way to putt an end to the war, but by an accommodation between the emperor and Spain; and the pensionary, as you will see by my dispatch, is of the same opinion: but I doe not think it a very easy matter to sett this on foot, notwithstanding what you may think of the disposition of the queen of Spain.

What the pensionary hints of his majesty whispering to the emperor that he sees no other resource for him, will be difficult to doe without exposing himselfe to the emperor's reproaches, or, at least, without laying so much blame upon the States, as will put them too much out of humour with us. I must own that there is a great deal to be sayd in our own justification, from the conduct of the emperor, in pursuing his views in Poland; in leaving all his dominions, both in Italy and Flanders, exposed to the immediate attack and surprize of his enemys, without having the ordinary provisions and ammunition necessary for their defence; in his having refused to accept the project of accommodation with Spain, untill it was too late; and in his having given no attention to our insinuations for his coming to an alliance with the king of Sardinia, before the troubles began; and at last in having refused to accept our good offices this time twelvemonth, before the allys had gained such successes in Italy, at a time when they all seemed disposed to a pacification; and lastly, the Dutch being equally engaged in the same treatys with us, would make it very difficult, as well as of little use to the emperor, for us to have undertaken a war without them,

them, besides the risque we should run ourselves with respect to our trade, &c. These things may be sayd, butt may certainly as well be lett alone, if they can possibly be avoyded. On the other hand, the emperour having constantly given manifestos or *papiers raisonnés*, which we have avoyded (tho' contrary to my opinion) to answer, that we might not exasperate matters, it is possible that he may be provoked, when he sees no hopes of our assistance, to make and publish a deduction of the whole.

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How, therefore, is it possible to make the secret insinuations to the emperour, to induce him to come into an accommodation with Spain, in such a manner as not to provoke his resentment, and at the same time to preserve our own dignity, and not confess we have been in the wrong in our proceedings, which I think we have not, and therefore cannot by any means allow it?

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DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, May 9—20, 1735.

Walpole
Papers.Private.

I Received by last post orders from lord Harrington to present a memoriall to the States with heads for that purpose; but these orders by the postscript were to be suspended untill I could hear from his lordship again, on account of some extraordinary news to be communicated by Ossorio to the duke of Newcastle. What that news can be, or what good it can doe at this juncture, when the king of Sardinia has concurred in the answer delivered by the French, I cannot imagine; because as the plan is rejected, and the suspension of arms mentioned in such a way as makes it impossible to take place, that prince must goe on with his friends to act. If he has agreed with Spain, it must be to drive the emperour out of Italy: if not, the emperour, by a continuation of the war, will be soe exhausted as not to be able, without our help, to subsist his army next year in Italy; and I see no reason he will have to hope for that; and therefore, altho' Mr. Ossorio will affect to place great confidence in his majesty, yett if he takes noe step, in consequence of that confidence, that will immediately

immediately tend to a pacification, we must not hearken to him; for his court, if possible, is the falsest court of all; and it is certain that without their perfidiousness in letting France into Italy, the war would never have been undertaken; and therefore they have no great merit any otherwise than by affecting a seeming friendship towards his majesty, they hope for his credit not to be undone. But good words may be given them, to prevent, if possible, their union with Spain, upon a foot of driving the emperor out of Italy, which the king of Sardinia will hardly consent to; because it is almost impossible for him to have sufficient security that, as soon as the emperor is out of Italy, Spain will not take the Milanese from him, the king of Sardinia.

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I think, all things weigh'd on both sides, it will be absolutely necessary, that I should present in form a memoriall for the augmentation of forces here, for the reasons you alledge, altho' there may be inconveniencies in it. I have already hinted to the pensionary that I expected such orders. His reply was that, if I must doe it, they must manage it here in the best manner they can, that I may doe as little harm as possible. But I doe not expect that it will dispose them to take a resolution agreeable to it: however, it will be a justification to the world of our past and future conduct, and it is necessary for that purpose. I expect to be invited this morning to a conference, to have the project of a resolution of the States communicated to me, in answer both to the French and Imperiall papers relating to our plan; and I suppose they will both be spoken of in such a manner as not to be satisfactory, because they neither of them seem to agree to the suspension of arms, and that the conclusion will be to press that point with the ministers of both the emperor and the allies in the strongest manner. I shall take this resolution, without giving my opinion, *ad referendum*; and the consequence of that may be, if I doe not receive them before, that his majesty will agree to concur with the States in that step, but send me orders at the same time to press an augmentation of their forces, as what the dangerous state of affairs makes absolutely necessary for our common safety.

I am sorry the paper, *Pensées particulières*, mett with no better success: it would have been, believe me, the same thing whether I had or had not communicated it at the same time to lord Harrington. What effect my subsequent particular letters to the q—n, as well as my dispatches relating to that point, will since have had, I can't tell; but it must come to bear sooner or later, either by our motion or the emperor's own motion, or from a particular understanding already concerted between Vienna and Spain; perhaps by a negotiation of count Conigsegg at Mantua, and Patino's son-in-law, minister at Venice, which

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situations will afford an easy intercourse between those two ministers if they have a mind to it: and it is plainly count Ulefeldt's discourse, as well as from the situation of the emperor's affairs, and his behaviour in consequence of it, that the court of Vienna must have some scheme for extricating themselves out of their affairs, or patching up matters one way or other. Count Ulefeldt has told me plainly, that the emperor will not consent to the armistice, unless the allies consent to make our plan the basis of the negotiation (which they have not done, and that will soon be known at Vienna); that the emperor cannot, he has told me as plainly, continue the war any longer than this campagne, without being assisted; and I am persuaded he sees no hopes here of any assistance, and that we cannot give it without the Dutch. He has added, that as soon as the campagne draws to a conclusion, the inability of the emperor to go on any farther, will make him call upon the Dutch and us to let him know what we both or either can or will do for him, that his Imperial majesty may determine the part he is to take. Which determination I think the emperor must have already in his mind, or else he would agree to a suspension of arms, unless he is in so good a condition, not only (as it is thought at St. James's) as not to have any thing to fear on the Rhine, but to be able to act offensively there; for a quiet campagne (considering how he is already exhausted, and how impossible it will be for him to find money another year) will be as fatal to the emperor almost, as an active one to his disadvantage; and therefore I conclude, that there is a resource in petto. What that is, it is, if possible, our business to find out, and manage that knowledge so, that he may not take measures to the disadvantage of the maritime powers, either by a reconciliation with Spain, or (which I hope he does not think of, and is not, I believe, practicable if he does) by a particular accommodation with France, relating to some cession of part of the Netherlands to that crown; but if such a thing was intended, it would have been by this time in agitation, and we should have got some lights of it.

This accommodation, therefore, with Spain, is most likely the thing intended; and as that must be very disagreeable to France, and create a coolness between that crown and Spain, it is very likely the latter will not come to an agreement with the emperor, as he did in 1725, without consulting and taking the king into the alliance, having found the inconveniencies of that former step, which drove us into France, and may, if any thing is done to the prejudice of us, do the same thing again; besides, that Spain has found by experience, that she cannot depend much upon the emperor alone.

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In the present state of affairs I think we must, (pursuant to what I suppose will be the contents of the States resolution,) after I have by memoriall pressed an augmentation of forces here, sollicite both the emperour and the allys to come to an armistice. I doe not apprehend that will have any other effect than to amuse the publick with the appearance of a negociation; but at the same time it will justifie our conduct, as well on account of the emperour's behaviour in not agreeing to a suspension of arms, as by our having endeavoured to perswade the States to putt themselves into a better posture of defence by encreasing their forces; it being impossible that we should act without them, who will be soonest exposed to danger; and by this means the emperour will see that nothing but a pacification is to be expected from the maritime powers, without their declaring positively that they will never act. For their forbearance to act, and his own necessitous condition by autumn, will press him to take his last resolution, whatever it may be, to extricate himselfe from his difficultys; if he could be perswaded privately to explain them early to us; and perhaps the merit of our having by memoriall solicited the States to take vigorous measures, (but that memoriall must not appear to have been concerted with him, altho' it will be known by him afterwards,) may indeed induce his Imperiall majesty to open his thoughts in confidence to the king; and it may at last putt an end to the war upon a tolerable foot, by keeping still those united whose union is necessary for preserving the ballance of Europe, and securing the emperour's succession according to the pragmatick sanction. But in this case it will be necessary that the emperour should lett the king know the destination of his daughters in marriage, upon which the succession depends.

As to the reconciliation between his majesty and the king of Prussia, I look upon what has been wrote to me on that head as chiefly intended to parry for the present the other propositions, of an union between the emperour and Spain, or of his majesty and the States attempting once more to procure a pacification by a confidentiall negotiation with France, without any reall design to come to a good understanding with Prussia. But untill his majesty and the States shall have chosen the part they intend to take in the general question of the quarrell in Europe, we can doe nothing with the king of Prussia; for it will be impossible to know how to settle his pretensions, in which the emperour and France must be concerned with us at the same time, without having first determined our finall resolution between those two great powers. Besides, I find his majesty will expect something for himselfe, before he will agree to any thing in favour of Prussia relating to Bergh and Juliers, if his majesty had any pretensions on

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that head; and were it not a point of a publick nature, but concerned the king of Prussia's own particular interest only, without farther consequences, nobody would say a word in behalfe of that prince.

The cardinal's letter to me of the 30th past was to prepare the way for the answer to be given for rejecting the plan, and at the same time to dissuade rather than deter us from publishing the correspondence; for altho' he hints, as if he could justifie himselfe, yett the whole tenour of that part of the letter betrays a great fear and concern lest we should appeal to the publick. You will have seen by the pensionary's and my answer that we have left him in suspence on that head still; and indeed I am of your opinion, that the publication of this affair should rather be the consequence than the forerunner or provocation of a war, if we shall be forced into it.

Having wrote thus far, I have been in a conference with the deputys, who communicated to me the project of what might properly be said at present in consequence of the two answers, from the emperour and the allys to their respective ministers, asking my concurrence to it. This project, I think, is conceived in very proper terms, suitable to the occasion; but as I found by the heads of the memoriall, transmitted to me by last post by lord Harrington, that his majesty intended to propose the augmentation of the forces of the States, as a step necessary to be taken previously to any other, I would not venture to agree to the project without his majesty's orders, which will be expected before it becomes a formall resolution of the States. And altho' I should receive, by the mail that is now due, his majesty's directions to deliver the sayd memoriall, that should not hinder my having directions sent me to concur in the project I now send for his majesty's opinions; his majesty's approbation being accompanied with his hopes or expectations that the States will concur in his recommendation for their encreasing the number of their forces.

As to Portugall, count Ulefeldt has been so often soe earnest with me to lay hold of this opportunity, that I cannot doubt but the Imperiall court, if they be not the authors, are greatly the fomenters of this quarrell.

The king is now expected on this side at the time fixed, but not without great surprize at his taking this journey at this great crisis. How business can be carried on in a practicable manner between the distance of the king at Hanover and his councill in England, especially if there should be different opinions, is unconceivable; but should they always agree, the tediousness of it would be intolerable. Lord Harrington must accompany his majesty; there is noe help for it; and as his lordship, according to custom, will be here, I suppose,

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two or three days, I should be glad to know what he is to say, and upon what points, that I may conduct myfelfe accordingly with him.

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Pray doe not give too much attention to the house of Savoy, for unless they could help you to an armistice, they can doe nothing for us: they will be more jealous and uneasy, and indeed not without reason, at a marriage between the emperour and Spain, and will crosse it as much as possible; and indeed any thoughts of that nature should be industriously kept from Ossorio. Your's most affectionately, &c.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Alarm in France at twenty-five ships of the line sailing to Portugal.

MY LORD,

Paris, June 1st, N. S. 1735.

IT is chiefly to inform your grace of the impressions, I think, his majesty's having ordered a strong squadron to the coast of Portugal has made upon the French ministers, that I trouble you with this dispatch.

Late the night before last, I received the honour of your letter of the 16th past, O. S. by Du Commun the messenger; and it was very lucky it came then, for, as I was to be yesterday at Versailles, it directed me how to talk to the French ministers on the subject of our squadron, in case it should be necessary. Lord Durseley, who has been here some days, having desired me to present him to the French king, I carried him with me to court. It is the custom here to acquaint the secretary of state for foreign affairs, when any foreigner is to be presented; for that reason I alighted at monsieur Chauvelin's. We were told he was at the cardinal's, and had been there about an hour, but was just coming back. As Chauvelin's going to the cardinal on a Tuesday morning (a day he ought to be at home to receive the foreign ministers) was unusual, every body judged that some extraordinary matter must have been the cause of it. Monsieur Chauvelin returned soon after to his lodgings, and when I presented lord Durseley to him, he scarce took the least notice of him; and, without inviting us to dinner, which is usual on such occasions, he told me, that if I intended to see the French king, we had no time to lose, for the levee was begun, and that he desired to speak with me before I left Versailles. This was said in the gravest ill-humoured way imaginable; and I mention these circumstances, that your grace may see how horridly mad Chauvelin is with us at this time. I own it gave me the greater pleasure, as his outward anger plainly shewed that he did not know how to help himself; for if he did, he would have dissembled.

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I went from thence to the cardinal, whom I found, in appearance, less angry than his colleague, but equally vexed. He told me, in a most pathetick manner, that he could not but be excessively alarmed at the consequences of our sending so strong a squadron to the coast of Portugal: that he was acquainted with the reasons that had induced his majesty to take this resolution; and tho' monsieur Chauvelin had wrote word that the king's ministers had assured him, nothing would be undertaken by our fleet but in defence of his majesty's subjects, and to protect their commerce; yet when the king of Portugal should see such a *terrible* fleet as twenty-five large English men of war come to assist him, it would raise his courage to such a degree, that there would be no dealing with him: that undoubtedly the emperor's friends at Lisbon would encourage him to attack Spain, and he would probably do it. In fine, this step of ours would bring on a war in those parts, in which we should be partys, and consequently the war would be soon general.

As I thought it better to encrease than lessen his apprehensions, and being in hopes that, by making him talk, I might discover what grounds there were for the court of Spain's answer to his majesty's offer of his mediation, I told him coolly, that the king could not be answerable for consequences that fell out contrary to his expectations: that his majesty meant to attack nobody, and that his ministers would be far from encouraging the king of Portugal to be the aggressor: that his majesty, seeing the great preparations of the court of Spain by sea and land against Portugal, could not, in prudence, but make a sufficient provision for securing the effects of his subjects in that country, where more may and do arrive daily, if his majesty had no other concern for the preservation of that kingdom: that supposing Spain should come with a squadron and block up the river of Lisbon, nobody knows how secure even those English merchant ships might be, who coming in without knowing of the broils between that crown and Spain, would perhaps be exposed to be treated as contrabanders, carrying provisions and ammunition to an enemy, and as such confiscated, or at least put to great trouble and expence to get their ships and effects released: in fine, that his majesty's conduct in this case could be liable to no exceptions. If his subjects were not attacked, or their substance endangered, our fleet would offend nobody.

This, as I expected, brought on the discourse upon the king of Spain's answer to our late offices; the cardinal pretended not to know exactly what it was, or to suspect the truth of the account monsieur Vaulgrenant had from Patino, of what had passed at Mr. Keene's audience of their catholic majesties. I got his
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eminency to speak first, telling him, I would set him right, if his informations were different from mine. He said that the king and queen of Spain had received Mr. Keene *avec toute la politesse du monde*, had expressed in a very civil manner their obligation to his majesty for his friendly interposition in the dispute between them and the king of Portugal; but excused themselves from accepting his majesty's mediation, having already accepted that of France.

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I told the cardinal, the account he had agreed perfectly with mine; but I must own to him, that when I received Mr. Keene's letters, I was a good deal surpris'd, because I never heard that France had offered her mediation: that I remembered very well his eminency had told me, some time ago, that he had directed monsieur de Vaulgrenant to endeavour to appease the broils that were fomenting between those two courts; and that, as he said, without much hopes of success, by which I looked upon the notion of the mediation of France, as coming rather from the desire of Spain, than from his eminency's seeking it. The cardinal puzzled a good while, but could not give me a direct and fair answer. Tho' I kept him some time to this single point, he would not say positively whether France had or had not offered the mediation of her own accord. The turn, I thought, he intended to give was, that Vaulgrenant had a discretionary power, in case he found the court of Spain tractable, to offer the mediation of France.

I asked him next, how he had managed Portugal; for, by Mr. Keene's letters, he seemed to have some notion that they had secured that crown before they made their offers to Spain? After a good deal of shuffling, he told me in confidence that, soon after the quarrel happened, one Mendez, a man employed here by the king of Portugal to buy pictures and curiosities, by which means he gets admittance every where, came to him, and shewed him a letter he had received from monsieur de Mendonça, in which Mendonça says, he wishes that France would use her endeavours to hinder Spain from attacking Portugal: that from that time he, the cardinal, had not heard a syllable more, and therefore he believed the king of Portugal had no thoughts of prosecuting any thing here, and that thereupon he likewise had quite dropt it.

To prevent my questioning him any farther, at which I found him very uneasy, he returned to his apprehensions of the consequences of our fleet's sailing, as being no less than engaging a general war. He seemed in a manner vexed that (tho' on their account) the court of Spain had declined his majesty's mediation. He said, he did not see why we might not be joint mediators; that, for his part, he desired no better; that the Garde des Sceaux should likewise
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be for it; and that I might inform your grace of these his dispositions, which he repeated over and over. All I answered was, that I would not fail sending your grace an account of whatever he desired.

From the cardinal's embarrass when I put him upon explaining how France came to offer her mediation, and from the turn Patino gave Mr. Keene to what their catholic majesties said to him on that subject, it looks very much as if France knew little of their being chosen by Spain as mediators, till the arrival of Brettel, who brought a pretty large packet for the Garde des Sceaux. And tho', since the late instances we have had of the cardinal's falseness, we have little reason to depend on any thing he says, I own the account he gives of the step taken by Mendez seems probable, and a circumstance I omitted above of his desiring me not to mention it, lest it should expose Mendez and monsieur de Mendonça, carries an air as if this was the only grounds they had for insinuating at the court of Spain, that it was at the instance of the king of Portugal that France offered her mediation; but when this affair comes to light, which can hardly be avoided after the formal story told Mr. Keene by Patino, it is not unlikely but we may see that monsieur Chauvelin has enlarged considerably on the step taken by Mendez.

I shall make one farther observation on what the cardinal said, viz. that Chauvelin should be for a joint mediation, which seems to be a proof that they had had some discourse before on the subject, and that Chauvelin was against it.

Before I proceed to the remainder of my conversation with the cardinal, which was on different subjects, I believe it will be more proper to give your grace an account of that I had with the Garde des Sceaux in the afternoon on the foregoing business. I found him, as in the morning, excessively out of humour: he had at first a mind to bully, but as I could not help shewing him that I was not in a temper to bear it, he softened. He told me, we were overturning every thing; that Spain could never submit to a forced mediation; that we first offered our mediation, and before we had an answer, we sent our fleet to overawe them; that he knew very little of the queen of Spain, if this did not exasperate her to the highest degree; and ran on a pretty while with such kind of reasonings not worth repeating.

To try whether I could get any thing out of him relating to their project of being mediators, I said, that as the adjusting this affair seemed to be in their hands, it could not fail ending in an amicable way: that nobody could find fault with the king's precautions for the security of his subjects; and as the
 quarrel

quarrel would be made up by his most christian majesty's influence, the only difference at present with respect to our fleet was its laying off the coast of Portugal instead of the coast of England, which could give no uneasiness to anybody that had not an intent to hurt or molest us. All the Garde des Sceaux's answer was, that if we had not taken this step, we might have acted jointly in the mediation; but as the case stood, it was now impracticable. I told him, that as I did not know his majesty's intentions on a joint mediation, I could say nothing of them; but that the cardinal had not thought our sending out our fleet any obstacle, for he had spoke to me very clearly on that head, and wished to have a joint mediation, without this restriction, which he, monsieur Chauvelin, would put it under.

He insisted that I must have misunderstood the cardinal: that if our fleet failed, we could not be proper mediators; and that neither Spain nor he would ever acquiesce in it. Then he pretended France was ill used by our sending out a squadron to the coast of Portugal; and that the king's ministers had promised monsieur Chavigni the squadron should not sail without previously acquainting this court with it. I answered, that the king was no ways accountable to any body for what he did with his fleet; however that I might assure him that the only intention his majesty had at present was, to defend the trade of his subjects, and the coast of Portugal, in case of any attack that might be made on them; but as to the promises which, he said, were made Chavigni by the king's ministers, I knew nothing of them. However I enquired about what time they were made. Upon this, he got up and fetched a letter, he said he had received in the morning from Chavigni, which had occasioned his going then immediately to the cardinal. He read to me two or three broken sentences. The letter was dated the 16—27th May. Chavigni says he had been with the duke of Newcastle, my lord Harrington, and sir Robert Walpole, and seen them separately: that he had remonstrated against sending out our fleet; and that they had assured him no harm was intended by it, unless Spain should attack Portugal by sea; and that he, Chavigni, should have notice before it sailed. I observed, the improbability of his having had such an assurance given him, as Chavigni himself was to set out the next day for Paris; and I added, that as I did not know that any thing had been concerted between our two courts concerning Portugal, I could not see to what purpose Chavigni should be acquainted with the time of our fleet's sailing. In fine, I saw plainly that the whole drift of the Garde des Sceaux was, to hinder the sending out our fleet, and in order to engage us to

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this complaisance, he would allow us to be joint mediators with France, but on no other condition whatever.

To return to the conclusion of my conversation with the cardinal: amongst the several reasons he gave for being alarmed at the sailing of our fleet, he said it would infallibly disappoint his project for an armistice: that, according to his former promise, he had been at work, and had even sent his plan for a suspension into Spain, where he made no doubt but it would have been approved of. But now the queen of Spain would listen to no reason, and all his hopes of seeing peace restored were vanished. I told him, I did not see that any thing we had done in the Portuguese affair could make much difference as to other matters now depending in Europe: that if the king of Spain does not attack Portugal, we shall be quiet: that if he should now, it would be a demonstration that he was resolved upon it before, and every unprejudiced person would own his majesty did wisely to put himself in a state to protect the trade of his subjects, and defend his ally: that, considering the king's present measures in another light, there is more reason to expect they will take a good than a bad turn, from the practices of the court of Spain. For tho' they have hitherto talked angrily, and threatened Portugal, yet, before they entered upon action, they may think more calmly of it, and may weigh the inconveniencys of attacking a prince who will be supported by England, and from this consideration they may be more tractable than they would be, were not our fleet on the Portuguese coast; and should this be the case, our fleet's going out would rather promote than obstruct the pacification. But the cardinal is so piqued at this step of ours, that he will allow nothing to be a good reason for our taking it.

His eminency talked yesterday to Gedda on this subject with great concern, and full of fears and apprehensions of its being a forerunner of our declaring for the emperor. His plan for an armistice, he said, was ready framed, and gone to Spain, and an order obtained from his catholic majesty to monsieur de St. Gil to act, in every thing, according to the instructions monsieur Fenelon should receive from hence; all which, the cardinal said, would facilitate and hasten the conclusion.

I have endeavoured to lay all I learnt yesterday from the French ministers in as clear a light before your grace as I could, from the conversations I have had with them. It is evident they are heartily frightened at our preparations, and what adds to their fears is, lest now one step is taken in favour of a prince more inclined to the emperor than to the allies, his majesty may hereafter take some others more disagreeable to them.

I hear

I hear they have had a council, to which monsieur de Maurepas was called, to know what ships they can fit out with speed; but I am assured, that at Brest and Rochefort they cannot get 15 men of war in readiness these six weeks, and to do that they must work night and day. At Toulon they have not above eight fit for service, and by the gallys being countermanded this year, it is a question, whether that whole squadron will go out, or only three or four ships as usual, to visit the French factorys of the Levant.

By accounts from the armys on the Rhine, the *rations* for the French horse are reduced to four pounds of hay per diem, and little else. In Italy there is great complaint, the French soldiers having no straw to lay on, there being none in the country, nor a possibility of having any till next harvest.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Chavigny relates his private conversation with sir Robert Walpole.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, June 6—17, 1735.

MONSIEUR Chavigny arrived here in his way to Hannover the 4—15th inst. in the evening, and yesterday in the afternoon I had a long conversation with him, which began by his asking me, whether I had not received a private letter from you in consequence of a particular conference between you and him, *tête-à-tête*, just before I left England, and expressed his surprise at my telling him I had not. However, he proceeded to lett me know what you had said to him, *by way of supposition*, that he, Chavigny, had treated and come to an agreement with you, on the foot of being prime minister, and having the chief credit with the king, exclusive of the duke of Newcastle as secretary of state; and his grace coming to the knowledge of it, and declaring his aversion to what had passed, you asked what was to be done in that case, and what he would say to things being stopt and overturned from such an opposition?

Monsieur Chavigny said that, without pretending to understand what you meant, or desiring to have the secret explained, he told you, as what naturally occurred to him, that you should endeavour to reconcile your opinion with the duke of Newcastle; this was indeed a very quick and artful answer, supposing he knew nothing of what was at the bottom of your hypothesis. He then entered a great deal into the disposition of his court for a peace, and bringing it about by a particular confidence between England and France, and a good understanding between you and monsieur Chauvelyn; or, as by way of compliment he added, between monsieur Chauvelyn and me. But when I pressed him

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to know in what manner, upon what terms, and how it is to be sett on foot, insinuating that we had done all on our part for that purpose, and that it was time they should explain themselves, since we were fully convinced that nothing could be done with the cardinal without Chauvelyn. Monsieur Chavigny made me no return, but general words of good inclination, &c.

In talking upon the state of affairs in generall, he sayd France might agree to the armistice, but would not hear of the plan, and quoted you and the other ministers in England as having layd aside the plan, while I still insisted upon the ill usage we mett with, in their not having accepted it as a basis for the negotiation. But he persisted in saying we might negotiate without it, but did not tell me how, nor in what manner. As to the particular parts of the plan, he sayd that they would never agree to Stanislas abdicating the crown of Poland, it was inconsistent with the honour of France: having asked him whether they intended to make the peace in these parts depend absolutely upon the establishment of Stanislas upon the Polish throne, he sayd that was not their intentions, it being impossible to compass that point as things stood at present. But I could not draw from him clearly the views of France on that head: but by what I could infer from his dark hints, it looks as if, supposing they are disposed to make peace, which I question, they will either leave the affairs of Poland out of the question for the present, or ask for some particular establishment elsewhere for Stanislas.

As to Tuscany, he pretended to insinuate, that it must goe to don Carlos; and when I mentioned the pragmattick sanction, he sayd it was *bors d'œuvre*, that it was not concerned in the question of the war; in short, he affected to talk in a confidential way, but sayd nothing at all; but he gave me to understand that he would discourse with me again. You will see an account of what passed in generall between the pensionary and monsieur Chavigny, in my dispatch to the duke of Newcastle. I have thoroughly considered lord Harrington's letters of the 12th to his grace and Mr. Robinson, and I am more convinced that it is a right measure, and there is nothing else to be done, but to push things into a private accommodation. I suppose the king made his lordship leave out of the extract of my letter of the 3d to his grace, which he sends to Mr. Robinson, that part which relates to Spain; but by degrees we must come to it at last, if it be not too late. But by the appearance of confidence which at present subsists between France and Spain, so far as that the latter, contrary to all rule and practice, seems to rely entirely upon France, Patino must have come to a strict union with Chauvelyn, or else some other game with that appearance. I am your's most affectionately, &c.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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Hints at a separate accommodation.—Approves of exchanging Loraine for Tuscany.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, July 4—15, 1735.

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YOU will, before you receive this, have considered the memorialls presented by Count Kinsky at Hannover. That of a more publick nature, to which Count Ulefeldt's is annexed, will not be easy to answer without saying something that may perhaps not be agreeable to the Imperiall court, which at this time must, if possible, be avoyded; but two points, one of their having accepted of our good offices as soon as offered, and the other, of the existence of our engagements, must never be granted them. I have not yet learnt the pensionary's thoughts, nor indeed, now the States of Holland are assembled, he has not time to think of this matter.

As to the most secret memoriall, it may perhaps be avoyded to give any thing in writing in answer to that; the Imperiall court is unreasonable in pressing us to help them without the Dutch; but I suppose it is not what they expect, and it is done with a view of saving their own honour, and justifying their conduct, in making a particular accommodation.

It seems plain to me by the conclusion of it, they have some scheme for a particular accommodation, and it is what they describe in general terms in answer to the 2d point, viz. *Il est bien vray que des occasions s'etoient presentées cy devant pour rendre la condition de l'empereur meilleur, &c.* whatever were the particulars that offered on these *occasions*, that I believe is the scheme of accommodation which they will now follow, and I am confirmed in that opinion by their giving no answer to the 3d point, in which his majesty desires that the emperour will lett him know, if in case he has noe way to gett out of his present embarras. But I should be at the same time disposed to believe that he will follow the scheme in his power, without consulting his majesty, but that, as it seems to me to relate to Spain, I scarce think that queen will come to an agreement with the emperour, without the intervencion of the king. Since what Mr. Keene has wrote of Patino's new insinuations for our treating separately with the allys, and what has been sayd by lord Harrington to Kinsky, I have been considering what particular scheme would be best for preserving the ballance of Europe, and in what manner it may be best brought about; and I am so far from thinking that the maritime powers should lay aside their good offices for a general pacification, that I look upon the keeping of a generall negotiation on foot, the best means to

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compass privately a particular agreement, without giving room to jealousies and suspicions, that may embarrass the separate scheme. Upon this foundation I rose two days since early in the morning, and scratched out in hurry the inclosed paper, which you may make use of or not, as you think fitt. I know the duke of Newcastle will never bear to think of disappointing the duke of Lorrain, a brother free mason, and nothing but the publick good could put such a barbarous thought in my head.

Since writing what goes before, the messenger is arrived from Hannover, and by a very hasty perusal of lord Harrington's letter to his grace, I must own that I entirely agree in the project of yielding Lorrain for Tuscany, if the rest of the plan can be obtained on that condition; but I don't believe Spain will ever agree to it, because that queen will be contented with nothing less than an archduchess, or else a sister of the duke of Lorrain might be given at the same time to don Carlos. Mr. Robinson's letters are so voluminous, that I have not had time to read them with care enough to form any judgment upon them, nor can I have time to take a copy of them before the messenger must continue his journey to England. Your's most affectionately, &c.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE QUEEN.

Sends to the queen a proposal formed by Mr. Trevor, of bribing Chauvelin through the duke of Lorraine.—The cardinal desires peace.—That inclination should be improved.—Cabals and intrigues at Vienna.—Perverse conduct of the emperor.

MADAM,

Hague, August 1—12, 1735.

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ALTHO' the mail due this day from England be nott yett arrived, and I have no particular commands from your majesty, yett I hope you will excuse this trouble, wrote with a view to his majesty's service, altho' I can't tell whether it will answer that end.

Being fully convined as I think every body is, that no scheme can take place, whatever the cardinal's intentions may be, without the concurrence of Chauvelyn; and taking no notice of what the duke of Newcastle has wrote to lord Waldegrave, in order, if possible, to gain him, I held a council with my little cabinet here on this subject, and my president, Mr. Trevor, suggested a thought that I must own struck me; and he having at my request putt it into writing, I have the honour to send your majesty the infant as it was conceived, brought to light, and dressed by himselfe, that he may have the meritt of so good a scheme,

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if it can be executed; of which nobody can be so good a judge as your majesty. How to get the duke of Lorraine privately, and dispose him to undertake the thing without the knowledge of their Imperiall majestys, and in what manner and thro' whom he shall break it to Chauvelyn, as well as what manner and with whom in England his highness shall keep a secret correspondence in the progress of this affair, if undertaken, are the chief difficultys, which nobody alive can resolve and settle so well as your majesty's great wisdom, and therefore I putt it and leave it in your majesty's hands.

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It is plain that the cardinal was struck with the * * * * * † resolution of the 26th past, that he seeks for peace, and that moment should be improved by all means; I shall not be wanting in my poor endeavours here to doe it. Monsieur Vanhoey wrote last post in the most earnest terms to the pensionary, recommending the cardinal's justice, moderation, and sincere disposition for peace, in such a manner, that it was plain his eminence dictated the letter to the Dutch ambassadour, and fear suggested it to the cardinal.

† Illegible.

I am always afraid of the aukward and perverse conduct of the Imperiall court; there are as many cabals and intrigues as there are ministers, which makes every body wonder that there never are any alterations in the ministry; but the reason is plain. They have all of them a particular secret with the emperor, from the oldest to the youngest, which makes him trust nobody thoroughly, nor thoroughly love or hate any body. He knows all their thoughts in confidence by turns, decides himselfe without any settled scheme, according to pride or prejudice, which makes his administration subject to a variety of contradictions; and I am now apprehensive that he will be one while for a reconciliation with Spain, and the next moment for an accommodation with France; and the sudden arrivall of an account from Kouli Khan having beat the Turks; of an irreconcilable difference between the allys in Italy, or an expresse from count Ulefeldt, that these people are heartily dissatisfied with the conduct of France, joyned with the brave Russians having passed the Palatinate; I say these incidents are capable, I am afraid, of making the emperor think of nothing but a generall war, and to gain time, decline the acceptance of any plan of accommodation; or else I must own, madam, that I see some prospect of a tolerable peace, especially if the cardinal has already sounded the emperor upon the plan opened to lord Waldegrave. For to tell you the truth, I doe not think that either France or Spain will make a peace with the emperor, without taking the maritime powers into it, in any case but that of his parting with the Netherlands;
for

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for which I must own I can see no room at present. The marriage of the princesses of Lorraine to the king of Sardinia, and don Carlos, are certainly part of the cardinal's scheme; for this plain reason, because, unless don Carlos be married, France may, even after the making of the peace, be apprehensive of his having an archduchess. I would only add my wishes that the archduchess was contracted to the electoral prince of Bavaria; I really think the cardinal would not, altho' I believe Chauvelyn would be against it. But this addition, by procuring the consent of the Bavarian family to the pragmattick sanction, would crown the whole work with the prospect of a lasting peace. The common news here is, that the prince of Wales will certainly be married on his majesty's birth day.

Proposal to bribe Chauvelin by means of the duke of Lorraine.

* Afterwards
 viscount
 Hampden.

By Robert Trevor *, secretary to Horace Walpole. Inclosed in the preceding letter.

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*Most secret and
 particular.*

SINCE of all the several expedients which the present circumstances of things admitt of, for restoring the peace of Europe, that of an accommodation between the emperor and France, in concert with and under the accession and guaranty of the maritime powers, upon the foot of their plan of pacification, with the alteration of transferring the family of Lorrain, upon the death of the present great duke, into Tuscany, and annexing their ancient patrimony to the crown of France, has, in the opinion of all the king's servants, been judged the most eligible: and since the cardinal has of late very positively declared to lord Waldegrave his inclination to put an end to the present war upon these conditions, even in contradiction to the allies of France; it seems highly prudent and necessary to use all possible means to improve, without loss of time, this disposition in the cardinal for the advantage of the publick.

Experience has sufficiently shewn, that nobody is capable of doing so good or so bad services in an affair of this nature as his eminency's colleague. There is likewise good reason to surmise, that this gentleman is determined in his conduct more by private than publick motives; and as his ascendant over the cardinal has hitherto been found irresistible, there can be no rational hopes of a pacification, unless this minister can be secure of finding his own advantage as much in a quiett, as it is certain he does in the present embarrassed and violent state of affairs.

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But at the same time his aversion to the English ministers, and his knowledge of their no less aversion to him, will scarce ever suffer him to listen to any pecuniary overtures, however tempting, from their quarter; as a step of this nature must degrade him so low in their opinion, and put him so entirely into their power. Or should his avarice and self-interestedness get the better of his pride and fears, he will still sell himself proportionably dear to the reluctance he must necessarily have to expose his weakness to those whom he hates and fears.

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But supposing a pacification upon the foot above mentioned to have been (as it is not improbable) secretly concerted between the emperor and the cardinal; or supposing the Imperial court, on being founded upon it by his majesty, should have come into it, as may be expected from what Mr. Robinson has written of late, there may then be found another canal, which seems more natural and more likely to succeed, and that at less expence, for coming at monsieur Chauvelin, and securing his good offices in this affair; namely, that of the duke of Lorrain, who should employ some proper person, in whom he can place an entire confidence, to take a suitable opportunity to mention this plan to monsieur Chauvelin, as what his highness had some reason to think was then or might soon be in agitation, and as what, in his opinion, would put an end to the present troubles of Europe, in a manner very honourable and advantageous to France; would prevent the coalition of the house of Austria with that of Spain, which the emperor's distress, from the superiority of his enemies and supineness of his allies, would otherwise render inevitable; and as what would consequently be so agreeable to his highness's wishes and interest, not to mention the immediate advantage of this exchange, that the duke would think he could never sufficiently express his gratitude to the man who should be the chief instrument in bringing it about; conjuring the garde des sceaux to an absolute secrecy upon this confidential declaration of his highness's dispositions and desires, to which no man living was privy but himself, it being absolutely necessary for that prince to dissemble them to the emperor and to England, in order, by making a merit of sacrificing his paternal estates to the exigency of the times, and their convenience, to lay those powers under the stronger obligations, the one to give him his daughter, the other their friendship and guaranty. That indeed the duke's affairs were not at present in so flourishing a condition as to enable him to express his gratitude in a manner suitable to his sense of such an obligation, all at once, without having recourse to such expedients as might raise speculations in the emperor and the world; but that, if the garde des sceaux would promise to concur, and perfect (which he was
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the only person capable of doing) this projected accommodation in favour of the duke of Lorraine, he had been verbally authorised and commanded to promise, on the part of his highness, and under the tie of an impenetrable secrecy, (of which his master's personal honour and interest were the guarantees,) a yearly acknowledgement to monsieur Chauvelin, for the kind part he shall have acted in this affair, or to any other person to be named by him, of 100,000 crowns for four years consecutive from the signature of the said treaty between the emperor, France, and the maritime powers. And that moreover, if monsieur Chauvelin imagined that the marriages of the princesses of Lorraine to the kings of Naples and Sardinia might be a means to facilitate the concurrence of the allies of France to this plan, his highness would use his utmost credit with the emperor to obtain his permission to dispose of his sisters to those princes.

Upon this foot, perhaps, the vanity of being addressed to as the effective minister of France, the merit and popularity of procuring an acquisition to that kingdom, and of preventing the aggrandisement of the house of Spain to too great a degree, after having considerably weakened that of Austria by its cessions in Italy, joined to the risk monsieur Chauvelin may run from thwarting too far and too barefacedly the cardinal's bent for peace; or from the suspicions which his refusal of so considerable a national advantage as the acquisition of the dutchy of Lorraine might give (perhaps not unjustly) of his being under some undue influence from the court of Spain; or lastly, from the events of a general war, together with a persuasion of the secret being safe in the breast of the duke of Lorraine, who has so apparent an interest to conceal it, especially from the courts of Vienna and London, (a point essentially necessary to be inculcated,) and whose precarious situation during the emperor's life will always oblige him to manage the court of France; not to mention the charms of the offer itself; may prevail upon a minister of the Garde des Sceaux's principles to unite, by accepting this proposal, his own interest with that of his country and all Europe.

How to break this matter to the duke of Lorraine, and how to dispose and prepare his highness to act this rôle without the privity of the Imperial court, (who are by no means fitt depositaries of a secret of this important and delicate nature,) seem the principal difficulties in this project. However, may not the first be removed by the means of lord Waldegrave's and monsieur Stainville's residence and intimacy at Paris? Or may there not be proper canals (which seems the most desirable method) of laying this thought directly before the duke of Lorraine? who, if he approves it, should take some unsuspected way
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of instructing, either by word of mouth or in his own hand-writing, and that without loss of time, monsieur Stainville to proceed, as is above sett forth; without letting that gentleman, in this case, into the whole confidence with respect to the secret concert between his highness and the king. And as to the latter, may not the immense interest which the duke of Lorraine has to see this scheme brought to its perfection; his knowledge of their Imperial majesties having it no less at heart; joined to the moral security on one side of this step's never being discovered on the part of monsieur Chauvelin, and a just confidence in the discretion of his majesty's servants on the other, get the better, in this instance, of that prince's scrupulous attachment and entire devotion to the emperor, and determine his highness to serve himself, their Imperial majesties, and all Europe, by the means suggested and furnished to him by the king's generous concern for the publick?

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The means of reimbursing, or rather advancing to his highness the sum he shall engage for on this occasion, without giving Chauvelin any suspicion of the concert, seem too obvious to need any explanation, as well as too important to the peace of mankind and the safety of his majesty's dominions to be neglected.

Might it not likewise be of service to instruct lord Waldegrave to make, as near the same time as possible, some vague insinuations of the same nature (sufficiently diversifying the consideration and the conditions) to monsieur Chauvelin, or to some proper creature of his; taking care, however, to do this in so gross a manner as to secure his not being closed with? Would not this feint attack serve to fortify the Garde des Sceaux in the belief of England not being in, or at all acquainted with the offers made him by the duke of Lorraine? and might not this minister, after his vanity had been indulged in making a parade of his integrity to his majesty, give more readily, and with greater security, into the temptation from another quarter, which he may look upon as too inconsiderable to grow presumptuous upon this secret, and as too much interested in it, to reveal it?

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

*Confidential conversation with the cardinal on the subject of a general pacification—
And on the reciprocal acquisitions of the belligerent powers.*

MY LORD,

Paris, August 2, N. S. 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

I Shall only at present return your grace my most humble thanks for the honour of your several letters of the 18th past, O. S. which I received last

Most private.

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night by Raddon the messenger, for I have not time to answer the several matters contained in them.

I am to give your grace an account of a very long and confidential conversation I had this morning with the cardinal at Issy. It began upon a resolution he shewed me of the States General of the 26th past, by which they desire a clearer answer from the allies, than that given them by monsieur de Fenelon on the 20th past of the same month. The cardinal pretended to be mightily surpris'd at it, and not to have expected such a return for what, he thought, would have given great satisfaction; though in the sequel of his conversation he owned, that monsieur de Fenelon had been so picqued at the resolution taken that day by the States, that he would not explain to the assembly, though much press'd to it, some passages which, without explaining, might put the maritime powers under greater difficulties than were intended, with respect to the guaranty. The cardinal spoke in general as to those explanations, saying they related only to Poland; upon which I observ'd to him, that it would have been much more to the purpose to have worded the answer in such a manner as to make any verbal explications needless, since, in negotiations of this kind, the letter of what was given in writing was to be stood to.

I then expos'd to his eminency, in the most lively colours I was able, the calamities he was drawing upon all Europe by his present way of proceeding. I represent'd to him in the most friendly and confidential manner, that, for my own part, I would, as long as it was possible for me, give the best construction to any thing I thought he had a hand in; that I did not doubt of his own disposition for restoring peace to Europe, but hitherto I could see nothing but ruin and destruction from the fluctuating measures of this court; beginning negotiations, and dropping them as soon as there is the least appearance of their coming to perfection, and substituting new projects in their place, which any one might be sure would come to nothing. He defend'd himself but slightly, and own'd at length, that he did not expect much good from the congress, or the suspension of arms he had propos'd. I then press'd him home to say how peace could be restored; and finding him pretty willing to hear any thing I had to say to him, I ask'd him some plain questions: first, Whether he would let the emperor have a footing in Italy or not? At this he paus'd, and looking earnestly at me, he said, *Ne me trahissés vous point?* I assur'd him it was not my intention. Well then, says he, "I will unbosom myself to you: the emperor shall have a footing in Italy, I think it right he should; for to keep a balance there, it is necessary that some body of weight should be between the king of Sardinia and don Carlos:" in fine, he allotted Mantua, a great share of the Milanese, and some other

other parts which he was not determined upon, to the emperor, and, by his manner of talking, Parma and Placentia; but he apprehended he should have a good deal of difficulty to make the queen of Spain yield up her native country to the emperor.

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As for Tuscany, he said, the emperor could not have it. This brought on, as I expected, the exchange of it against Lorraine; on which subject I gave him some encouragement. He immediately cleared up his countenance, and owned it was the only thing could satisfy the French nation; that for Poland he cared but little, it was only the point of honour made him insist upon it; but that if a real advantage was offered to France, in his situation he could not refuse it. He said he could not propose the exchange, after the declarations that had been made on his part; but Lorraine was what he wished for, and to have the exchange proposed to him. As to the king of Sardinia, he was of opinion he deserved something more than was allotted to him by our plan, and he thought the places on the coast of Tuscany, lately taken by the Spaniards, ought to be given to don Carlos, with Naples and Sicily.

I then asked him who was to propose this plan? He gave me to understand that nobody but his majesty could do it, and that if ever it was to be executed, it must be in consequence of a private agreement between England and France for that purpose. I asked him next, Whether, if that was to be the case, he would leave his allies, if they did not approve of it? After a fresh pause, and repeating twice, *Ne me trahissés vous pas?* he said that such a peace being established on a foundation of justice and reason, since due care was taken of them, he would abandon them if they did not comply.

Your grace sees by this the cardinal's present project; France to have Lorraine; the house of Lorraine to have Tuscany; the emperor, Mantua, Milan, and a great part of the Milanese; France disposed to give his Imperial majesty Parma and Placentia, but apprehensive of the queen of Spain's not consenting to it; France to guaranty the pragmattick sanction; don Carlos to have Naples and Sicily, and the towns heretofore possessed by the emperor on the coast of Tuscany; the king of Sardinia, besides the Tortonese, Novarese, and Vigevanasco, to have some farther share in the Milanese, but what, the cardinal could not directly say: the execution of this plan to be privately concerted between his majesty and the French king.

The experience we have of the cardinal's irresolution, gives little hopes that he will abide by this project, if it should meet with opposition from the Garde des Sceaux. I cannot say (considering the present posture of affairs) that I

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could hope for a better plan. In what manner it may be proposed, if it is liked, must be submitted to their majesties. The secrecy enjoined by the cardinal, leaves it to his honour to allow or disavow what I write; and if this plan should be to their majesties' liking, it can be proposed, but as coming directly from us. All these matters will be more maturely considered by your grace and his majesty's other ministers than I can pretend to do.

I must not omit acquainting your grace that, in talking of Mantua, the cardinal said, he did not know what to make of the king of Sardinia; that he offered his troops for attacking that place, and was ready likewise to go and meet the Imperialists, should they think of returning into Italy next autumn, but would not lend a single piece of cannon for the reduction of that city.

As to the elector of Bavaria, the cardinal seemed to approve his conduct, in consenting to the passage of the Muscovites, as a thing he could not help, and which was besides agreeable to the constitutions of the empire. His eminence added, with strong asseverations, that all the engagements France had with Bavaria were purely defensive, and subject to that elector's conforming himself in every respect to the constitutions of the empire.

As to the Portuguese affair, I observed to the cardinal, that there was a great difference between what Mr. Keene wrote, and what his eminency had told me. The cardinal in answer said, that till Portugal had accepted the joint mediation of England and France, Spain could not; but when the former consented, the latter would immediately follow the example. I did not care to tell the cardinal directly, how forward that business was in Portugal, but only, that I believed it would be soon agreed to.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.
Meets Buffy at Versailles, with whom he establishes a secret intercourse.—Secret negotiation between France and the emperor.

MY LORD,

Paris, August 2, N. S. 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

* M. Buffy.

MEETING lately at Versailles with * in such a manner that he could not avoid me, he began with making excuses for not being in a condition of paying some money I lent him when I was at Vienna. I complimented him, as being a trifle, and that I had more at his service if he wanted it; and turned the discourse upon the affairs of the times. Upon his saying I knew more of them than he did, I gave him a hint, that if I knew what he did, it would be of great service to me in my present state. Our conversation broke off by persons joining us. At parting, in a whisper, I told him I wished he would

would let me see him, and inform me now and then with the things he could, and he might depend upon my secrecy and gratitude. Yesterday he came to me, and told me he had made a discovery, which not being of his department, he could venture to reveal to me; for secrets that were trusted to him directly he would not for all the world discover them. The information was, that this court had sent privately monsieur de la Beaume to Vienna, as he supposed, to see what France could do with the emperor. I got no more out of him then. He recommended instantly that he should not be named in the use I made of this intelligence. The apprehension he seemed to be in lest any body should observe him speaking to me, would not allow us to talk farther; but we are to meet by appointment next Friday night at the Thuilleries, where I will endeavour to fix some money upon him; which, if he takes, I hope will answer expectation. I will not fail to give your grace an account of what passes there.

The information I had in your most private letter of the 17th of June made me think it absolutely necessary to send your grace this account, imperfect as it is, and must defer to my next what farther lights I can get of this affair. I can hardly imagine this man would have come thus to me but for money, which makes me hope well of it. Your grace knows the state he is in from profuseness. If he is sincere, one may come at great discoveries; but there may be a trick at the bottom also. Perhaps the Garde des Sceaux may have sent him on this errand to alarm us: perhaps also the cardinal may have made a secret to the Garde des Sceaux of sending to Vienna; but till I have seen [Bussy] again I can form no judgement; tho' from the contents of my letter that goes herewith I can hardly suspect the cardinal can have so many engines in the fire at once.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Hopes that the Squadron sent to Portugal will not return until the dispute with Spain is settled.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, August 5—16, 1735.

I Was favoured this evening with your letter of the 1st, O. S. I shall say no more upon the Bavarian question; the reasons for that measure flow'd in upon me more strongly the more I consider'd it.

I desire you will take notice of what I say in my dispatch of this day, relating to the joynt mediation for preventing hostilities between Spain and Portugal. I mentioned that matter very fully once before, but I do not find that my notions are yett followed; and I am apprehensive that our fleet may be order'd home without that joynt mediation being accepted on both sides, which will leave

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leave room for the committing of hostilities at a time when the season of action between Spain and Portugall shall begin; and if that mediation was accepted, perhaps our fleet might return home without any objection from Portugall. For my part, I think this a matter of soe much importance, that in order to procure the acceptance of that mediati^{on} on both sides, I don't know whether it may not be proper to have it insinuated indirectly to Spain (not directly from England as a condition) that when the mediation shall have been accepted, and all danger of hostilities removed, the fleet will be ordered home. Perhaps this is going too far, but it is a matter worth considering; so that care be taken not to disoblige the king of Portugall, nor to allarm the English merchants; for the sending of the fleet has been a very fortunate and popular thing in England, and it must not be recalled as long as there is the least appearance of danger to Portugall from Spain, or off the Brasil fleet.

Endorsed in Horace Walpole's hand-writing, *Thoughts on the present state of affairs*, in sir Robert Walpole's of August 21st, 1735.—This and the following Paper appear to have been drawn up by sir Robert Walpole, as the dates and some corrections are in his hand-writing.

Orford
 Papers.

Aug. 15—26, 1735. By the last letters from Vienna it appears that Mr. Robinson had founded the several ministers of the court of Vienna, in regard both to the proposition of a separate negociation between the emperor and France, by the exchange of Lorraine, and Tuscany, &c. and with regard to a separate negotiation between the emperor and Spain, upon the foot of a marriage between don Carlos and the second archduchess. And by his report it appears that the first scheme was relish'd much the most of the two, tho' attended with difficulties and objections, which, if not remov'd, will render the whole ineffectual; and that the second was either wholly rejected, or received with silence and without an answer.

But as Mr. Robinson's conversations were grounded upon his own motion, and without any authority, they were received as such; and the Imperial ministers declin'd entering upon either, until he was authorized to speak. But the conclusion of all the conferences turned almost upon this single point, whether his majesty wou'd positively promise and engage from this time to succour the emperor, at all events, in case the emperor should be induc'd to enter into any or either of the schemes, and they should prove unsuccessfull, and this attended with strong declarations that, without such an assurance, the emperor wou'd take care of himself exclusively of the maritime powers; and it must be observed

observed that there is great reason to believe that some secret overtures have passed between the courts of France and Vienna, with secret instructions for that purpose.

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It will be unnecessary for his majesty immediately to determine what orders shall be given on this demand of the Imperial court; for, as Mr. Robinson has since received his majesty's orders to speak directly to the emperor upon both of the two propositions, it will be proper to wait for the answer that shall be given to either or both of them, now proposed in form, before his majesty needs speak to the general demand, which has not yet been made to him in form; but it is before his majesty, as the conclusion which Mr. Robinson draws from the several conferences which he has held with the ministers of the emperor.

And when this question comes to be considered, it will be necessary that the true state of the case between the king and the emperor shall be previously explained, for all the reasoning of the Imperial ministers is founded upon a supposition that all the schemes that are suggested by his majesty to extricate the emperor out of his present and very pressing distresses, tended equally or more to the immediate service and benefit of his majesty than of the emperor, and in consequence that the emperor's entering into them would be such an obligation upon his majesty, as demanded, in return, an assurance from the king that he would engage in the war at all events, upon the failure of success in any attempt that should be made to procure a separate or general pacification. His majesty is to be considered as the best and nearest ally the emperor has, engaged by interest, inclination, and defensive alliances to support the emperor as far as it is possible and practicable, and consequentially deeply concerned in the events of the present war. His majesty, in conjunction with the States General, has been labouring to find out all probable means of putting an end to the present troubles; and his majesty's regard to the emperor, in all his proceedings, has been so great, that it has rendered him so far suspected by all the allies, that his partiality to the emperor is the chief obstruction in all the other courts, that has made his majesty less able to serve the emperor by his good offices.

At the present conjuncture, the plan of pacification being laid aside, to which the emperor himself is daily making infinite objections, intimations have been given to his majesty from the courts of France and of Spain, pointing at a separate negotiation to be carried on by the means of his majesty with the Imperial court; his majesty, by his minister at Vienna, communicates, in the utmost confidence,

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fidence, these intimations to the emperor, lays them before him, in the most friendly manner, for his consideration, and even option, as to which shall be first proceeded upon, suggests them as what carried a greater appearance and probability of success than any other method that does at present appear, and offers to the emperor his assistance to endeavour to bring that about that shall be most agreeable to his Imperial majesty; for the absolute success he does not, cannot answer. What pretence then can there be for the emperor, upon the failure of success, to demand of his majesty any new engagements or assurances for his majesty to take a part which he has frankly declared to the emperor, in the present situation of affairs with regard to the Dutch, he is not in a condition at present to give the emperor any reason to hope for?

The inference from all this is, that the emperor shou'd be convinc'd how unjust and unreasonable it is to reject any method that shall be offer'd of serving himself, unless the king will make such positive declarations as the present circumstances will not permit; and what a greater injustice it will still be, for the emperor to endeavour to make his own peace, at the expence of his best friends, because they cannot immediately do all that he wishes, although they have demonstrated to all the world that they are desirous of doing all they can. But there is one point suggested in Mr. Robinson's private letter which deserves the greatest consideration, I mean the intimation of his majesty's advancing to the emperor a sum of money, that might enable him this campaign to make use of his numerous armies in such manner as shou'd be thought most advisable. I mention not what is called the electoral loan, which is none of our business.

This money to be advanced by Great Britain must either be in a publick, or a private manner. If to be avowedly given to the emperor, I am afraid it wou'd be the same thing, or it wou'd always be in the power of France to understand it so, as declaring war against France, and in the consequences wou'd differ in nothing but doing the same thing in the method least effectual and least serviceable.

If then it is to be done privately, and the sum is not inconsiderable, it wou'd be very dangerous to issue a sum of money out of the supplies of the year, without a power given by what is called a vote of credit, and to come to parliament to have it made good, without explaining or declaring the uses and services to which the money was applied; and I am afraid the difficulties upon this head will, upon due consideration, appear to the most willing mind unfurmountable.

August

August 21st, 1735.—The last resolution of the States Generall, received by the last mail from Holland, deserves the greatest attention and consideration; and as I cannot but be of opinion, that Mr. Walpole in the conference, when that resolution was delivered to him, behaved in a manner that truly deserves the fullest approbation, I presume he will be ordered, in proper time, to let the States know, that his majesty looks upon their conduct upon this late occasion, in the same light as has been represented to them by his ambassador.

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But as a sudden and hasty concurrence with the Dutch, in such a step, may too much encourage the promoters of this proceeding, who discover so great a tendency and bias to the measures and counsells of France, and as there is a good foundation to doubt of the measure itself, it was thought proper not to be precipitate in advising the immediate concurrence, altho' upon mature deliberation it may be found advisable not wholly to reject the proposition, if the mischiefs and inconveniencies shall be found greater than shall follow from such a resolution.

It is therefore to be considered what might be the consequences, if his majesty should happen to joyn with the Dutch in promoting a congress; or, if his majesty should be induced to proceed upon that footing, in what manner and how far it might be adviseable to go.

It must be admitted that the resolution of the States Generall is a very weak and imperfect piece, and all the pretences that are alledged to support the measure, are at best but forced constructions, and the reasonings of a willing mind, determined to put such a sense and meaning upon the past transactions, as may in some manner justify what they seemed otherwise resolved to do.

If therefore it shall be thought reasonable to concur with the Dutch in the measure of a congress, it will not be at all necessary to joyn with them in their reasonings and allegations, any farther than they shall be thought proper. But his majesty may, in compliance with the Dutch, and rather than separate from them at this critical conjuncture, at their instance consent to a congress, if it shall be understood or taken for granted, that the allies desire their answer may be taken in that sense, and that the explanations given by monsieur Fenelon, in Holland, and the explanation given by the cardinal to lord Waldegrave (whose words were taken down in writing in his presence,) are likewise to be taken as such a declaration from France, as removes the objections to the generality of the answer of the allies; and in short, if the establishing a congress shall be consented to at the desire of the allies and of the Dutch, it may make the difficulty, in his majesty's refusing to concur, the greater. And

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what favours the opinion of his majesty's complying, rather than rejecting this offer of a congress, is the consequences that are immediately to be apprehended upon any apparent disunion or difference between his majesty and the States Generall.

From that time the cardinal's apprehensions of a general war will vanish; and whatever influence and effect the union between the two maritime powers have had upon the counsels of France, they will there cease; for if the Dutch should persevere in this opinion, and his majesty should differ from them, nobody can tell how far they may then think it necessary to seek for their own immediate safety, by having recourse to a stricter alliance with France; and how hopeless forever any expectation of making the Dutch act or speak with vigour may have hitherto been. Yet our endeavours have hitherto had so much effect, that they have constantly alarmed France, and all the favourable indications in the court of France, that have been seen from time to time, are truly to be imputed to no other cause. But upon such a disunion as may now happen, we must lay aside all thoughts even of a possibility of our making the Dutch at any time subservient to such views as may offer, of entering into the war, or of procuring either a generall or separate accommodation by the joint intervention of the maritime powers.

The union between the maritime powers has certainly given France the greatest uneasiness, and the court of France has often and in many shapes attempted to disunite them, but without effect: it seems not advisable for us to do that rashly for them, which they have not been able to do themselves.

It must be admitted that the intelligencies from all quarters demonstrate the distrusts, jealousies, and uneasinesses, that subsist among the allies themselves: and as it is as little to be doubted but they begin to be so sensible of the weight and burthen of the war, that they are all looking out for peace, if it can be procured upon their own terms, without regard to one another; such a situation must in all probability open new scenes, that may turn to the favour and advantage of the emperor; and upon such an incident, if the harmony between the maritime powers is kept up, the weight of the Dutch must be thrown into the scale of the emperor, which otherwise may incline him to the other side.

These sorts of reasonings seem to make it advisable not to differ with the Dutch upon this point, if they insist; but as this resolution of the States goes no farther than to be communicated to his majesty for his concurrence, without which they declare they will do nothing, if it be thought necessary, Mr. Walpole may be ordered to expostulate with them, to see if they can be prevailed upon

upon to desist or recede in part, or in the whole, with proper instructions to him to modify his majesty's concurrence, if it is at last to be given, in such a manner as may remove the objections that arise from the form of the resolution, such as may be distasteful to the emperor, or such as may not be proper for his majesty to concur in.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Coolness between the cardinal and Chauvelin.—Their endeavours to impose upon each other.

Paris, August 16, 1735. In the course of my conversation my friend* told me there had been of late a considerable coldness between the cardinal and his adjunct; his eminency having of late discovered several of the other's practices to make himself master of all the foreign ministers, and consequently of the negotiations, by the secret correspondence he has with the ministers. In one word, the character he gives of both is short, *Ils sont tous deux des fripons, qui ne cherchent qu'à se jouer l'un l'autre*; therefore neither of them can be trusted or depended upon. An instance he gave me of their playing on each other was Jannel's negotiation. Jannel informed the Garde des Sceaux of it, the day after the cardinal first spoke to him of it; yet the Garde des Sceaux kept this to himself for above two months, being sure that Jannel would not go beyond his, monsieur Chauvelin's, instructions.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

Extract.

* Buffy.

In fine, my friend's notions are, that we shall never be at quiet, but by engaging the emperor to give his second daughter to don Carlos; and then Spain and the emperor will bring these people to reason, and we may take which side we please.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Necessary if possible to gain Chauvelin—And to arrange the conditions with him.

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, September 8—19, 1735.

I Am now to return you thanks for your most private and particular letter; the subject of it is, as you may imagine, the greatest secret; and all your letters upon it go thro' no hands but my own, and such as are necessarily entrusted, and therefore I am sure I need not caution you about it: and I desire for the future all your answers may be in your hand, and that you would continue to write on your letters, *to be opened by myself*. The present circumstances make it absolutely necessary, if possible, to gain 201*; for by his means, in that case,

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* Chauvelin.

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case, we might hope that we should be admitted into the secret negotiation, which is now so far advanced, and that it should not be concluded to our prejudice, or without us; this therefore must be the condition, if things go on. The queen would have you immediately open yourself, either to 201 himself, or to the person whom you think would be intrusted with any thing of this kind. You will be best able to judge in what manner you should break it; but if you find him inclined and disposed effectually to give his assistance to prevent the conclusion of any secret negotiation to our prejudice, (which may be to be apprehended from the behaviour of the court of Vienna, if not immediately prevented,) you may then assure him that, upon that condition, he may depend upon such marks of the king's acknowledgment and favour, as you and he shall agree upon. And as affairs of this kind are not to be treated by letter, you have directions, in case you find a disposition in him, to write hither immediately for leave to come to England for a week upon your private affairs, and that you shall then return fully authorised to perform and ratifie what shall be settled between you; and it is her majesty's pleasure that, if you see any probable hopes of success, you should immediately take the pretence of your private affairs to ask leave to come to England for a few days, and you shall then return fully informed of the king's pleasure, and enabled to do what be proper and necessary. This is the time when that person is most wanted, and therefore this opportunity is not to be slipt. You see I write in my own hand for greater caution, tho' not for greater ease either to yourself or me. I am, &c.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Cardinal Fleury secretly opposes or thwarts the siege of Mantua.—His jealousy of Spain.

MY LORD,

Paris, Sept. 21st, 1735. N. S.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

I Went yesterday, as usual, to Versailles. The cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux were both very inquisitive, and, I thought, uneasy to know how their plan had been relished in England. I told them, as it had undoubtedly been sent to Hanover, they must be patient for a few days longer, before they could know his majesty's sentiments upon it. However, considering the present situation of affairs, I thought it rather best to give them hopes, provided they did not create new difficulties, and such as they themselves must be sensible of, by the motions of their army in Italy. I imagined also, that by talking to them in this manner, we might be more likely to discover their real intentions. I therefore encouraged

raged them to hope that, in the gross, it might serve as a foundation for restoring peace to Europe. So far I went with the French ministers, and in return they both spoke in the following manner, whether by concert or no, I can't directly say; but, upon the whole, the cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux held the same language, tho' I saw them separately.

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The cardinal expressed the greatest uneasiness at the apprehensions he was under about the siege of Mantua. He had, he said, gone as great lengths, as he was able, to delay it, without absolutely declaring he would not let it be undertaken, and shewing the world he had some private negociation in hand, which would be but to the prejudice of Spain, whose diligence on this occasion had been beyond example, and hardly to be imagined. He was, therefore, now at a non-plus, and forced to follow the Spanish general's impetuosity, whatever the consequences were to be. He told me, in confidence, that he had consented and encouraged the troops of the allies entering into the Venetian state, purely to be doing something that might retard the siege, in hopes of having an excuse from the weather, or sickness of his soldiers, to oppose that undertaking, since the fall of so important a place into the hands of the Spaniards would defeat all his schemes, and render their catholick majesties intractable. He added farther, that there was no possibility (according to his way of thinking) of putting an end to the war in a safe and honourable way, but by following his proposal, which he feared might become every day less practicable, from the variations that might happen in Italy: he therefore, after the strongest professions of the sincerity of his intentions, concluded with asserting, that, if his majesty would come into his manner of thinking, and would agree to sign a private agreement for that end, no time was to be lost; and that, if once we had both signed, England must immediately engage the emperor to consent to an armistice *in statu quo*, which would not only save Mantua, but put it in the power of the contracting parties to do for his Imperial majesty all that should be stipulated between them in his favour. He therefore desired of me to send this day, without loss of time, a messenger to England to represent his distress, and press not only the coming into his scheme, but also to procure the emperor's immediate consent to an armistice *in statu quo*, grounded on the assurances we should be able to give his Imperial majesty, (if we were determined to come into the cardinal's measures,) that he would get more by consenting to an immediate suspension of arms, than he could expect in some years, if the war was to continue, and even we declare for him.

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I need not trouble your grace with numbers of other arguments the cardinal made use of to support his opinion, tending to shew the ill state the emperor is in, the expence we must be at to extricate him out of his present difficulties, and the time it must take to dispossess the allies of their conquests in Italy. He protested, in the most solemn manner, that he would do all that in him lay, to prevent any step that might either render the pacification impracticable, or raise new difficulties to the execution of his plan; but at the same time he said he could not do any thing that would expose him to make a ridiculous figure in the world, or give jealousies to his allies of his present views.

The Garde des Sceaux spoke in general to the same purpose; but as to particulars, was more ready to seek for expedients to avoid the inconveniencies apprehended by the cardinal. He seemed, nevertheless, full as fearfull of the siege of Mantua, from the accidents which now and then oblige the strongest place to surrender unexpectedly. He said he had thought of expedients, and made use of some to delay the siege; such as keeping their troops, for the sake of subsistence, in the Venetian territories, till he knew the king's sentiments upon the plan; adding, that if we were once agreed, he could make their troops retire, as if it were at the instances of the Venetians, and bring them for subsistence into the Milanese, since there would be none in the Mantuan. He would however own to me in confidence, and upon the opinion he has, that his majesty would come into his plan, that he is erecting magazines in the Milanese, either to maintain his army, or to be in a condition of sending troops to the Mantuan, if the siege is to be undertaken.

This he said in an amicable manner, without the least view of intimidating; but added, at the same time, that this was our only opportunity to put an end to the war, by agreeing to the plan, and by our prevailing with the emperor to agree immediately to an *armistice pure et simple*, which monsieur Chauvelin made no question of the emperor's coming into, upon our promising him what is stipulated for him by our private negotiations, and which could not fail taking effect; since nobody would be in a condition to oppose it. He went upon the footing of his project, and the method of executing it in the following manner, saying, when we and France had signed our private convention, the Dutch, without doubt, would readily accede, and he would answer for the king of Sardinia. Then, says he, let the worst that can happen, the emperor and Spain may be angry, the emperor can't help himself, and I know so well the condition of the finances of Spain, that she cannot assist him. A congress must meet; the
pleni-

plenipotentiarys of the four powers will have private instructions, conformable to what will be settled here. If it be thought necessary, they may, at first, seem to wrangle, but will at last agree upon what is stipulated between their respective masters. No other way will be allowed of to settle peace, and the clamours of the Spanish or Imperial ministers will not hinder the main business being concluded. He repeated here, in a friendly way, what he had said last to me, with regard to the load the emperor would be to us, if we took his part; but he said he would not take any advantage of it to distress the house of Austria. That it was necessary, for the honour of France, to get some compensation for the expences she had been at, purely out of a point of honour. That if we now agreed upon the terms for accommodating matters, we should find him as ready as we, and inclined to concert every thing in the best manner for our reciprocal honour and safety. This I must add, that monsieur Chauvelin seemed so earnest and so sincere in all he said, that it would be hard upon him to think he meant, at the time he spoke, to deceive me.

I must observe to your grace, that in all the cardinal and Garde des Sceaux said to me of our secret negociation, they carried along with them a supposition of our having already consulted the emperor about it. They neither of them pretended to blame such a step, provided we were not too soft in our expressions, which would, in their opinion, make the Austrian ministers less tractable; for, they said, we might depend upon it, that if we spoke firmly the emperor would be reasonable, and not otherwise. They both look upon the emperor's present condition to be as low as possible, and that it is for want of money and credit that he can undertake nothing. They mentioned count Konigseck's not returning to Italy, and Prince Eugene's going back to Vienna, as evident marks of his distress.

Upon the whole, it appears to me, that as smoothly as their affairs seem to run, this court is very uneasy at something or other; what that is I can't say. The reasons given me by monsieur Chauvelin of the emperor's and Spain's wanting money, and therefore not in a condition to prevent the execution of his plan, ought to be equally so against his fearing their joining at present; but they are not sure of us, and that made him apprehensive. He talked to me of monsieur de Montemar as of a madman, but who had done more to forward the siege of Mantua than could have been imagined; that he had already carried fifty pieces of cannon over hills between Leghorn and Bologna, where heretofore post-chaises could scarce travel. He added, quite in confidence, (I suppose not to discourage me,) that he had still a fetch to retard the siege of Mantua.

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Period VI. Mantua. The cardinal told me on the same head, that should the siege be
 1734 to 1737. actually begun, and the armistice agreed upon, notwithstanding the opposition
 1735. he knew he should meet with from the Spaniards, the necessary provisions for
 the daily subsistence of the garrison during the armistice should be allowed to
 be carried into the place.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

The cardinal and Chauvelin positively deny that a negotiation was on foot with the emperor.

MY LORD,

Paris, September 28th, N. S. 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

YOUR grace having already had, by my letter of the 24th instant, an account of the arrival of Carrington the messenger with your dispatches of the 8th, O. S., and of the conversations I had with Pecquet on their contents, I am now to inform your grace with the conferences I had yesterday at Versailles with the cardinal de Fleury and monsieur Chauvelin, in consequence of her majesty's orders.

I began my discourse to the cardinal with telling him, that tho' I had talked with great freedom to monsieur Pecquet, yet there were some things I did not think fit to mention to him, my orders tying me in some measure down to impart them to his eminency and monsieur Chauvelin only, as they related to private information his majesty had of their negotiating at Vienna. I assured his eminency, I could give no account how those informations came to his majesty; tho' I thought it not amiss to give him to understand that I could hardly believe they were founded after all that had passed between his eminency, monsieur Chauvelin, and me: yet I put him in mind of his having dropt in discourse that he offered more by us than the emperor could expect, and that the knowledge he had of it came from count Sinzendorff, which might leave me some room to think the court of Vienna had been founded. But I could assure him, with great truth, that the orders I had from his majesty could not be grounded upon that hint, since we could have no answer from Hanover to what I then wrote, and which, perhaps, if received, might have made the present *eclaircissement* unnecessary. However, as what I had to say upon that subject must give his eminency and monsieur Chauvelin the strongest proof of his majesty's confidence in them, and of his sincere desire to contribute towards a pacification, I would let them know his majesty's sentiments, upon the supposition they had been, or were actually treating with the emperor.

I then

I then run thro' the contents of that part of your grace's letter relating to that point, and acquainted the cardinal that the king had been for some time informed of the secret transactions carrying on between this court and that of Vienna; and that, as his majesty had no other view but to bring about a peace consistent with the equilibrium of Europe, his majesty was so far from opposing any negotiation of that kind, that he would be glad to facilitate it, provided the terms of it appeared consistent with the said equilibrium and the interest of his subjects; and therefore, in order to be able to promote the success of that negotiation, his majesty hoped they would make no difficulty to acquaint me in confidence with the conditions on which they are now treating at Vienna, which his majesty supposed to be pretty much the same as those contained in his eminency's plan.

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The cardinal, in answer, said he was mighty glad to see the confidence the king reposed in him, and the desire that appeared in his majesty to put an end to the present troubles. He denied positively any private negotiation being now on foot with the emperor, and offered to take his oath of it, if I required it. I could not however help observing in myself, that he avoided saying any thing as to time past, which seemed to me a sort of concession that he had negotiated, but that his negotiation had been unsuccessful. I saw likewise, as I thought, an awkwardness in his looks not usual to him. He asked me a second time, whether I would have him take an oath to satisfy me he was not negotiating, but I told him his word was sufficient. He gave a turn to our suspicions as if they were raised by the Imperial ministers, to engage us, by such insinuations, to declare for the emperor. He added, that the manner in which he had opened himself to the king was an evidence that he would rather have peace by the means of, and jointly with his majesty, than by any other method whatsoever: that he was too much bent upon engaging England in his way of thinking, to try any other power. He protested solemnly, that if he had meant to treat elsewhere, he never would have gone into measures to the prejudice of England: that, whatever some people might imagine, he wished to live well with England, and desired nothing more than to live in amity with his majesty. He spoke a good deal more to this purpose, insinuating, that a mutual confidence was necessary; and he would have inferred, from our suspicion of him, that we were not so much in earnest to bring about an accommodation as he was.

At length, to shew me still farther that he had no private negotiation on foot at Vienna, he bid me observe how they harraressed the emperor every where, seizing, even in the Venetian state, all that belonged to him. But as to Mantua, he

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faid he was at least as much in pain about it as the emperor himself, since if that place was taken, it would be very difficult to get him any part of Italy; for such *arrangements* must follow amongst the allies as would render it very difficult for the emperor, let him be never so well assisted, ever to get a footing again in that country. As a proof of the obstructions he put to the siege of Mantua, he told me, in confidence, that he had writ a letter in his own hand to the duke de Noailles yesterday was se'nnight, to avoid coming near Mantua as long as he could, and to seek as many pretences as could possibly be alledged to count Montemar for not undertaking the siege: at last, if he was drove to a nonplus, he was to tell the Spanish general, that he must write to court for orders, without which he was not to stir. This, he said, would occasion a delay of near three weeks, by which time the season of the year and other unforeseen accidents might make the undertaking unadviseable. At the same time, the cardinal spoke with an appearance of great concern for the bad condition the place was in, thro' want and sickness, which very possibly might oblige the governour to surrender without the formalities of a siege. His eminency argued from this topick upon the necessity of our coming into his measures, and that without delay, as the only means to save that important place, and to secure a good share in Italy to the emperor.

I then proceeded to the reflections her majesty has made upon the cardinal's plan, and I let him know that the queen had been extremely glad to see so good a disposition in his eminency to come to an accommodation with the emperor. His plan, I said, was gone to his majesty at Hanover, wherefore he could not yet expect an answer; however, her majesty upon perusing it had made some observations which, I was persuaded, would be of weight with his eminency, since they were the dictates of the strictest justice and of the strongest reason.

I here made use of all the arguments suggested in your grace's letter, to shew how convenient it would be to all parties to engage the emperor, since his Imperial majesty alone could influence the duke of Lorraine, without whose consent the plan proposed by the cardinal could bear in no shape. I shewed the immediate advantage France was to have by placing Stanislaus in Lorraine; and I observed that this was contrary to their repeated declarations. His salvo for departing from those declarations was the expence he had been at since that time. He urged likewise, that their honour required it, and that the emperor could hardly pay too dear for his pragmatick sanction.

He seemed inflexible as to what is allotted to the king of Sardinia by his plan. The Tortonese was, he said, of little value to the emperor; and Tortona was absolutely

absolutely necessary for the king of Sardinia. That king was not to be obliged by France; and times were altered since he said that the pacification should not be stayed for the king of Sardinia. He did not deny having said it, but he urged that he had not then the same obligations to that prince as he now has. That as it is, it will be very hard upon the king of Sardinia, to oblige him to relinquish to the emperor the greatest part of the Milanese, considering it was guaranteed to him by France in the strongest terms. As to the Langhes, which I spoke of as a great equivalent to the Tortonese, those he said had been of no value to the emperor, the produce of the country depending on contingencies, which never went into his Imperial majesty's coffers, but were embezzled in the offices; whereas, by the king of Sardinia's management, it would be an advantage to him, and an inconsiderable difference to the emperor.

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After saying all your grace had ordered me relating to the *stati di presidii*, I could get no satisfaction from the cardinal. He defended himself upon the trouble we should have to engage don Carlos, or the court of Spain, to be easy even with this addition.

As to the passage in your grace's letter relating to the duke of Lorraine's not being obliged, if he comes to be emperor, to yield Tuscany to his younger brother, least by that means he might not only lose Lorraine, but Tuscany also, he seemed to think *arrangements* might be made to remedy that contingency; and said, that he would come into any measures to obviate such a case. This, your grace will observe, is the only point in his whole plan in which the cardinal seemed to yield; and the reason of it is very clear, from its being the equivalent for what France is to have, which otherwise might hereafter become precarious.

Upon the whole, he had recourse to the impracticability of concluding any thing, if meer impossibilities were to be *fended* * against. He talked much of his *bonne foy*, and of his readiness to concur in reasonable things when once he should be sure of his majesty's. I asked him how he could imagine the king would engage for the performance of matters that did not depend on him. He insinuated, that every body would become reasonable, if England and France spoke the same language. In short, he seemed so determined, that I did not think it worth my while to propose any expedients, which could come but from myself, till I have the king's orders, and then I may let him know what the king will come into, and what not. For whilst he has this check of Mantua upon the emperor, (which for all his boasts may not fall into the hands of the allies this season,) I don't imagine he will recede in the least from any part of

* So in the original.

Period VI. his plan, excepting some modification as to the settlement of Tuscany in the
 1734 to 1737. house of Lorraine.

1734.

Before I leave his eminency, I must not omit acquainting your grace that he shew'd great uneasiness when I told him I did not think the king would leave Hanover so soon as was expected; and I endeavoured to raise his fears of the consequences of the king's staying there, if, thro' the unreasonableness of his demands, the hopes of peace should be set aside.

I talked to monsieur Chauvelin much as I had done to the cardinal, and had pretty near the same answers from both. Chauvelin seemed more in haste to have us agree with him. He denied point blank that there was any truth in our notions of his treating separately at Vienna. The chief reason he gave to prove the contrary was his own eagerness for a month past to conclude with us; and he said he was ready to sign that moment the private convention, if I was sufficiently authorised. The notion of his treating at Vienna, he told me, was framed in Holland: the pensionary had mentioned it to monsieur de Fenelon, but that, for his part, he wished as the cardinal did, to make peace thro' his majesty's means, and our coming into his plan was the only method. That, in an affair of this nature, being over nice would spoil all. He earnestly begg'd to be put out of his present pain, which, he said, would continue whilst there was a possibility of Mantua's falling into the hands of the Spaniards by our delay. He said he would give me proof of his veracity at this juncture; he had just received by a courier letters from monsieur de Noailles of the 22d, by which he saw the bad situation of that place beyond all doubt: the sickness was so great in the town, that the Jews were obliged to guard several posts. After a good many solid reasons to shew him the difficultys that must naturally occur to the acceptance of his plan, in the manner it was given us, I supposed, for a moment, its being agreed to by his majesty. I asked him how he proposed to have it executed? By offices, he said, to be used at first; and by the joint forces of the allies, if offices did not prevail. I asked him, if he would attack Leghorn, Parma, and Placentia, &c. if the Spaniards would not evacuate them? His answer was, he would do it if necessary; but he could not suppose it would ever come to that. Upon the difference between the present and the former plan with relation to the king of Sardinia, he said, the emperor had a footing at that time in Italy, but had none now. That the Spaniards look'd upon Mantua now as their own; and the king of Sardinia expected what had been promis'd him by treaty should be made good. That it was true, his Sardinian
 majesty,

majesty, to be quit of so troublesome a neighbour as the Spaniard, would undoubtedly relinquish something; but he was not in so bad a state as to give up all, neither was France in a condition to force him. These arguments he made use of, rather to convince me of the reasonableness of his own insisting for additions being made to the king of Sardinia, than to give him an opportunity of arguing him out of it.

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In the instance I gave of the variations in the present plan from the cardinal's first proposal of the reversion of Lorraine to France, only after the grand duke's death, he did not mean to disown the cardinal's having said it, but he had not; letting me plainly understand, that nothing would hold for which he did not engage.

Monsieur Chauvelin came very readily into making the duke of Lorraine easy upon the contingency of the eldest archduchess dying without children; in which case, he said, it was but just that Tuscany should go, as Lorraine would have done. Here he commended his own justice, and protested we should ever find him reasonable. But, upon my making use of the opportunity to shew him several other points of this plan that were as unreasonable as that he had just given up, he differ'd with me in opinion, and call'd them trifles, which, upon a serious consideration and a sincere desire of putting a stop to the present war, could admit of no dispute.

Upon the whole, I see no possibility of engaging these people to make any material alterations in their plan, till they know how far his majesty will concur with them for the execution of what both courts may come into. I think they will recede in some points, tho' Chauvelin says not. It is certain that the cardinal's chief view is to prevent the king's taking a share in the war. He is not also without his fears, lest part of the Imperial army should make its way into the Low Countries, which might occasion a great change in their present projects, and for that reason he presses so much coming to a conclusion. I must not omit acquainting your grace with a pretty extraordinary matter the cardinal let fall, relating to the congress, whenever it is to be held. I spoke as by chance of monsieur de Fenelon's extravagant pretensions of precedence over the ministers, as a point, if insisted upon, that would shew all that had passed hitherto, or should hereafter pass, to forward a congress, would be but mere amusement. It was therefore necessary to agree to a *pêle mêle* amongst ministers of equal rank. The cardinal said that he understood it so, that at a future congress the same forms should be used as at Soissons, Utrecht, and Cambray; but that he would tell me, in confidence, the congress should not be at the Hague. I asked him

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him why, and where then he proposed it should be? The place, he said, he had not fixed upon; it was a point must be concerted; but that it could not be at the Hague, for the Dutch themselves did not desire it should be there. This being the substance of my conversations with both the French ministers, I have nothing to add, but that I am, &c.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Weak proceeding of the emperor's ministers in thinking that the English nation would force the Walpoles to support the war.

DEAR SIR,

Hague, October 1, 1735.

I Have been favoured with your letter of the 17th, but have little to trouble you with from hence, things being here at a stand in expectation of what may be said farther from the respective ministers of Vienna and Paris, for removing the difficultys that obstruct the conclusion of the armistice. I must own I am extreamly surprised and concerned that count Uhlfeldt has received no orders on that head, in consequence of what had been said to him in an amicable manner for that purpose. I find the Imperiall court is resolved to receive no advice from those who will not or cannot give them succours; but methinks for their own sakes, if they had no immediate scheme for keeping foot in Italy, and for preventing the siege of Mantua, they should have laid hold of the only means for that purpose which offered, and that is to endeavour to obtain an armistice; and perhaps it may not yet be too late, if they would seek it without insisting upon terms that can never be obtained, and which are not agreeable to the sense of the word *basis*, as contained and mentioned in our plan. For I must tell you here that, while the Imperial ministers declare that they have agreed to every thing proposed to them by the maritime powers, the manner in which they explain themselves at the same time upon the armistice, makes a great many people differ with them as to that pretended complaisance. Let that be as it will, surely the siege of Mantua should be prevented, and the only way to do it is an armistice.

I have learnt from very good hands, that the Imperiall court has taken a resolution to hearken to nothing that shall be advised from England, and even to lett things continue upon the same foot they are, whatever may be the consequence, untill our parliament shall meet, in hopes that the English nation is so alarmed with the successes of the house of Bourbon, that the W——les will be obliged to declare publickly in favour of the emperour, or to resign their places.

This

This is the old game of the bishop of Namur, and a certain way of thinking that prevailed then among some of the ministers at Vienna, and will have the same end. Compassion upon the emperor's circumstances ought and shall with me get the better of resentment and retaliation. But if his Imperial majesty's servants would, instead of flattering themselves with the hopes of great advantages from little, idle, favourable circumstances, that now and then occur, have taken the proper hints that have been so often suggested to them, and have sett themselves honestly at work to extricate their master out of his unfortunate situation, in the best manner they could, they would have done him much better service than all their elaborate papers and little cabals and intrigues will be ever able to doe. I will take upon me to say that I have taken the truest method to doe the emperor more service, than all his ministers together; and if I have not had the success I desired, and even expected, it is chiefly owing to the notions entertained here from the conduct of some of the emperor's ministers, (whether true or false I will not pretend to determin,) that nothing would satisfie that court but the maritime powers going directly into a war.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Cardinal owns the negotiation with the emperor.

MY LORD,

Fontainebleau, October 26th, 1735. N. S.

THE moment after I had dispatched Raddon, last Saturday, to your grace from Paris, I returned hither; and the next day, between one and two in the afternoon, Bill the messenger brought me the honour of your grace's dispatches of the 7th. I had been with the Garde des Sceaux in the morning, before Bill arrived, to talk to him about the *commédiation*, which point was soon settled in a very good-humoured way. But when he found I had nothing new relating to his plan, and that, in discourse, I did not encourage him to hope that the king would alter his mind as to the observations I had made upon it by his majesty's order, he grew excessive testy, and muttered as if all treating with us was at an end; which I minded the less, as I was persuaded it proceeded more from the disagreeable situation he found himself in, by his negociation with the emperor, than from any intention of absolutely concluding without us. I told him calmly, that as long as he would insist upon impossibilities, he must not expect his majesty's concurrence; but that according to the cardinal's desire, to which he had not objected, I reckoned the king had sent orders to Mr. Robinson to feel the pulse of the Imperial court; and that

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

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if the emperor had a mind to give all that is desired, provided the king did not think it would affect the equilibrio, I did not imagine his majesty would oppose it; but that the emperor's consent was absolutely necessary to the execution of their plan with ease; that the cardinal and he had been sensible of it four days before, and I could not understand why he now seemed to be of a different opinion. As I afterwards gave him some hopes of my hearing from your grace, he came a little to himself again, but did not say the least word tending to own his negociation at Vienna; and thus I left him.

I went from monsieur Chauvelin's to the cardinal, but as he was then very busy, he sent to desire my company to dinner, after which we should talk together. Just as I was returning to the cardinal's, Bill the messenger arrived. I read over the dispatches in a hurry, to see whether they contained any thing to require my speaking immediately to the French ministers; but finding nothing new, and that the orders your grace had sent me were left in a great measure to my discretion, I resolved to try how far the cardinal would carry his dissimulation, without, however, exposing ourselves to the risk of being left out of the negociation, or, by seeming too desirous to be in it, make them think we should look upon it as a favour, when, on the contrary, I don't doubt but they will desire it as one of us.

I found the cardinal, after dinner, very uneasy, which I easily accounted for from the knowledge I had by your grace's dispatches, joined to what I knew from other parts, of the uneasiness he could not but be in, with respect to us, as well as to the emperor.

Thus rested the matter till this morning; for all the day yesterday the cardinal was so taken up on account of the expresses that they received in the night from the army, that none of the foreign ministers could see him; and this morning I saw him but an instant. The sum of what he said to me, was owning a private transaction between this court and the emperor, tho' he would not say how, or by whom it was carried on, upon which he made the following declaration: That it had never been his intention, in this affair, to do any thing but what would be agreeable to his majesty; that he had declared at Vienna, that his majesty must be a party to whatever should be agreed on; and he added, that nothing should be agreed upon without his majesty's knowledge; and that, if the negociations at Vienna went on, all relating thereto should be communicated to us. The Garde des Sceaux came in as he was finishing this declaration, and his eminency repeated the same in monsieur Chauvelin's presence; adding, that for this twelvemonth past, he had constantly

stantly told me, that he desired nothing more than to act in concert with his majesty, by which means we could both be sure of maintaining a just equilibrium in Europe.

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As I don't suppose I shall find a leisure hour this day or two to talk more fully to the French ministers, I would not delay one moment sending your grace this advice, which I hope to be able to clear up better by the next opportunity.

I must not omit acquainting your grace, that monsieur Chauvelin, in a very short conversation I had with him, assured me I should know all in a very few days. He gave me a hint, that the tendency of their private transaction at Vienna was, to form a quadruple alliance between his majesty, the emperor, the French king, and the Dutch. I encouraged, in general, such a project, as what would most probably secure a lasting peace in Europe; but he had not then time to explain himself any further. He insisted on my not mentioning this to the cardinal, nor to any body living, till we had again conferred together.

I shall not trouble your grace, at present, with any observations on what I received from you, or on what goes herewith, not to detain my messenger. All that I can add is, that I will endeavour to execute, the best I can, the orders your grace has sent me, and in the manner prescribed.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Sir Robert Walpole will see him in the evening.

MY DEAR LORD,

Chelsea, 2 o'clock, Sunday noon.

WHEN I came hither, I found sir Robert had a particular party at dinner, upon some business, and that it would be inconvenient for you to be here. Sir Robert comes in the evening to London, and desires you will leave word at your house where he may send to you to come to him. Nobody is to be at sir Robert's with you but myself; you may imagine he wants some very private discourse with you. I can assure you, you will find him much your friend and servant. I hope you don't doubt my being so. I am glad to hear you are gott safe to England, and am sincerely your's.

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Private.

MEMOIRS OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Expectations from his visit to Chauvelin.

MY DEAR LORD,

Whitehall, October 3—14, 1735.

Waldegrave
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*Private and
particular.*

* Queen.

I Have little to say in answer to your private and particular letter. We are in great expectation from your visit at Gros Bois; we look upon it as a sort of assignation, and therefore hope for great things from it. Sir Robert Walpole is very much obliged to you for the kind things he said of him; he may depend upon a return from Sir Robert to all his civilities that he shall shew. Things look well at Vienna, and I hope to hear they do so at Paris. I did not myself read Tom Pelham's letter to Stone; the Q.* tells me he talks of you; you should not have said any thing to him upon it, and if you have, he should have been more discreet than to have mentioned it in an office letter: pray give him a caution for the future. Remember my cook and my wine.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Suspects that France has come to an engagement with Spain and Sardinia, and to push the siege of Mantua.—Reasons on the conduct and views of France, and proposes terms to be laid before the cardinal.—Hints at the jealousy of the duke of Newcastle.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, October 4, 1735.

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Secret.

IN a long and hasty letter, upon a cursory perusal of Lord Waldegrave's letter of the 21st past, N. S. I acquainted her majesty with my apprehensions of the reasons used by the French ministers to his lordship for pressing the immediate signature of an agreement upon the terms of their own plan, and for our inducing the emperor to agree to an armistice pure and simple. I must own to you, that a more serious perusal of that dispatch has not altered my opinion, and I still fear, that the French find that they cannot come to an agreement with the emperor on their own plan; that they have brought the kings of Sardinia and Spain to a good understanding and agreement about the disposition of the conquests in Italy; that they have resolved together upon the siege and taking of Mantua; that they are laying in for an excuse in taking those steps, while they are in a secret negotiation with the emperor and us, by attributing to them the perverseness of the Imperial court in not being reasonable, and to our backwardness in not signing a convention with them, which being, as they will pretend, very reasonable, they could not be sure of

us;

us; and what confirms me in this opinion is, that every reason made use of by them to show they had hitherto delayed the siege, proves quite the contrary; and that they have done all that was necessary towards advancing and facilitating the siege before the great artillery was arrived.

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This complaisance towards Spain may, perhaps, be weakness in the cardinal, but I am persuaded it is real and serious in Chauvelyn; and you will find, by the late letters from Mr. Keene, that Spain, who had been so long so uneasy at the conduct of France, seems at present extremely easy, and persuaded of their being able to take Mantua, which they could not be without the assistance of France and Sardinia. And altho' the acceptance of our mediation for accommodating the differences with Portugall is, abstractedly, a very good thing, yett I heartily wish it may not have been by Spain a reciprocal condition for the besieging of Mantua. In short, if you will read that dispatch of lord Waldegrave's with attention, I believe the same jealous reflections will occur to you. I can assure you that both the pensionary and greffier, to whom I have communicated it separately, made the same remarks immediately upon it; that they apprehend hitherto nothing but amusement from France; and that this earnestness to sign with us such imperfect proposals to prevent the siege of Mantua, after the French ministers, by their own confession, have concurred in the preparatory steps to make that siege easy, and to deprive the Germans of all possible means to support or relieve the town, has a very bad air with it. And, between you and me, I am extremely surpris'd that lord Waldegrave did not, instead of running so hastily into the desires of the French ministers, expostulate with them upon their having so long obstructed the armistice; upon their still insisting upon the *statu quo* with respect to Germany; and of their concurring to march their troops into the Venetian dominions, and by that measure destroy the means for the subsistence of the Imperiall troops, and their return into Italy. I doe not say this to find fault with his lordship; he has good sense, and a particular address to insinuate himselfe into the good opinion of others; but then his desire to please and to be pleased (as I have often observed) makes him too easy and willing to believe what he wishes. His lordship's last letter of the 14—25 does not mend the matter; the sending of Pecquet (which, as the duke of Newcastle well observes, was done to be informed and prepared to answer his lordship) was no good sign of confidence, and of acting roundly with us. But you will, before this comes to your hand, be more fully informed and enlightened upon this whole affair, by the conversation which his lordship will have had with the

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cardinall and the Garde des Sceaux, pursuant to the instructions sent by his grace the 8th instant; and therefore, whatever I have sayd may have been unnecessary; and whatever I shall say may be entirely out of the way, as I am at present in the dark; however, I will venture a few words.

If the negociation shall be entirely broken off, by the French absolutely denying that they have had any secret negociation with the emperour, or by their insisting immediately upon our signing a convention with them, I think orders should be sent to lord W. to represent how necessary it is that the French should, in concert with the king of Sardinia, prevent the siege of Mantua; that they should, in order to enable his majesty to prevail with the emperour to agree to an armistice, consent, for that purpose, to retire their troops out of Germany, except the strong places. That the French and Sardinian troops should be so quartered and disposed in Italy that Mantua may not be blocked up, but suffered to be victualled by a communication with the German troops on that frontiere. That his majesty will not fayl, in conjunction with the States, or by his own personall credit, to doe all we can to procure the emperour's agreement to an armistice; and at the same time to conciliate, by his interposition, the differences which obstruct the conclusion of the agreement between him and France upon the terms of the peace: that the cardinall may be able, without exposing himselfe to the suspicion of a private negociation, to facilitate the terms of the armistice, and by that means save Mantua; and that if they have such a delicacy with respect to the suspicion of Spain, in a point soe easy and so little inconvenient as this is, it can never be expected that they will have firmness enough to carry the convention thro', in opposition to Spain, were it once signed; because they must look for an unwillingness on the part of Spain to consent to such terms that even France will allow to be reasonable, if she is sincere for a peace. That it is unreasonable for the cardinall to press our signing a convention for the disposall of the dominions of a neutrall and innocent prince, without his consent, and his being satisfied with the equivalent, and the certainty of his obtaining it, altho' his majesty is; and that the French ministers may be strongly convinced of it, seriously disposed to make the exchange of Lorrain with Tuscany, as a reserve for Stanislaus and for the honour of France, the basis of this treaty. And, not to enlarge on this subject, a great deal, I think, may be sayd to the cardinall to convince him of the justice of this discourse, with proper insinuations of the obligations he is under, on account of what passed last year, and what he himselfe then offered and desired, with respect to the king of Sardinia, in that secret transaction, to
 make

make him reasonable if he be sincere in this affair; (but this last discourse must not be held in the presence of Chauvelyn.)

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If the cardinall cannot be prevayled upon to facilitate the armistice, and to take proper measures in conjunction with Sardinia to prevent the siege of Mantua, I am afraid that his weakness and Chauvelyn's dexterity, will have confounded at once this negotiation. Because it is very plain, by the nature of the French plan, and by what passed in lord W.'s discourse with those ministers, according to his letter of the 21st, that his eminence will not take one step towards obliging Spain to consent any otherwise than by negociation, at least for some time. By the plan, the cardinall desires the immediate cession of Lorrain for the reversion of Tuscany, without saying one word of removing the Spanish forces out of the strong places there. He likewise desires that don Carlos shall keep the possession of the places he has taken on the coast of Tuscany, which is a ridiculous demand on the part of France upon any other principle, besides that his eminence does not know how to dispossess him; and he has told lord W. *that the fall of so important a place as Mantua into the hands of the Spaniards would defeat all his schemes, and render their Catholick majestys untractable*; which, together with what follows in some part of his lordship's dispatch, shows plainly that his eminence designs at present to gain Spain by treating only. Monsieur Chauvelyn confirms this in his description of the method of executing the project. When, says he, France and England shall have signed their private convention, &c., the emperor and Spain may be angry, but can't help themselves; a congress must meet; the plenipotentiaries of the four powers (viz. England, France, the States, and Sardinia) will have private instructions conformable to what shall be settled beforehand. All which implies the trying to bring matters to bear at first by negotiation at a congress.

I don't make this remark with a view to oppose this method, but only to shew that as the cardinall will certainly decline himselfe all *voye de fait* against Spain, it will be hard to gett any thing stipulated by him that may seem to require France being employed against that crown for the execution of it; and consequently the main business to be laboured at present is, to prevent Mantua from being taken, and to engage the French to enter into such measures, in concert with Sardinia, as may hinder that town being besieged. And as on one side we should endeavour, with our utmost application, to obtain the emperor's consent to an immediate suspension of arms, we should on the other endeavour to perswade France to make the conditions of that armistice as easy as possible with respect to the *statu quo*. In the mean time we should even labour with the
emperor

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emperour to consent to the armistice pure and simple, rather than by obstinately persevering in conditions not practicable give the Spanyards time to take Mantua. And indeed, considering how far the season of the year is advanced, and that the campagne in Germany is in effect at an end, what can the emperour loose by agreeing to a suspension of arms immediately? Altho' the preliminarys proposed by us are not declared to be the basis, yett there are no other that oblige the emperour to agree to what he shall not think reasonable; and indeed without accepting our plan, which France will never agree to accept, it is impossible for France to declare any preliminarys before the armistice is agreed to, and the congress opened.

For supposing France to be disposed to come into such terms of peace as his majesty would think reasonable, yett as even such terms, we are perswaded, cannot be agreeable to Spain, is it possible that France should declare her consent to them publicly before any thing is signed? I must own, as jealous as I am of France, I think such a thing not reasonable. Our business, therefore, is to represent to the emperour how necessary it is, even upon the view of our seriously endeavouring to procure as far as is possible such conditions as are now depending in the secret negotiations, that he should forthwith consent to the armistice, and prevent by that means Mantua being taken; which, if it should happen, would, for reasons that may be explained to the Imperiall court, entirely confound this negotiation, and make it impossible to obtain a peace on terms now offered; and we should at the same time obtain some assurances, besides facilitys in the act of armistice, from France, that she will immediately sett about the proper means for stopping the siege of that place; we giving that crown the strongest assurances that we will use our utmost efforts, notwithstanding their compliance in this respect, to bring about the emperour's agreement to an armistice, and to reconcile the differences between them relating to the plan proposed by the cardinall. And should we not be able to succeed in that last point against the opening of the congress, yett our concert might still subsist by the secret instructions to be given to our respective ministers to understand one another in the course of the negotiation, and may at last obtain the desired effect; and if his majesty and France shall have come to such a reasonable plan, as to make the conditions reciprocally, and the certainty of the performance equal, it may so happen that the peace will be at last concluded, and the emperour and Spain must come into it, as not being able to help themselves.

But if France will not consent to an armistice untill the plan be signed between his majesty and that crown upon the foot now proposed (which it is impossible

impossible can be done, considering that the chief article depends upon the disposition of dominions that belong to a neutral prince, &c.) and will not immediately agree to prevent the siege of Mantua before an armistice is actually fixed, (for even Spain will endeavour to retard it,) I can't help thinking, notwithstanding all the plausible speeches of the cardinall and the Garde des Sceaux, and the readiness of lord W. to putt his trust in them, that they have taken another resolution, and are determined upon having Mantua taken, and to lay the fault upon the emperour for not coming into the armistice, and upon us for not signing an imperfect, unequall, and precarious project of peace. And after Mantua shall be taken, the French will tell us that they will surrender Phillipsbourg and fort Louis, and make a peace for the cession of Lorrain, or for any other equivalent by which the honour of Stanislas may be saved, and France have some compensation for her great expences; and that it is the emperour's business to find out that equivalent, who, as they will say, was the occasion of the war.

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The substance of what I mean is this: 1. That applications should be made to France to facilitate the means for procuring an armistice, and to agree forthwith to take the proper measures for preventing the siege of Mantua, for which they may be furnished with many excuses in concert with the court of Sardinia, without giving Spain any jealousy of their negotiation. 2. That applications should be made by his majesty and the States to persuade the emperour to consent to an armistice in order to save Mantua, which would keep up the publick negotiation between us and the republick; and besides, Mr. Robinson may be privately instructed with such reasons as relating to the secret negotiation may have an effect upon that court. You will take notice, by my dispatch of this night to the D. of N. that I have layd a foundation for renewing our instances to the Imperiall court to agree to an armistice. 3. Upon procuring this armistice, instructions should be sent for the ministers that are to treat together, under the mediation of the maritime powers, for opening their conferences; in case the emperour and France are not come to an actuall agreement, and the secret negotiations should be still continued at Paris and Vienna for reconciling their respective demands; and in case the emperour and France are by our interposition come to an agreement; yet I think the cardinall will still insist upon a publick negotiation, in order to bring Spain into it by degrees, and not by force, untill all other means have been tryed.

In the mean time, I must own that the sending of a counter project, as has been suggested by lord Harrington, to lord Waldegrave by way of instructions
extreamly

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extreamly right. The reasons given by the D. of N. for inducing France to make the emperour easy in the affairs of Italy, in order to his perswading the D. of Lorrain to the exchange of Tuscany, are extreamly good; but untill it is seen in what manner this exchange is to be made, and the security for the performance of the equivalent for the cession of Lorrain, that article is nothing at all. And this is not, as his grace seems to think, a matter of form, but in truth the essentiall part of the whole; and I am surpris'd that lord Waldegrave presses soe much for our signing with France, without considering and stating what is to be signed. This was my view in sending a *projet mitoyen*. But, my dear friend, the duke looks upon the thoughts of any body else as reflections upon his own; and instead of considering the use that may be made of what is suggested by another, looks upon it as a personall thing, and runs out into a long justification of his own performances, which nobody finds fault with. But I have done, after having added one observation, that if we can once bring matters to an armistice, and to conferences, I think the consequence will in all likelihood be, that if the peace be not made upon the foundation of the plan depending between the emperour and France, it will give an opportunity of a separate negotiation and agreement between the emperour and Spain: but what I still apprehend is, that the emperour is not yett disposed to hearken to a practicable accommodation, nor Chauvelyn to grant a reasonable one. Good night, &c.

There went a copy of a letter last post from the P. of Hesse to lord H—n, about the discourse which that prince had with P. Eugene, which, if I understand right, does not please me. His lordship's answer goes to England by this messenger, which pleases me as little. The Imperiall court will believe that if they have patience his majesty will help them, and Sweden will believe that we will hire their troops.

HORACE WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

Seems to blame the precipitation in requesting a farther explanation from the court of Vienna.—Insinuates that the properest method to act in regard both to the emperor and France would be to let them continue the negotiation in their own way.

MY DEAR LORD,

Hague, October 19, 1735, 7 in the morning.

Weston
Papers.Private and
particular.

I Was honoured last night with your publick dispatches of the 10th; and as I was extreamly busy in writing to England, I had hardly time to peruse them; referring myselfe to the copys I had ordered to be made of your last letters

letters to the duke of Newcastle and Mr. Robinson for my breakfast this morning (for I live upon paper): but I am now called up by Over the messenger; and as I do not think fitt to detain him any longer than while he is getting his horses ready, knowing the king's impatience, I shall only beg leave to observe, that I do not agree with your lordship in showing soe much satisfaction at the imperfect communication made to Mr. R. Altho' I would not appear pleased with it, I should, in my humble opinion, instead of solliciting with resentment a farther explanation, have waited, and seen what they had farther to say to us.

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The emperor has plunged himselfe into a negotiation with France without us; he must gett thro' it as well as he can, and he must have our assistance for it; and I think he plainly tells us so. The paper delivered to Mr. R. is rather in the nature of a request than of a reproach; and the court of Vienna must become petitioners to us for accomplishing their own work, instead of our having been hitherto petitioners to her. With respect to France, supposing that court disposed to be sincere, as by keeping up the cardinal's apprehensions I think he will become sincere, I think pretty much the same conduct should have been observed. The cardinal should be made sensible that we know, and have constantly known, without the help of the Imperiall court, the secret negotiation. He should have been lett to see that we were not at all surpris'd at his denying it, because he must have been under the strongest previous obligations imaginable not to own it, and perhaps to deny it, and was prepared to doe so (and indeed I am not at all surpris'd at that denyall); and after proper intimations to him of our not being at all in the dark, I would without sollicitation, or appearance of uneasyness to gett to the bottom of the negotiation, have left it to the French ministers to explain themselves. If they are desirous, as well as the emperor, to make a peace, they will, as things have fortunately turned out, want our concurrence and assistance as well as he. The Imperiall court will want money, and the cardinall some countenance from us in opposition to Spain; and it seems our business to wait and hear them explain themselves, and make a merit of what we are to doe: but your lordship will pardon these hasty and I believe injudicious reflections.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

Is concerned that lord Harrington should have expressed so much resentment against the Imperial court for opening a secret negotiation with France.

Grantham
Papers.

Private.

In cypher.

Extrad.

Hague, Oct. 25, 1735. You will have seen by my last that I am extremely well satisfied with what has been done at Vienna, and with the communication, though imperfect, that was made to you: and between you and me, I could have wished that my lord Harrington had forbore to express so much resentment and dissatisfaction as I find he has done against the behaviour of the court of Vienna in his letter to you on that occasion. I must own that, for several reasons that you give, and for others that occur to me, I think ourselves in a more advantageous situation than if we had been originally concerned, and had had the confidence of every step: since, without our appearing either satisfied or dissatisfied, they must come to us. For I cannot, and indeed I never could see how the emperor and France could make an absolute pacification without our assistance, &c.

FROM LORD HERVEY TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Arrival of the king.—Uniformity of his character.—Sir Robert Walpole distinguishes himself in the court of the exchequer.

DEAR SIR,

St. James's, October 31, 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

AS in general I hate to be neglected, and should more particularly hate to be neglected by you, so you may easily account for my not sending a letter to Holland till the king had left it, being very well assured you would either have put it in your pocket without reading it, or have read it without minding it. I know not in what temper you found his majesty on the other side of the water; but since he came hither, we think he seems as well pleased as if he had left nothing that pleased him elsewhere. He was extremely well satisfy'd with the crouds and shouts that attended him through the city, and is fallen since he came to London into all the *vielleries* of last winter. If the change does not strike him at first, I take his to be a sort of temper, and that change to be a sort of thing, which time might have made more easy, had it been disagreeable at first. But time and habit will, in my opinion, never make any thing less easy or less agreeable to one of his regular disposition, who, on all occasions, seems to think his having done a thing to-day an unanswerable reason for his doing it to-morrow. For the rest of the court, it is inhabited, and moves on just

just as you left it. We have nothing new but the prince of Modena, and even he is as little regarded as if he was not new. Selkirk makes his purple nose white with thrusting it into the king's perriwig ten times a day as usual.

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We have one minister* that does every thing with the same seeming ease and tranquillity as if he was doing nothing: we have another† that does nothing, in the same hurry and agitation as if he did every thing. We have others that know every thing, but understand nothing; and are doubly secret from not comprehending most things they are told, and not being able to utter even the few they comprehend. Poor Grantham is in the greatest affliction for the loss of his favorite nephew; and the duchess of Marlborough in so little for the loss of her favorite grand-daughter, that before she was bury'd, her grace sent to the duke of Bedford for all the jewels she had given his wife at her marriage, pretending they were only lent.

* Sir Robert
Walpole.
† D. of New-
castle.

Your brother, I believe, will be as famous in Westminster-hall as in the house of commons. He has lately gained immortal honour by a determination in a suit between Nash and the East India company in the court of chequer. The barons being divided, it was his province as chancellor to make the decision; and after a trial, admirably pleaded by six of the best council in England on each side, which lasted nineteen hours in three days, he sum'd up the whole, and in a speech of an hour and half gave his opinion and sentence with as great skill, strength, eloquence, and clearness, as if he had been bred to the law, had practiced no other business all his life, and had had nothing in his head but this cause. There was a most numerous attendance in the court, and the most general applause and satisfaction that it was possible for countenances to bestow and reveal all the while he was speaking. I was there every day, from the beginning to the end of every hearing.

When I began this letter I intended to talk a great deal to you upon political subjects; but am not so unconscionable at the end of four sides of paper as to launch afresh into a topic that probably would fill at least four more. I cannot, however, conclude, without telling you how much more material commentators, as well as your humble servant, approved of the polite letter you wrote to the queen, on taking leave of her regency. She herself said, *tho' you thank'd her for her instructions and commands, that the truth was she had during the whole summer been only writing in pursuance and obedience to your's.* I am wanted at whist, which will release you for this time from the loquacious pen (if you allow that expression) of your's, &c.

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THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Forwards his letter for sir Robert Walpole to the king, who orders it to be sent to Houghton.

MY DEAR LORD,

Newcastle House, November 25, 1735.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Private.

* Chavigny.

I Had the favour of your private letter of the 2d of December, N.S. enclosing one to sir R. W. As I had the king's positive orders to send your letters to sir R. to his majesty unopened, during sir R.'s absence, I could not avoid doing it; and his majesty returned the letter sealed, and ordered me to send it to sir R. in Norfolk, which I have accordingly done. The king has not thought proper to say one word to me of the contents of it. So I am, and shall be, an entire stranger to it, as you will have known by the hint I formerly gave you. If you have any thing to say to me that nobody else should see, I desire you would enclose your letter to me in one to Mr. Stone, for otherwise it may be liable to accidents: and I depend upon your lordship that you will burn this letter, and never own that I ever wrote one word to you upon the subject to any body. You say you have done C—y's* business. His coming over here to sollicite the execution, and being charged with this important commission, is no sign of it. I hope he does not, nor will not, suspect I ever wrote against him.

As to your request about the garter, I have long promised any little interest I may have to lord Effex. Before he first went to Turin, I promised him my interest for the first that should be then vacant, and he had great encouragement given him from others. But when he was last here last year, he had, I believe, and indeed know, the king's absolute promise of the first. He has been once putt by; but I dare say the king will remember his promise upon this occasion. You know, my dear lord, how ready I am always to do you any service that is in my power, when any thing offers that may be of real service to you: nobody is or shall be more zealous and faithfull in acquitting myself in the best manner I can for you. I am sure you will not blame the freedom with which I now write to you. You do extreamly well; and every body is mightily pleased with you, which is always a pleasure to me. I received a letter from Tom Pelham, about leave for Amiger. Pray, with my best compliments to the duke of Kingston, lett him know that when the secretary att warr comes to town next week, I will not fail to take the best care I can of it. I hope we shall see the duke this winter. Once more, burn this letter, and believe me, &c.

LORD

ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE.

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LORD HERVEY TO HORACE WALPOLE.

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Rejoices at the prospect of peace between the emperor and the allies, and congratulates him on being accessory to the accommodation.—Justifies preventive measures, and the ministry for not going into the war.

DEAR SIR,

St. James's, November 18—29, 1735.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

THE pleasure you are so kind to say you take in hearing from me, and the pleasure I am sure I have in hearing from you, are two such prevalent reasons for my endeavouring always to quicken our correspondence, that you cannot wonder at my sending you a letter constantly the next post after my receiving one. But though I did not owe you a letter as your correspondent, yet the great share you have had in what has been done lately makes me owe you so many thanks as your countryman, and so many congratulations as your friend, that it would be as impossible for me at this time to be silent, as it is for the queen of Spain, tho' from a different motive; as the most reasonable acknowledgements open my mouth, and the most unreasonable resentments her's.

Illicit traders and smugglers will always roar and grumble when they are not let to cheat as much as they wish; but if you suffer them quietly, on paying the duty, to enjoy what they endeavour'd to run without paying any, and put them upon the foot of legal merchants, they ought, in my opinion, to think themselves well off. As to what has been done, I do not only thank the Walpoles as I am an Englishman, but acknowledg their claim to thanks is on a more extensive patent, and return mine as an European. Nor do I doubt of the pleasure you enjoy on this occasion from your own reflexion; for besides the satisfaction your vanity and pride (weaknesses which nobody is without) make you feel on doing a great action, I am sure your good-nature (a quality much less general than those I mention'd before) doubles your joy, when you reflect on your conduct having been as universally beneficent as it must be universally approv'd. What your enemys or your friends may say upon it, (excepting just those under this roof,) I am unable to inform you, the town being emptier than ever I knew it in the dog-days.

I conclude we shall hear of the old story of *a temporary expedient*; but till those political Solomons, those theoretic projectors and systematic schemers, will shew me that human nature will admit, in any part of it, of being put upon so permanent a foot, that it shall not be liable to the accidents of change and misfortune, I shall always value *expedients*. I shall be glad to eat when I

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am hungry, drink when I am thirsty, and sleep when I am weary, without waiting for such food, drink, and couches, as shall prevent my ever feeling the want of them for the future, or hoping to avert the revolutions and vicissitudes of such sensations and imperfections as Providence has pleased to make all mankind liable to, without the example that I know of in any age or any country of one exception. I believe these gentlemen would say I was very ungratefull, if I deny'd having any obligation to a physician who had cured me of the small pox, because he had not exempted me from being subject afterward to a fever or a pleurisy : and if the body politic, like the body corporal, is exposed to as many diseases in the state, as the other is in each individual, I shall ever look upon him as my benefactor who removes what immediately afflicts me ; and him as a visionary madman, or at best a refining coxcomb, who would go about to make those things perfect and immortal, which nature has made brittle and perishable.

Between you and I, I cannot say when France was to be detach'd from Spain, or Spain from France, that I should not have been more inclined to have broken *the formidable alliance* (as it was called) by *the marriage* that has been so often spoken of. I believe you were inclined that way too ; but if the emperor himself, or the princes of the empire in general, (not to mention any particular prince whom you and I should be obliged to consider more than the rest,) were so averse to this marriage, that the obstacles to the breaking *the formidable alliance* that way were insurmountable ; the breaking it at all was your business : and tho' you could not break it the way perhaps you would, it was wise and prudent in you to break it the way you could. Nor do I indeed see, that when you would not assist the emperor in the war, that you could with any decency insist, or with any efficacy oppose, his making peace the way he liked best.

The short abstract therefore of the conduct of the English administration, I take to be this : A war broke out in Europe in which you judg'd it not for the interest of England (if you could avoid it) to take part, knowing that England is always a great loser by a war whilst it lasts, and can never be a great gainer when it concludes. In the next place, (as paradoxical as it may sound,) I think it very evident that you were of greater use to those whom you must have join'd had you gone into the war, by keeping your force in reserve, unimpair'd, and untry'd, than you would have been in exerting it ; and that you have done the emperor, as well as England, much more service by making peace *for* him, than you could have done by making war *with* him : not forgetting that you might, by joining him, have been left alone to finish what he alone begun. In

my

my opinion, let patriots and craftsmen say what they will, England never made so great a figure abroad, or was ever in so flourishing a condition at home, as in this reign; and nobody is ignorant where they owe their thanks for this situation, tho' they may be reluctant, knowing where they are owed, to pay them.

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Your brother is still in Norfolk. The duke of Newcastle return'd yesterday. Thanks be to God the duke of Modena is at last departed: sure that is the most impenetrable piece of dignify'd dullness that ever any princely family produced. Most of the little conversation that used to be extorted from him consisted of inarticulate sounds; like, ah! and hah! and whenever he did deviate into articulation, his words were as bare of meaning, as his noises generally were of words: whilst *si fait, nonni, cela se peut*, and *peut-être*, seem'd to be all the furniture in his whole vocabulary. We have a female piece of foreign goods as extraordinary to the eye, as the other was to the ear; I mean madame Loffe, who is taller than any of the king of Prussia's granadiers, and as slender as one of their musquets, and not more like a may-pole, in her shape and size than in her air and dress, being at least as stiff, and adorned with as many faded flowers and dirty ribbons. Sure she must have some extraordinary occult qualitys to be able to have made herself, without beauty, mistress to a king, and her husband, without sense, his first minister. Adieu, I am too much ashamed of the length of this letter to own it by setting my name.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

In answer to his request for the garter, which is declined.

MY LORD,

London, December 4, 1735.

I Laid your lordship's letter concerning your private request before his majesty, who, upon this occasion, express'd a just sense of your faithful services, and a disposition to distinguish your lordship by a mark of his grace and goodness upon any proper occasion; but I found his majesty was not at liberty to gratify your lordship at this time in the manner you desire. I shall be very glad to be instrumental at any time in doing your lordship a pleasure, for I am with great truth and regard, &c.

Waldegrave
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Private.

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FROM HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Hints at what ought to be said to the kings of Sardinia and Spain on the secret negotiation.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, December 9, 1735.

Orford
Papers.

Private.

YOUR absence in the country has suspended our correspondence at a time when perhaps it was more necessary than ever, in order to bring to a good issue the prospect of a peace, without running the hazard on one side, by our conduct, of disobliging the great powers that have concerted the plan; or of running ourselves into a war on the other, while we are putting an end to the present troubles, where we have as yet taken no part but that of good offices.

Altho' the alteration in this project from what was offered by the maritime powers was not settled by the immediate intervention of his majesty and the States, it was underhand suggested by us. We were ready to transact on the same foot; and as it is entirely agreeable to what we proposed, it is impossible but that we must like it; especially since it is settled by the principal powers engaged in the war: yett, as we had not an immediate concern in adjusting and agreeing to the articles, we are at liberty to act with prudence in the part we may take in this great affair for our finall approbation and concurrence in it, without running into new dangers and inconveniencys.

Before his majesty and the States (or rather the pensionary) had received any formall communication, and which is still a secret and confidentiall one, of the articles, the king of Sardinia had acquainted his majesty with what had been imparted to him from France, being intirely a stranger to the thing before, and desiring the king's councill and direction for his conduct in it. The court of Spain likewise, after monsieur Vaugrenant's communication, has caused Mr. Keene to be founded, in order to learn how far his majesty may have been concerned in the secret, with insinuations of hopes, and menaces with regard to our treatys of commerce, &c. with Spain, according to our conduct on this occasion: and the same language has in a manner been held to monsieur Vandermeer. It was perhaps to have been wished that an answer had been returned to these two courts before the communication had been made by the Imperial and French ministers to the king and the pensionary, of what has been settled, altho' as yet pretended not to have been signed, with monsieur l'Etang. But it is over; the communication is made, and intimations given, but without any formall writing of the emperor's and France's desire, that his majesty

majesty and the States would concur both in the signature and the execution of this plan, that it may become one common work of the four powers. And this signing by them all joyntly is intended to be look'd upon as the only first conclusive act or treaty in this affair.

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You will have seen by my last dispatch that the Dutch ministers here pretend that they cannot, by the nature of their constitution, proceed immediately to the signing of such a convention; and have proposed in confidence, without consulting as yet the States, two methods for their proceeding, which have been transmitted by the Imperiall and French ministers to their courts. As I have as yett noe advice of what has passed between the cardinall and lord Waldegrave as to the method of proceeding, nor what are the instructions to monsieur Chavigny, I continue somewhat in the dark. However, may it not be proper, while these couriers are going and returning to and from Vienna and Paris with the pensionary's expedients, for his majesty to order an answer to be returned to the application of Sardinia, and the insinuations of Spain?

I think the answer to the first is very obvious; setting forth his majesty's regard and friendship for that prince, on account of the mutual confidence that has subsisted with an inviolable secret between them almost ever since the troubles began, and the king is still desirous to improve it by all reasonable and practicable means. That his Sardinian majesty must remember the nature of the plan proposed by the maritime powers, to which they received no answer, and from which they could not recede untill something else offer'd. That since the two principall partys in the war have retouched, and in some things varied the plan, while they have made it the foundation of their work; and that the variation is not at all to the disadvantage of him, the king of Sardinia; considering likewise how impossible it was to bring his Sardinian majesty and the court of Spain to a good harmony and understanding, and the danger he would run hereafter of loosing not only his new conquests, but some of his own dominions, if the peace had been made up by a reconciliation between the emperour and Spain by means of a marriage, which would certainly have been the case if this scheme with France had not taken place. His majesty, altho' he has had noe share in this transaction, and may have reason to complain of his not being admitted into the secret, cannot but, out of due regard for the king of Sardinia, his concern for putting an end to the present troubles, and seeing no possible method of doing it on a more advantageous foot, exhort his Sardinian majesty to come into it, when it shall be proposed to him; and he may be assured of the king's embracing all occasions to testifye to him his sincere friendship and affection,

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affection, &c. and lord Effex may, without giving any thing in writing, perhaps be able, monsieur Offorio being before hand prepared in a proper manner to write to the same effect, fatisfye the court of Sardinia in this affair.

The answer to be returned to the court of Spain may be still more difficult, and, whatever it is, less capable of impressiion. There is indeed enough in our hands to say to monsieur Patino, and convince him that his majesty's conduct, as a mediator, has been favourable to the views of Spain, as it has been employed from time to time; but there may perhaps be danger in making such a confidence; and whatever of that nature shall be sayd, since it has not had its effect, will not perhaps gain much credit. However, in return to monsieur Patino's insinuations, Mr. Keene may not be improperly instructed to lett that minister feel, that altho' the transaction and settling of this scheme was without his majesty's concurrence or intervention, and that the king may have just reason, as well as the States, to complain that no greater notice was taken of them (considering the part they had acted by good offices) during the negociation, besides assuring them, when it was publick, that nothing was transacted either directly or indirectly that could be any ways prejudiciall to them. Yet, notwithstanding this just cause of uneasyness which his majesty and the States may conceive at this proceedure, when the king considers that the plan now negociated at Vienna seems to be founded upon what had been proposed by the maritime powers, and that there is no variation that is more prejudiciall to the interests of don Carlos, and that the two principal partys originally concern'd in the war have adjusted it in this manner, it cannot be expected that the king can find fault with any thing but the form of the proceeding, by which the States and he, having no concern in the alliances for carrying on the warr, cannot be much affected, since the thing itself is agreeable to their notions, and to what they had proposed. And therefore, if his majesty may venture his advice to their catholic majestys, he thinks it would be prudent for them to agree to the pacification upon the conditions transacted between the Imperiall and French courts; the king being at the same time desirous that the treatys between the two courts in other respects should subsist, and a mutual friendship preserved and cultivated, as soon as the generall peace shall be established; and generall things to this purpose may be sayd by Mr. Keene without giving any thing in writing. If something like this method should be followed, and it should not be thought sufficient to send it in cypher by the ordinary post, but by a courier, as that will create curiosity in France, it may perhaps be proper to let the cardinall know, that monsieur Patino having talked in generall terms on occasion of this transaction

transaction at Vienna, orders had been sent to Mr. Keene to exhort the court of Spain to come into the conditions settled or negotiated at Vienna. And in all events it may not be amiss to let France see that our orders to Spain tend entirely to dispose that court to accept of the pacification on the foot of the new project, in answer to what monsieur Patino had sayd in generall terms to Mr. Keene, to found our opinion upon what has passed between the emperour and France; and that by this step noe time can be lost in forwarding the great work, since the proposalls of the pensionary about the method of proceeding consistent with the nature of this government, and the opinion of the Imperiall and French courts upon them, afford this opportunity of returning an answer to Spain.

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As to the method of proceeding for our being concerned in this affair, there is noe doubt but that the French court (by what monsieur Fenelon has lett fall to me since I wrote last to England) will press an immediate signature of the maritime powers, to make it as if it were an originall quadruple alliance, and the emperor will be of the same mind; and great attention should be had not to disoblige those two powers, not knowing what time they may take, or what their secret articles may be relating to the execution, in case they suspect our backwardness to joyn in this affair. But, on the other side, considering ourselves as no ways concerned but by our offices, as mediators in this affair, it seems just and reasonable for us, either to propose the plan as now alter'd to Spain and Sardinia, or by some other means and application to lay this plan before those powers, with our earnest instances to them to come into it, &c. And I am fully perswaded that the States will not be brought to an immediate signature to become contracting partys to this convention, without taking joyntly with the king some such previous step: and perhaps our private accession without them, in a case which certainly renders our treatys with Spain voyd without her consent to this alteration in them, may prove inconvenient. And, indeed, here the nicety of the whole depends; to avoyd on one side the danger and jealousy of our being backward to concur in this affair for the sake of detaching Spain from France; and the other, the inconvenience of disobliging Spain in our going too fast, without observing any measures with that crown, into a treaty that gives them great offence.

But perhaps the cautious and dilatory proceeding of this government will give us an opportunity and time of letting the Imperiall and French courts see our sincere and earnest desire to make this work perfect by our approbation and concurrence in it joyntly with the States; and at the same time to shew all rea-

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sonable decency and regard for Sardinia and Spain, by endeavouring, while the Dutch ministers here are taking the proper measures to dispose the States to concur in it, to dispose their Sardinian and catholick majestys to concur in it too. What is certain is, that, considering the age of the cardinall, and the situation of affairs in Europe, we must not loose this opportunity of a pacification. This I write in great hast, and indeed with great uncertainty of mind, being not determined in my own opinion as to the manner of proceeding, for fear of going too slow or too fast; but in all events lett us take care to secure a confirmation of our treatys on the foot they stood before the troubles began, and the guaranty of those with whom we shall take part, whether the treaty becomes partiall or generall at first.

* Lord Talbot

For I believe, one of the chief reasons for the slowness of this state in becoming either original partys, or accessors to new treatys, (besides their weakness, and from thence their unwillingness to take extensive engagements,) is, that they may take care to stipulate and confirm what regards their own immediate interest and security. As to my own opinion for our proceeding in this affair, I must confess I have noe particular biases; I would have you consult with those of good sense and judgment, such as lord chancellor* and lord Hardwick, besides the usuall lords, in every step, for the finall conclusion of this great affair, as a matter of great nicety as well as importance. I am sorry Chavigny is employed, tho' I have no other prevention against him but the experience of his falseness, covered with the greatest suppleness and dissimulation; for, believe me, he is indeed a man of mischief, but not of business. I hope you will lett me know early your thoughts about the project of a speech from the throne, as far as relates to foreign affairs.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

This correspondence to be secret.—Desires him to settle with Chauvelin the specific gratification he is to receive.

MY LORD,

December 4—15, 1735.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

* The next
letter.

THE letter* that accompanies this was wrote, as your lordship desired, to be shown to our friend; what is further necessary to be explained is, that he will exert in bringing things forward to a conclusion, which can never be done till all the parts are fully explained. We know nothing how far the two courts have proceeded and are agreed upon the articles of the treaty; no mention is made of the time or manner of execution, and by whom the several parts are
to

to be executed. Chavigny was particularly careful to distinguish between the preliminaries being signed, or being *convenu & arrêté*. He seemed to me to discover a backwardness in the whole, as far as he could without reproach. The communication in Holland is still called secret and confidential, which so embarrasses the Dutch from their forms of government. If all this be a management for Spain till they shall hear the result of their last communication, when that answer is come, it will be necessary to remove these difficulties, that we may be able to hasten to a conclusion.

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What I mention of this correspondence being seen by the king alone, is by his special order that you will be pleased to make no mention of your correspondence with me in any of your other letters. If this proceeds, and comes to any thing beneficial to *our friend*, it is but just that nobody should know it, but when it is absolutely necessary; and, upon this head, I must desire your advice when and in what manner that part is to be farther opened. It is certainly most to be wished that the consideration should be annual, but most probable that a sum down will be expected; whether that is to be a voluntary present from the king, or a sum to be agreed upon, you must judge. It looks at present as if it was intended that the service should precede the reward. *The quantum* is a very material article, but something far short of what was once mentioned may reasonably suffice. Pray turn your thoughts to these several particulars, and let me know your opinion by the first occasion.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Secret correspondence with Chauvelin.—Known only to the king.—Promises inviolable secrecy.—Requests information.

MY LORD,

London, December 4—15, 1735.

I Had sooner acknowledged the honour of your lordship's letter of the 1st instant, N. S. but I was in the country when it came to my hands; and upon my arrival in town, I learnt monsieur Chavigny was hourly expected in town to communicate to his majesty the plan of pacification, as now agreed between the courts of Vienna and Paris, which I thought might enable me to write more fully upon the present posture of affairs. Monsieur Chavigny arrived in London on Tuesday, and yesterday had his audience of his majesty, and a conference with his servants; an account of which your lordship will receive at large from the duke of Newcastle.

I must

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I must now begin with making my acknowledgments for all the undeserved compliments which *our friend* was pleased to bestow upon me. Your lordship may, with great sincerity, assure him, that my honour and esteem for him is equall to any favourable thoughts he is pleased to entertain of me; and whatever good opinion he may have conceived of me, I will never forfeit it by my conduct and behaviour towards him; that I am very desirous to improve this correspondence into an intimate friendship; and if perfect sincerity, and a just sense of the value and consequence of his friendship, will encourage him to merit his majesty's regard, I will be answerable to him that he shall have no cause to repent of any confidence that he shall place in me. It is needlesse to expresse my assurances of the utmost secrecy which the nature of this correspondence and honour commands, and which I am incapable of betraying.

And here it is necessary to acquaint your lordship, that your last letter was seen by no person living but the king and myself; that the contents of it are unknown to every other person, as what I now write is in like manner: and as, in the farther progress of this correspondence, I shall have occasion to inform *our friend* of what may be agreeable and desired here, I desire it may be from henceforward understood, that whatever I propose is in the name of the king and by his authority, altho', the better to disguise the correspondence, I shall no more make use of that name.

As to the grand affair now upon the tapis, I make no doubt but we all agree in our desires to bring it to a speedy and happy conclusion. Delays are always dangerous; and our friend may be assured if, in the publick transactions between the two courts, there appear any marks of caution, they are occasioned only by the method which the courts of Germany and France have put this into, and not out of any coolness or indifference for the success of this great event.

In your letter to me you represent the preliminaries as signed at Vienna, and orders sent for the ratification. Monsieur Chavigny, in his communication, confines it expressly to their being *convenu & arrêté*, and desires only a verbal approbation of them untill the treaty shall be made; but was uninstructed about the terms and conditions of the treaty, or the method of execution; which made it impossible for us to go any farther than the declaration that was made, untill the whole shall be explained.

I can see no use in continuing to make these communications secrett and confidential and with reserves; what is known not only in substance, but even

even to particulars, in every corner of Europe, creates difficulties with the Dutch, from the manner of communication. If our friend will procure, that the whole shall be laid before us, all the articles of the treaty that is to be made, and the manner of the execution, we shall have the whole at once before us, and in a condition finally to determine. But whatever is to be transacted in form, must still pass by your lordship by the offices. This secret correspondence between *our friend* and me, may be for our mutual information, and contribute towards the forwarding what shall be for the interest of both nations.

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My brother in Holland is apprehensive, from monsieur Fenelon's discourses, that he will make difficulties about the *pêle môle*; as he has declared he will, without positive orders from his court. It would be very unfortunate if any trouble should arise, at this important conjuncture, about such a piece of ceremony. I hope *our friend* will, by proper orders, immediately prevent any such disagreeable incident, which will scarcely be supposed to be accidental.

1736.

LORD HERVEY TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Earl Stanhope in opposition.—Lord Bolingbroke's opinion of the peace.

DEAR SIR,

St. James's, December 23—January 3, 1735-6.

A Very tedious and painful confinement to my room for these last ten days, in which I have been forced to undergo every operation of physick and some of surgery, has prevented me thanking you before for the favour of your letter. The last time I was out, was the night I received it; when I was with the queen while she was answering one she received by the same post that brought mine: we both agreed that you were in extreme good humour, and that you had good reason to be so.

Walpole
Papers.

I hear of nothing threatened for the approaching session that will be likely to change it on your arrival here; and should be very sorry any thing should make that disagreeable to you, that will be so great a pleasure to all your friends. The repeal of the test-act, I hear, is the only proposal expected to give trouble; and the opposition to the troops the only stand your enemies design to make. As to the first, in my opinion it will not be brought in, tho' wiser people are of another; and as to the other question, it is never any thing

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thing more than the dispute of a day, which are never the questions that distress most.

We are to have lord Rockingham and lord Stanhope (who are just come of age) in the house of lords; the first of which I hear will be with us, the latter against us. All the Stanhopes and Spencers * are taught to look on a Walpole as one they are to hate by inheritance; which puts me in mind of two lines of Mr. Dryden's, who says,

“ Forgiving to the injur'd does belong,

“ But they ne'er pardon who first did the wrong.”

I hear my lord Chesterfield says his kinsman is too fond of the ancient Greek and Roman virtue, to be the slave of power, or a tool to an administration. If his kinsman is to be wrought upon by that style, I will read his writings, but I will never be acquainted with him; for I have heard already, from sir Thomas Hanmer, all that can be said on that subject; and know nothing I am so sick to hear of as the virtue of the Romans, except it be the wisdom of my ancestors, and the folly of some of my cotemporaries. I am told lord Bolingbroke's comment on the peace was, that if the English ministers had any hand in it, they were wiser than he thought them; and if they had not, they were much luckier than they deserved to be.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Sends letters of compliment to cardinal Fleury and Chauvelin.—Complains of the uncertain state of affairs.—Gives hints for Chauvelin's conduct.

MY LORD,

London, December 24—January 4, 1735-6.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

I Am honoured with your lordship's of the 25th instant, N. S.; and am sorry that the delay of my writing occasioned the least uneasiness to our friend; which I assure you proceeded from the only reasons that I mentioned before. If this shorter delay should have the least effect of that kind, you will easily explain it was for want of a proper conveyance; no messenger having gone from the office since I received yours, and I believe you will not think Chavigny's courier a proper hand to be trusted with any thing of this kind.

I have taken this occasion to make my compliments to both your great men and in a manner that I hope will please, and be thought natural and un-

* Alluding to the misunderstanding with Charles Spencer earl of Sunderland and the first earl Stanhope. affected.

affected. Your lordship will be pleased to introduce them as the proper tributes of the season of the year, and accompany them with my best wishes to them both of long life, health, and prosperity.

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I cannot but say things seem to be kept in unnecessary suspense; and if the answers of approbation from the maritime powers are not yett given to the satisfaction of the two contracting powers, they must see it is their own fault; and the longer things are delayed, the more wise, bartering, and perplexing the Dutch will be. The late instance is a demonstration how they have fallen off from the first warmth with which they received the first news of these preliminaries; and all that I can say is, if I know all that our friend knows, the great work is as yet very imperfect. There is no plan of execution agreed upon: and whilst the French court seems to be desirous to avoid giving Spain offence, the rage of Spain is already broke out against them in the highest fury and resentment; and if our friend thinks that the queen of Spain distinguishes betwixt him and the cardinal, that management will not last long, unlesse he is able to gratifye her passions, which can no ways be done but by breaking this system, and that, I am satisfied, he is not capable to entertain a thought of.

Lett not our friend look out for foreign support both from the north and south till they are rendered a little more compatible: of the one, he may be sure, and depend upon it; of the other, he is the best judge how precarious any dependence must be upon a court made up as the court of Madrid is; and all that I shall say for this speculation is, that standers-by sometimes see more than gamesters; and I am sure this is well meant.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Probable motives for Chauvelin's conduct in requesting their support.—Difficulty in deciding whether it is most prudent to support Chauvelin, who had always counteracted the views of England.

MY LORD,

London, December 24—January 4, 1735-6.

I Send your lordship herewith a letter of compliments, as you desired. It was necessary to take in both the great men; and if fine words will do any good, nothing is so cheap.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

I confesse the situation you see our friend in makes our proceeding with him a matter worthy consideration. If all that he wants is our support, to help him to stand his ground, we should make but a sad figure to have contributed to the saving of a person, who we have had all the reason hitherto to believe the

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instrument of defeating all our views and designs. But I think he cannot stand very loose, if what we are to do for him would save him alone; and if he really thinks it may be of some service to him, our withdrawing our assistance, just at the time that he wants and desires it, would at once undo all that we have been doing. That we may, therefore, have his assistance in carrying through the great work now upon the tapis, I think your lordship should go on with him, in a manner that he may not suspect any change, coolness, or indifference on our parts. For if that should be the case, I fear, weak as he is, he would be strong enough, as long as he continues in office, to defeat all our expectations: and if the expectations he conceived from a correspondence with me have been an inducement to his going thus far, he will abate in his speed as he finds your lordship slackens your pace. I confess it is a nice and critical case; but if we should loose him at last by our own conduct towards him, it would be a great misfortune. Your lordship's judgment and discretion upon the spot can alone direct you.

I come now to what you were pleased to say in relation to the late request that you made to his majesty, which I laid before him in the best manner I was able, and am to acquaint you that his majesty does not think at present of disposing of the vacant garter, but to defer it untill there are more vacant. Your lordship needs not apprehend any undue preferences with regard to his majesty's service abroad; for I believe your lordship may have the satisfaction to believe that the king does you all the justice upon that account that your lordship can desire. I am going to write another ostensible for our friend, which will be short, for I have but little to say as matters now stand, but to keep on foot the correspondence.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Praises cardinal Fleury and Chauvelin for their joint-endeavours to promote a general pacification.—Danger of procrastinating matters.

MY LORD,

London, December 24—January 4, 1735-6.

Waldegrave
 Papers.

Secret.

THE favorable prospect of a generall pacification in Europe gave me so much pleasure and satisfaction, that I am allways extremely concerned when I see any unnecessary rubs or difficulties arise that may obstruct or retard the conclusion of this desirable work. From the time that his eminency the cardinal and monsieur le Garde des Sceaux entered into that friendly and confidential manner of transacting business with your lordship, I promised myself all reasonable

sonable successe. It is the continuance of that, and that alone, which can bring this great affair to a happy conclusion ; and I cannot upon this occasion omit this opportunity of desiring your lordship, if you think it worth the trouble, to make my sincerest compliments to his eminency upon that agreeable prospect, and for the great share he has had in conducting and forwarding this important transaction, which I make no doubt but he will persevere to see perfected and fully accomplished ; that it may for ever be remembered to his honour that he gave a generall peace to Europe, threatened almost immediately with a generall war, a work that required not only the great credit and influence which he so justly holds in the councils of Europe, but that great capacity, temper, and resolution which have been seen and admired through his whole administration, and his eminency knows that in these great undertakings

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Fine coronatur, fine probatur opus.

And now I am upon this subject, it would be inexcusable in me not to do justice to the meritt and services of monsieur Chauvelyn. His joynt endeavours to forward the publick welfare are too remarkable not to be confessed and acknowledged, and received with that satisfaction which they justly deserve.

But the chief occasion of my giving your lordship this trouble is to spur your court on to remove difficulties and delays, which seem rather to procrastinate than forward business. Surely monsieur Fenelon will be ordered to make his communication and requisition in form, that may enable the maritime powers to declare that approbation, which is the first necessary step. If our friends the Dutch are as awkward and backward with the French in making peace, as they were with the emperor in regard to entering into the war, France had so great advantage from the first, that they should more readily dispense with the latter ; and I hope every appearance will be removed that can be construed into affected delay. Time passes : we have not a month now to the meeting of our parliament. If any thing is to be said there to add weight to the dispatch of the present system, lett it be considered what can be done towards declaring the approbation of the maritime powers, if the communication and requisition is not made in a manner to found it upon.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Justifies his brother.—Better accounts from Spain.

London, January 1—12, 1735-6.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

I Beg your lordship will look upon this as a postscript to the letter it accompanies, wrote so long agoe as the 24th of the last month ; but no messenger going from hence that time, I waited till this opportunity ; and indeed with a view that things might mend a little of themselves and clear up ; as they have now done, by the Imperial and French embassadours' having made the communication in form in Holland ; and altho' the deputies of some of the provinces have taken time to consult their principals, we are assured the answer will be agreed to. There never was any thing more unjust, than imputing the difficulties that arose concerning the answer, to my brother : for I do assure you what happened was a great surprise and mortification to him, and he had great difficulty to gett the answer, as it is now fixed, accepted.

To tell your lordship the plain truth, the great men there had drawn another project of an answer, wherein the first part, relative to the former plan of pacification, was carried much higher, and in a manner that would have been very offensive to your court ; and they left out the paragraph containing the concurrence by future treaty ; and nothing but the earnest instances of my brother prevailed with them to admit the project as now given in, and transmitted from hence, before we dreamt of or foresaw monsieur Fenelon's difficulties. It is but just the truth should be known, tho' not at all advisable for friends and allies to be laying blame upon one another.

The last accounts from Spain are much more promising than was at first to be apprehended ; and I hope the answer returned to sir Thomas Fitzgerald will be to the satisfaction of your court. What we have said in one or other answer concerning the late plan of pacification was necessary, and the best reason that could be given to Spain for our approbation of the new preliminaries.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Proposes to offer Chauvelin a large sum as a present.

MY LORD,

London, January 1—12, 1735-6.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

I Am afraid you will be uneasy again at my long silence ; but you will see by the packetts I send you, and the dates of them, that I was prepared a week agoe ; but there being no messenger to be sent from the office, I declined sending

ing one on purpose, not to create any jealousies about the secret correspondence; and this, if any observation is made by our friend, you must give as the true reason.

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Your lordship's last letter, of the 30th of December, alters the question concerning our friend very much; and I have marked my three letters with small figures at the corner of the outside of the covers. I desire this may be considered as a private postscript to No. (2). By what you say of the cardinal's conversation concerning our friend, I think we must conclude he will stand his ground, and consider him in that light. It is plain that our secret correspondence hitherto produced nothing but words, and our friend, to speak plainly, has done nothing but what the cardinal has compelled him to; and there is great reason to believe he has embarrassed business at the Hague by sending monsieur Fenelon orders contrary to the sentiments of the cardinal.

On the other hand, I am afraid that our friend may think that he has had nothing but good words, which, if his views are lucrative, may have made him bold. I see no reason why, if you can do it properly and with decency, you should not break it to him that you believe the king has intentions to make him *some compliment* on the new year, if you thought it would be agreeable to him; and if his answer or reception of such a hint favoured at all of encouragement, though attended with a *nolo episcopari*, I think 5000*l.* or 10,000*l.* should be given him; I would not go higher at once. It makes a great many crowns; and this being represented as an earnest or pledge of future friendship, I fancy it might sweeten. You are the best judge whether this should be broke to himself or to his wife, or to his other acquaintance; but I would now, as you see proper, bring it to a point.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Conclusion of the correspondence with Chauvelin.—Chavigny cabals with the opposition, and sends malicious reports.

MY LORD,

London, March 21, 1735-6.

THE private correspondence with our friend seeming to be at an end, or at least wholly uselesse, I have not for some time troubled your lordship about it; altho' I cannot but say there is something in it that appears a little mysterious, that so great hopes should be conceived in the beginning, and the whole drop at once as if no such thing had ever been thought of. It is a great opportunity lost, if ever it could have been had.

Waldegrave
Papers.

I trouble

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I trouble your lordship now in particular about a paragraph in a late letter from your lordship concerning what the cardinal said about monsieur Chavigny; and I think it is absolutely necessary your lordship should know that I am convinced his present conduct is more offensive here, and more prejudicial to the king's affairs, than ever he had a power to make it before. The opposition here are now in so low a state, that they scarce think of giving any trouble. His intimacy and communication with them is in every respect the same as it always has been, tho' insignificant from the circumstances of time and things. But he is diligent and industrious among all the foreign ministers, full of insinuations to the prejudice of this court; and where he gains any credit, it must be thought that the friendship between the courts of England and France is but occasional, and of no longer duration than until it shall be proper for France to take off the mask. This is the constant turn that monsieur Chavigny gives to every occurrence that offers itself. You are very sensible how any representation of this kind in form might be taken, and by whom, if known, made use of to support rather than to remove him. But as your lordship wrote word some time agoe that *his businessse* was done, and as the cardinal, by your last letter, seemed to be preparing for a change, you cannot do better than to effect it now, the manner and management being wholly left to your conduct.

There is great reason to think the king will go to Hanover again this year; and it is very much wished that Chavigny may not be suffered to go thither; which makes this consideration a little more pressing in point of time than it would otherwise be. It was thought more adviseable that I should write upon this subject than a secretary of state, it being not properly the businessse of an office letter. I have the king's orders to acquaint your lordship that he does not think fit to continue Mr. Buckley's pension any longer. I am sorry to send you this message, because I fear it will be disagreeable.

LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Declaims against corruption, and the ruin of the constitution.—Determines to part with Dawley at all events.—Condemns Swift's Four last Years as a party pamphlet.

DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

March the 18th, 1736.

Egremont
Papers.

I Answer your's of the 4th, 6th, and 22d of February. If corruption will be the bane of our constitution, and that the continuance of it must be so even the corrupt cannot doubt, and if nothing can put a stop to this gangrene, but
a con-

a conjuncture wherein the crown shall have little to ask, and a minister who will scorn this odious and abominable expedient of government shall be in power, as you think, *desperandum est de republica*. I shall carry the weight of this affliction to my grave; and nothing will in the least lighten the burthen, unless a perfect indifference to all that can happen, if this be to happen, can lighten it; or the comfortable reflexion that I did, in a low and perhaps no very effectual part, but the only part I could act, all that was in my power to prevent the ruine. I once thought that there was another remedy to this fatal evil, a remedy which might constantly palliate, and, by redoubling the dozes in a favourable crisis, radically cure the distemper. But perhaps I was mistaken; or perhaps there is not patience and perseverance enough for the one, nor vigour or perseverance enough for the other, in the minds of men. Both come to the same point. For it is as much a mistake to depend upon that which is true but impracticable, at a certain time, as to depend on that which is neither true nor practicable at any time*.

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But no more of this. Since I can be no longer of use to my particular friends, and to my country, I must live to myself; and I thank the Author of human and all other nature, that I am able to do so with the utmost contentment. I can drudge away my life in business, when my judgment and my sentiment concur in approving it; or I can trifle away my time in pleasure, when opportunity and example seduce me, and no strong call summons me from it. But I can and I always could do, what I will express in Latin better than English would express it, *me mihi vindicare*. I am now at an age when this is to be done for the last time: two acts are over at least; and the farce, you know, consists but of three.

Upon this foundation I will speak to you about my private affairs; for tho' I have mentioned all the particulars that occurred to me necessary to be mentioned at present in my letter to Mr. Corry, which you will see to be sure, yet there are some other more general and ruling considerations that I must explain to you. If I could have retired from the world with quiet, decency, and some degree of dignity at home, I should have chosen it; but since that could not be, and since nothing shall ever call me out of retreat again, but the necessity of self-defence, or such publick confusion in my own country as may set me on

* Had the noble writer well considered the justness of his own reflections, he would not have formed such visionary schemes of government as he laid down in his *Patriot King*, and other political works.

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a level with every other man in acting for her, one of which I believe, and the other of which I hope will not happen, it is probable in the highest degree that I shall never return to live amongst you. This applied to my private affairs, decides, you see, for selling my estate at Dawley as soon as I can. I do not desire, you know, to sell it at any extravagant rate; but I would not willingly undersell it very much to one of those who may wait to take advantage of the necessity they may guess I am in of selling, nor easily yield to the contrariety of my fortune, that may render it hard for me, when it would not be for any other man, to sell at a fair price. I will add two other considerations that decide on the same side very strongly in my mind. They are these. A revenue fully sufficient, and secured without risk or trouble, is an article of vast importance in the life I propose to lead; and such a revenue I can have whenever Dawley is sold as I propose to sell it. A settlement of all my affairs, not only for my own life, but for those that will be concerned in them after my death, is another point on which my mind is very intent; and the more so, because I judge, without either fear or spleen, upon my word, that my life will not be long. Now, this settlement cannot be made neither as definitively and as effectually as I desire, until Dawley be sold.

When I examine myself, and consider my affairs and circumstances in this light, you may be sure I am under the pangs of impatience till this transaction be finished; but upon the whole matter, thus I simplify my thoughts, and thus I resolve. If, by luck better than I expect, you can sell for me as I desired, sell without hesitation: if the opportunity of doing it hangs off, let upon the hints given in my letter to Mr. Corry. If neither of these can be done this summer, I shall feel a reasonable uneasiness, and be exposed to future inconveniences that will disturb all the quiet of my life; for tho' I do not wish to live like Aristippus, I cannot live like Diogenes. In this case, there will remain but one thing for me to do, which I shall do tho' very unwillingly, and that will be to go into England before the end of the summer, set Dawley and all I have there to sale, make the most I can of it, content myself with that, whatever it be, and return free from cares of all kinds to my foreign hermitage. This, my friend, is the sum total of my thoughts, and the result of all my reflexions. Upon this foot act for me, and let me hear from you as frequently as you see occasion, or have the opportunity.

* * * * *

Dean Swift had begun an history of the four last years of the queen's reign. I saw it some years ago, and disliked it. Many mistakes were in it, and I thought it

it a party pamphlet, not an history. I spoke my mind freely to Pope, to whom you will do me a pleasure to talk about this work. I think I took the copy away, that it might not go into the world as it was; and if I did so, that copy remains among some papers that I have layed by carefully and safely in England.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Civilities pass between him and Pulteney.

London, May 25, 1736. Upon what I read in your last letter to the queen, I thought proper to acquaint you, that civilities pass'd betwixt him and the court before she left this place. There was no message sent or received; but he had express'd himself in such a manner, that I was to understand he desired it might be reported to the king and queen, who both received it in a gracious manner: but he was gone before the answer could be given. I saw him in the house of commons the day before the house rose, and civilities passed betwixt us. I thought it proper you should know thus much.

Walpole
Papers.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Visits Pulteney.

(Loo, at the prince of Orange's house, June the 10th, N.S. 1736.) Your's of the 25th past, O. S. overtook me in my way hither, where I arrived last night, and shall continue till to-morrow at least. The person you mention came with his lady and child to the Hague the night before I left it, and immediately sent me a message in his own as well as his lady's name, that they would wait upon me, but that he found himselfe much out of order, and wanted rest, it being past nine at night. I was not then at home, and after having sent them a How-doe-you? the next morning, I waited upon them about noon. We embraced at entrance very cordially, and took leave in the same manner. I stay'd above halfe an hour with him, where there was alsoe in the room Dr. Stewart, one captain Mead, and Mrs. Pulteney herselfe and the little boy, of whom I took much notice. I endeavoured to be easy and chearfull, and to make him soe; but his constant complaint was lowness of spirits, and, in my opinion, he is rather dead-hearted than sick in body: and in other respects, had a stranger come into the room, he would have thought we had never been otherwise than good friends. I hope to continue my journey to Hannover to-morrow, altho' their highnesses talk of keeping me a day longer.

Walpole
Papers.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Inquires the reasons for sir Luke Schaub's journey to Paris.

MY LORD,

London, June 16, 1736.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

I Take the opportunity of this conveyance to submit to your observation a scene that will soon be open'd where you are. Sir Luke Schaub is preparing to go immediately to France in company with monsieur and madame Momorancy. He pretends here that he is going to Swisserland, which is his publick declaration; to others, to whom he thinks himself oblig'd to explain a little more, he says his business is with monsieur Molafrean, *fermier de finances*. If I mistake the name, I hope it will enable you to discover who is meant. This person was a particular friend of count Heyme, with whom all the count's effects are suppos'd to be entrusted and conceal'd: and sir Luke goes over to draw out and secure those effects for the benefit of the count's family.

* Afterwards
cardinal
Tencin.

This is sir Luke's great secret; but as the archbishop of Ambrun * has been lately sent for to Paris, and there have been speculations that there may be a design in the cardinal to bring him into business, so far that his coming into England has been spoke of. Considering the great and personal intimacies that were supposed to have been between sir Luke, when in France, and the archbishop's sister †, is it impossible that the chevalier's true errand should be some scheme with the archbishop, under the disguise of count Heyme's affairs? If the prelate is design'd for publick business, I should not think it the most improbable conjecture, that the little Swisse goes an emissary from the patriots here, to settle a correspondence with him. If this is mere speculation and refinement, it will not be a great trouble if it should furnish some employment for your curiosity to watch his motions, to observe where his haunts chiefly lye.

† Madame
de Tencin.

If the fair lady you mention'd to me be madame Monconseil, I should think her husband much preferable to any other person that has been nam'd for Chavigny's successor. If he is a creature of Chauvelyn's, I doubt no other will be suffer'd to come hither; and is it not better to have one from whose family there is a profession of civility, (your lordship perhaps would have call'd it more than professions,) than one who does not even affect such dispositions? Your lordship will have the goodness to forgive these out-of-the-way notions; and believe me to be, &c.

SIR

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

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Settles the mode of their correspondence.—Gives his private opinion concerning a northern league between Sweden and Denmark, and the maritime powers—On the mediation between Russia and the Porte—On the succession of Berg and Juliers.—In all instances recommends cautious proceedings.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, June 18—29, N. S. 1736.

I Find there may be some difficulty in carrying on this summer's correspondence between you and me; for I do apprehend you will be constantly ask'd what letters you have, and as constantly desired to show them, which will be unavoidable, unless upon particular occasions I give you the trouble of a separate paper with an ostensible letter to be produced: such a companion this shall have. Look upon this as my private thoughts suggested to you alone.

Walpole
Papers.

Private

There seems to me to be three points now upon the tapis that may deserve consideration. The affairs of Berg and Juliers; the mediation betwixt the czarina and the Porte; and a northern league, said to be in view, to be form'd between Denmark, Sweden, and the maritime powers, to observe the growing power of Muscovy. Of this last I shall make no mention in my other letter to you, tho' I cannot suppose but it must have been mentioned to you by the king and by Mr. Finch, who I understand has mentioned it to the king as suggested by monsieur Rossencrantz; but you are to know nothing of this from me, till you hear further of it. Upon this point I must begin with observing, that count Kinski, in his parting conference with me, mention'd such a design as a cause of jealousy and complaint in the court of Vienna, which, as I had not heard one word of, I very roundly denied the least notion of it: and for my part I cannot conceive what inducements should lead us into such a negotiation, the surmise of which must give offence to the czarina, in consequence to the emperour, and may tend to make the courts of France and Vienna more intirely one, and in the conclusion at the expence of the maritime powers. And I cannot think the state of affairs in any part of Europe settled enough to make us desire to be engag'd sooner, or more than we shall necessarily be call'd upon to be so. Lett us wait, and see how things will turn out, and then determine what part to take. The late treaties with Denmark and Sweden have been burthensome and expensive, and our subsidies will never be unwellcome to them.

The next article that naturally occurs is the mediation between Muscovy and the Porte; and here too, I think, we should defer concerning ourselves,

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selves, untill it is demanded of us by both parties. I observe by Mr. Robinson's letters, that it is expected at Vienna that the Porte should make a formal demand, and, *in that expectation*, full powers are order'd for Mr. Tatman *pro istâ vice*. But it seems to me, that this will be conditional: and altho' no mention is made of such an expectation from the Russians, the strict alliance that subsists between the emperour and the czarina persuade me that no step would be taken upon this subject at Vienna but in concert with the czarina. That should likewise be equally expected by us; and if the demand of both is made, we should then do nothing but in concert with the Imperial court and the States Generall.

I have read the long letter from count Osterman to the grand vizir, which seems to me to be as strong a remonstrance of a long continued series of violences and oppressions as it is possible for one power to lay to the charge of another; and altho' it concludes with professions of a sincere desire for peace, that is no more than is usual in all declarations of war: and when sir E. Faulkener is desir'd to deliver the letter, nothing is said to him that implies at all any desire of our mediation, but proposes the sending ministers reciprocally to the respective borders to treat and adjust, without any mention of the intervention of other powers. These reasons induce me to think, that we are in this case too to wait for events and proper applications, and to be well assured of the real sentiments of both the Imperial and Russian courts, before we offer our good offices, and take any step which may possibly disoblige, without a probability of doing any good.

The same spiritt of not being too forward induces me to think our taking any part as yett in the affairs of Berg and Juliers is not advisable. In that case we must wait for the sentiments of the emperour and France, and what part they will probably take, before, in compliance with the Dutch, we make any declarations which may be thoroughly disobliging to the king of Prussia, and in which we may be left singly with the Dutch. It is most certainly a very desirable thing to me, if it were possible, that all future occasions of a rupture in Europe should be remedied and prevented. But as no court of Europe, except the Dutch, have an inclination to make the settlement of that affair a part of the present pacification, but both the emperor and France are *expressly of opinion to postpone that affair till the chief business of the present negotiation shall be over*, and as there is in the preliminaries a positive exclusion of all matters foreign from the late war, I see great inconveniencies that may arise from our pressing that affair to be carried on at the same time, altho' in a separate negotiation, with

with the generall tranſactions now upon the tapis. Upon further conſideration, I ſee no occaſion of your communicating my thoughts upon any of the heads at preſent to the king, but leave them for your own information and amuſement only; and ſhall write you only a ſhort letter upon the army-matters, tranſmitted now by ſir William Young, as far as I had troubled the king about them before he went from home.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Objects to the alliance with Sweden and Denmark, unleſs it can be made without giving umbrage to the emperor and Ruſſia.—Advifes not to take any haſty reſolution about the ſucceſſion of Berg and Juliers.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, June 25—July 6, 1736.

I Have not troubled you with my thoughts about foreign affairs ſince you left England, becauſe all things going on in the principal courts of Europe, where buſineſs is now tranſacted, in their naturall train, and nothing being brought to any concluſion, which might call upon his majeſty to take any ſtep, or come to any reſolution, I thought it uſeleſs to be giving any premature opinion upon events which may every day alter, before things are brought to any conſiſtency.

Walpole
Papers.

The only points that appear'd to me to require any preſent conſideration are, a northern league, between Great Britain, Sweden, and Denmark, which has been mentioned to me; and the affair of Berg and Juliers.

As to the firſt, if the deſign and views of thoſe two crowns is to form an alliance, principally with regard to the growing power of Muſcovy, and in oppoſition to the czarina, it ſeems to me to deſerve great conſideration, how far, by beginning ſuch a negotiation, we ſhall give jealousy and offence to the Muſcovites, and in conſequence to the Imperial court, in the preſent ſituation of Europe: for if, by taking the advantage of a ſuppoſed coolneſs between France and Sweeden, to ſecure Sweeden from France, we ſhould at the ſame time give jealousy to the Imperial and Ruſſian courts, by carrying on a negotiation ſecretly and ſeparately from them, the ill conſequences might exceed the advantages that we propoſe by ſuch an alliance. But if our treaties with Sweden are now expiring, and can be renew'd in conjunction with Denmark, with due care to avoid giving offence to other powers, I ſee no objection to the entering into ſuch a negotiation; which, when I ſee the project, I ſhall be very ready to give my
poor

Period VI. poor opinion of it; but I do not know that there are any thoughts of forming
 1734 to 1737. any project here.

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As to the affair of Berg and Juliers, my humble opinion is, that we should know what part France and the emperor will take in it, before his majesty comes to any resolution; and I cannot see that it is at all the king's interest to declare himself previously, or to endeavour to have that affair settled as part of the general pacification, or even at the same time, which may probably embarrass other matters, and I do not see how they can at all forward them.

P. S. Since I wrote what is above, I have seen the queen, and learn from her majesty, that the king wishes some project was form'd here of a treaty to be made with the northern crowns, including Muscovy. As nothing has yett pass'd through any of the offices relating to that subject, and there is no formal knowledge that such a thing would be agreeable to or accepted by the respective courts, or upon what conditions one or other of those powers would enter into such a treaty, it will be impracticable for us here to form such a project. But if his majesty will be pleased to give you his commands to reduce his sentiments into the heads of a project, to be sent over hither, it may be thoroughly considered, and his majesty's commands may be afterwards signified in due form; which, with humble submission, I conceive would not be so properly conveyed thro' the channel of his majesty's private correspondence with the queen.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

On the state of the mediation between Spain and Portugal.—Of the negotiations with the emperor.

SIR,

Whitehall, July 6, 1736.

Orford
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YESTERDAY an express arriv'd from France with very voluminous dispatches from Mr. Keene, inclosing a declaration sign'd by the ministers of the mediators, a counter-declaration sign'd by monsieur Patino, and a paper of points agreed on, signed by nobody; copies of all which I send you.

Mr. Keene gives a very full and long account of all that has pass'd in this negociation; in which monsieur Patino's double dealing, falseness, and, I may say, assurance, (not to give it a stronger term,) appear in the strongest light. You will perceive that the declaration sign'd by our minister is more favorable to Spain in the expressions than even that sent and proposed by monsieur Chauvelin.

Que

Que la conduite d'Espagne étoit trop vive is entirely left out. That the king of Portugal *avoit le plus grand tort*, which did imply that there was some blame in the court of Spain, is also omitted. But what is most surprising, after monsieur Patino had, in writing, given the king his master's consent that those very expressions should stand, and had promised day after day that the whole should be concluded, for (I think) near three weeks together, after he had acquainted Mr. Keene, by the order of his master, that the design of his (Patino's) separate proposal was, that France should have no hand in this affair, all of a sudden he sends for the French ambassador alone, makes him a particular confidence, that the king of Spain would not consent to the terms that he, Patino, had agreed to, and left it to Vaulgrenant to communicate this to Vandermeer. Keene, I suppose, was both mortified and enraged; but, however, he is willing to excuse his friend Patino for this complaisance to the French ambassador, which, I believe, you will think, when you come to read the letters, had some relation to their other negotiations with France. They all agreed, that they must accept it upon the king of Spain's terms; or else that it would be impossible to prevent the king of Spain's coming to a rupture with Portugal, &c.; and so they signed the declaration as you see it, in which, I think, upon the whole, they did right, for to be sure it was previously settled between Patino and Vaulgrenant.

Portugal will undoubtedly be offended at being put in the wrong in this manner. But however, as no act is required of the king of Portugal but what is reciprocal, viz. the releasing the prisoners, the cessation of the preparations of war, and the sending ministers, (tho' lord Harrington is of opinion, but, I think, quite without foundation, that the king of Portugal's ministers must declare his acceptance of this declaration in the same manner that Patino has done by his counter-declaration,) I think we should get this declaration through, if our ministers at Lisbon would act prudently, which I am much afraid of. Vaulgrenant has had the pen, and has prepared the joint account sent to the three courts, which is very well done. He has also prepar'd the letter sent to the ministers of the mediators at Lisbon, which letter, tho' cleverly drawn, contains so many harsh things upon Portugal, that, if not executed with the greatest caution and prudence, will make that court outrageous; particularly, the opinion of the mediators, that Portugal is in the wrong, is most strongly laid down. The king of Portugal is to be told (tho' only in case of necessity) that only one minister will be admitted at Madrid from Portugal, insinuating that several emissaries had been sent from Portugal that interfered with the domestic

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* Lord Ty-
rawley.
† Sir John
Norris.

mestic government there; he is also to be told (tho' that, too, in case of necessity) that, if he thinks of sending Belmonte back, he will find himself exposed, *avec ses propres forces*, to the risks that would result from it; and (what will be most provoking) that this is the judgment of the mediators, from which he has no appeal to any other tribunal. All this, insinuated in a prudent and discreet manner, might be well enough; but in the hands of a warm, discontented minister*, and a rough admiral†, that wants to return home, I don't know what may be the consequence of it: but, however, we shall have a meeting of the lords to-morrow, to consider in what manner the communication should be made here to monsieur Azevedo, and what orders (if any) should be sent to Lisbon. I should think we might, in a proper manner, insinuate to Azevedo what has been the conduct of France on this occasion. I should be glad to know your thoughts by the return of the messenger, who will be back here before we shall have an opportunity of writing to Lisbon.

The main point to be considered is the recall of the fleet, which, I think, should be long delayed; for as the thing is done, (and I am glad it is,) we should turn it as much to our own advantage as we can; and besides, after our minister has consented to it, if we don't disapprove him, we must stand by it; that is, we can't take part with Portugal, should Portugal refuse to consent; and therefore what use can our fleet be of there, but to give umbrage and jealousy to Spain?

I send you a letter from lord Waldegrave, which came by the last express. The general pacification seems nearer a conclusion at present than it has of late done. The king of Sardinia has communicated nineteen pieces here that have passed with the court of France. Upon the whole, he acquiesces in such a manner as, I think, the court of Vienna will make no further difficulty about his affairs.

By the accounts we received yesterday from 101 [Buffy], Spain is also in the same disposition. They depart from their pretension of uniting Naples and Sicily to the kingdom of Spain, prefer the allodials to an amicable negotiation with the emperor, will evacuate Tuscany upon a proper act of cession of Naples and Sicily; and I think we shall soon hear of their matters being over also.

In the mean time, the cardinal expresses to lord Waldegrave a great dissatisfaction at the court of Vienna; charges Mr. Robinson with having done them ill offices there; and monsieur Chauvelin has made the same insinuations against us in Spain. The cardinal will not speak out about a definitive treaty, but wants mightily to be sure of the king's accession to what they are doing, in case

he shall think proper to ask it, which, by his own account, will depend on future events.

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Keene has an intelligence, as if some projects had been lately offered to Patino for the surprising Jamaica. He thinks there is no other foundation for it, than that there may be some scheme on foot to prevent the contraband trade pretended to be carried on from that island. I wish you would talk to sir Charles Wager upon this matter. When our ships return from Lisbon, why should not our squadron in the West Indies be augmented? I forgot to tell you that D'Ormea has told Villettes that they have certain intelligence from Vienna that they are weary of their new allies; and that, as soon as this bustle is over, they will have recourse to their old friends, and particularly to the king.

I beg pardon for troubling you in your retirement. The news from Spain was of too great consequence not to give you the earliest notice; and indeed I was desirous to have your thoughts, before I wrote either to Hanover or Lisbon upon it; so that I beg you will dispatch this messenger with all expedition.

P. S. As the meeting of the lords is put off till Thursday in the evening, I shall hope it may be possible to hear from you before that time.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Origin of the scheme for an alliance with Sweden and Denmark.—King zealously promotes it.—Requires the opinion of sir Robert Walpole.—Is induced, by the representations of that minister, to change his opinion.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hannover, July 7th, 1736.

THE last messenger brought me your letter of the 18th past, O. S.; and before I enter into the particular points of it, it may not be improper to recapitulate what has been sayd to me with respect to the treatys with the northern powers.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

Upon my arrivall here, the K. told me, monsieur Rosencrantz had talked, in general terms, of a scheme for that purpose to Mr. Finch at Hamburgh; that he had wrote to the qu—n upon it for her and your sentiments, and that he expected the Danish minister would suggest, in the mean time, his thoughts in writing, which he had hitherto declined doing. This was confirmed to me by Mr. Finch, who I found here; but he could not explain the particulars of Rosencrantz's project. All that I sayd to him, as well as to his majesty, was, that care must be taken not to disoblige Muscovy, for reasons I gave that are

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obvious. But what Mr. Finch seems to have most at heart is, (according to the usual zeal of ministers to favour that court where they are employed,) the support of count Horn and his friends, against his enemys and our's in Sweden, who are under the influence of France; and the renewall of our treaty with Sweden, which has subsisted ever since the year 1720, made by lord Carteret, and expires in 1738, having been made for 18 years. I told him that was a matter to be considered; and if it is a defensive alliance, and alsoe relates to our commerce, that, as well as those in the Swedish ministry, who disappointed the dangerous intrigues of France last year, deserve our attention.

After the arrivall of our first messenger from England, his majesty told me, that he found by the queen, that you were not against making a treaty with Sweden and Denmark, but that Muscovy should become a party to it; and care should be taken to have noe extensive guarantys, or burthenfome conditions in it; and that he expected you should write your thoughts fully to me upon this head, as well with regard to Bergh and Juliers. I only replied, that I believed the nature of our treatys, with respect to the northern crowns, was so different, that it was difficult to combine them together; that with Denmark confirmed an ancient treaty with that crown, but chiefly related to the subsidies that are now payable for another year; that with Sweden was a treaty of mutuall guaranty and defence, with some articles relating to commerce; that with Muscovy was only an alliance of friendship and commerce, without any guaranty; it not being prudent for England to guaranty to Russia her acquisitions upon Sweden.

When the second messenger arrived from England, the king asked me with some earnestness, whether I had heard from you on the foregoing points, and seemed eager for having something done with the northern crowns; letting me know that he should make some new treatys with them as elector; and there never was a more favourable opportunity for England taking engagements with Sweden, than at this juncture, when he had undoubted intelligence of the administration of Sweden being more than ever embroyled with that of France, and in particular with monsieur Chauvelyn, relating to the complaints of the Swedish officers that served king Stanislas at Dantzick; which intelligence, as indeed all is that is procured here, has been communicated to me. I repeated what I had sayd to his majesty before; adding only that as I had not with me the respective treatys with the northern princes, I would send to England for copys of them; and Mr. Tilson has accordingly wrote for them to Mr. Weston.

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When the last messenger came who brought me your letter of the 18th past, O. S. I expected, upon my going to court, that the king would have been very inquisitive for an account of your thoughts to me upon all these points; but, on the contrary, altho' he had received a large paquet, as he told me himselfe, from the queen, he sayd not one word to me on that subject. He mentioned to me, in his eager way, some things which I suppose, by the nature of them, must have come from 101 [Bussy], and particularly about their not being able to fix upon the person in France to be sent ambassador in the room of Chavigny, in which he seemed more disposed for the marquis de Mirepoix then *Monconseil*, tho' I spoak in favour of the last, for reasons which I need not tell you; but, in short, he has not, since the arrivall of the last letters, sayd one word to me about northern engagements, occasioned, as I believe, from the queen having shewn, from your discourse with her, the inconveniencys and burthen of them. And yesterday monsieur Titley, who has attended the king of Denmark at Hamburgh, having desired to wait upon his majesty here for a few days, to impart to him some things of importance which had been suggested to him, (I suppose by monsieur Rosencrantz,) not proper to be committed to writing; the king has permitted him to take a turn here, but did not expresse great zeal and curiosity for the information he was to bring with him. With respect to Denmark, therefore, we must wait and see what that court has to propose.

With respect to Sweden, the defensive alliance with that crown does not expire untill January 1738, N. S.; and as there are many things in it that have no relation to the present times, (for I have perused it in Rouffett's Collections,) and as the Swedes have lately made severall alterations with respect to commerce, to our disadvantage, even contrary to that treaty, the renewall of the alliance with that crown will always be a matter of long and serious consideration. However, we must continue to keep up our interest and credit at that court, in support of the administration there, in a prudent manner, against the violence and intrigues of monsieur Ch——lyn, who seems resolved to destroy them if possible at the meeting of the next Swedish dyett, for no other reason but because they disappointed, by concluding a treaty with Muscovy, the views of France to sett the whole north in a flame; and consequently to prevent the peace with the emperour, by their convention for giving subsidys to Sweden, which they refused afterwards to ratifye on account of the sudden conclusion of the treaty with Russia. And at present a new alteration, relating

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to the Swedish officers that were in the service of Stanislaus, is, by an impertinent memoriall delivered to the king of Sweden and the senate, by monsieur Carteja, carryed so far, that the Swedish secretary of state has ordered, in the king's name, monsieur Gedda to make the strongest complaints to the cardinall *alone*; which complaints, tho' framed in appearance directly against Carteja, yett they are levelled at Chauvelin. And on this occasion I cannot but lament my being deprived of the light of the intelligence from 101 [Bussy] to know the true state of the *Garde des Sceaux* with his eminence, because something might occur, perhaps, to make the cardinall sensible of the opinion that all the world has of his coadjutor; and such a turn might be given to it, with prudent management, as not to offend his eminence, nor to betray the intelligence. But without the proper lights I write and must write in the dark.

Butt to return; this situation between Sweden and France will require Mr. Finch's return to his post as soon as possible; since, as long as France will endeavour to destroy the administration at Stockholm, disposed to live well with us, and to preserve the peace of Europe, and will (as she certainly does) remitt great sums of money to support an opposite party there, she must have views detrimentall to the peace of Europe, and should, by all prudent and secret means, be disappointed in those views. For that purpose, Mr. Finch should be furnished with personall credit; and with weighty reasons, as occasion may offer, to have an influence on some, and retain the confidence which he has obtained with others. As to his credit, the king seems disposed to send him back with new credentiall letters, expressed in a manner to doe him honour; and alsoe to give him a full power, (I have not touched upon the pay for it); and I have hinted to Mr. Finch, that altho' I believe it will not be possible, as he seemed to desire, to allow him a certain sum to be employed as he shall think fitt, yett I was perswaded, that upon his representing from Sweden any particular occasion wherein money may be necessary for his majesty's service, it would not be refused him. I have enlarged the more upon this head, because it is impossible for France to be so zealous in her intrigues with Sweden (I mean Chauvelyn) without having some scheme to create new troubles in Europe, which they may hope to compass from the rupture between the Muscovites and the Turks; and it is not impossible, but that the delays to execute the preliminaries in Italy, and their orders for their troops, which were marching out from thence, to stop, may have some relation to those broyls in Turkey, and to the part which they apprehend the
 emperour

emperour may take in them. In the mean time, while Mr. Finch is in Sweden, he may take an occasion to sound the ministers there, as from himselfe, about their disposition to renew the allyance with England upon the expiration of it, giving them to understand, that the alterations since made, relating to commerce, to our disadvantage, must be redressed; without which it is impossible to treat with them: and thus we shall gain time and see before us, and have no occasion to conclude any treaty (unless some unforeseen accidents happen to make it necessary) that shall be burthensome to us, or offensive to any body else. But we must be attentive to the motions of France, and, if possible, with caution and secrecy disappoint her views; which, being carryed on without our knowledge or consent, must, sooner or later, affect the tranquillity of Europe, and consequently rebound upon us.

After what I have sayd relating to Denmark and Sweden, there is nothing to be added, with respect to Muscovy, relating to engagements in the north. We have a treaty, and a very good one, of friendship and commerce with the czarina; we must endeavour to preserve that; and we must avoyd going any farther. But the rupture between the Muscovites and Turks, I must own, merits great attention; and altho' we should not precipitate our offers to become the mediators, yett, in my opinion, we cannot be too desirous of having an end putt to that war as soon as possible, by the joynt mediation of his majesty and the States; and, indeed, in concert with the emperour, if his Imperiall majesty be disposed to it. But, indeed, it is not our business to force a mediation upon either the Turks or the Muscovites; they must consent, and show a reall disposition to it: and, in that case, his majesty and the States cannot be too earnest in bringing them to an accommodation, tho' it is possible that the emperour may not, in his heart, be so fond of it. For, by some observations I have made from some discourse of count Kinsky's, and from some circumstances in other places, I am not clear but the Imperiall court may lay by, and see whether the consequences of this rupture with the Turks may not give him an opportunity to attack the Turks too, in order to gain *Bosnia* from them, which would indeed be of great advantage to the emperour: but he would run the hazard at the same time, by such an enterprize, to draw new troubles upon him from France, who has had too much experience of the service and advantage she has reaped from the formidable neighbourhood of the Turks to the Imperiall dominions, to suffer that thorn to be taken out of the emperour's side, by reducing the Turkish empire too low. And therefore, if the success of the Muscovites against the Tartars, and the taking of Asoph, which

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which will, in all likelyhood, soon fall into their hands, should dispose the czarina to enter into a negociation with the Turks, and to show an inclination to have the mediation of his majesty and the States for that purpose, and the Porte should discover the same intentions, I do not think the backwardness of the emperour to it should make the maritime powers indifferent and cool in that matter. For, altho' the emperour may think that the maritime powers will be obliged, as indeed they will, to assist him, if the French should fall upon him while he is engaged in a war with the Turks, yett it is the business of the maritime powers to prevent, if possible, their being brought to that necessity, and consequently to putt a stop or an end to this war between the Muscovites and Turks, as soon as they can be concerned in it with honour. In the mean time, we must observe all imaginable regard for the Imperiall court, so as to give them noe reason of complaint against us; and see what turn things are likely to take after the success of the Muscovites; for it is very possible that they may not be of the same mind with the Imperiall court as to the future proceedings with respect to this war with the Turks.

As to the affair of Bergue and Juliers, I agree with you that we must wait for the sentiments of the emperour and France, it not being practicable for the maritime powers to bring that dispute to a determination without the concurrence of other courts. But I think the proceedings of the States are not clearly understood in this matter. They apprehended a flame breaking out in their neighbourhood on the death of the elector palatine, who is 76 years old; they desire a concert of all the considerable powers, to accommodate the different pretenders, or to prevent a war while the accommodation is negotiating. Their resolutions on that head have offended the king of Prussia; but his minister, after having severall warm conferences and expostulations with the deputies of the States, has at last, in a conference with them, (of which you will have seen an account lately from Mr. Trevor,) to show the disposition of his Prussian majesty to prevent all troubles relating to the succession of Bergh and Juliers,—has, I say, proposed the very terms upon which he is disposed to come to an accommodation, and, in my opinion, has done it in a manner that will be disagreeable to the States; especially if they think (as there is good reason to think) that his Prussian majesty may even make a great abatement of those terms. The States have taken noe step in answer to this exposition, being in dayly expectation of an answer in writing from the emperour upon their first application to him on this subject.

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But should the emperor defer returning an answer much longer, decency towards such an amicable application from the king of Prussia must oblige them to take some resolution, which, I suppose, will be to lay the Prussian proposals before his majesty in confidence, &c. and conclude by desiring he will concur with them in employing their good offices with the respective powers concerned, to dispose all parties, that have any pretensions to the succession of those dutchies, to enter into a negotiation for adjusting them, his Prussian majesty having shown his disposition to treat about terms of accommodation for that effect. Can this be refused them? In short, the States have no thoughts of taking upon them to decide the right between the different pretenders; they have no thoughts of disobliging the king of Prussia; they have none of making it part of the negotiation for the general peace. But on the other side, if the considerable powers of Europe for different views, the emperor, for the sake of keeping the contending powers in a dependence upon him, and France, for the sake of having an occasion of creating a new war in the empire, will plainly show that they intend to do nothing towards determining their dispute, big with new troubles, upon the death of the elector palatine, I will not answer for the States being disposed to concur in the system for a general pacification, upon the terms of the preliminaries, when executed and laid before his majesty and them for their accession and guaranty. But this letter is already too long. Your's affectionately, &c.

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I must do Mr. Finch the justice to say that he took several occasions in a handsome manner to let me see he had no other bias than that of serving the king, and with zeal, under the administration he is pleased to employ; and I gave him to understand as civilly that the difference of opinion in some of his relations would have no effect upon my friends with respect to him.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Difficulties about lord Irwyn's petition in favouring his brother.—Is ordered by the king to prepare a project for a northern league.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hanover, July 4—15, 1736.

I return you the letter signed Cha. Hardy, and dated the 2d—13th past, from Boulogne, and can only assure you that I have not the least notion of the person that writes it, and still less, if possible, of the memorandum he mentions concerning

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concerning some important transaction, in which you and I are supposed to be concerned, in 1706. Having received a letter from lord Irwyn himselfe in favour of his brother, with a copy of the memoriall layd before the queen, I took an occasion to mention it to his majesty. It mett with neither a refusall nor a great deal of encouragement, but a generall answer that there *were* variety of *pretensions to be considered*. But I did not think it seasonable to explain the whole matter according to the contents of the paper you sent me. The answer was so short, and the transition to another cause so quick, that I was afraid at that time of doing more harm than good. The only way to succeed is for the queen to recommend Mr. Ingram in her private letter, and you to mention his case and him in an handsome manner to me in an ostensible one; and I will make the best use I can of it.

As soon as I waited upon the king, after the arrivall of the last messenger, he showed me what he called a curious intelligence from 101 [Buffy]; and while he perused the draughts of my letters of correspondence, he bid me read the other; and as he had finished his lecture before I had done mine, he took the paper and continued to read it to me to the end himselfe, and then putt it into his pocket. But I desire noe more may be sayd of it. It will only make him angry; and if those papers, or abstracts of them, can be sent me privately, well; if not, I am contented; for tho' I think, by having recourse to them now and then, usefull questions may be made, and hints given in proper places, yett that may be done by others; and according to the scheme I have framed to myselfe, I shall carry my thoughts no farther than what ordinarily occurs in the nature of my correspondence during my continuation here.

I showed the king your letter containing your thoughts about a northern league, and Bergh and Juliers, which I am glad I did, because I found the queen had prepared him for it, as I indeed imagined, otherwise I should have been inclined to sink it; because I foresaw that the preparing of a project according to his majesty's sentiments would be layd on my shoulders; and I have received the king's commands for doing it; but in what manner, and to what purport, I doe not clearly understand; and I am sure it is impracticable for us to enter into a new negotiation with Muscovy without their requiring what it is impossible for his majesty to grant. But I have gained soe much time that I am permitted to wait for the copy of our last treaty with Russia from England. In the mean time, Mr. Tittley being arrived, and made his report to the king of the notions that have been suggested to him, he is ordered to putt them in writing; and I

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at present think the best way will be to make what Mr. Titley shall suggest a foundation of having that affair of an alliance in the north transmitted to England for the queen's consideration by the advice of such lords as are usually consulted on these occasions. Least the queen should ask you whether I have given an account of what his majesty was pleased to say to me upon reading your thoughts, I shall write you a letter ostensible on that subject.

When the scheme for a treaty shall be put in writing, I will send you my thoughts. I foresee difficultys without number.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Inform him that the king approves the opinions suggested in his letter.—Is desirous to avoid expensive and burthensome guarantees.—Is inclined to make a treaty with Russia.—He thinks it impracticable to make such a treaty with Sweden and Denmark as will admit of the accession of Russia, or to guarantee the possessions of Russia without disobliging Sweden.—The king nevertheless desires that a defensive treaty with Sweden and Denmark may be previously made.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hanover, July 4—15, 1736.

I Have layd before the king your thoughts relating to a league to be made with some powers in the north, and to the affair of Bergh and Juliers. As to the last, his majesty concurs in your opinion of deferring the settling, and even the consideration of it by a formall negotiation, untill the generall pacification is fully perfected.

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He likewise agrees with your notions, that care should be taken, in forming any treatys with Sweden and Denmark, not to give the least offense or umbrage to Muscovy, for the reasons sett forth in your letter. The king would likewise avoyd expensive and burthensome guarantys; and so far from giving any occasion of suspicion to the czarina, he is desirous of making a treaty with that princess, and the chief aim and principle of it should be to secure a body of troops to be furnished by her to his majesty, when he shall have an occasion for them, for the security of his own rights and possessions; and his majesty has been pleased to order me to consider of a project for that purpose.

As I have not here at present the severall treatys, that either anciently subsisted, or such as have been lately made, and are near expiring, between Great Britain and the respective crowns of Sweden and Denmark, nor the treaty of

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friendship and commerce with Muscovy, I can't tell upon what grounds to proceed in turning my thoughts on this subject. But by the generall notion I have of all these treatys, I believe it is impracticable to make such a defensive alliance either with Sweden or Denmark as will admit of the accession of Russia, especially with regard to Sweden; since his majesty has hitherto, for fear of disobliging that crown, refused to give his guaranty to the possessions of Muscovy acquired from Sweden.

As to a particular treaty with Muscovy for furnishing troops, I am afraid whenever his majesty shall show a desire of having the help and assistance of that power, and renew a negotiation for that purpose, the demand of a guaranty of all the Russian possessions by England will be renewed by the Muscovites; which must end, if granted, in disobliging Sweden; or if not granted, in creating some coolness between us and Russia. In expectation of renewing the copys of the treatys from England, and of seeing what has been suggested to Mr. Titley, who is preparing it in writing, these are my present thoughts, which, if you think fitt, you may lay before the queen.

Since writing what goes before, his majesty has lett me know that he desires that treatys with Sweden and Denmark should take place first, worded in a manner to make them entirely defensive, which the king thinks will convince the czarina that there can be no ill design against her, since no step is taken for making an advantage of her being employed at such a distance with the greatest part of her forces, and consequently no offence can be taken: that room may be left for the accession of Muscovy, and a particular article for her to furnish his majesty with troops when wanted; and that prince Cantemir, when things are advanced to a certain degree, may be acquainted with it and with the king's desire to have at the same time a stricter union with this court, by agreeing for troops, and by improving the commerce between the two nations. And I am commanded by his majesty to acquaint you with this, and with his orders for our framing the project of a treaty to be entered into between England, Sweden, and Denmark.

THOMAS

ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE.

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THOMAS PELHAM TO ANDREW STONE.

*Views of Chauvelin, who governs the cardinal.*Period VI.
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SIR,

Paris, Aug. 2, N. S. 1736.

THE intelligence you send us about the elector of Bavaria, if true, is very material. In a letter I wrote about ten days ago to Hanover, I mentioned that news was arrived here of the elector's having given the necessary orders for a free passage to the Russians, and of their actually being on march through that prince's territories; but I cannot send any confirmation of his having gone so far as to offer his contingent as elector of the empire.

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Copy.

You will see, in my lord Waldegrave's dispatches, an account of a long conversation he has had this morning with the cardinal; and by the manner of his excellency's relating it to me, I dare say he forced his eminence to open himself in a very free manner; and were the cardinal master of himself, great dependance might be had on the scheme proposed for putting an end to the war, and for satisfying the court of France. But unless monsieur Chauvelin is in or can be brought to the same way of thinking, I would not have our friends in England flatter themselves with the hopes of bringing such a project to bear.

I cannot discover that the Garde des Sceaux's views are as extensive as those of cardinal Richelieu were; nor do they seem calculated merely for aggrandising the power of his master. But I am almost convinced that private interest is what guides his politics; and that as long as he can with safety to his own character here continue the war, (by which means he keeps at a distance from court all the nobility, who might otherwise be tempted to aim at supplanting his administration, and has frequent occasions to gain friends by having the disposal of most of the military promotions,) I say, as long as he can do it with safety, he will invent new *brouilleries* and new *embarras*, untill by some event he sees himself enabled to make a *coup d'éclat*, that may establish his credit at this court, and put it out of the power of any persons to undermine it. Whilst he is persuaded that the Dutch will not enter into any vigorous measures, and is under no apprehensions of our separating the allies, we shall find him untractable in any negotiation: but when he suspects the danger of either of these cases, his *hauteur* will diminish considerably.

The cardinal is not only governed by monsieur Chauvelin, but is afraid of acting contrary to the other's opinion; nay, monsieur de Steinville, who is

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cautious enough of speaking of the French ministers, told me, a few days ago, he knew that the cardinal repented having made the Garde des Sceaux *ministre adjoint*.

The report lately of monsieur de Torcy's gaining credit with the cardinal, might give rise to such a notion; but monsieur Chauvelin's being raised to so high a post made it impossible for his eminence to employ monsieur de Torcy. As the latter is the only person, at present, the Garde des Sceaux has cause to be jealous of, you may be assured monsieur Chauvelin has put a stop to any further intercourse with that gentleman.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Cause of sir Luke Schaub's journey to Paris.—Chauvelin jealous of Torcy.

SIR,

Compeigne, August 3, 1736.

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Draught.

ACCORDING to what I had the honour of writing to you in my last, I went to Paris for a day, the 17th past, to learn whether my friend had been able to make any discovery of sir Luke Schaub's true errand: I was assured that it was chiefly about count Heyme's affairs; and by a visit the knight made me the other day, after my arrival at Paris, and what has since followed, it seems pretty much to be so. He told me he was going to make a tour in Switzerland; that he took Paris in his way to see one Milfoneau, who was trustee for count Heyme's effects here; that this Milfoneau is chief clerk to messieurs Paris; that he was in hopes, by this man's means, who has a very fair character, to prevent the count's effects from falling into the hands of the count de Saxe, a natural son of the king of Poland's, who had begged them of this court; that in case he, Schaub, should want my protection for the ends aforesaid, he was in hopes of it, since he could assure me, the saving count Heyme's effects for his family, would be a very agreeable thing for her majesty. Thus rested the affair for five or six days, when Schaub came hither: he desired me to present him to the cardinal; informed me of what he had to say relating to count Heyme's affairs; and entreated me to be present at the audiences he had of the cardinal and monsieur Chauvelin, which I the more readily agreed to, that I knew the two French ministers desired it likewise. Sir Luke found them as ready to serve count Heyme's relations as he could desire; so there was no need of many instances in their behalf. The cardinal invited sir Luke to dine with him, which his eminency could

could not avoid, because his dinner was served whilst we were with him. He saw Chauvelyn after dinner, and returned the same night to Paris.

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I don't find there has been any thing between the knight and the archbishop of Ambrun: the latter is pretty cautious since his return to Paris. I reckon he is on his good behaviour: the cardinal does not care much for him, and Chauvelyn detests him, as the most likely man to replace him, should he be dismissed.

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I have try'd all I could to get monsieur de Monconseil named for England; the cardinal has a good opinion of him, but thinks he is not versed enough in affairs to be employed at first at our court. He told me yesterday, in the utmost confidence, that we shall either have monsieur de Cambis, heretofore ambassador at Turin, or monsieur de Mirepoix, whom I have already mentioned to you. They are both reckoned men of great honour; and I don't suppose would either of them give into *our friend's* private correspondences. Cambis is to have his choice of London or Vienna; and Mirepoix will go to the post the other declines. The cardinal protests Chauvelyn knows nothing yet of this transaction; therefore I beg it may be strictly kept private till you hear more from, &c.

P. S. Monsieur de Cambis is to be named for England, as you will see in the P. S. of my letter to the duke of Newcastle.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Objects to a league with the northern courts, yet sends a project for that purpose drawn up by order of the king, together with a private paper on the last convention with Denmark.—Views of France in Sweden.—Intrigues of Johnn the Danish envoy, in favour of France.—Necessity of opposing the schemes of France in Denmark and Sweden.—Propriety of appointing Mr. Titley envoy to the court of Copenhagen.—Mentions the prince of Orange's desire for the king to interfere in his favour.—Exposes the danger of that proceeding, and recommends delay.—King highly approves and favours the project.—His principal motive to keep the king of Prussia in awe.—Submits it to the consideration of the queen and lords justices.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hanover, August 5, 1736.

YOUR ostensible letter of the 25th past, relating to a defensive alliance with the northern crowns, in which your thoughts are given in a very doubtfull manner, and from which no other conclusion can be drawn, but that there

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However, when I consider that we have not the least authentick encouragement for this step, from the known disposition of any of the crowns to be concerned in it, much less any demand or application from them, that by the nature of it, and the present situation of affairs with respect to Muscovy, it is hardly possible that court should accede to it; and that it is almost impossible to hinder that court, tho' she may dissemble her uneasiness, not to resent it secretly, as having a design to putt a check and restraint upon them; and that the remedy suggested by the king, of taking Muscovite troops into his service as king of England, is difficult, if not impracticable, as you will find by some short queries I have added in the margin of that article: I say, these considerations, and the consequences of them, make me by no means forward to push this treaty on at present, altho', if such a one ever should be necessary, what I have sent will be the least lyable to objection of any thing I yett saw of that nature.

Besides this letter, you have my thoughts in a paper apart inclosed, on the expiration of the last convention with Denmark: our former standing treaty of amity and commerce, made in 1670, still subsists; but I believe, upon the expiration

expiration of our last treaty with Sweden in 1719-20, which determines in 1738, we shall have no treaty of any sort subsisting with that crown, with whom, I believe, all our treatys were ever made for a term of years only; and therefore, we must be thinking of what is proper to be done in that respect: and, according to my present thoughts, the czarina must always be made acquainted with what steps we take in that affair.

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We have undoubted intelligence here, you may easily imagine which way, that the French ministers are irreconcilable to the present Swedish administration, for having disappointed their schemes last year, and for their attachment to England; and will labour to distress them at the meeting of the next dyett in 1738. There as is little doubt to be made, by the conduct of monsieur Johnn, of which I sent you an account, that there is a French party forming at Denmark, and that he is entered into it; and therefore, proper attention must be had with respect to Sweden, that count Horn may not think that he and his friends will be entirely abandoned by England; and proper care must be taken to discover, and by great prudence and management to thwart, the views of France at Copenhagen; and both those measures should be undertaken at present, by giving proper instructions, and strength to our ministers at those two courts, as you will find hinted in my deliberations annexed.

Such steps are taking here, as, we hope, will recall monsieur Johnn; and therefore, not only Mr. Titley's merit, but even the regard due to his Danish majesty, who has already named Johnn to be envoy at our court, should engage the king to make Titley envoy: he is a very pretty man, and endowed with proper qualities to make an able minister; and nothing less than the making him envoy will putt him in a condition to watch the motions of the French, and to make an interest with the ladys that govern that court. I own it seems as necessary, not only as a proper encouragement for his past successful behaviour, but to enable Mr. Finch, in concert with count Horn and other friends, to support his majesty's influence and credit at the Swedish court, that he should have a full power, and the allowance belonging to it, with instructions to sound, as occasion shall offer, the ministers there upon what foot they propose to renew the treaty between the two crowns, without his giving any plan himselfe. But it may be absolutely necessary that some alliance should be made and settled before the meeting of the dyett, which may disappoint the views of the French better than if that assembly should meet without any treaty whatsoever subsisting between England and Sweden, or no other but what is ready to expire. We shall, in the mean time, as events fall out, and

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and circumstances alter, either with respect to those two courts, or the union between the Turks and the Muscovites, and the generall pacification of Europe, and according to the accounts which we shall receive from our ministers of the dispositions in Denmark and Sweden, be able to judge whether a defensive allyance be proper or not, without proceeding directly upon it in the first instance. We are not to loose our credit with those courts; but there is no need of going farther than they themselves as yett appear to require and expect; but we must certainly renew some treaty with Sweden.

You will find, among my dispatches by this messenger, one relating to the prince of Orange's requiring his majesty's interposition by letter to the States Generall in his favour, against the violent and unjust proceedings of the province of Zealand, by dispossessing him of the marquifat of Vere and Vlessingaen, with the draught of a letter to be wrote by the king to the States for that purpose. If any thing was to be done in that affair at this juncture, yett, to be sure, that letter is not conceived in proper terms; but I believe it will be best to gain time. The greffier was last year privately consulted, and he thought it would be a very imprudent and unprofitable measure; but his name must not be mentioned. I must own we should see first a finall conclusion of the generall pacification, and whether and in what manner his majesty and the States are to be concerned any farther in that great work, before we meddle in Holland with the domestick concerns of the prince of Orange. But I desire my name or opinion may not be made use of on this occasion, but lett it be the joynt sentiments of the king's servants, whatever may be proper to be done; and delay, or a civill answer for the present, may be best. I return you many thanks for the care you have taken of Mr. Barbut.

Since writing what goes before, his majesty, having approved very much (which I was afraid he would not) my letter to lord H—n, inclosing, for the queen's and lords' consideration, the project of a defensive alliance with the northern crowns, added, that he should write to her majesty to give all possible dispatch to it. He is extremely full of it, and perswaded it will do. His chief view, I believe, is to keep the king of Prussia in aw. By gaining the confidence of all the northern crowns, he will soon sett on foot an allyance with the king of Poland, in the quality of their being electors. If it was possible, by a joyntt tho' secret negotiation, at once to unite Muscovy, Denmark, and Sweden in one treaty of mutuall defense with Great Britain, it would certainly be a great and desirable scheme. But how to goe about it and carry it on is the question that deserves consideration; and if that cannot be hit upon at present,

present, the next question will be, what is to be sayd to the king: perhaps an absolute refusall, as well as an absolute acceptance, of the present project will be wrong. In short, I can only repeat again, that negotiations must be kept on foot; our Danish and Swedish ministers must be sent back with proper instructions, (which I think not difficult to draw, after the sentiments of England are known,) for negotiating in a certain manner; and they must be putt into a condition to negotiate; and particularly the renewall of a treaty with Sweden must be thought of: but if we are the seekers and proposers of it, we shall give an advantage to those with whom we treat. But I would take noe step in that, without letting Muscovy know it time enough to prevent jealousy. In short, the king is fond of the thing, likes the project, and thinks he sees a perfect union between himselfe and the three northern crowns. How far the lords will concurr in seeing that at first view, and what they will advise his majesty accordingly, is the great question; and there I think it is time to leave it after soe much trouble.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Declines laying the project for a northern alliance before the cabinet.—Is of opinion to delay the communication until the scheme is farther advanced, and the sense of the respective courts is known.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, August 6—17, 1736.

UPON the receipt of the project of a treaty between the king and the crowns of Sweden and Denmark, and discoursing with some few of his majesty's servants upon it, I was inclined to think that for the present it was not absolutely necessary to lay it before the cabinet council, where, I apprehend, there would have been great difficulties, not only from the thing itself, but from the surprise of producing so suddenly and all at once an affair of that consequence. It was therefore thought more advisable to postpone the formal consideration of this affair, till matters could be better prepared, and it might be seen what probability there was of succeeding in the respective courts where this negotiation was to be transacted. In order to which it is with great submission presumed that it may be very advisable to send back Mr. Finch and Mr. Titly to their respective courts, with proper instructions and intimations of his majesty's sentiments, that they may discover and learn how far such treaties will be agreeable to either or both of those crowns, and upon what terms they will be willing to renew their former, or enter into new engagements with his majesty:

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and as their cause and interest is more nearly and immediately concerned, it will be an advantage to his majesty rather to hear and receive than to make propofalls.

If any prejudice could arise from the danger of loosing the present opportunity, which there might be hazard in retrieving if now neglected, these cautions might be avoided; but as the jealousies that will arise in other courts, and the umbrage and offence that will be taken be immediate, it is worth while to consider whether his majesty will subject himself to all the inconveniencies that may immediately follow from setting such a treaty on foot, which (as the courts of Denmark and Sweden are constituted) will not be a secret, before he sees into the probability of concluding such a treaty as may answer his majesty's reasonable hopes and expectations. As we have above a year good before the expiration of the treaty with Sweden, there is time sufficient too, upon the foot that our present alliances stand with Denmark, which it will certainly be proper to think of renewing, either jointly or separately, as circumstances and opportunity shall offer: but I hope there will be no prejudice in taking a little time to look about us. The scene of affairs in Europe should, in my poor opinion, be a little more settled, that we may see who and who is together, before we form new schemes that may clash with we know not whom, nor how.

The mobbs and tumults in Spittlefields are now quite over; and it appears every day that the dispute with your Irish labourers was the true source of the whole; with this favourable circumstance, that the attempts of the Jacobites to carry it further did not succeed.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Explosion of gunpowder in Westminster-hall.

Walpole
Papers.

Whitehall, July 16—27, 1736. Your excellency will see, by the minutes of the council which I send you inclosed, that her majesty has been pleased to order a proclamation to be issued upon a very extraordinary insult that was committed on Wednesday last in Westminster hall, upon his majesty's authority, the whole legislature, and the principal courts of justice in this kingdom; a particular relation of which the queen has ordered me to transmit to your excellency, to be laid before his majesty.

On Wednesday, between one and two in the afternoon, when all the courts of justice were sitting, and the judges on the bench, some gunpowder went off, which made such a noise, flame, and smoak, as created a general consternation in

in the hall. Upon which, at first the business a little stopped in the respective courts; but they soon proceeded, till the inclosed seditious and treasonable paper was brought into the king's bench by some of the officers of the court, who had picked up several of them in Westminster-hall, which appeared to have been scattered in the hall by the force of the gunpowder, which was made up in the five acts of parliament mentioned in the paper. It is not yet known in what manner the gunpowder took fire; whether by a match that was of itself to set fire to it, or whether the fire was put to it by any particular person. There was a person seen with an iron in his hand, who probably was concerned in it, but in the hurry and confusion he made his escape without being seized.

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As soon as this infamous paper was brought into the court of king's bench, lord Hardwicke stopped the business, and told them that there was an affair of much greater consequence than the common business of the court which required their attention. He then read the paper himself in open court, and expressed the highest resentment and detestation of such an insult on the king and whole legislature; which his lordship was of opinion came very near high treason. He directed an officer of the court to go to the grand jury of Middlesex, who were then sitting, with his orders to have the author and paper presented; which was accordingly done immediately, in the strongest manner, and I send your excellency inclosed a copy of the presentation. Lord Hardwicke took that occasion to go through the several acts of parliament mentioned in the paper, to shew the reasonableness and necessity of them; and in the strongest manner to direct the several justices of the peace and magistrates to enforce the execution of them, and to use their utmost endeavours to discover and bring to punishment the authors and contrivers of this wicked and abominable insult.

As soon as ever I heard of it (which was quickly after it happened) I had her majesty's orders to consult with my lord chancellor and my lord Hardwicke what might be proper to be done, to shew the resentment of the government, and for the discovering and punishing the offenders; and we agreed humbly to offer our opinion to her majesty, that a proclamation should be ordered in council, promising a very considerable and great reward for discovering the persons concerned in it, and enforcing the necessity of the execution of the laws in such a manner as may, for the future, deter any persons from such facts as these, and may prevent any ill consequences from this bold and wicked attempt to alienate and inflame the minds of his majesty's faithful subjects. And as no time was to be lost, the proclamation was yesterday ordered in council; and

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another council was held this day for the issuing it. I send you inclosed a copy of the proclamation, which will be published to-morrow in all the gazettes, and which her majesty hopes will have the king's approbation.

Being obliged to write to your excellency upon this subject, I cannot but beg leave to express my utmost abhorrence of this wicked and traiterous design, calculated to infuse the vilest and most unjust suggestions in the minds of his majesty's subjects upon the wise and necessary proceedings of the legislature; and I beg his majesty would be assured, that no care or attention shall be wanting on my part, to sift this affair to the bottom, and to bring the authors of it to that punishment they deserve. I have given Mr. Paxton search warrants for searching the printing shops of such persons as there is reason to suspect.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

On the explosion of gunpowder.—Riots in Spittlefields about employing Irishmen.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, July 29—August 9, 1736.

Walpole
Papers.

THE excuse for my long silence you will easily conclude to be principally owing to my absence in the country; and altho' I have been some days in town, the absence of the duke of Newcastle, upon account of the death of lady Lincoln, and most of the other lords being dispersed, has made it unnecessary to trouble you with any occurrences from hence, till the late disorders that have happened this week made it proper that his majesty should be acquainted with the true state of what has happened. You will have been acquainted with the insolent affair at Westminster-hall, and the measures that have been taken thereupon. Since my coming to town, I have been endeavouring to trace out the authors and managers of that vile transaction, and there is no reason to doubt but the whole was projected and executed by a set of low Jacobites, who talked of setting fire to the gallery built for the marriage of the princess royall, by a preparation which they call a *phosphorus*, that takes fire from the air. Of this I have had an account from the same fellow that brought me these and many such sort of intelligencies. He has promised to give a more particular account, but declines giving evidence.

At the same time there are great endeavours using by the same sort of instruments to inflame the people, and to raise great tumults upon Michaelmas-day, when the ginn-act takes place; and as these lower sorts of Jacobites appear at this time more busy than they have for a great while, they are very industrious, and taking advantage of every thing that offers, to raise tumult and disorders among the people. An instance of this has happened this week, in which they

have undoubtedly mixed and promoted, altho' I am not of the opinion that they were the first authors and instruments of these riots and tumultuous mobs.

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On Monday night last, there was an appearance of numbers of people being assembled in a very disorderly manner at Shoreditch near Spittlefields. Their cry and complaint was of being under-worked and starved by the Irish: *Down with the Irish*, &c. But that night the numbers were not very great, and they dispersed of themselves without doing any mischief.

It is necessary here to explain what is meant by this complaint against the Irish, which is founded upon greater numbers than ordinary, as is said, of Irish being here, and not only working at hay and corn harvest, as has been usual, but letting themselves out to all sort of labour considerably cheaper than the English labourers have; and numbers of them being employed by the weavers upon the like terms. This last particular, together with an incident that happened in those parts, is thought to have occasioned the scene being laid at that end of the town. They are building a new church at Shoreditch, where, I am told, the master workmen discharged at once a great number of all sorts of labourers, and took in at once Irish men, who served for above a third less per day; and this I am at present, and as yet of opinion, is the principal cause of the uneasiness that has stirred up the mob, or at least, I think, is the only cause that great numbers of them know any thing of.

Upon this pretence the tumult began on Monday night. On Tuesday evening they assembled again in greater bodies, and were, about seven a clock, thought to be above two thousand in number. They now grew more riotous; they attacked a publick house kept by an Irishman, where the Irish resorted and victualled, broke down all the doors and windows, and quite gutted the house. Another house of the same sort underwent the same fate. By this time (these places being without the jurisdiction of the city) the magistrates and deputy-lieutenants of the Tower Hamletts were assembled, to endeavour to disperse them. The proclamation was read; but the mob, wholly regardless of the proclamation, increased every minute, and were thought to be about four thousand strong. The magistrates, upon this, gave orders for raising the militia; and in the mean time the deputy lieutenants wrote to the commanding officers in the Tower, to send to their assistance such a number of the guards as they could spare; upon which an officer, with about 50 men, was sent by major White. Upon the appearance of the guards, the mob retired, shifted from one street and alley to another, and gave no resistance; and by break of day were all dispersed. All Wednesday, things remained very quiet, untill the evening,

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evening, when the mob rose again to as great a number; but the militia of the Tower Hamletts being then raised, marched against them; but the mob in the same manner retired before them whenever they came, and gave not the least resistance. The deputy lieutenants upon this wrote to the officers of the Tower that they did not want their assistance; and in this situation things remained all Wednesday night; the mob continuing together in great bodies untill the approach of the militia, but as constantly running away upon sight of them, and so dispersed themselves before the morning.

The deputy lieutenants were with me this morning, and desired no further orders than what had been already given, that the guards of the Tower might assist them if necessary. My lord mayor, sir John Williams, was likewise with me, and gave the strongest assurances of his zeal and resolution to discharge his duty, if the disorders spread in the city.

I sent severall persons both nights to mix with the mob, and to learn what their cry and true meaning was; and by all accounts the chief and original grievance is the affairs of the Irish, and so understood by the generality of the mob: but in severall quarters, the ginn-act was cried out against; in some few, words of disaffection were thrown out; and one body of men, of about eighty, were led on by a fellow that declared for liberty and property. It is said that money was dispersed both nights, but that does not as yett appear to be certain. But altho' the complaint of the Irish was the first motive, the Jacobites are blending with it all other discontents, endeavouring to stir up the distillers and ginn-retailers, and to avail themselves of the spirit and fury of the people.

P. S. July 30th. I have now received an account of what passed last night. It was between ten and eleven before any number at all appeared in bodies; they did not amount to 300; they fled before the militia from place to place without any resistance, or doing any mischief but defacing one weaver's house, who, they said, had employed Irish journeymen. I believe there is now an end of this bustle, and so I hope will all attempts end to disturb the peace of his majesty's government.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Riot in Spittlefields.

Walpole
 Papers.

Whitehall, August 5—16, 1736. As your excellency will have seen by the news-papers that there have been some tumultuous meetings of the mob, some nights last week, in the neighbourhood of Spittlefields, I thought you would not dislike

dislike to have a particular and true account of it. It has been customary, for some years past, for numbers of Irishmen to come over to England, to work in the harvest; and some of these people having, from time to time, been employed as journeymen by the master weavers and other artificers in Spittlefields and the adjacent parts, and having hired themselves for that purpose at lower rates than are usually given to journeymen in England, many of the poorer sort of people, (who by this means found that they should either want employment, or be obliged to work for less wages than they were used to do,) on the 27th past, gathered together in a tumultuous manner, and attacked a publick-house in Spittlefields, where the Irishmen used to resort and to eat, the windows and doors of which they broke, and drove the inhabitants out of it; and the same night they also attacked another house in the like manner and upon the same account.

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The magistrates immediately assembled together, and gave directions for raising the militia; but as it would require some time before they could get ready to march, they applied for the assistance of a party of the Tower guard; and the commanding officer accordingly sent out a small detachment, at the first appearance of which the mob immediately dispersed, and were quiet for that night. During this whole disturbance the cry of the mob was against the Irish, and no mark of disaffection to the government appeared. However, as it was thought necessary that the earliest and most effectual care should be taken for putting a stop to these riotous proceedings, the number of the Tower guard was increased, and small parties of them and the militia patrolled for some nights in those parts where the disturbances had happened. This had so good an effect, that (except on Friday the 30th past, when the mob attempted to gather together again, but were immediately dispersed, and some of the rioters secured, who have been since committed to Newgate) every thing has been perfectly quiet. The militia is now discharged, and for several nights past there has been no patrol in the streets, nor any appearance of the least attempt to make any further disturbance.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Highly approves the paper on the northern treaty.—Apologises for, and submits it to the queen, who promises to write to the king.—Irish tumults, and gin act.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, August 6—17th, 1736.

WHEN I came to consider the project of the treaty which you sent over, and had perused your paper upon that subject, I was so fully confirmed

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in *Very private.*

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in my own opinion, that it was not proper to be too hasty in proceeding at present upon that affair, that I found it necessary to convince the queen likewise; which I had no ways of doing so effectually as reading your paper to her, which, as it was impossible it should not, had the desired effect; and she will write to the king by this messenger in the same manner as I now write to you. I ask your pardon for showing the queen that paper; but it appeared to me so perfect a state of that great question, and so unanswerable, that I thought I should be inexcusable if I did not. She has promised me not to let the king know there was any such thing there. I am sure the good it has done will justify me, who could not have promised myself the like success any other way.

There have been great endeavours to have blown this Irish tumult into a general disorder: and there is still reason to have some apprehensions upon the ginnings taking place. But I really think what has passed a favourable indication that people are not so ready as the Jacobites flatter themselves, to join in general riots; altho' it is very doubtful what may happen on Michaelmas day.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Approves of his answer to the complaints made by cardinal Fleury against the conduct of the British ministers abroad.—Objects to the practicability of an alliance between England and France, from the opposition it would meet with from Chauvelin.

MY LORD,

Hanover, Aug. 8—19, 1736.

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Most private.

Copy.

MONEY the messenger brought me, the 16th instant N. S. from England, your excellency's most private letter of the 3d, giving an account of a very particular and remarkable conversation which had passed between you and the cardinal, occasioned by the present state of affairs in Europe, which I have laid before the king; and am to acquaint you that his majesty extremely approved the general answers which you gave his eminence, when he endeavoured, in return for the confidence he had made you of the prospect he had of a speedy conclusion of the peace, to learn the king's sentiments as to the part his majesty might intend to take with regard to the general pacification; and also the proper reply your excellency made to the insinuations which the cardinal let fall of his majesty's ministers in foreign courts having constantly shewn their ill-will towards France.

Your

Your excellency put in a true light the king's conduct during the whole negotiation between the courts of Vienna and France, and his sincere desire, of which he had given undoubted proofs as occasion had offered, to see an honourable and lasting peace established in Europe; as well as the malicious endeavours of those who, wanting to keep up a coolness between the two courts, misrepresented, without any facts or the least foundation of truth, the behaviour of his majesty's ministers abroad. If your excellency should think it necessary to touch upon these topics again with the cardinal, as what his eminency may expect from your having given an account of the conversation between you, you will repeat what you have already said from yourself, as the real sentiments of the king. That as there can be no greater evidence of his most earnest wishes to see the tranquillity of Europe established than his majesty has shewn by his early approbation of the preliminaries, at the same time declaring his readiness to concur in settling the peace upon those terms; and without having given the least interruption since to the measures negotiated for carrying them into execution, and for bringing the whole to a happy conclusion; so it is impossible for his majesty to explain more precisely his intentions, or to give your excellency or any of his ministers abroad any particular instructions as to the part the king is disposed to take, until the result of what has been transacted for so many months without his participation shall have been fairly laid before him, and examined and considered by him, and he shall have been informed of what may be desired and expected from him; his majesty still continuing in the same unalterable principles he has always pursued, of contributing all in his power to consolidate a work that shall appear to be founded upon the preservation of the balance of power, and agreeable to the interest and safety of his own subjects.

You will let his eminency know, that the king likewise approved what you had said to him with respect to the malicious designs of those that suggest to him groundless reflections upon the conduct of his majesty's ministers abroad with regard to France; that neither their orders nor actions corresponded in the least with such vile aspersions; that if the king would give as much attention as he was sorry to find the cardinal did to insinuations made to him against France of the same nature, there would be no end of complaints and grievances. But if his eminency would treat such low and vile artifices with the same contempt the king does, they would soon lose their aim and come to nothing.

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But it is possible that the cardinal, altho' satisfied with these general terms on those heads, may expect a more particular answer to the scheme he opened to your excellency of a strict alliance between England and France, to check the ambitious designs of the emperor, and to keep in awe the restless spirit of the queen of Spain to aggrandize her own family: upon which I am to let your excellency know that his majesty thinks your observations upon this scheme are very judicious. But whatever may be the real motives and views of this remarkable overture from his eminency at this juncture, in order to parry or frustrate on one side the cardinal's design, if it was calculated purely to discover his majesty's intentions with regard to foreign friendships and alliances, and that France may take her measures accordingly abroad; and not to disoblige his eminency on the other, by an absolute refusal of it, in case his desire of making a particular alliance between his majesty and France, for the preservation of the peace, be sincere; although it would be impossible to come into it, were there no other reason than what your excellency mentions, viz. that however good the cardinal's intentions may be, his colleague, Chauvelin, will disappoint us in reaping any advantage from them; it is his majesty's pleasure, if you think you cannot avoid saying something to him on this particular point, without creating a good deal of jealousy and uneasiness in the cardinal, should you be absolutely silent upon a proposition in appearance so plausible and friendly, that you should take occasion to let his eminency know that his majesty is fully persuaded of his views for restoring peace to Europe being sincere, and heartily wishes with the cardinal that it may be established upon such a foot as to be lasting, of which the king can frame no judgment at present, untill he sees the whole work finished and compleated. That his eminency must be convinced that his majesty, in all times, has, in the quality of elector, been very zealous to maintain the rights and libertys of the empire, and as king of Great Britain, the balance of power in Europe, against any ambitious designs of the Imperial court; and that the experience which the emperor has had of finding a constant opposition to all such attempts will, his majesty hopes, make him extremely cautious and backward in entertaining for the future any thoughts of that kind. That his majesty is as sensible as the cardinal can be of the restless temper of the queen of Spain in favour of her family; but hopes that without the encouragement and support of some other prince, which he flatters himself she will not meet with after the peace is fully established, it will not be in her power alone to break it. That while the strictest union

union and concert of measures subsisted between Great Britain and France, and constantly ever since, his majesty's actions must have made it evident to the cardinal, as well as to all the world, that the preservation of the tranquillity and equilibrium of Europe, upon which the interest and safety of Great Britain depends, is what the king has always had most at heart. That the variety of treaties and transactions that France has had with several powers of Europe some time before the breaking out of the late troubles, and the complicated and perplexed negotiations for the execution of the preliminaries with the different princes concerned in them, of all which his majesty has as yet had no participation, makes it impossible for the king to judge and determine what measures or what alliances shall be most proper for preserving the tranquillity and balance of Europe, until the whole plan of the peace, perfectly finished, shall have been proposed to him. And when that shall be the case, he will not be backward to appear and concur in supporting it, if it answers those great and desirable ends, by such means as shall seem most necessary and expedient, when the situation of things, and of the different powers interested in this great affair with respect to one another and to the rest of Europe, shall appear in a true light.

In the mean time, the cardinal may be assured that he will always find his majesty disposed, upon these principles, to preserve a good understanding and friendship with the most christian king; and as he is fully convinced of the same inclination on his eminency's part, he cannot forbear expressing his concern for having seen several good things, at first projected and promoted by the cardinal under the greatest secrecy, at last disappointed by the after-knowledge and management of others, who act upon different views from his eminency. And lastly, you will let the cardinal know, that, as this is to be looked upon only as a private correspondence betwixt your excellency and me, for learning and communicating to each other the sentiments of the king and of his eminency, it shall be kept an inviolable secret here, there being not the least doubt of the same being observed by the cardinal, according to the promise he made you on his part.

Your excellency, who is upon the spot, and will feel the cardinal's temper in discoursing with him on this subject, must be, his majesty thinks, the best judge in what manner and how far you may proceed in delivering the king's sentiments upon it, in which his majesty's chief aim is to avoid the entering into the negotiation for a particular alliance with France, which can certainly never succeed, nor have a good effect, as long as the influence of monsieur Chauvelin sooner or later will prevail; and at the same time not to give the cardinal reason to be jealous of his majesty's intentions, and to suspect, by our declining to

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close with his propofal, that the king is determined to make allyances with other powers independant of France.

The king is extremely pleased to learn by your private and particular letter to the duke of Newcastle of the 5th instant N. S. that monsieur de Cambis will be soon appointed ambaffador to England; his majesty looking upon it, from the character he has had of that gentleman's principles and temper, as a further proof of his eminency's inclination to preserve a good understanding between the two crowns, of which you will take proper notice to the cardinal, if your excellency thinks fit.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Sir Everard Fawkener's full powers to mediate between the Turks and Russians.—Mentions it as the general opinion in England not to be too precipitate in offering, but to be ready to accept the mediation if proposed.—Thinks the tumults in Spittlefields at an end.

DEAR HORACE,

August 20—31, 1736.

Walpole
Papers.

I Suppose you will receive by this messenger the opinion which the committee of lords presumed to give to the queen upon the mediation between the Turks and Muscovites. They did not persist to object against sending the general full powers to sir Everard Faulkener, if they were expressly restricted to his not acting, nor undertaking any thing without the expresse requisition and demand of both the parties. What is chiefly apprehended is, least, if sir Everard Faulkener should be authorised by any orders or instructions to offer the mediation of the king at the instance of the Port only, or to join in any propofal to be made by Mr. Calkoen for that purpose, without or before the mediation is equally accepted or desired by the czarina, we may be engaged in measures that must consequentially be disagreeable to the Russians, if not declared by them previously to be agreeable, and what they desire.

It is very plain that the joint-conference between the grand visier and the two ministers was the sole act, and procured by the management of Mr. Calkoen. The consequence of which was, by the eagerness of the Dutch minister, carried further than was necessary or perhaps advisable, and sir Everard was unavoidably drawn in to go along with him some lengths further than I think was to be wished; and I hope the reception of his correspondence with Mr. Rondeau may not prove this to be true, and that we shall not be found to have given distaste to the czarina, who will construe our officiousness to interpose unasked a partiality to the Port, and an attempt to stop the progress of her

arms

arms in a course of success, when she has most evidently declined giving us the trouble of a mediation. This sort of reasoning prevails very much here, not that there is any objection to the maritime powers becoming mediators, when they are reasonably and properly desired by both parties to undertake that province, and till then the voluntary tender of our services cannot possibly be of any use. But it is the unanimous and natural opinion of every body here, that we may be too precipitate in offering what we may be justifiable in accepting.

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I am now taking the opportunity of a leisure hour to acquaint you how I apprehend this matter stands, but do not know for certain whether the full powers will be sent by this messenger (the duke of Newcastle being gone to the Lewis horse-races); but general full powers are agreed to, under the restriction of being desired by both parties; and for my own part, I think you may as well hope to break in upon the constancy of two lovers in the honey-moon, as to stop the career of two powers just engaged in war, in the heat of their resentment, and before they have had time to feel, to reflect, and grow cool. I shall add but one word more. It was never thought here that the emperor could or would become an immediate mediator, but that was no objection to those that were not in haste to drive on a mediation which was thought premature; but after what has passed, I think full powers must be sent, under proper restrictions and instructions, and not confined to the conjunction of the emperor.

The tumults and disorders here are quite at an end; and I think, without flattering ourselves, this favourable inference may be drawn, that the industry of the Jacobites was not able to improve this truly Irish incident into a more general confusion. Various are the reports, and some apprehensions that new troubles may arise on Michaelmas-day, the commencement of the ginn-act; but I am fully satisfied that hitherto there is no formed design; and what seems to me most probable is, that the lower sort of brandy-shops, whose poverty secures them from the penalties of the law, may continue to sell in defiance of the law, and in hopes that no body will think worth their while to prosecute them for what they cannot possibly recover.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Full powers for the mediation between the Porte and Russia will be forwarded.—

Recommends caution in not pressing the offer of mediation.

London, September 3—14, 1736. The last messenger brought me the packett with the several inclosures; and when I do not answer all your letters constantly

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Papers.
Extra.

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constantly and regularly, it is when I do not think there is any occasion for it: and as both the secretaries correspond regularly with you, I do not see the use of writing the same things at the same time, if no particular occasion requires it.

As to the business of the mediation between the Port and Muscovy, you will now have the full powers; which I dare say will come soon enough. That affair has taken its own train, and shows plainly that for some time there will be no room for our interposition. And, by the account that monsieur Bruyninx has sent of the instructions sent to monsieur Tallman from Vienna, the declaration he is ordered to make, can be looked upon at the Port as no less than the forerunner of the emperor's taking part in the war against the Turks, if they do not comply with all the demands of the Russians; which makes me still think we had better keep ourselves free from all engagement, or being concerned, till we are required by both; and see plainly for whom and against whom we are to be employing our voluntary services.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Requests the Garter.

SIR,

September 26, 1736.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Draught.

* Chauvelin.

BY my lord Berkley's death, a second garter is become vacant. I hope, from the marks I have already had of your favour and friendship, and from my unalterable attachment to you, that you will be so kind on this occasion as to speak to the king in my behalf. I can assure you that such a mark of approbation of my conduct from home would not only raise my credit here, but put it much more in my power to serve his majesty, and to check the insolence of our quondam friend *, but now our greatest enemy, than you would perhaps imagine. In whatever light you are pleased to put my most humble request, I shall think myself sure of success, if you are pleased to undertake it; and shall ever acknowledge it with the utmost gratitude.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

On the riots occasioned by the gin act.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, September 30—Oct. 11, 1736.

Walpole
Papers.

I HAVE foreborn troubling you with the various surmises and apprehensions which of late at different times have fill'd the town with different fears and expectations, concerning the first and immediate consequences that might attend the commencement of the gin act, because it was difficult at some times to form

form any probable opinion of what might happen; and at other times, and especially lately, it appear'd a great deal more reasonable that there would not be any trouble or disorder at all; untill about the middle of last week, I then began to receive again accounts from all quarters of the town that the Jacobites were busy and industrious in endeavouring to stir up the common people, and make an advantage of the universal clamour that prevailed among the populace at the approaching expiration of this darling vice. The scheme that was laid was, for all the distillers that were able, to give away *gratis*, to all that shou'd ask for it, as much ginn and strong waters as they shou'd desire, and the great distillers were to supply all the retailers and small shops with as much as they shou'd want to be distributed and given away in like manner. The shops were to begin to be opened on Tuesday evening, the eve of Michaelmas-day, and to be continued and repeated on Wednesday night, that the mobb, being made thus drunk, might be prepar'd and ready to comitt any sort of mischief; and in order to this, anonymous letters were sent to the distillers and town retailers in all parts of the town, to instruct them, and incite them to rise and join their friends, and do as their neighbours did. Four of these letters have fallen into my hands, which the persons to whom they were directed discovered and brought to us: and by the excise officers that go round the town I am inform'd that letters to the same purpose were dropt, and * to most of the distillers in all quarters. Those we have seen differ very little from each other in the tenour and substance, and the strong criminal expressions are in all the same, only transposed. In such as were less formal, and not so labour'd, the word was given sir Robert and sir Joseph †. Upon the information, the queen was pleased to give such orders to the guards as you will have had an account of, which have had the design'd effect, and in the opinion of all mankind are thought to have prevented the greatest mischief and disorders that have of late been known or heard of, at least we have the satisfaction to have our measures universally applauded.

I must beg leave to say, there have been infinite care taken to observe and watch all their motions for above a month past; and upon the turn that the Spittlefields riots took, I think I may affirm, that the whole spiritt was at once dashed and seemed to have been totally laid aside; but upon the contrary success at Edinburgh, the fire kindled anew, and nothing less than such vigorous measures could have prevented the evil, which I hope now is put an end to. But the murmuring and complaints of the common people, for want of ginn, and the great sufferings and loss of the dealers in spirituous liquors in general,

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* Illegible,
probably
directed.

† Jekyll.

Period VI.
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general, have created such uneasiness, that they well deserve a great deal of attention and consideration. And I am not without my apprehensions, that a non-observance of the law in some may create great trouble; and a fullen acquiescence and present submission in others, in hopes of gaining redress by parliament, may lay the foundation of very riotous and mobbish applications when we next meet.

October 1st. That last night is likewise past over in perfect quiett, altho' the patrols in the streets were taken off.

LETTERS RELATING TO THE TUMULTS AT EDINBURGH ON THE
MURDER OF CAPTAIN PORTEOUS.

MAJOR GENERAL MOYLE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

On the murder of captain Porteous.

MY LORD,

Edinburgh, September the 9th, 1736.

Walpole
Papers.

Copy.

I Think it my duty to acquaint your grace with what happened here last Tuesday night, about a quarter of an hour after ten. Being then in my bed, colonel Pears, who commands lieutenant-general Sabine's regiment in the Cannongate, came and told me he heard there was a great disturbance in the city, on which I immediately ordered him to assemble the six companies quartered here, and to parade them near the guard in the Cannongate, and to send for the three companies from Leith, which was done with as much expedition as possible, for some of the companies are quartered a great distance from the Cannongate. I dressed myself as soon as possible in order to joyn the regiment. I was scarce dressed when Mr. Lindesay came to me, and told me there was a great mob in the city.

It then wanted but fourteen minutes of eleven. He assured me they had got possession of the city gates, and that with much difficulty he got out at a small wicket, and was obliged to come round by the King's Park. He made no demand of a guard to assist them; but I told him I had ordered the regiment to be under arms, but that I could not force any of the town gates, or give orders for attacking the mob, without a legal authority from the lord justice clerk, or some other of the lords of the justiciary, for it was from one of them I had received all orders relating to the military, since I came into the country. I then asked Mr. Lindesay if lord justice clerk or any other of the lords of the justiciary were in town. His answer was, that neither the justice clerk or lord Royston

Royston was in town, but lord Newhall was ; but there was no getting to him ; on which, knowing the justice clerk lived but two miles and a half off the town, I desired Mr. Lindesay to write immediately to him for his directions, what he would have the troops do ; and sent the letter by my own servant, who galloped all the way. My lord being in bed, he got no answer from him till near one of the clock. The letter was directed to Mr. Lindesay, so I never saw the answer ; and long before it came, the poor man was hanged by the mob. By what I since hear he was executed before Mr. Lindesay came to my house, for they got him out of prison a little after ten.

It was a great oversight that the poor man was not put into the castle as soon as his reprieve came for him, that being the only place to secure him from the rage of the mob. This unheard-of barbarity had been concerting several days ; and I am surprised the magistrates were not more upon their guard. The town souldiers, instead of resisting, delivered their arms to the mob. The turnkey of the prison owned he had a hint given him in the morning that the prison wou'd be attempted to be broak open that night, and that he acquainted the gaoler of it, and desired him to make it known to the lord provost, that care might be taken to prevent it. The magistrates were drinking together in the Parliament-cloze when the mob first assembled, but did not take care to read the proclamation, which was a very great neglect in them. On their suspecting the mob would rise that night, the care of the port next to the Cannongate ought to have been immediately put under the guard of the king's forces, and then the communication between the city and subburbs would have been kept open.

I have to add, that had the troops forced their way into the town by demolishing one of the gates, without a legal authority, your grace would soon have had a terrible complaint from the magistrates. The regiment here are much fatigued, having lain two nights on their arms. I can't but mention to your grace that this is the third prisoner, within the memory of man, that has been taken out of a talbooth here, and barbarously murdered by the mob. They charge me with procuring Porteous's reprieve, and threaten to murder me in my bed, or set fire to my house ; but I despise them all. I don't hear that any of the criminals are yet apprehended, tho' well known by many of the inhabitants of the town.

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On the murder of captain Porteous.

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* Lord chief
justice clerk.

Narrative of the tumult at Edinburgh, on Tuesday the 7th day of September 1736.
Sent by Andrew Fletcher* to the duke of Newcastle.

Friday, the 3d day of September, the lords of justiciary served an order upon the magistrates, intimating a reprieve for John Porteous, for six weeks. On Saturday, the 4th, there was a surmise that a mob intended to set fire to the prison on Wednesday night, the 8th of September, if Porteous was not executed that day pursuant to his sentence. This was carefully inquired into by the magistrates, but they could not discover any foundation for the report. On Tuesday the 7th, about a quarter before ten at night, the magistrates had notice that a few boys had seized the drum of the suburb of Westport, and beat it in the Grass-market, within the city. About six minutes before ten they sent to the captain of the guard, to have his guard immediately under arms; but a few minutes before the clock struck ten, a mob suddenly rushed in upon and surprized the guard, and at once drove them from the guard-room and seized all their arms, being ninety firelocks in number, besides several Lochaber axes, and distributed them among themselves, and almost at the same time made themselves masters of all the gates of the city.

The lord provost and magistrates hereupon immediately dispatched Patrick Lindisay, esq. late provost of Edinburgh, to general Moyle. This gentleman, who was well known to the general, finding the Nether Bow Port shut, and in possession of the mob, made shift to get out at the Potter Row Port, and went through the park, and got to the general's house at Abbey-hill a quarter before eleven. The general, having notice before of the mob at the Nether Bow, had ordered all the men in the Canongate and Westport to be under arms; and upon provost Lindisay's application, likewise ordered up the three companies from Leith, to join those in the Canongate; but in regard that all the gates were locked up and barricaded by the mob, refused to allow any man to march without a warrant from the lord justice clerk, or a lord justiciary, who happened then to be all out of town.

Immediately after the mob had seized the guard, they attacked the goal; and the magistrates, with several of the members of council and deacons of crafts, attempted to disperse them; but the mob threw stones so violently at them, and threatened to fire, they having furnished themselves with shot by breaking open the shop of one Alexander Dunning, wherewith they had loaded the pieces they had seized in the guard; and having wounded several of those
who

who attended the lord provost and magistrates with stones, Lochaber axes, and butts of muskets, obliged them to retire.

The mob, finding themselves absolutely masters, immediately set fire to the prison gate, and in about an hour it was so much consumed by the fire that the mob beat it to pieces, and rushed into the prison, seized the turnkeys within, and forced them to open every ward in the prison, dismissed all the prisoners, and then laid hold of captain Porteous, dragged him down stairs, and hurried him up the Lawn Market-street, down the West Bow to the Grass-market, where they broke open a shop, and took out a coill of ropes, and tyed one end of it about his neck, and threw the other over a dyer's tree hard by the common place of execution, and pulled him up and hanged him. About a quarter before twelve o'clock at night, several attempts were made to take down the body, but the mob beat every one who made such a proposal, till about day-break a few members of the council and some neighbours got the body taken down, and layed it in the Grey Friar's church.

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On the murder of captain Porteous.

ANDREW FLETCHER TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

MY LORD DUKE,

September 16, 1736.

YESTERNIGHT I had the honour of your grace's letter of the 12th instant; and in obedience to her majesty's commands, this morning I met with the magistrates of this city to consult the proper measures for restoring and preserving the peace of the city, and for discovering the authors and actors of the late wicked and audacious proceedings. Besides the precautions I had the honour to acquaint your grace by my last had been taken for maintaining the peace of the city, by order of the magistrates and common council, two companys of the Trained Bands, consisting of about 200 burgeses and inhabitants, have kept guard every night, attended by one of the magistrates, and are to do so while there remains any suspicion of disturbance; and they are all furnished with firelocks and bayonets from the city's armory. As the soldiers of the city guard are so intimidated that they are unfit for service, which evidently contributed to the insolence of the mob, an order is made by the magistrates to dismiss them, and inlist able bodyed men fit for the service. They were generally old decayed tradesmen or day labourers: and if a method could be fallen on to supply this guard at once with well disciplined men from the regiments of foot in Scotland, I humbly think it would contribute greatly to strengthen the hands of the magistrates in maintaining the peace of the city. The present guard

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consists of three serjeants, three corporals, and about eighty private men. There has been no disturbance since the 7th, nor do I apprehend any till such time as some of the guilty come to be apprehended, and then we must be upon our best guard.

As this outrage was committed not by an ordinary sort of mob guided by sudden rage, but by a well contrived scheme, executed by a cool resolute gang, taking evidently to themselves authority over the mob, and restraining them from every folly but the wickedness they had determined to perpetrate, to which they kept them close at work; there is great reason to believe that some of that abandoned gang of smugglers had a chief hand in all this. One of the first things they were observed to do was to liberate two smugglers then in prison; and all this being done in the night time, tho' some moon light, it was not easy for by-standers to know persons in the least disguise. Some of the magistrates and I have spoke with several persons who were eye-witnesses to most of the tragical scenes, and yet did not know one of the actors, tho' they spoke to some of them. I have got some hints of some of the principal actors, but doubt much of getting evidence against them, except from such as if they were not actors were at least abettors, and they'l never speak out, I am afraid, unless they be assured of their pardon, and also some encouragement of living elsewhere, in case, as they all dread, they could not live here, if they make any discovery. As there is an end of government, if such practices be suffered to escape punishment, and as it is of the greatest consequence to discover the contrivers of this barbarity, all methods are set agoing to make the discovery, of which I shall from time to time take the liberty to acquaint your grace. I have, in obedience to her majesty's commands, sent an express to the lord advocate to come immediately to Edinburgh. I had formerly wrote to the solicitor general, and have his answer that he is to be here to-morrow. May I beg your grace to assure her majesty that I shall, with dutyfull zeal, endeavour to obey her commands, by doing all that lyes in my power to preserve in the most effectual manner the peace of the city of Edinburgh?

SIR

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

On the riot at Edinburgh, and the murder of captain Porteous.—Measures to be pursued.—Thinks that Mr. Finch should be supplied with money to counteract the French intrigues in Sweden.—Recommends Mr. Villars to be minister in Poland—And the lord chancellor's son to be clerk of the dispensations.

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On the murder of captain Porteous.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, September 20th—October 1st, 1736.

YOU will have received, by the last post, from the duke of Newcastle, an account of the horrible outrage committed last week at Edinburgh. The letter from lord justice clerk, and the narration that came with it, are all the accounts that have come as yet to the hands of the government; by which you will observe, that the magistrates had not then received any information, or made, or attempted to make, the least discovery of any of the authors or ringleaders of this barbarous murder. It appears, by some private letters, that the whole villiany was begun and perpetrated in two hours; and that the mob dispersed of themselves as soon as their work was done, and flung down and left all the arms that they had seized in the guard-room, in the Grass-market, the place of their vile execution; so that all things seem, at present, as quiet at Edinburgh as if nothing had happened.

Walpole
Papers.

This leaves nothing to be done immediately, but to use all possible means to discover the criminals, and to take effectual care, if they are discovered, that they may be secured and brought to condign punishment. For the first purpose, the most peremptory orders to the magistrates, attended with ample rewards and encouragements, must be given, and a sufficient force placed in the castle and suburbs of the city, with proper and necessary orders to defend and assist the civil power in putting the laws in execution, if any discoveries can be made, and convictions obtained upon them.

But here lye my greatest apprehensions, that we have, as yet, no prospect of coming at either, altho' it is impossible but the chief agents must be known to great numbers of people. But so great a panick seized them at the time, and such a terror seems to me to continue upon them, that I very much fear it will be difficult to persuade them to do any thing that may expose them again to the same ill consequences. I speak this as my own private observations; notwithstanding which, I think nothing must be omitted that can possibly be done to make examples of such an unheard-of attempt.

Lord Ilay goes for Scotland this week; and I think is determined to exert himselfe to the utmost upon this occasion. The queen's orders are likewise sent to general Wade to repair immediately to Scotland, to countenance and assist the government in their further proceedings.

I had

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I had this day a long discourse with Mr. Finch, who is preparing to leave this place in a few days. He mentioned to me what he had proposed to his majesty at Hanover, that some method should be taken to strengthen the hands of the king's friends in Sweden, and to enable them to encounter the agents of France with their own weapons. He seemed to think that a credit given him for about 5000 l. to be drawn for as occasion shall require, at three or more different payments, might answer the purpose. I promised him to desire you to represent this to his majesty as a matter worthy of his consideration, and that might be of great service. If his majesty is pleased to be of that opinion, you will settle it with Mr. Finch, and let me know the king's pleasure upon it. Mr. Finch pressed me very earnestly to recommend him to his majesty's goodness for the addition of plenipotentiary's pay; which indeed he convinced me, after so long service, was not an unreasonable request; and I have the queen's commands to lay this before his majesty in the most favourable light.

* Afterward
 Lord Clarendon.

I believe you are not unacquainted that lord Jersey was very solicitous, before his majesty left England, that his brother Mr. Villars * might succeed Mr. Woodward as minister in Poland; and now that the publick affairs seem to be so far settled in those parts, that it may not be improper for his majesty to name a minister, lord Jersey has renewed his application to the queen, that she would be pleased to recommend his brother to his majesty for this employment, which her majesty has commanded me to do in her name. By the character I hear of the young gentleman, I think his majesty will make a very proper choice; and I am obliged to say, lord Jersey very well deserves this mark of his majesty's favour; his behaviour, in all respects, is what his majesty must approve,

The queen has directed a warrant to make Dr. Brook *regius* professor of Oxford, pursuant to a minute entered in the secretaire's office, by the king's command. I received a letter from the lord chancellor, to desire his majesty would be pleased to let him name a successor to the office of clerk of the dispensations, now vacant by the death of the former. The office, his lordship says, is wholly under him. I acquainted her majesty with this request, who was pleased to think it reasonable, and ordered me to lay it before his majesty. The person the lord chancellor will propose, is his second son, but desires that it may not be known, lest so long notice before his new election, should stir up an opposition, and give him trouble. I send you a letter from the lord chancellor upon this subject.

THE

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THE EARL OF ILAY TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

On the assassination of captain Porteous.

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SIR,

Edinburgh, Oct. 16.

I Have not writ to you since I came here, because I almost every post gave the duke of Newcastle an account of any thing that occurred, and there remained nothing to trouble you with that could deserve your attention. It is a great concern to me to find it so difficult hitherto to make discoveries of the murderers. I am sure there is all the pains taken in it that is possible, and I never before had the pleasure to see all the king's servants here act so uniformly together in the discharge of their duty. On the other side, the secret patrons of the mob seem to be as busie in preparing false evidence to acquit the criminals as we all can be to bring them to justice. They that are in prison have already in their mouths the names of persons who, they say, will swear to their innocence, that is, their accomplices in the murder will easily perjure themselves to save their friends. The most shocking circumstance is, that it plainly appears the high flyers of our Scotch church have made this infamous murder a point of conscience. One of the actors went strait away to a country church, where the sacrament was given a vast croud of people, as the fashion is here, and there boasted of what he had done. All the lower rank of the people who have distinguished themselves by pretences to a superior sanctity, speak of this murder as the hand of God doing justice; and my endeavours to punish murderers are called grievous persecutions. I have conversed with several of the parsons, and I observe that none of those who are of the high party will call any crime the mob can commit by its proper name. Their manner of talking, were it universal, would extirpate religion out of the world for the good of humane society; and indeed I could hardly have given credit to the publick reports of the temper of these saints, if I had not myself been witness of it, and been admonished by one of them to have regard to the divine attribute of mercy (in English) to protect the rebels and murderers.

Under these and other difficulties, particularly the dread all the common people are in of being murdered if they make discoveries, the inquiry goes slowly on; but I cannot but hope that by degrees this matter will come to light. I have had great difficulty to prevent mischief between general Moyle and Mr. Lindsay. Moyle says that Lindsay was drunk, and never asked his assistance. Lindsay says that he told him he came from the magistrates to ask his assistance. I have, as far as it was in my power, enjoined silence upon this subject, or any other of the like nature. The behaviour of the magistrates

was

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was certainly worse than can well be imagined, and some of them, I have reason to suspect, were wilfully neglectful; and at the late elections at Michaelmas endeavoured to do all the mischief they could. I spoke to several of the present magistrates the other day, and told them that if they could not or would not show the people of England that the peace of the city of Edinburgh can be maintained, and such vile criminals be detected and brought to justice, I was apprehensive that the parliament would apply remedies very disagreeable to them; and, upon such an occasion as this, none of their friends would be able to protect them. They promised me to show such a spirit as to clear them of all imputation of want of zeal in the support of the laws. There shall be an experiment made in two days. A proposal shall be made to them by one of their members, to make an order of their town council for the examination of every merchant and every tradesman in the city concerning the apprentices and servants they had on the day of the tumult, and who have absconded since: this will be of use many ways in the further progress of the affair.

Mr. Wade and I have had some discourses about the forces; and we both agree that this is the best opportunity that could have happened for continuing, for the future, a strong garrison in the castle of Edinburgh; and we are proposing to make use of an order of the treasury for repairing the offices belonging to the royal palace, towards building stables for 50 or 60 dragoons, to be kept always there. The smuggling bill has had a very good effect here; a ship has been seized merely for want of hands to run the goods ashore as usual, the country people being afraid of the penalties, and are jealous of one another, for fear of the rewards' taking place. The gin bill is universally liked here, and will save this country 50,000 l. a year. And as brandy was the staple commodity in smuggling here, the effect of the act has appeared several ways already. As for the election, I am apt to think that the patriots will not appear; though I am told just now, that the earl of Stairs comes to town next week; I hope we shall have at least 25 present, which is more than they and all their proxies can make. There is a doubt arisen upon a clause in the gin act, relating to the duties on low wines; which the commissioners of excise apprehend may affect the civil list here. They were going to lay it before the treasury in a memorial, but I have desired them to delay it till they should write privately and receive good advice. This puts me in mind of the commissioners of the customs; you may remember their late behaviour as to the salt debentures. I was surprised to find, since I came here, that whereas formerly, when the salt duty was in force, they had, each of them, 200 l. a year as commissioners of salt, out of the salt duty; they now take that 200 l. a

year

year out of the customs, in ease of the salt, which is a loss to the civil list of 1400 l. a year. You'll pardon my troubling you with all this stuff; but it will come to you the end of the week, when you will be most at leisure. As there is no hopes of any tryals here these six weeks or two months, I shall leave this place when the election is over; and will always be ready to come here again upon the least accident that happens.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The king deeply affected at the murder of Porteous.—Consents that Mr. Finch may draw for 5000 l.—Approves Mr. Villars as the minister to Poland.—Consents that the lord chancellor's son should be made clerk of the dispensations.

DEAR BROTHER,

Göhrde, October 6, 1736.

I Received your letter of September — on the 3d instant, N. S. by Over the messenger, and have laid it before the king, who was extreamly surpris'd and concerned not only at the horrible outrage committed by the populace at Edinburgh, but at their being able to act in so barbarous a manner with so much ease, in open defiance of all law and government, without the least interruption on the part of the magistrates. But his majesty hopes, that now the necessary orders are given, to support the civil authority in discovering the chief authors and abettors of this notorious violence, the unwillingness, or panick fear that affected the civil officers before, will be turned into alacrity and zeal for putting the laws in execution, and bringing some of the murderers to condign punishment; and therefore, the king was extreamly pleased with lord Ilay's resolution to go immediately himself to Scotland, to exert his zeal for the service of the government on this occasion.

Walpole
Papers.

Copy.

As to the 5000 l. which Mr. Finch proposes he may be enabled to draw from time to time by particular sums, as he shall find it necessary for his majesty's service, and for strengthening the hands of his majesty's friends in Sweden, the king was pleased to say he had no objection to it, in case the civil list could well afford it, and it was managed with proper frugality and prudence. As to the allowing Mr. Finch the additional pay of plenipotentiary, which the queen directed you to lay before the king in a favourable light, on account of his long and successful ministry in Sweden, his majesty has not absolutely consented to give Mr. Finch this gratification and encouragement for his past and future services, but was so gracious as not to give a direct refusal. And therefore, I will take another opportunity to know his majesty's pleasure upon it.

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As to her majesty's recommendation, at the instance of lord Jersey, of his brother Mr. Villars, to succeed Mr. Woodward as minister in Poland, I am to acquaint you, that some weeks since the Saxon minister having hinted to me that his majesty's appointing a minister to his court would be very agreeable to his master, I mentioned it to the king, taking notice that I had heard Mr. Villars had been talked of for that station. But I was ordered to let monsieur Lofs know, in the civillest manner, that the king could not, at this distance from England, well determine upon the proper person for that honour; and therefore, he hoped that the deferring of that appointment to his return hither, would not be taken as a want of regard and affection for his Polish majesty, to whom he had given so many marks of his friendship. Upon renewing this application to the king, in consequence of your letter, his majesty was pleased to tell me that he readily agreed to the nomination of Mr. Villars, speaking at the same time in the handsomest manner of lord Jersey; but added that care should be taken to put him in mind of dispatching the proper instructions upon his arrival in England.

His majesty readily consented to lord chancellor's recommendation of his son to the vacancy of clerk to the dispensations, and that it should be done at such time as his lordship should think most convenient, on account of his election; and, in the mean time, he may depend upon the secret being observed here.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Cardinal Fleury proposes to renew the antient union between France and England.

MY LORD,

Paris, September 25, 1736.

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Papers.

Private.

Copy.

MY being so slow in giving a particular answer to the honour of your grace's private letter of the 27th past, by Walton the messenger, has been occasioned by some circumstances of which I shall here give your grace an account.

The steps I had taken in consequence of your grace's orders of the 17th past, would have been in a great measure sufficient to shew the king's disposition with relation to the overtures made me by the cardinal, had not monsieur Chauvelin's unaccountable behaviour made it necessary to open myself more freely to his eminency, and to shew him the great confidence his majesty reposed in him, whilst his colleague uses his utmost endeavours to represent our whole conduct in the most disadvantageous light, by laying all the rubbs this court meets with in her negociations abroad to the underhand dealings (as he calls them) of the king's ministers in foreign courts.

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To obviate, as much as in me lay, the ill effect and impression Chauvelin's malice might make upon the cardinal's mind, I went to him last Tuesday morning early, and acquainted him, that since our last conversation I had received more ample instructions, in answer to his ideas for coming to a closer union with his majesty, as the surest means for preserving a true ballance in Europe, and for preventing the ambitious views he supposed other powers might have for disturbing it. I repeated to his eminency most of what I had said to him on that subject, which I observed to him seemed to be as much as he could expect, till he should open himself further to his majesty. That, however, to put him (the cardinal) at ease from any apprehensions he might have of the king's being entered into alliances to the prejudice of France, I was authorised to assure him, that his majesty neither has entered, nor is disposed to enter into any measures or engagements that could be disagreeable, or give a just cause of offence to this nation; and this declaration, I hoped, could not fail of giving entire satisfaction, as it explained fairly the state we were in, and put it upon him to suggest more freely what he wanted of us, than perhaps he would have cared to do, whilst he thought we were treating upon a different bottom with other powers.

The cardinal seemed exceedingly pleased with this declaration. He said it was all he could desire: that now we must consider of the nature of the alliance he wanted to enter into with England, so as to make it agreeable to both crowns, as well as to other powers whom it might be thought proper to invite to accede. Upon which he thus far explained himself, that the alliance he aimed at was not intended for enabling either crown to make new acquisitions, but mutually to defend what each other possessed, and to prevent the encroachments of others, by which the ballance of Europe might suffer. If once a negociation for this purpose was set on foot, he said he would engage to end it in three months.

In order to give a further proof of the king's disposition to live well with France, I thought this a proper time to mention the part of your grace's letter relating to monsieur Chauvelin's being admitted into the confidence. I did it in such a manner as to let him feel the necessity of it, since Chauvelin would probably have the greatest share in the penning of the treaty, and the difficultys that might attend carrying on such a negociation without him. These reasons I gave as my own, assuring him, at the same time, that in the orders I had received those considerations were not mentioned, and that I was barely authorised to advise with his eminency concerning the time and method of taking monsieur Chauvelin into the negociation.

The cardinal took the matter quite right, agreed that it was proper to let monsieur Chauvelin into the secret, but thought it unnecessary till matters were

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ripe. I kept him to this, hinting that the first thing I was to expect was an entire communication of what he is now about; that the sooner he finished with the emperor and Spain, the sooner he might acquaint his majesty with it, and propose the steps he should think most adviseable to be taken by our respective sovereigns to consolidate the work. He gave me all possible assurances that he would do it without delay, as soon as the remaining difficulties between the emperor and Spain should be surmounted, which alone retarded the conclusion. He repeated again, in the most solemn manner, that we were much in the wrong if we still supposed that he had any engagements with the emperor beyond what we saw in the preliminaries; that he would never be accessory to the emperor's views for enslaving Germany; that the ambition of the house of Austria had never been more unbounded than at this time, and therefore he thought an union between England and France the *primum mobile* for that purpose, which inclined him to bring it about.

He then added, in the utmost confidence, that he had mentioned his scheme to monsieur d'Antin; that he found him averse to such an union; that d'Antin had put him in mind of our last treaty of Vienna, and argued from thence, that as we had concluded that treaty at a time when we were under engagements with France, we might do the same again, if it suited with our conveniency, without consulting them. The cardinal said he answered him, that the steps we had then taken were absolutely necessary for our keeping well with Spain, which it was our interest to do at that time; but it could never be our interest to break the union he now projects: upon which monsieur d'Antin acquiesced. We talked a good deal in general of this intended union. I seemed eager for it, giving still way to the cardinal's reasons for consummating the work of peace, and acquainting his majesty with it before we could come to treat closely; for now the cardinal looks upon it that he shall be able to compass the pacification by himself, and that he shall engage the emperor and Spain to come to some modification with each other.

This is the sum of what passed between us on last Tuesday; but yesterday the cardinal, resuming the discourse, was more explicite. After repeating most of what he had said the time before on the subject, he continued in this very manner: "*Il faut vous dire tout*, I will not treat with you whilst I am treating with the emperor. I solemnly protest I have no engagements with him, nor will have any with him, or any other power, beyond what is stipulated in the preliminaries. When once they are executed, I will lay the whole before the king your master, in order to concert with him proper alliances, to keep every body to what is stipulated in the preliminaries. This you may acquaint your master

master with; and I will stand to this as the only means to establish a lasting peace in Europe. Let the king think on his side; I will think on mine. We will do nothing but in concert. What we stipulate shall be in the strongest manner; and thus will our ancient friendship be renewed, and established upon such a foundation as to make it for neither of our interests to break it, since we shall have nothing to expect from one another, nor any thing to do, but to keep such powers within their bounds who would want to extend their dominions at the expence of others." I encouraged the cardinal in these notions, as they tended to put off any immediate proceeding upon a negociation; and they seemed to be a proof that at this time he has nothing in hand to our prejudice, which I took to be the chief object of the orders her majesty has been pleased to send me. As to the cardinal's sentiments upon the affair of Bergues and Juliers, I must beg leave to refer your grace to the inclosed copy of a letter I wrote the day before yesterday to Mr. Trevor on the subject.

I spoke last Tuesday to the cardinal of the notions Chavigny and his friends entertain of his going to the Hague, and taking England in his way. His eminency assured me that nothing was more false than both these notions; and that monsieur de Cambis should be declared out of hand. I pressed him yesterday, that it might be done immediately, and he said it should.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

On Chauvelin's behaviour to lord Waldegrave, and the difficulty of obtaining his removal, on account of the cardinal's irresolution.

SIR,

Whitehall, September 24—October 5, 1736.

I Am to transmit you herewith, by her majesty's orders, copies of several letters that I received on Tuesday last from lord Waldegrave by Saunders the messenger.

Her majesty was glad to find, that the orders, sent to his lordship for his conduct with the cardinal upon the confidential overtures lately made by his eminency, had so far an effect as to keep the cardinal in the same seeming good disposition he was in, without laying the king under a necessity of either entering into, or declining, an immediate negociation with France; and to make his eminency so far explain himself, or repeat again that he had no engagements with the emperor, nor would have any with him or with any other power beyond what is stipulated in the preliminaries; and that, when once they were executed, he would lay the whole before the king, in order to con-

emperor's

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cert with his majesty proper alliances to keep every body to what is stipulated in the preliminaries. And the manner in which the cardinal told lord Waldegrave that he might acquaint the king his master with this, and that he would stand to it, as the only means to establish a lasting peace in Europe, shews at least, (if there can be any dependance upon him,) that at that time he had no intention to enter into a stricter alliance with the emperor; and from the air in which it seems to have been spoken by the cardinal, may have proceeded from his eminency's knowledge that monsieur Chauvelin was disposed to follow another method, tho' he was determined to pursue that. The queen, however, could not but think it a great instance of the cardinal's weakness, (and what might be sufficient to disappoint his eminency's good intentions, if he really had them, for entering into measures to establish a good correspondence with the king,) that he should communicate his projects and his thoughts upon this subject to monsieur D'Antin, whom he knew to be an absolute creature of Chauvelin's; and her majesty looks upon this as a fresh proof that whatever the cardinal's disposition may be, he can neither conceal any scheme that he may have from the Garde des Sceaux, nor have the courage and resolution to execute it, if monsieur Chauvelin should oppose it.

Your excellency will see a very particular and a remarkable relation, in lord Waldegrave's private and particular letter, of monsieur Chauvelin's unaccountable behaviour towards him, and of the manner in which his lordship had talked with the cardinal upon this subject. Her majesty observes, notwithstanding the cardinal could not but own the force of every thing that lord Waldegrave said on this head, and declared very warmly his own dissatisfaction with monsieur Chauvelin's conduct, and seemed persuaded that he had all along thwarted his measures for the conclusion of the peace, yet that he owned frankly, that tho' he knew him to be false and ungrateful, he must nevertheless keep him on: so that how just soever lord Waldegrave's complaint may be of monsieur Chauvelin's behaviour, and however adviseable this attack might have been, if there had been any hopes to get him removed; yet as it is not to be expected that the cardinal, during his time, should have courage enough to take a resolution to displace him; and considering that, in case of any accident to his eminency, monsieur Chauvelin would be left in possession, in a great measure, of the power and authority of that kingdom, and, being in possession, would probably keep it for some time at least; her majesty is inclined to think, that lord Waldegrave should be directed, since he has already let the cardinal know the reasons he has to be dissatisfied with monsieur Chauvelin,

fin, to pass it over for the future, and to put things upon such a foot as to be in a condition to treat with the Garde des Sceaux upon business, and carefully to avoid giving him any pretence to quarrel with him, which it is plain monsieur Chauvelin would always be glad to lay hold of.

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Her majesty observing by lord Waldegrave's letter to Mr. Trevor, that the cardinal seems to apprehend that a negotiation is on foot between England, Holland, and Prussia, about the affair of Berg and Juliers, submits it to the king, whether lord Waldegrave should not be instructed to take an opportunity unaffectedly to undeceive the cardinal in that respect.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Conversation with cardinal Fleury on the riot at Edinburgh.—He thinks an union with the protestant princes in Germany necessary to prevent too great an increase of the emperor's power, and that it would be the interest of France to join in it.—Suspensions of the cardinal's sincerity.—Mentions the general opinion of the cardinal's unwillingness to risk a new war.—Nomination of Cambis.—Conduct of Chauvelin in that affair.—Cardinal's dislike of Chauvelin.—Expects his dismissal.

SIR,

Paris, October 23, 1736.

I Had this morning a very extraordinary conversation with the cardinal, which he allowed me to impart to you alone. It was upon the subject of the late riot at Edinborough, in which captain Porteous was murdered. I find the Jacobites and their abettors here have made a great stir about it, and look upon this horrid act as a signal of a rebellion. In this sence the cardinal mentioned it; not from his seeing it in that light, but as deserving nevertheless the utmost attention of the government. I acquainted his eminency with the facts as they were related to me in a letter from the duke of Newcastle, which agreed exactly with the account given in our news letters on all sides. I satisfied him that in the tumult nothing had appeared like disaffection towards his majesty; that as soon as the mob had perpetrated their inhuman revenge, they retired quietly, and had not given the least provocation since.

The cardinal said he knew all this; but that he saw in our gazetts promises of rewards for apprehending the actors in this wicked scene. That he was sensible they deserved the utmost punishments, but he was not for severity. That the proclamation might be very proper *in terrorem*, whatever step was intended in consequence of it after the discovery; tho', for his part, was he at the head of

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of affairs in England, he would rather let the matter drop than be too inquisitive: that it would be well to know the persons concerned in the scheme, which could hardly have been executed with so much address, had there not been better hands than the mob to conduct it: that in speaking to me thus, he meddled with other people's business, but that his respect and good will towards their majestys made him wish that rigour might not be used in this case.

I told the cardinal that I was no ways a judge of what ought or ought not to be done in this affair: that at a distance we saw things in gross; and that often with us a small accident or circumstance alter'd the whole face of an affair: that I was persuaded that whatever was done, would be upon the most mature deliberation: that I was very sensible of his good disposition towards us, from the share he took in our concerns. He said his desire of seeing England peaceable and quiet, made him apprehend any thing that might disturb it: that blood generally, instead of quieting, exasperated mobs, who, tho' mostly despicable in themselves, if once incensed, gave opportunitys to disaffected persons to join them in insurrections, easier to be prevented than quelled: that it was true he did not see in England a head of weight enough to give us much trouble, but still it was better to run no hazards.

I let the cardinal go on as long as he had a mind to in this strain, thanked him every now and then for his good wishes, and at last assuring him, that if I gave the king an account of so friendly a conversation, his majesty would take it very kindly. At first the cardinal seemed averse to my mentioning it; he supposed we might think it strange that he should meddle with our domestick affairs. I assured him of the contrary, and that his manner of doing it could not but be taken well; and that I was persuaded great deference would be shewn to his opinion, were there not circumstances in the case which might put the king under a kind of necessity of acting differently. Upon this the cardinal agreed to my mentioning it, provided it was to you alone; and he expressed on this occasion, as he has on many others, the greatest value and respect imaginable, and a sincere desire to live in strict friendship with you. I thought there could be no harm in giving way to the cardinal's sending this piece of advice to his majesty, as it carries a shew of good will, and tyes us down to nothing.

This conversation was followed by another still more extraordinary, considering the man it came from. We were discoursing upon proper alliances to maintain peace and a right ballance of power in Europe. The cardinal began with
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making a short apology for himself, telling me that I would perhaps be surpris'd at his frankness; but as he knew me, and was sure I would not make an ill use of any confidence he made me, he would open his mind. The cardinal then laid down as a rule, that nothing but a firm union between the protestant powers in Germany could prevent the emperor's growing too powerfull: that it behoved the king, not only as elector but as king of England, (and as such the first protestant prince in Europe,) to bring about an union between the protestant powers, to support themselves against the emperor or any one else: that it were to be wished a hearty reconciliation could be effected between his majesty and the king of Prussia: that the king of Prussia alone (considering his temper) was not of much consequence; yet, in a body with others, he would make a great figure: that it would ever be the interest of France to join a protestant league in Germany: that it was no new thing there, France having been constantly engaged in their support. He ran on a good deal in this project, saying, he did not speak on this subject as commonly people of his cloath used to do, but that, as minister of France, he was to prefer his master's interest and safety to all other considerations; therefore he was for keeping well with protestant powers, and glad to see them a respectable body.

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I thought it right to encourage the cardinal in these notions. He put me under no restraint of secrecy; however I judg'd it was better to add this in my letter to you, than in one to the office, since probably he would not like to have it made use of, and lookt upon what he said as private conversation.

I must own, sir, that such unexpected confidence and shews of friendship might make me expect they were to cover some fresh game, especially considering the informations we have had of the pretender's and the court of Spain's projects; but as all the others I have been able to procure seem to assure that no harm is intended us, I protest I am much at a loss to find out what to make of it. We have seen in several instances the cardinal's weakness, and how Chauvelyn has turned him about like a child, and made him recede from the strongest engagements; but I can hardly think him capable of so much craft and falsehood as to hope to lull us asleep with fine words, whilst he was endeavouring to destroy us. Besides, the general opinion of the most knowing here, that the cardinal would not for any consideration soever run the risk of a new war, seems to be an additional security against all we might have to apprehend from France during his administration.

I must not conclude this letter without a word relating to Cambis's nomination. The cardinal owned to me this morning, very freely, that Chauvelyn did

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all he could to hinder it; finding this impracticable, he would still have de-
lay'd it, but succeeded no better. I observe that ever since my disclosing my
mind to the cardinal about his colleague, whenever we meet, he speaks of him
as our common enemy, and really in such a manner that I should be no ways
surprised if he sent him a-packing the moment the drudgery of the pacification
was over. I fancy Chauvelin suspects it himself, and that may be a good rea-
son for his retarding it as much as he can.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Endorsed in Horace Walpole's hand-writing, "Project of a most secret letter to
sir Robert Walpole."

*Incloses the subsequent letter.—Acquaints him by order of the king that cardinal
Fleury offered subsidies to Sweden with a view to excite a party against Russia.—
The king orders Mr. Rondeau to communicate this intelligence to the czarina.*

Hanover, Nov. 4, 1736.

DEAR BROTHER,

Walpole
Papers.

Draught.

I Am commanded by the king to lett you know under the greatest secrecy, to
be communicated to nobody whatsoever besides the queen, that his majesty
has undoubted information that cardinal de Fleury took an occasion from M.
Gedda's discoursing with him upon the present supposed bad condition of the
Muscovite army in the Ukrania, and his enquiring what were the intentions of
France with regard to Sweden at this conjuncture, to give that minister soe
much encouragement as to assure him that France would doe every thing that
Sweden could in reason desire: and, after canvassing the difficultys and delays
of tedious propofalls for negotiating a treaty, and touching upon the subsidys
of the last convention, his eminence expressed himselfe in the following manner:
*Tenés; si l'occasion se presente pour vous remuer, il n'y a rien que je ne fasse pour
votre assistance avec argent, et si le tems pressoit, même avant quelque stipulation,
nous la ferions aussitôt après que possible; ce que vous pouvez mander hardiment.*
All which M. Gedda has accordingly wrote to count Horn in great con-
fidence.

His majesty concludes from this generous propofall of the cardinal, so con-
trary to his naturall temper, delivered in so firm a tone, that his eminence is
much in earnest in this affair; and the more soe, because severall obvious rea-
sons concur for disposing France to enable the Swedes privately with money to
fall upon the Muscovites on this occasion; to revenge themselves upon the
Rufs for their behaviour in opposition to France in the late troubles, on this side
to

to check the growth of so great a power in the north, that appears to be so useful and so steadily attached to the Imperiall court; to procure some relieve and diversion in favour of the Turks, whose empire France cannot willingly see brought too low; to recover, if possible, the strength of Sweden, to serve as a ballance to that of Russia, and that that crown may be hereafter, as formerly, subservient to the views of France. And lastly, the king thinks that one of the principall motives for this offer being made by France to Sweden at this juncture, is a strong desire to distress, and if possible, to destroy the ministry of count Horn and his friends; his majesty having the fullest evidence that the French ministers, in concert with count Gullenbourg and his party, have of late pointed all their views and measures relating to Sweden to that end; and monsieur Chauvelyn may imagine that nothing will contribute more effectually towards obtaining it than such a popular and plausible proposall, in appearance, for the service and interest of Sweden at this juncture.

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Count Horn, who is prudent and cautious, and knows the poverty and weakness of his country, naked and exposed to the maritime power of the Russ, may apprehend that a hasty and precipitate undertaking of a war against the Muscovites may make them resolve to put an end at once to that with the Porte, and even, rather than run the hazard of loosing what they have conquered from Sweden, consent to restore Asoph and all they have taken from the Turks, for the sake of making a peace on that side, the consequence of which might be the entire ruin of Sweden, if the whole Russian forces should be brought against them. On the other side, the people of Sweden are soe entirely devoted to France, are soe incensed against the Russians, and soe desirous of recovering from them their lost provinces, that nothing perhaps can withhold them, encouraged by the offer of money from France, animated underhand by the intrigues of Gullenbourg and his party, from crying out loudly for a war with the Muscovites, in a manner that cannot well be withstood by count Horn and his friends; and consequently may either oblige that minister to give into a measure that may prove fatal to his country, or to resign his administration.

The cardinal's offer has been as yett communicated to count Horn only, in the greatest confidence, for his consideration. He may indeed keep it to himselfe; but it has the face of being so advantageous to Sweden, that he cannot venture to conceal it long from others; besides that he cannot doubt but monsieur Chauvelyn will take care to apprise Carteja, and by his means the opposite party, with it; and consequently it must after some time come to be considered in form and in a way agreeable to the nature of that government. This

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being the state of this affair, you will easily conceive that his majesty can by no means think it for his service that the administration of count Horn and his friends should be distressed; or that Sweden, by rash and precipitate councils and measures, should be drawn into a war that may either prove fatal to them, and reduce them to a worse condition than they are in at present; or supposing them to be victorious against the Muscovites by means of the monies advanced to them by France, will for ever subject them to the influence and direction of that crown, which may prove of very dangerous consequence to the liberties and balance of Europe. In order therefore to obviate and prevent the confusion and hazards with which the cardinal's offer, should it take place, may be attended, his majesty has thought it advisable for him to give the czarina in the greatest confidence an intimation of it.

The season of the year is so far advanced, that the Swedes, should they be ever so much disposed to a rupture with the Muscovites, can do nothing more towards it at present, besides making preparations and concerting the measures against the time of action shall come on; in the mean while, the condition of the Russian army in the Ukraina, which by all accounts is extremely bad, joined with this intelligence, may, during the winter, dispose the czarina to make serious reflections upon her situation, and the consequences of it, so as to incline her to think in earnest of putting an end to the war with the Turks, before another campaign can begin. I have no need to say any thing of the obligation which that princess will have to his majesty for this singular mark of confidence and friendship in communicating to her such a seasonable and useful intelligence, which his majesty has thought proper to be done, by my writing a letter in cypher to Mr. Rondeau for that purpose, according to the inclosed copy, which I send you to be laid with this before the queen, and the king hopes it will meet with her majesty's approbation.

HORACE WALPOLE TO CLAUDIUS RONDEAU.

*Sends intelligence that France is endeavouring to excite the Swedes against Russia—
 with orders to communicate it to the czarina.*

Walpole
 Papers.

Most secret.

In cypher.

(Hanover, 21st Oct.—1st Nov. 1736.) I am by the king's special command to acquaint you in the utmost confidence, and under the tie of the greatest secrecy, that his majesty has had intelligence by a sure hand, that France, thinking that the losses Muscovy is said to have suffered this last campaign, and more particularly in the retreat from the Crimea, may prove a strong incentive to
 Sweden

Sweden to lay hold of the opportunity, and to attempt the regaining of their lost provinces, encourages as much as she can that spirit among the people; and, in order to determine the taking such a resolution in the senate, offers to assist the Swedes with great sums of money, without any previous treaty or stipulation, to put themselves in a condition to undertake and carry on such a scheme. The party for France in that kingdom, headed by count Gyllenbourg and monsieur Hopken, is both strong and active; and tho' count Horn is wise and cautious, yet the flattering juncture, the bent of the nation, the intrigues of the French partisans, and the great offers of that court, may overpower his prudence, and engage Sweden to attack the Russ on their side.

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His majesty, being persuaded that this is the plan of France in order to distress Muscovy as much as possible, has thought it became the true friendship he has for the czarina to have this intelligence communicated to her by a safe and trusty hand. The king has indeed one great difficulty upon his mind, which is, that as his majesty has been very earnest in pressing the court of Russia since the late rupture to come to an accommodation, the czarina may be apt to think that this intelligence is thrown in chiefly to promote the same end; wherefore, before you open yourself upon this subject to count Biron, to whom you are to apply, you will premise that the king has no other aim in all his proceedings than the advantage of her czarish majesty, to whose consideration he leaves entirely what he offers, as being the best judge of her own affairs. And you will then, after having exacted from the count the strictest secrecy as to the intelligence, and the manner how and by whom he had it, go on to inform him in the most confidential terms of what is above, that he may convey it to the knowledge of the czarina his mistress, as coming solely from those good and friendly intentions the king has always for her and her interest. You will also desire the count to manage the whole with the greatest caution, and not make the least mention to any one else of the canal by which he had those advices; only you will take his thoughts whether he or you should impart the same to count Osterman under the like seal of the strictest secrecy.

Tho' you are of yourself carefull, yet I must add by the king's command one further caution, that you should avoid giving any thing in writing upon this subject, or on any other important one, which you may have to transact with the Russian ministers, unless by order. It is his majesty's pleasure that you should send your answer to this most secret letter separate, and write to me only, without making a duplicate for England.

CLAU-

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CLAUDIUS RONDEAU TO HORACE WALPOLE.

*Communicates to count Biron the information contained in the preceding letter.—
Conversation with him on the subject.*

Walpole
Papers.

In cypher.

Most secret.

(St. Petersburg, November the 16th, 1736.) Tho' I had the honour to receive, on the 11th instant N. S. by way of Dantzic, your excellency's letter of the 21st October—1st November, I could not possibly answer it sooner for want of an opportunity to communicate the same to count Biron, which offered but two days ago. After having exacted from that gentleman the strictest secrecy on what I was going to tell him, and having first assured him, in the best manner I was able, that no other view than the great friendship the king my master had for the czarina and her interest, had led his majesty to tell his excellency what the French were doing in Sweden, that he might acquaint his mistress with the same, I then related to the count all your excellency has been pleased to intrust me with by the king's special command.

After that gentleman had desired me to thank the king, in the czarina's name, for this great mark of his majesty's friendship, he told me, he was persuaded the French would never be able to lead the Swedes to attack Russia; the consequences of such a step being too dangerous for them to undertake: for the Swedes could not be ignorant, that in case they should break with this court, and the Russians should have over them but one fortunate campaign, they would be able to penetrate even to Stockholm. I answered the count, that tho' I was convinced the Swedes of themselves could do them no great hurt, yet nevertheless, with the assistance of French money, they might distress the Russians very much at this time that they were at war with the Turks. Count Biron replied, that he did not doubt but the French would do them all the hurt they could; but that, in case they ever could design to furnish the Swedes with money enough to enable them to attack this court, he thought they would sooner have done it during the war in Poland, which had been a much more favourable juncture.

I answered him, that as the French had certainly done at that time all they could, tho' without success, to lead the Swedes to declare openly in favour of king Stanislaus; so now, that they think the great losses the Russians have suffered this campaign is a good occasion to make another attempt, they will leave no stone unturned to try again to lead Sweden to attack Russia; and that count Gyllenborg and monsieur Hopken will assist them with all their might.

To

To which the count made no reply, but thanked me again for the information I had given him; and seemed, I thought, persuaded that there was nothing to be apprehended from Sweden. Nevertheless, he desired me to inform count Osterman myself of all that I had been ordered to communicate first to him. I accordingly the same day waited on that gentleman, and acquainted him with the affair, after I had made him promise he would not discover it, nor the manner, nor by whom he had it.

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His excellency desired me also, in the most obliging terms, to thank the king, in the czarina's name, for this fresh mark of the king's friendship towards her; and desired me to mention to your excellency, that the czarina hoped the king would continue to inform her of all he should hereafter learn of that affair; and order his minister at Stockholm to do his utmost to prevent the French persuading the Swedes to undertake any thing against Russia; which would infallibly occasion great troubles in the north. For, in case the Swedes should act so contrary to their treaties and interests, they might be great sufferers in the end; for they must know, that if the czarina was willing to stand only on the defensive, on the side of Turkey, she could have more troops at liberty than were necessary to act offensively against Sweden.

The count then gave me to understand, tho' not in direct words, that the French had made new attempts to gain this court; and in case the czarina would have entered into measures with them, they would very willingly have helped her majesty to make a very advantageous peace with the Porte. I answered count Osterman, that I was easily inclined to believe the French would do all they could to lead this court to enter into her measures; but that I hoped the czarina would never abandon her old friends, whose only views were to do all that lay in their power to increase her honour and glory. To which his excellency replied, their actions shewed that they were unalterable in their friendship; and asked me, if I did not think, that in case the French should continue their intrigues at Stockholm, and did not succeed in their views, this would not be a very proper opportunity for the king my master's entering into some engagements with the court of Sweden, that would for ever ruin the French interest in that country: to which I could only reply, that the king was the only proper judge of that affair. The count said, he could not yet persuade himself the French, notwithstanding their great offers, would be able to lead the Swedes to make a step so hazardous, and so much against their interest, as would be their attacking this court; and added, that let the event be what it will, he was certain it would not engage the

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the czarina to alter her measures in the least; which last words looking, I thought, as if the count thought this intelligence had been given to lead them the sooner to make up matters with the Turks, I ended my visit in reiterating to him again, that the great friendship the king has for the czarina was the only and sole view his majesty had in giving the above account, which the king had received from a sure hand.

Your excellency may depend I shall not write a duplicate of this letter to England; and that I have always taken great care to give nothing in writing to this minister on any subject of importance; but have often, at their request, given them extracts, sometimes copies, of the letters I have received from my lord Kinnoul and sir Edward Fawkener, with news; which they have had translated, to be communicated to the czarina: and I find the Imperial and Dutch ministers do the like.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Thanks cardinal Fleury for his civilities and advice, and is willing to open a secret correspondence with him.

MY LORD,

London, October 29—November 11, 1736.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

I Deferred acknowledging the favour of your lordship's of the 23d instant N. S. untill I had an opportunity of speaking my mind with great freedom and sincerity, in return to the civilities which his eminence the cardinal had been pleased to expresse for me: and if this may prove the beginning of a correspondence to be carried on with friendship and confidence between his eminence and me, I shall be very glad to improve and carry it on for the mutual honour and interest of our respective masters.

I must begin with returning his eminence my thanks for his friendly advice, in relation to the late outrageous proceeding in Scotland; and when his eminence is pleased to recommend temper and moderation, all the world is witness how much that spirit hath been the rule of his majesty's government through the whole course of his reign, and to such a degree, that it is become almost no question, whether the too great lenity of the government has not greatly encouraged these late tumults and disorders. When the enemies of a government construe mercy into weakness, and are bold enough to promise themselves impunity from what they call a fear of punishing, it is high time to check at once their daring attempts. But the present affair of Scotland is not enough looked into as yett, to determine his majesty what part to

take;

take; but so great authority as his eminence's will not fail to have its due weight.

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But I must come now to the second part of your excellencie's letter, of an infinite more generall and extensive concern; which is his eminence's conversation upon a firm union between the protestant powers of Germany, to be established and supported in concert with the crown of France. His eminency has before, several times, mentioned to your lordship his thoughts concerning a more strict union and friendship to be established between the crowns of France and England.

The queen has, by the secretary of state, constantly declared her readinesse to enter into such a negotiation, and to promote it as far as can be thought reasonable and just. But as I am now writing with my own hand, in confidence to your lordship, in return of the cardinal's obliging professions towards me, I make no difficulty to venture to go a little farther than might be proper in an office dispatch, and to desire your lordship to acquaint the cardinal, if he will be so free as to open his mind more explicitly to your lordship, he shall have my assistance and concurrence; which I promise the more freely, because I am confident his eminency will propose nothing to his majesty, but what he may with honour and justice enter into. What I mean to say is, that tho' the notion in generall commands at first sight our greatest attention, yett as it must consist of so many parts, and regard so many different interests, it is impossible for a man to form any judgement or hazard an opinion upon a proposition so generall, and hitherto not explained. If the cardinal will draw out the heads of what he has conceived, and transmit them by your lordship to me, I do give my honour that what comes in this channel shall be equally unknown to every other one of his majestie's servants, as what I now write is to every person living, the queen only excepted.

I must now take a freedom which I hope the cardinal will excuse, as it proceeds from the greatest sincerity, and is said with the greatest deference. I must confesse I have found myself under the greatest difficulty to reconcile the advices your lordship has given us, from the cardinal's own mouth, of his sentiments with regard to the conclusion of the peace in generall, and in particular with respect to England and the maritime powers, with the intelligences, and of no little authority, which we receive from Vienna. For whilst the cardinal is talking in this pacifick and friendly manner to your lordship, we are *assured, from Vienna*, that propositions have been sent from France for forming a separate peace between the emperour and France, exclusive of the maritime

powers:

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powers : that some project or scheme of this kind had for a time laid dormant, and was not at first relished by the court of Vienna. But we are assured now, that under various artifices and disguises, it begins to gain ground a little ; and the shape in which it is now represented to us is, that it will be necessary for the three principal powers, viz. the emperor, France, and Spain, first to conclude a definitive treaty of peace upon the foot of the preliminaries, without any participation of the maritime powers, and that treaty to be the foundation afterwards of a generall definitive treaty.

The tendency and consequences of such a project, if it should prevail, are too obvious ; but in particular, are no ways consistent with what is said to you ; and I do hope the cardinal will give your excellency satisfaction upon this article.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Believes cardinal Fleury to be sincere in recommending lenity to the persons concerned in the riots at Edinburgh.—Strong inclination to pacific measures.—Mentions his motives for recommending an union of the protestant princes and France against the emperor.—Good effects of lord Waldegrave's insinuations to the cardinal against Chauvelin.—Probability of Chauvelin's removal.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hanover, November 11, 1736.

Walpole
Papers.

Private.

HIS majesty having been graciously pleased to communicate to me the account lord Waldegrave has given to you alone in a letter of the 23d past, of an extraordinary discourse which the cardinal had held to him in confidence, upon the conduct which he thought is most adviseable for the king to observe in his domestick as well as his foreign affairs at this juncture, I beg leave to trouble you with a few words upon it.

As to the first part relating to the outrage committed by the populace at Edinburgh in the barbarous execution of captain Porteus, it is plain the cardinal thinks that the orderly manner in which that was managed and perpetrated is an undoubted evidence of its having been contrived and conducted by persons of greater weight and consideration than the unruly mob, which seemed to be the worse part of it ; and therefore his eminence, according to his calm and pacifick disposition, seems of opinion that a strict inquisition and severe punishment of those concerned in this wicked act should rather be dropt than pursued. This way of reasoning, looking upon the cardinal to be an old, bigotted, popish priest, and a declared enemy not only to our religion but to our government and present happy establishment, and that he delights in confusion, would make one

one naturally suspect his having some knowledge of the horrid crime that was committed, of the authors of it, and of their being persons of consideration; and consequently that his design was, under this colour of friendship for his majesty and his government, to divert us from discovering and punishing the heads of it, and to keep us in ignorance and indolence in regard to the true view of this horrid crime and the consequences of it.

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But without considering whether this advice of his eminence should or should not be followed in any degree, I really believe, from the long and intimate acquaintance I had for severall years with the cardinall, that his confidential frankness towards lord Waldegrave on this head proceeded from the naturall disposition of his mind, as a lover of peace and quiet. For he has often told me at times, when I could have no reason to suspect his having any particular view, that notwithstanding his religion, to which he was strictly attached, notwithstanding his being a cardinall, yett he was too good a Christian, too much a lover of mankind, to encourage any attempt in favour of the pretender against his majesty's government; which must create a scene of blood and confusion in England, and in consequence of it in all Europe. And altho' he may possibly have from time to time returned civill answers to the pretender's agent, agreeable to his mild temper, yett I never had cause to think his eminence gave him the least hopes or encouragement. Nay, on the contrary, the Jacobites that had been very numerous and active at Paris upon the cardinall's first coming to the administration, after some experience of his words and actions, soon vanished, and retired in despair; saying, *there was nothing to be had during that old fool's life, who is governed entirely by the Walpoles*. And during severall years of my embassy, and his eminence having the chief credit in France, I did not perceive any thing that tended in the least towards favouring the pretender; and notwithstanding the great industry and address of the late bishop of Rochester to gain, by the means of the Jesuits, (whom the cardinall then favoured in opposition to the Jansenists,) some interest with his eminence, it had noe manner of effect. He was used to tell the Jesuits they had nothing to do with politicks; and therefore I really believe that what he has sayd to lord Waldegrave on the affair of captain Porteus, proceeds from a sincere desire that his majesty's government may continue upon a quiet and agreeable foot. Whether the means he suggests for that purpose be proper or not is another question. For he has often told me that, as he layd the foundation of his meritt in endeavouring to preserve the tranquillity of Europe, and should value himself more upon being called the *pacifick cardinall* than his predecessors could doe upon

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their

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their great and extensive conquests, he was perswaded that the publick peace in a great measure depended upon preserving the present establishment in England; which makes me believe that the cardinall's discourse was cordiall and sincere.

As to what the cardinall added relating to his majesty's endeavouring, as the first protestant prince in Europe, to bring about a firm union among the protestant princes in Germany, altho' it seem'd very extraordinary to lord Waldegrave, as indeed it would to any body who knows nothing more of him than being a priest and a cardinall, I can assure you he has held that language, during our great intimacy, often to me, founded upon a principle (which I thought the late war had cured him of), viz. that the emperor is a most formidable power; and that, in consequence of it, he is a most ambitious prince, and desirous to make himselfe absolute in Germany, which nothing can prevent but an union between the protestant princes in Germany, and France joyning in case of necessity with those princes, to check the designs of the house of Austria. I have often endeavoured to shew him the weakness of that family without the assistance of the maritime powers. He always persevered in insisting there could be noe sufficient restraint to the emperor's power and views, but a perfect harmony among the protestant powers in the empire, and noe sure way of preserving the tranquillity of Europe but a good understanding between France and the maritime powers. However weak the first part of this reasoning, as is found by experience, may be, and however the last maxim may be to the old ambitious views of France, yett I must doe the cardinall the justice to own that he never departed from talking and acting agreeably to these principles for severall years. But after monsieur Chauvelyn came into the administration, he found means by his tricks and impositions to make his eminence deviate from them, particularly in the execution of the treaty of Seville.

The cardinall's way of talking of monsieur Chauvelyn to lord Waldegrave, on occasion of the nomination of monsieur Cambis, shows plainly what a good effect his lordship's confidentiall overture to his eminence of the Garde des Sceaux's insolent behaviour has had; and I must freely own to you that I was not easy untill his lordship had done something of that nature, which you seem'd averse to in England. For I know by experience that the making such a confidence to the cardinall in a friendly manner, and with that address which is peculiar to his lordship, far from being disagreeable to his eminence, would please him, if you followed his advice for your conduct upon it afterwards. And as to the management of monsieur Chauvelyn, who by the weakness of his eminence

nence might be able to discover it, there is nothing so true and so well known to all the foreign ministers at Paris than that there is no pleasing that minister if you will have a particular regard for the cardinal; nay, unless you will abandon his eminence entirely, and be a meer dupe to the tricks and falsehoods of the other. The foot that lord Waldegrave is now upon with the cardinal, if managed, as I don't doubt but it will be, with prudence, may be of great service to his majesty. And what his lordship says relating to the removal of the *Garde des Sceaux*, joyned with what is intimated of that nature in the written newsletters from Paris, and what don Louis d'Acunha has mentioned in his letters to his friends at the Hague, after a conversation with monsieur Chavigny, makes the fall of that minister appear more probable than I ever thought or expected, especially since the duke d'Antin, that great and able courtier, and his friend, is dead; for I believe that monsieur Chauvelyn has not now one sincere friend of consideration about the court or the cardinal. All that I can say is, if that event should come to pass, it is impossible for his successor, lett him be ever so bad, to be worse for his majesty's interest than he is.

If we had known, or would have believed, what is the true situation of Chauvelyn with the cardinal, or if the doctrine of managing him to so great a degree had not been preach'd up in England, there is no doubt but what you hint in your letter to me, of not having lett him know the blunder he had made, would have been the wisest way, and the confidence of it to his eminence might have destroyed him quite.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The cardinal delivers his sentiments on his letter about the definitive treaty.—Expresses himself highly in his favour.—Proposes a secret correspondence, to be known only to the king of France and king and queen of England.

SIR,

Paris, November 21st, 1736, N. S.

ON the 13th instant I received the honour of your letter of the 29th October —9th November. As I could say but little in answer to it till I had seen the cardinal, I deferred till now giving you an account of my proceedings upon the several matters contained in your letter.

I was with the cardinal the day before yesterday at Issy, and yesterday I had another conference with him at Versailles. I began the conference at Issy with reminding his eminence of the discourse we had had some time before, which he had allowed me to communicate to you in the utmost confidence. I then told him

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him that I was authorised by you, and ready to acquaint him with your sentiments upon his friendly overtures. The cardinal seemed earnest to hear what you said on the several subjects we had treated. I told him, by way of introduction, that I would, in the first place, read over to him your whole letter, to apprise him in general of its contents, and then, if he pleased, we would consider upon it article by article, in order to take his thoughts the better upon the answer he might make. During the first reading, I found the cardinal often disposed to contradict some of the advices you had from Vienna; but, upon my observing that we should be less lyable to mistake one another if he made his objections when we took the letter to pieces, he acquiesced.

I am now, sir, to give you the most exact relation I can of what passed at the second reading. As the first paragraph of your letter consisted most of compliments, and shewed your desire to cultivate a friendship with his eminency for the mutual honour and interest of our respective masters, he made the like professions on his part, adding, that he did not question but this correspondence would answer the ends proposed by it; since, besides your known and distinguished abilities, he knew you to be *un tres bonnête homme, et de grand courage*, characters he looked upon as highly necessary to carry on good business, *bonne besogne*; the accounts he had from all people confirmed him in this opinion. In this confidence, he would enter into a private correspondence with you through my channel, that nobody in France should be privy to it but the king his master: and he expected that nobody besides their majestys should know that any thing I wrote upon the affairs that might be treated between you came from him; for tho' his taking this step was for the common good, yet, as a minister, he ought not to disclose matters of state. But his dependence was so great on the honour of those he now intrusted, that he was persuaded, that in any use you might hereafter make of any hints he should give you, his name would never appear. I gave him all the assurances he had a mind to; and, when our compliments were over, we proceeded to the body of the letter.

The cardinal approved extreamly your manner of reasoning upon the late outrageous tumult at Edinburgh; and, from what you were pleased to say on the subject, he was satisfied you would follow the properest step in such a case. He was very sensible and acknowledging for the attention intended to be given to his notions, which he had adapted to his conduct here; he felt the difference between the customs of England, and the extent of power in this kingdom, where, without shedding of blood, offences might be punished as they deserved.

We

We came next to the general part of your letter, relating to the alliances which might be made between the protestant powers, supported by France, and to the hints his eminence had lately thrown out for a more strict union between England and France.* I recollected, in a concise manner, what his eminence had proposed on both those heads, and made a short recapitulation of the answers I had given by command, which contained the fullest assurances of our readiness to concur with him in all that might be thought just and honourable for both crowns. I observed farther, that hitherto we had talked to one another in general terms, giving reciprocal assurances of a sincere desire to bring about a lasting union between our masters; but as now his eminency and you were agreeing to come to a closer understanding, the plainest method for this purpose was that he should indulge us so far as to draw out himself, or dictate to me, heads of what he might think conducive to the foregoing ends: that, considering the incertitude we were in with regard to the variety of shapes his negotiations had been in since his first treating with the court of Vienna, he could not think us unreasonable; and by a friendly proposal made by him, we might at once regulate our motions to act in concert with him, being fully persuaded that he would propose nothing but what should be consistent with his majesty's honour to come into. He allowed that what I advanced about the variations in his negotiations at Vienna to be true, relatively to the form; but as to the substance, he denied positively there being the least, insisting that when we saw the whole, we would believe him; that in the mean time, he would consider of my proposal, and let me know his sentiments. He insinuated pretty strongly that applications were made to him from many parts, *l'on nous recherche de beaucoup d'endroits*; but he should ever prefer a strict union with England, and would seriously consider to answer your expectations and his own insinuations for that purpose.

I thought it best not to press him farther on the preceding parts of your letter, foreseeing that the next paragraph must make him speak closer than he has done hitherto, unless he had been absolutely determined to amuse us by vain words and general propositions. In reading it to him, I laid my stress upon the advices you had from Vienna, that France had proposed to finish alone with the emperor exclusively of the maritime powers: that this scheme had lain dormant for some time, but began now to revive, and with the addition of Spain to the emperor and France, for the conclusion of a definitive treaty, which should be the foundation of another general definitive treaty. I added, carelessly, that I could not give credit to your intelligence for the same reason

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you mentioned, since it was contradictory to all his eminence had said to me of his intention, and of his desire that his majesty and the States General should be included in all the conclusive transactions for the pacification; and even he had wanted to engage his majesty in a particular treaty with France, to check the ambitious projects he apprehended the house of Austria and the court of Spain would probably imagine, when once the present pacification had taken place.

Here the cardinal bid me take a pen and a sheet of paper, and began to dictate as follows: "*Il est faux que l'on ait proposé un traité défensif entre l'Espagne, la France, et l'empereur. Il est vrai que l'on a proposé un traité définitif entre l'empereur et la France, comme le moyen le plus court pour parvenir à l'exécution des préliminaires, que le traité proposé n'est que général d'amitié et d'union, sans aucune stipulation, contre aucune puissance, ni même aucune stipulation particulière à leur sujet que ce traité n'est pas conclu.*"

A l'égard de l'Angleterre—Des le commencement de la négociation avec la cour de Vienne, la France a proposé que l'Angleterre et la Hollande eussent part à la pacification, que bien loin à présent de chercher à les en exclure, elle continue dans ses premiers sentiments pour les admettre.

As the cardinal made a sort of pause, I asked in what manner, how, and by what means this admission was to be brought about. But the answers to these queries were put off to farther consideration, and the cardinal dictated on: *Que l'objet présent de la négociation à Vienne c'est l'exécution des préliminaires tels qu'ils ont été communiqués à l'Angleterre, qu'ils n'y a absolument pas d'article secret, que le but en est de garantir réciproquement les arrangements qui y sont contenus.* By way of explication to the foregoing paragraph, he said there might be a small variation as to the letter of the preliminaries, in case Spain evacuated Tuscany, for then France was to have the actual possession of Lorraine: but this would make no alteration as to the general system with respect to France, since having that dutchy in present, or upon the grand duke's demise, considering its situation, seemed indifferent to the rest of Europe.

The cardinal then thus pursued to dictate: *Sa majesté très chrétienne n'a présentement d'autre vue que d'empêcher autant que faire se pourra par des alliances défensives qu'aucune puissance n'envahisse les états ou les droits des autres. Par ce qui est déjà dit monsieur le chevalier Walpole peut voir la part qu'il conviendra à l'Angleterre de prendre pour ces fins, il pourroit même (s'il le juge convenable) trouver des moyens de faire goûter à la cour de Vienne l'admission de l'Angleterre au présent traité, que la France, concurreroit volontiers, et cela ne paroîtroit pas étrange à Vienne, puisque monsieur le cardinal y a toujours parlé dans ce sens.*

These are the very words as they were dictated to me by the cardinal the day before yesterday at Issy. I read them over to him yesterday at Versailles to avoid mistakes, and he acknowledged them as his own. He put me there again in mind, that it was not in his ministerial capacity he took this step, but merely to shew his confidence in you: that he thought it the best way of treating, since by exposing the state he was in, you might judge what might be proper for England to do to act in concert with France.

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I thought it more desirable to overlook some inconsistencies in the series of his proceedings, than to venture putting him out of countenance, and perhaps out of humour, by observing upon them, especially upon his confession of the particular treaty between France and the emperor for finishing exclusive of the maritime powers. I just made him feel I was sorry he had been drawn into such a step contrary to his own intentions. He did not deny it, but all was for the better. I asked him nevertheless, whether, if this particular treaty was concluded, he intended to have a general definitive one? He answered briskly, *assurément*, for every body had a mind to it. I asked how it was to be made, by whom it was to be proposed, and where it was to be negotiated? He answered, he did not really know; that no measures had yet been taken; that he was at a loss when the first treaty (if that was to take place) would be settled, from the dilatory ways of the court of Vienna. For, if once she was in possession of all she might expect by the treaty, she would not be in haste to finish it; and as the evacuation of Tuscany was not to be in consequence of this treaty, but of the acts to be passed between Spain and Vienna, the emperor would have no reason from thence to hasten the conclusion of his treaty with France.

To keep up the discourse, I asked the cardinal if he thought of a congress for the general definitive treaty. He said he would avoid one if he could; that we saw how much time a private transaction with the emperor for matters quite settled by the preliminaries had taken up; that if a congress was appointed for the discussion of such other as would unavoidably be brought there, God alone knew who would live to see an end of it; therefore, if he was not forced to have a congress he would have none. Here he talked a good deal, rambling from one point to another, and throwing out general propositions: that as by the preliminaries nothing was to be treated in the general pacification but what had been done in consequence of the late war, the settlement of the preliminaries was sufficient to establish the peace; that all the rest was but formalities, which might even lessen the strength of the *foud*; that the pacification had taken up a long space; that he was tired, and would finish at any rate; and

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that if the emperor's councils judged right, or he was in the emperor's case, he would agree to the last project of Spain, which seemed to be equitable.

This last passage gave the cardinal an opportunity to assure me in the strongest terms that he had no engagement whatsoever with Spain; that his engagements with that court had finished with the warr; that the queen of Spain hated him as much as ever, and was as jealous of France as if he was at the eve of declaring war to her; that she pretends to know for certain that France will join its forces with the emperor to drive her out of Italy, if she does not quit Tuscany. The cardinal observed here that he has no such intention; he is not sorry the queen of Spain should think it, hoping it will make her more tractable. He then told me the allarms count Glemes had put her into upon some advices he received that the French were drawing a considerable body of men together on the frontiers of Catalonia. This gentleman, who commands the Spanish forces in that province, sent an account of it to Madrid, hinting that he had reasons for apprehending the French would invade Catalonia, if the embarkation went forward. Upon receipt of Glemes's letter, the queen of Spain sent for monsieur de Vaugrenant, abused him excessively, and would not believe a word of all he said to remove her suspicions. She sent orders immediately to Trevigno to make strong remonstrances against this manner of proceeding of the French court. This the cardinal told me in great confidence, and as a proof of the moderate footing he is upon with their catholick majesties.

When he had concluded his story, I put him again upon the subject of his former notions of treating privately with us, when his treaty with the emperor should be continued in the same mind as before; that he would *bona fide* acquaint us with all his treatys; that we ought to do the like by him, and we might then see to form alliances agreeable to both our engagements; that with respect to him we should have few difficulties, for he had no treatys but what we knew of; that it was a common notion we had lately concluded one with king Augustus, and that we were now upon concluding one with Sweden. But he was not in pain about them, being sure that you would not take engagements without France inconsistent with those you might have with other powers; that his object in treating with us was to maintain a just ballance in Europe, and to obviate what might occasion fresh disturbances; that this object ought to be equally desirable by his majesty as by France; and for that purpose he (the cardinal) was as ready to treat, tho' with this express condition, that in any future convention or agreement between England and France we must not look upon ourselves to be engaged only by the terms of art, but be likewise engaged upon our honours

honours not to enter into any engagements with other powers without previously acquainting each other with what we proposed to do. In this method, and in no other, we could make a lasting work.

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I talkt in general of the treatys France was supposed to have, particularly of that with the elector palatin for the succession of Bergs and Juliers. He said that when it was a proper time to consider of that matter, we should see his engagements did not go a great way. He still suspects the Dutch having their private views in favouring the king of Prussia, tho' they would have it thought they mean only to remove any occasion of *voyes de fait*. He supposes that it would be more beneficial to the maritime powers that a good share of the palatin succession should go to a branch of that family, who would have little besides, than that it should go towards making the king of Prussia more powerfull in Germany than he actually is. He said that after this we would easily believe he had no engagements with that prince, adding it in a jesting way, that the presents the French queen sent him of tapissery and snuff-boxes, &c. were a sufficient compensation for the civilitys he had shewn her father.

In the course of the conversation the cardinal himself renewed his former professions of having nothing to do with the pretender. He told me frankly that he fancied we had had some suspicions of his or his master's being disposed to favour him. He said as much as it was possible to say to clear himself and the French king of such an imputation. As we were breaking up he renewed an old complaint against Mr. Robinson, and attributed to him many difficultys he had been under in the Vienna negociation; and he desired that I would get you to write to Mr. Robinson to avoid if possible giving room for such complaints. I did the best I could to clear Robinson, told him that he had justified himself sufficiently some time ago on these heads; and that I was persuaded these suggestions to Mr. Robinson's prejudice came from people who wanted to keep up a coldness between our courts. He pretended still to think differently. I take it for granted that Bartenstein makes a merit to Dutheil in exaggerating things that Mr. Robinson may now and then let fall in his splenetick moods; and it is very probable that Dutheil, to cover his frequent blunders, and to make his court to monsieur Chauvelyn, may lay his own faults to Mr. Robinson's charge.

I must not omit acquainting you that the last thing the cardinal said was, that Chauvelyn must not know a word of any thing that passed between us, and this he repeated in a misterious manner, putting his finger to his mouth; *Pas un mot de cecy au Garde des Sceaux*. I have endeavoured to relate facts as near as I could as they were told me by the cardinal. My letter is already too long for

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encreasing it by observations of my own, and you are much more capable of making just ones than any body I know. All I can venture to say on the foregoing subjects is, that tho' it is to me a great question whether much will be concluded in consequence of these private transactions with the cardinal, yet from what he said, one may judge that he has not taken any engagement, nor is like to take any to our prejudice.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Baron Gedda is desirous to go to England as Swedish minister.

DEAR SIR,

Paris, November 24, 1736.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Draught.

JUST as I am dispatching a messenger for England, monsieur Gedda is come in to me; he says he is under some difficulties to his project for going to reside in England on the part of Sweden. His case followeth:

The place of secretary of state for foreign affairs in Sweden will be soon vacant, the present secretary being to succeed baron Ribbing in the presidentship of the mines. The queen of Sweden has insinuated to Gedda, that she would like to have him put in for the secretaryship; and Gedda has not dared to decline asking it: but he has writ at the same time to count Horn, that he would like full as well to go to England, provided he had the same allowance as baron Sparr had there, upon account of the expensiveness of the country. But count Horn wishes that Gedda should go for England. The count has constantly told him that the only difficulty that could attend his going was the salary he expected, since the pretence taken to recall Sparr was to save the extraordinary they gave him, and this was a point would not be easy to get over. Gedda hopes he has found out an expedient to remove count Horn's difficulty; he reckons that it may be easily brought about. That though he should be appointed secretary of state, he may be sent to England, and his place of secretary be executed *pro interim* by a deputy, of which there are many instances in Sweden: by this means the common pay of envoy with the pay of secretary would be sufficient to maintain him well in England, and count Horn's objection would be removed. Gedda desires me to write this to you, that, if you think proper, you may get Mr. Finch to talk of it to count Horn, not as a thought from Gedda, but as a thing that may have occurred to him. Forgive this scrawl, which is owing to the haste I am in not to detain the messenger.

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SECRET CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO A LETTER FROM THE
PRETENDER, WHICH CHAUVELIN BY MISTAKE GAVE TO LORD
WALDEGRAVE.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

*Chauvelin delivers by mistake, among other papers, a letter from the pretender.—
Conversation with Chauvelin on that subject.*

MY LORD,

Paris, October 11, 1736.

I Write this most secret letter to give your grace a full account of a most extraordinary transaction between monsieur Chauvelin and me, occasioned by a paper which was given me the day before yesterday by this minister, I am to suppose, through a gross mistake.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

After dining with monsieur Chauvelin, I went down, as usual, to talk upon the affairs I might of course have to treat with him on the ambassador's day. Before we began our conversation, he went to his desk and took out a parcel of papers, which he said were the answers, sent him by the controleur general, to a memorial I had given in at Compiègne in behalf of one Gallichamp, a Jersey-man, recommended to me by your grace. He made me an excuse for not giving it sooner, which had happened out of forgetfulness, for the controleur's letter was dated the 17th past. As I intended, at my return home to Paris, to have the papers looked over with Gallichamp, I put them in my pocket, and proceeded to talk with monsieur Chauvelin upon other matters; and after a short visit, I took my leave. When I got home at night, I was much surprized, in looking over my papers, to find amongst them a copy, or a translation, (I rather suppose the latter,) of a letter from the pretender to some agent of his here; but, as there was neither docket nor superscription upon it, I cannot say which. Your grace has here a copy of it, exactly conformable to that I had.

After my first surprize was over, I considered with myself, whether this paper had been put, by mistake, amongst those monsieur Chauvelin gave me, or whether this might not be an artifice of his, to shew me, by an indirect way, that the pretender and his emissaries were awake; and that, if we disoblige France, this court might do something disagreeable to us in the pretender's favour; hoping, by this step, to intimidate and bring us into whatever measures he should propose.

After numberless reflexions on the case, I determined to return to Chauvelin, to endeavour to find out the truth of the matter, and to hear what the Garde
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des Sceaux would say upon it, before I mentioned it to the cardinal. I defer'd going till this morning, that there might not be an appearance of mystery, which my being at Versailles two days together would infallibly have occasioned.

The paper given by monsieur Geddes to the ministers of the mediators at Lisbon, inclosed in your grace's letter of the 23d past, which I did not receive till yesterday in the evening, (the mail having been detained by contrary winds a day longer than ordinary,) gave me a very good pretext to go this morning to court; and I took my measures to arrive there at an hour when the cardinal is usually with the French king; so that my going strait to Chauvelin appeared a thing of course.

He seemed surpris'd at seeing me there, and still more so when I told him it was he that brought me. I asked him if he had miss'd no paper since the night before last. He said he had not. I watch'd his countenance as narrowly as I could, to see whether it alter'd; but all I could observe, was an eagerness to know what I meant by my question. Upon which I told him that he had given me, with Gallichamp's papers, one no ways relating to that affair, and I had brought it with me to restore it to him. I then put the letter into his hands, telling him, in a jesting way, that I was the last person it ought to have been given to, unless it was intended as a mark of his dislike to the writer, and to his cause; in which case I was much oblig'd to him for this confidence in me, and the king my master would be very sensible of it. All this pass'd standing. He then propos'd sitting down; but upon looking into the letter, he was so dash'd, and knew so little what he was about, that after reading over three or four lines, he said I will read it all to you if you please; I replied, smiling, that he could not suppose I had it a whole day without being apprised of its contents. He then protest'd he had never read it himself; that it had been given him the same morning he had, by mistake, given it me; and to make what he said appear more credible, he insist'd upon reading it over aloud to me. When he came to that part of it where the pretender talks of his *retablissement*, he said, *S'il attend que nous le retablissions, il attendra long tems*; and then made a sort of protestation of his never having been a favourer of the pretender, nor a listener to his foolish projects. He observ'd, that the pretender's ministers were very much out in their calculations, in supposing that France would propose any thing in his favour to the court of Vienna; or, if they did, that the emperor would hearken to them. He afterwards read away pretty fast to himself, saying, now and then, with an air of derision, *Ces mes-*

seurs sont bien instruits. In fine, he said, this is one of those letters he generally writes, upon the least alteration of affairs in Europe, to put in his claim for support and protection from any of those powers he hopes may think it worth their while to encourage him; but, I can assure you, that is not the case with us.

I put it home to him to know who the letter was to, and whom he had it from; I supposed O'Brian the most likely for both; but he denied it positively, and would make me believe that it was the translation of an intercepted letter. He said he could not tell me exactly how he came by it, but that I might easily guess; for that it was his office to be informed of every thing, by one means or another. I bid him observe the date and conclusion of the letter: by the first it appeared to have been writ six weeks ago; by the latter, the person it is writ to is directed to wait upon the cardinal and him, to talk upon the matters contained in the letter. That it was not to be supposed this agent, whoever he was, had been so neglectfull of his master's business as not to have been with him and the cardinal to execute his orders. He pretended not; but, in a kind of confidence, he said, *Mais il pourroit bien venir Samedi*, the day after to-morrow. I asked who; he answered O'Brian; adding, that in return for my civility to him, he would, at our next meeting, tell me plainly what had passed between him and this agent of the pretender's. He added farther, that though this was a great *méprise*, he was very glad of it in the main; since it not only afforded him an occasion to clear himself, if we had any notion of his being Jacobitishly disposed, but that the contents of the letter were an evident proof that this court was in no scheme, nor under any engagement, to promote the pretender's interest.

I made a short observation upon the last line or two of the first paragraph; where the pretender, mentioning the emperor's having a right to expect that France shall speak first, says, *Sur tout en égard à l'insinuation qu'il a fait il y a plusieurs mois.* This he said he could not explain; but that it seemed relative to some transaction between the court of Vienna and the pretender, to which he was not privy. May not this relate to the overtures which the cardinal told me, a long while since in confidence, were made by the pretender towards a peace? But I did not say so much to monsieur Chauvelin, considering from whom I had it.

The next matter in agitation was the use I might make of the letter. To cut short any entreaties which I judged he would make for its going no farther than me, since it was by his blunder, which he repeated over and over, that I came by it, I told him that, were he in my place, he would not hesitate a moment

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ment to give an account of it to the king his master; that I was determined to do the same; that I would represent the facts in the best lights I could to clear him from being supposed a promoter of the pretender's cause; that, as he desired me not to mention this accident to the cardinal, I would not. But I must tell him beforehand, that I should take a proper opportunity to insinuate to his eminency, that I had certain intelligence of the pretender's emissaries being at work, and hear what the cardinal would say to me on the subject. Monsieur Chauvelin was satisfied with this; and allowed me to say any thing, provided I would give him my word that the cardinal should not know how I came by it.

This accident, or whatever else your grace may be pleased to call it, seemed, whilst I was with monsieur Chauvelin, to have driven out of his thoughts all our late disagreements. He called me twenty times *mon ami*, and repeated as often, *je compte sur votre bonheur*. This is certain, that if he gave me the paper designedly, he acted his part exceeding well to disguise it.

I need not trouble your grace with any remarks on this letter; it speaks itself. I do not question its being genuine. It shows plainly the pretender's looking upon this as a proper conjuncture to endeavour to disturb our present happy establishment under the king and his royal family. I will use my utmost endeavours here to defeat any such pernicious designs; and I doubt not, but his majesty's ministers in other courts will exert themselves also in discovering and preventing the ill effects thereof. For though, as monsieur Chauvelin observed, this may only be a fetch of the pretender's to put people in mind of him, yet all that comes from that quarter deserves the utmost consideration.

P. S. October 13th. Conn has just been with me. He pretends to have undoubted intelligence that the pretender's eldest son is at a convent near Barcelona, disguised in a priest's habit. I questioned Conn, how he came by his intelligence. He says he saw it in a letter from a man at Barcelona, who is very well informed.

Letter from the PRETENDER, delivered by mistake from CHAUVELIN to the Earl of WALDEGRAVE. Inclosed in the preceding dispatch.

A Rome, ce 28me Aout, 1736.

Walpole
 Papers.

Copy.

JE n'ai pas tardé d'écrire à Vienne en conformité de ce que vous m'avez suggeré, il y a quelques semaines afin qu'on eût tout le loisir de prendre des justes mesures pour decouvrir, après l'entière conclusion de la paix, les dispositions

dispositions de l'empereur par rapport à mes intérêts, dans la supposition que la France seroit portée à faire une tentative pour mon retablissement, en cas que l'empereur n'y voulût pas mettre d'opposition. Je suis bien aise de m'être pris de bonne heure à écrire ainsi à Vienne; parce que, par la reponse que j'en reçois, je vois clairement que ce que j'ai écrit ne suffira point pour engager l'empereur à se declarer sur une matière également importante et delicate. Ce qui vient de moi seul sur une pareil sujet, sera toujours suspect. On pourra croire assez naturellement qu'à force de me flatter, je me figure ce qui n'est pas, et si je ne puis dire quelque chose de positive, et même plus ou moins d'authentique sur les dispositions de la France, je n'ose espérer que l'empereur voudra s'ouvrir à moi.

Enfin seroit il raisonnable, qu'il le fit sur des idées et des espérances vagues et générales, qu'on lui représenteroit de ma part, sans sçavoir ce que pense véritablement la France sur mon sujet. Car enfin quelque picqué qu'il puisse être contre l'électeur d'Hanovre, il croiera toujours qu'il lui emporte trop de conserver sa voix, comme électeur, pour ne pas avoir quelques ménagemens pour lui, jusques à ce qu'il puisse s'assurer de trouver mieux son compte ailleurs par rapport à ses veües pour sa succession. On suppose aussi que l'empereur n'est pas trop content des delais, qui ont été apportés à l'entiere conclusion de la paix. Mais, lors qu'elle sera une fois terminée, il n'est pas à douter, qu'il ne sent vivement à qui, il en sera redevable, et de quelle affreuse situation la France l'aura tiré, et même des à présent en retirant ses troupes du Rhin et de l'Italie, il me semble qu'il donne une marque bien éclatante à la France de sa confiance en elle, et que cette dernière devroit être encouragée par là à lui en donner de la sienne, particulièrement sur ce qui me regarde; sur tout lorsqu'on réfléchit que sur cet article l'empereur a plus de ménagement à garder que la France, laquelle ne paroît pas avoir à présent rien à espérer, ni rien à craindre, de l'électeur d'Hanovre.

Enfin il est certain, que si nous voulons sçavoir véritablement les dispositions de l'empereur à mon égard, il faut s'y prendre d'une autre manière. C'est aux ministres de France à considerer et à determiner ce qui leur convient de faire; mais s'ils veulent que l'empereur ne s'y oppose pas, et qu'ils souhaitent sincèrement de s'unir étroitement avec lui, je me flatte qu'ils n'hésiteront pas à fonder eux-mêmes l'empereur, soit par mon canal, soit par quelques autres, sur le parti qu'il seroit disposé à prendre, en cas que la France entreprît mon retablissement. Je suis si persuadé que l'empereur est tout disposé à n'y pas mettre opposition; et j'ai une si grande idée de sa droiture et de sa probité,

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que je suis pleinement convaincu que l'on ne risqueroit rien en cela. Je sens même, qu'il n'y a pas d'autre chemin à prendre pour faire parler à l'empereur sur mon sujet. Car quoique la confiance doit être mutuelle sur cet article, cependant il se croiera toujours en droit de s'attendre que la France soit la première à lui en faire à présent, sur tout en égard à l'insinuation qu'il a fait il y a plusieurs mois.

Du reste, depuis la lettre que vous m'avez écrite sur ces matières, les affaires ont changé de face par rapport à l'empereur. Il va s'engager dans une guerre qui l'occupera tout entier. Sa religion, sa gloire, son intérêt, y pourront être pleinement satisfait ; et en portant ses armes dans un pays si éloigné des nôtres, il ne fera pas même dans son pouvoir pour long tems de donner de la jalousie à la France. Or dans une pareille conjuncture qu'est-il besoin de faire aucune confiance à l'empereur sur les veües, que l'on peut avoir pour mon rétablissement ? et pourquoi tarder à l'entreprendre, dans un tems, ou tout paroît conspirer à en faciliter le succès ; si on le veut véritablement ? je ne vois pas ce qui doit, ou peut empêcher la France de faire, sans perte de tems, les dispositions à cet effet ; et quand tout sera prêt pour l'exécution, on pourra pour lors montrer de la confiance et de l'égard pour l'empereur, lui participer le projet, et lui en demander, pour ainsi dire, son agrément.

Enfin cette conjuncture me paroît bien critique et bien importante pour moi, et il ne tient certainement qu'à la France de me rétablir, j'oserai quasi dire, sans coup ferir. La nation Angloise est toute irritée contre la maison d'Hanovre ; l'empereur est sûrement piqué de la conduite de cet électeur envers lui, durant la dernière guerre, et ne pourroit pas l'assister quand même il le voudroit. Il est à presumer, que les Hollandois, vüe leur situation présente, ne feroient guères d'humeur de le faire, et les dispositions de l'Espagne envers cette famille ne peuvent être douteuses. De sorte qu'il y a tout lieu d'espérer qu'elle se verroit abandonnée de tout le monde ; et, nullement en état de s'opposer aux troupes Françoises, lesquelles, avec moi, feroient sans doute reçues à bras ouverts par toute la nation.

Quand vous auriez bien examiné cette lettre, il conviendra que vous alliés trouver monsieur le cardinal de Fleury et monsieur le Garde des Sceaux ; et que vous leur parlies à fond sur toutes ces matières, et avec toute confiance, en leur faisant bien sentir que la Providence semble, à présent, avoir mise mon fort entre leurs mains.

JACQUES R.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

The queen approves his conduct.—Instructs him what to say to Chauvelin and to the cardinal.

MY LORD,

Whitehall, October 8—19, 1736.

I Received, by express, your excellency's most secret letter of the 11th instant N. S. with the important paper inclosed in it, and laid them immediately before the queen.

I am, in the first place, to acquaint you with her majesty's entire approbation of your behaviour on so great and critical an event; and, as a mark of it, you will find that the directions now sent you are agreeable to the method that you yourself have already taken. Her majesty has no doubt, but that this material paper was given you entirely by mistake; which plainly appears from the confusion monsieur Chauvelin was in when he was acquainted with it. But the queen thinks it was so fortunate an incident, that (if rightly managed) great use may be made of it towards procuring a full discovery of what has been or may be carried on by this channel; and consequently preventing any ill effect that might have arisen from it.

Her majesty extremely approved your having so freely told monsieur Chauvelin, that you were determined to send a full account of it to your court; and at the same time that, as he had desired you, you would not mention it to the cardinal, but that you would take a proper opportunity to acquaint his eminency that you had certain intelligence that the pretender's emissaries were at work, in order to see what the cardinal would say upon this subject.

You will accordingly let monsieur Chauvelin know, that you having immediately sent hither an account of this accident, and of what had passed with him upon it, her majesty had directed you to return him her thanks for the strong professions he had made to you, that he had never been a favourer of the pretender, nor a listener to his projects; and for the assurances he gave you, that the pretender should receive no encouragement from his court: that her majesty could not but look upon his promise to acquaint you with what should pass between O'Brian, the pretender's agent, and him, as a great mark of his sincerity in this point, and resolution not to enter into any schemes in favour of the pretender: that, though her majesty is glad to observe, by the contents of the pretender's letter to his agent at Paris, that no encouragement appeared to have been given to the pretender from the court of France, and that his expectations were rather founded upon vain hopes and imaginations, than upon

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Papers.*Most secret.**To be opened
by himself.**Copy.*

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any real foundation, yet the Garde des Sceaux cannot be surpris'd, that when such a correspondence had accidentally fallen into the hands of the king's minister, her majesty should be very desirous of knowing the bottom of it; which, from monsieur Chauvelin's friendship, and the professions he made to you, the queen is perswaded you will be able to obtain, as far as it has any-ways come to his knowledge. And you will particularly endeavour to find out from whom the Garde des Sceaux had this letter (though it is pretty plain it was from O'Brian)? what may have been the reason of his having had it in his custody so long after it must have been received at Paris? and what can be meant by the insinuations supposed to have been made by the emperor some time ago to France? Though that is a circumstance monsieur Chauvelin pretended he was not acquainted with, when you mentioned it to him, he must have had the curiosity, in his conversation since with O'Brian, to desire an explanation of it from him. And as he told you, that O'Brian would probably be with him on Saturday last, and promised to acquaint you with all that should pass, you will get from him as full an explanation as possible of all that O'Brian said to him, as well as of his answers; and particularly of the answer he returned to the letter, the contents of which, it appears by it, were to be communicated to him and the cardinal; and consequently some answer must have been given to it; that her majesty might have the pleasure to see how the ill-grounded expectations of the pretender had been defeated. And his having owned to you that he was to see O'Brian, will have given you such an advantage over him upon this point, that it will be very difficult to avoid either telling you the truth, or being so disconcerted in his answer, as may enable you to judge whether O'Brian has received any encouragement from him or not. And, as an inducement to the Garde des Sceaux to open himself fully to your excellency, you may acquaint him that, out of regard to him, her majesty extremely approved your not mentioning this incident to the cardinal, which you are directed not to do; but only (as you yourself proposed) to take a proper opportunity to insinuate to his eminency, that you had intelligence of the pretender's emissaries being at work.

Her majesty doubts not but that, as you have hitherto acted with great prudence and discretion, you will continue to do it: and this incident would, in the queen's opinion, be very lucky indeed, if, either through fear of your discovering it to the cardinal, or from a real intention in monsieur Chauvelin to purge himself from any design in favour of the pretender, you should be able to establish a better correspondence with the Garde des Sceaux than you have lately

lately had ; and to make him think it is worth his while effectually to remove, by his future conduct, any suspicion that his former behaviour, or the incident of this letter having been found upon him, may have given of his ill-wishes to his majesty or his government.

Having thus, very fully, sent you her majesty's directions with regard to monsieur Chauvelin, I am now to acquaint you with the queen's pleasure in what manner you are to behave towards the cardinal. And, in the first place, you will take great care, as you have promised monsieur Chauvelin, not to let his eminency perceive what has passed between monsieur Chauvelin and you, or the incident which has given occasion to it. But, as you have been of late upon a foot of great familiarity and friendship with the cardinal, you will take an opportunity to acquaint him, that the late confidential conversations you have had with him, have not only given the king the greatest satisfaction, with relation to his eminency's good intentions to his majesty's family and government, but had encouraged you to open yourself with great freedom to him upon any advices that you might have received relating to them ; that therefore you are to acquaint him, that her majesty had certain intelligence that the emissaries of the pretender were at work, at present, in several courts of Europe, in order to endeavour to procure their assistance at this juncture, which the pretender very vainly thought a favourable one for him ; that the court of France, as her majesty had been informed, had not escaped their solicitations, though the queen had the pleasure to think that they had not given into any of the pretender's schemes ; and her majesty was firmly persuaded would not, from his eminency's known probity and integrity, and constant and repeated assurances to the contrary : but that, however, it would be an additional satisfaction to the queen, if his eminency would open himself to you, in confidence, upon this subject, and explain to you what applications (of which the queen is not altogether uninformed) may have been made to him ; and what answer he has ordered to be returned to them ; and what his eminency will do upon them, or would do if any such should hereafter be made.

That, as his eminency was pleased, some time ago, in great confidence, to acquaint you with the several methods the emperor had taken to convey his disposition to make peace with France, and had insinuated as if, amongst them, one was by the canal of the pretender, her majesty would be greatly obliged to him if he would, as a continuance of that confidence, acquaint you if any insinuation, with relation to the pretender, has since come, by any channel, from

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from the court of Vienna to France; and if he knows of any transactions between the court of Vienna and the pretender, in which France was, or was not, to be included; or any applications that may have been made by the pretender to the court of Vienna; and in what manner they may have been received there. And as his eminency has seen, by experience, that her majesty was far from making any ill-use of that confidence which he made to you so long ago, he may be assured, that whatever he shall further say to you on this subject, shall be managed with the utmost secrecy and caution.

You may then, in order to engage him to talk, and, by that means, open himself, put him upon the situation of his affairs with the emperor; and the prospect there is of things being now soon brought to a happy conclusion. You may endeavour to learn of him, in what manner he proposes to have the general pacification perfected; whether he thinks any more of the particular treaty, which he some time ago suggested between his majesty and France; and to which you may observe, that you had orders to give him such an answer as should encourage him to open himself further; and assure him of his majesty's desire and inclination to enter into measures for preserving the most perfect friendship and good correspondence with the most christian king.

You will particularly learn his thoughts with relation to a definitive treaty, in which his majesty and the States may be included, and in which you may shew his majesty's disposition to concur, if made upon the principles of what has hitherto been communicated to us; and you may fling out in discourse, that his eminency, who has the security of the future peace of Europe so much at heart, should be desirous of having the concurrence of those powers who are, equally with him, concerned in interest to preserve it. And you may talk to him in such a manner, upon these two methods of securing the publick peace, either by a particular treaty with England, or a general definitive treaty, (which are the only two methods that his eminency has ever talked of for that purpose,) as may probably lead him to disclaim any thoughts of securing the publick peace by a separate treaty only between the emperor and France, or to acquaint you with the suggestions that may have been made to him for that purpose. But your excellency knows very well the reason that you must be extremely cautious not to drop any thing that may give him the least notion that you have a suspicion that there has been any such design.

Upon the whole, your excellency now sees the use her majesty would have you make of the discovery you have luckily made. The letter proves, in the queen's opinion, that the pretender is at work, both at Vienna and Paris: but,

though he flatters himself with the good wishes of the one, and seems to expect the assistance of the other, it does not appear by this letter, that he can depend upon any encouragement or assistance from either court. However, it ought to double the diligence of his majesty's ministers; and so much regard should be had to it, as always to have in view what transactions may be carrying on between the pretender and the courts where they are. As your excellency is at one where there is naturally great intercourse with the Jacobites, her majesty is persuaded you will use your utmost endeavours to discover and defeat their designs and intrigues; and send the earliest and constant accounts of whatever shall come to your knowledge relating to them.

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THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Instructs him to enquire of Buffy, if any application has been made from the pretender to the French court.

MY LORD,

Whitehall, October 8—19, 1736.

I Take this opportunity to return your excellency many thanks for the honour of your several private and particular letters the 16th and 26th past, and of the 3d and 13th instant, with the material papers inclosed, all which I have laid before the queen. Her majesty continues to be very well satisfied with the accounts given you by 101 [Buffy], some of which have of late been very curious; and his answers to the queries you have put to him have been as clear and full as could be expected. Your excellency will continue to him all proper encouragement, and endeavour to see him as often as possible.

Hardwicke
Papers.

Private and
particular.

Copy.

You will take an opportunity to examine him whether he knows of any application from the pretender to the French court; when, by whom, and in what manner, it was made; and what answers were returned to it; and learn from him upon what footing the agents of the pretender are encouraged by the cardinal and the Garde des Sceaux. As it is of the greatest importance to be satisfied upon these points, you will use your utmost endeavours to procure from your friend the fullest informations relating to them, and put him upon making the necessary enquiries.

SIR

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE, TO BE LAID
BEFORE THE KING.

Without date or signature, probably written on the 8th—19th of October.

Observations on the pretender's letter.

Hardwicke
and
Waldegrave
Papers.

Copy.

THE letter lately fallen into the hands of his majesty's ministers, and transmitted to his majesty by this messenger, certainly deserves the highest regard and attention, as it is a letter from the pretender himself to his principal agent in Paris, with his particular instructions at the present conjuncture. It is a certain proof of what the pretender thinks and hopes for at this present time, or at least what he thinks adviseable to persuade the several powers of Europe to think and believe concerning his affairs, in order to induce them to undertake his cause, in the favourable circumstances in which he represents and asserts them to be.

The letter being in his majesty's hands, it is unnecessary for me to trouble his majesty with a long paraphrase and observations upon it; but submit to his majesty's own judgment the inferences and conclusions that are naturally to be drawn from so authentic a piece.

But the substance of the letter appears to me in this light: the pretender had, before this, pursuant to advice sent him from his agent at Paris, wrote to Vienna to discover the dispositions of the emperor after the intire conclusion of the peace, upon supposition that France was to make an attempt in his favour, in case the emperor would make no opposition.

By the answers received, the pretender sees clearly that what he had wrote had not been sufficient to engage the emperor to declare himself upon an affair so delicate and important; and enters into, and seems to admit, the reasons of the court of Vienna for not declaring their sentiments before France, and at this time, and at the instance of the pretender only. It is reasonable to be concluded, that the advice sent by O'Brian to the pretender, to discover the dispositions of the emperor in case France would make an attempt in his favour, was at the instigation of the court of France insisting to know the sense of the emperor upon the application made to France in his favour.

And the emperor declining to declare, the pretender, by this letter, renews his application to the court of France, and argues, that the way to know truly the dispositions of the emperor is, for France to determine what she will do; and if they wish that the emperor would not oppose any attempt of France, and sincerely desire to unite with the emperor, France will not hesitate to
found

found the emperor herself. The pretender then declares, he is persuaded that the emperor is intirely disposed not to oppose him; and he has so great an idea of his integrity and probity, that he is fully convinced they will risk nothing in this; for although the confidence between the emperor and France ought to be mutual upon this article, the emperor will not think he has a right to expect that France should speak first at present, especially considering the insinuations which the emperor has made some months ago.

The pretender then presses France to undertake it, even without the emperor's declaring that he will not oppose; because it is impossible the emperor, in his present situation, should give any jealousy to France for a long time; that when every thing is ready for execution, to show their confidence in the emperor, they may communicate the project to him, and desire his agreement.

If what the pretender asserts is true, it is plain there have been transactions in both the courts of Vienna and France with the agents of the pretender; and that he flatters himself he has received so much encouragement from both, that on one side he is persuaded the emperor is intirely disposed not to oppose him; on the other, he hopes France will undertake it, if the emperor would previously declare as much, which he thinks France should not insist upon, considering the insinuations which the emperor has formerly made; and this proves that the negociations of the pretender, in both courts, have been with the privity and reciprocal communication of both. For the insinuations formerly made by the emperor, in favour of the pretender, could have no weight with France; and the mutual confidence now demanded by France, justly implies the same thing.

The representations which the pretender makes of the favourable circumstances of his affairs, is the least he could do, when he is to persuade other powers to undertake his cause, and is but the natural effect of the representations which the Jacobites made from hence of the late disorders here, which are echoed back from Rome into France, and aggravated as much as possible in his favour. But it is now to be considered what orders your majesty will be pleased to send from hence to your ministers abroad upon this undeniable proof of attempts carrying on to subvert your government, and what further measures shall be taken to defeat these detestable designs, in which my poor endeavours shall be exerted to the utmost with a most inviolable and unshaken zeal and resolution.

In the first place, I think the queen's orders to lord Waldegrave for his conduct upon this occasion, both toward the Garde des Sceaux and the cardinal,

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are perfectly right. For as monsieur Chauvelin thought fit to make professions, and to treat this letter of the pretender as a vain attempt, and as the effect of false hopes which he flattered himself with, without any grounds or encouragement from the court of France, it is very proper to seem to believe him, so far to depend upon his professions as to make no doubt but that his answer to the application upon this letter was totally to disclaim any design to undertake the cause of the pretender, either with or without the privity or concurrence of the emperor; and to represent to him how reasonable and necessary it is, upon such a certain proof that the pretender relies upon the assistance of France, how groundless soever those expectations may be, for the king to expect a direct explanation of the sentiments and resolution of the court of France upon a question of the nearest concern to him. And lord Waldegrave may very properly observe to monsieur Chauvelin, that there being a positive direction in the letter to apply both to the cardinal and to him; and the whole tenor of the letter importing previous transactions with the pretender in both courts, and very probably with a reciprocal privity and participation, lord Waldegrave may insist not only upon such explanations as may give the king entire satisfaction, but hope that the answer of the court of France to this application of the pretender will be such as may cutt off all hopes of the pretender's, and put an end to the disorders which disturb the peace and quiet of his majesty's kingdoms, which are kept up and fomented by nothing but the hopes and expectations that are daily given to the disaffected here of assistance and support from abroad.

As this part is what in justice the king may demand of France, it may equally be insisted upon with the cardinal, tho' not with the same introduction, or upon the foundation of the letter: but lord Waldegrave, in speaking to him, may insist upon the king's having such certain and positive intelligence of applications being made to France on behalf of the pretender (in the manner contained in the letter) as to desire express and explicit satisfaction upon this great point.

And lord Waldegrave may likewise add, that the king has intelligence that assurances are given to the Jacobites here, that both France and the emperor are engaged to assist and support the pretender immediately after the conclusion of the peace. In consequence therefore of the frequent assurances which the cardinal has given to the king of his friendship and good faith, lord Waldegrave may desire the cardinal to let him know what transactions there have been between the agents of the pretender and the courts of Vienna and France; or at least, if he will not acknowledge, or may not think himself at liberty to betray any

any confidence made to him by the court of Vienna, concerning the sentiments of the court of France; and it is easy to make him sensible that as long as any hopes are given to the pretender from France, the emissaries and agents of the pretender will magnify and aggravate every circumstance to keep up the spirit of their party, which cannot but greatly affect the quiett of his majesty's government. For it is most certain that the tumults and disorders here are so represented abroad as to be look'd upon as so many declarations in favour of the pretender, and are made use of as arguments to engage foreign powers to undertake a work hopefull and easy; and on the other side, the hopes the pretender's agents pretended they received from foreign powers are transmitted hither, and give all the encouragement to the Jacobites here, which keeps up the troubles and disorders here, that nothing is more certain than that if the Jacobites despaired of foreign assistance, the king would not have any trouble from the disaffected at home; so much does it depend upon the cardinal, by letting the sincerity of his intentions be known, to put an end at once to all these broils and ferments concerning the pretender both at home and abroad.

And as it appears that the period fixed upon for any attempt is upon the intire conclusion of the peace, it may be proper time to take this occasion to desire the cardinal to explain himself upon the pacification; which (without hazarding any private intelligence which the king has had of monsieur Chauvelin's project of a separate treaty between the emperor and France) may reasonably be supposed must be reduced to one of the three following schemes: either to have a congress for settling the general pacification with the powers engaged in the late war and maritime powers together; or to make a private treaty of friendship between France and England, as hinted by the cardinal; or a separate treaty between the emperor and France, as projected. And it seems to me that these three points may be stated to the cardinal as the natural result from reasoning and considering this great event, and he may be desired to explain himself fully to the king upon the professions he has already made.

It seems very material to me that, as the pretender founds all his hopes upon measures to be taken immediately upon the conclusion of the peace, it should appear that regard is shew'd to England upon the general pacification, and that his majesty should be included and comprehended in it. For such a renewal of treaties with all the great powers would be an absolute rejecting of the cause of the pretender; and therefore any thing is better than a separate treaty between France and the emperor, exclusive of the maritime powers, which would be look'd upon as a forerunner of espousing the cause of the pretender; and there-

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fore lord Waldegrave should be ordered to talk to the cardinal with this view and this purpose.

This occasion likewise calls for proper application to be made to the court of Vienna; but as her majesty is not determined in what channel to put that, whether to talk first to monsieur Wafner, or to take any other method which the king may think more proper, the delay of a few days for a full and due consideration may not be a loss of time that will do any prejudice. Sending it directly to the court of Vienna, where Bartestein governs all, whom we know to be under the immediate influence of France, and with whom Chauvelin must carry on his project of a separate treaty if it succeed, is a matter that deserves great deliberation; and I cannot but say that I should look upon such a separate treaty between the emperor and France, to be little less than a direct preparatory for their entering jointly into the cause of the pretender as described in his letter.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Encloses the preceding letter.

Hardwicke
Papers.

Private.

Copy.

(Whitehall, October 9th—20th, 1736.) As I am desirous your excellency should have all the hints possible for your conduct on this great and critical conjuncture, I enclose to you a copy of a paper sent by sir Robert Walpole to his brother upon this subject; which may probably be of use to you in the execution of the orders contained in my letter, and by which you will be fully inform'd of what is thought here upon the letters you have lately sent, tho' you are to act pursuant to the orders sent you in my other letter.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Communicates, by order of the queen, the letter from the earl of Waldegrave together with the Pretender's letter to be laid before the king.

SIR,

Whitehall, Oct. 8—19, 1736.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

I Received on Tuesday last, by express, a most important letter from lord Waldegrave, of the 11th instant, N. S. a copy of which, and of the paper inclosed in it, I send your excellency by her majesty's command. I also inclose to you a copy of the letter which the queen has ordered me to write to lord Waldegrave upon it, which her majesty hopes will meet with the king's approbation. This transaction appeared to the queen to be of so high a nature, and the discovery so material, that her majesty thought no time was to be lost in making

making the proper use of it at the court of France, as well for procuring a full and ample discovery (if possible) of all that shall have passed between the agents of the pretender and the French ministers, as by talking to them in such a manner, with relation to the pretender and his applications, as may discourage them from giving in any measure into them: and this the queen thinks was best to be done by making suitable compliments to monsieur Chauvelin upon his professions that he had never been a favourer of the pretender, or his projects; and by talking confidentially to the cardinal, in the manner your excellency will see prescrib'd in my letter to lord Waldegrave.

You will, in general, see the queen's sentiments upon the pretender's letter, which her majesty thinks very luckily, tho' very accidentally, fell into lord Waldegrave's hands. It appears by it, in the queen's opinion, that the situation of foreign affairs, when the peace shall be finally concluded between the emperor and France, and the present disposition of the people of England, is looked upon by the pretender and the Jacobites as a favourable one for making some attempt upon his majesty's dominions; and indeed this is confirm'd by other advices and intelligences that the king's servants have been able to procure. As to the first, her majesty is persuaded the pretender flatters himself extremely with hopes and assistance from abroad, in which he will be disappointed; for tho' the letter seems to carry with it an opinion that the emperor is not an ill-wisher to the pretender's interest, and would not, if any thing was undertaken by France in his favour, give any opposition to it; yet there is the less stress to be laid upon it, since it was the business of the pretender to represent the disposition of the court of Vienna towards him in the most favourable light, in order to encourage France to make an attempt for him. And the letter is so far artfully drawn, as to shew that the situation of the emperor's affairs with regard to the Turks is such, that, if the pretender judges wrong with relation to the emperor's inclination, the court of Vienna would not have it in their power to give any opposition. But indeed the positive assertion that some insinuation has actually been made by the emperor to France in the pretender's favour, (*sur tout en égard, &c.*) gives great reason to fear that the court of Vienna have not acted with that thorough regard to his majesty and his interest that they ought to have done, and therefore deserves great attention.

The arguments that are used in the letter to induce the court of France to make an attempt shortly in favour of the pretender, do, in the queen's opinion, shew that, at present, the court of France has not entered into any scheme for that purpose: but, at the same time, the secretary of state of France being in possession

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session of such a letter from the pretender, and being to have a meeting with the pretender's agent upon it, is so material a circumstance, that the queen thinks all proper measures should be used in order to divert that crown from hereafter giving into any scheme of this nature. And it is for that purpose that lord Waldegrave is directed to talk to the cardinal in such a manner as may convince his eminency that his majesty is so far from having any suspicion of him, that the king is himself disposed to live in the most perfect friendship and good correspondence with France; which is the more necessary, if it can be supposed that the court of Vienna, or any of their ministers, have really been acting in the manner represented. And it is for this reason that her majesty has thought proper to direct lord Waldegrave to resume the discourse of the particular treaty some time ago suggested between his majesty and France, in order to shew his eminency that his majesty has not rejected the overtures that he has made for that purpose, and by that means to defeat or disappoint any artful insinuations that those who are not well intentioned to the king might make to the cardinal, in order to engage him in an opposite interest. And the manner that lord Waldegrave is to talk to the cardinal upon this subject will rather tend to the discovery of any secret transaction between the emperor and France (if there be any) than to promote or forward the conclusion of a particular treaty between his majesty and the most christian king, of which the king will always be master, should the cardinal, contrary to expectation and the opinion and advice of all those he consults in the French ministry, be seriously disposed to push it.

Her majesty has also directed me to acquaint your excellency, that she is inclined to think that some notice may be taken to monsieur Waffenaer here that we have intelligence from Rome of the pretender's application to and confidence in the emperor; and particularly of his expectation that the emperor would not oppose any attempt that the court of France should make in his favour; and that this should be done in such a manner as not to give the least suspicion from whence we had the account: that these advices should be mentioned to monsieur Waffenaer, as founded upon the vain hopes and imaginations of the pretender, rather than the real sentiments of the court of Vienna; and that no hint should be given to Waffenaer as if any credit was given to them here, or any other use be made of them than in a friendly manner to desire a communication of any advices that the court of Vienna may have received with relation to the pretender or his designs. For the queen thinks the greatest care should be taken that they should not imagine they are suspected.

Her

Her majesty has also directed me to submit it to the king's consideration, whether, as it seems the general opinion of the Jacobites that the conclusion of the peace will be a favourable juncture for them, and that the union between the two great Roman catholick powers will finally turn to the pretender's advantage, it may not be a reason for his majesty and the States to be more solicitous to become parties to the definitive treaty, which is to settle the general pacification; and that, by that means, the particular guaranties of his majesty's succession may be renewed by those very powers upon whom the Jacobites found their expectations, and at that time when they chiefly depend upon their assistance, which could not fail greatly to damp and discourage the Jacobites here. And her majesty also would submit it to the king, whether any, and what use should be made in Holland of this very material intelligence, wherein the Dutch are so much concerned, as well with regard to their own interest as to the insinuation that is made that they would be indifferent in what related to the king. And her majesty thinks it may be worth consideration, whether any thing may be done to remove the supposed coolness in Holland, and to settle such a friendship and correspondence with the Dutch, that, as the interest of his majesty and the States with relation to the general affairs of Europe is the same, it may appear to the world to be thought so by the republick.

The hopes that the pretender may have conceived with relation to the disposition of the people here (greater than he has always vainly and falsely flattered himself with) are, to be sure, to be attributed to the licentious and tumultuous behaviour of the mob in several parts of the kingdom; which, tho' greatly to the dishonour of the nation, and deserving the severest animadversion and censure, has undoubtedly been greatly magnified abroad, and assigned purely to a cause which possibly may have had the least share in it, tho' it would not fail to be benefited by it, if not suppress'd and severely punish'd.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Containing remarks on the discovery of the pretender's letter delivered by Chauvelin.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, October 11—22, 1736.

YOU will have seen before this time the extraordinary letter that fell by great accident into lord Waldegrave's hands; you will have seen the reflections which occur'd to the king's servants upon the consideration of it, as likewise the orders which her majesty was pleas'd to send to lord Waldegrave upon that occasion; which orders not having been receiv'd by lord Waldegrave, or executed,

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cuted, when his last dispatches came away, no further conclusions can as yett be drawn from his lordship's expostulations with the French ministers upon them.

However, as this consideration is of the greatest importance, and nearest concern to his majesty and his dominions, I could not forbear throwing my thoughts together, to be submitted to better judgments. I cannot think it at all advisable at present to press either the court of Vienna or the court of France to be more explicit upon this nice subject. We may drive them to the wall, and put them under a necessity of coming to extremities sooner than they may otherwise intend. If they are once made sensible that you suspect or believe the worst, and their intentions are really bad, there is no management to be kept, or time to be lost, if it is for their advantage to hasten the execution. Perhaps it had been better that monsieur Chauvelyn had not known what we know; but that is over, and with him now we must play dissimulation against dissimulation. But the first thing to be consider'd is, whether France or the emperor, or both joyn'tly, or joyn'tly or separately, have been trafficking with the pretender; and how far they may have gone in giving him such hopes and encouragement as are expressly contained in his letter. I am willing to suppose that the pretender greatly flatters himself; but we should be equally guilty of deceiving ourselves, if we believ'd he had no foundation at all for all that is so strongly implied and expressly asserted.

Lett us further suppose that both courts are at present putting off and avoiding to answer his pressing importunities, by refering him back from one to the other, and this would be to make the most favourable construction we possibly can for our good allies. As then it will be very difficult to have any certain knowledge of what is past, we have nothing to do but to observe and collect from their future measures what is reasonably to be expected and apprehended. It is to be observ'd that the pretender confines all his expectations *to the entire conclusion of the peace*, which at least gives us so much time to turn ourselves. But as that is to be the crisis, we must narrowly observe all the previous and preparatory steps and their tendency, to see how far in winding up their bottoms the powers concern'd leave themselves at liberty, by ent'ring into no new engagements with us, to putt in execution any designs against us, or by renewing or confirming all former treaties and engagements with us, they publickly and avowedly contradict and disappoint these imaginary schemes of the Jacobites. And this, I think, will greatly turn upon the part the maritime powers shall be desir'd or admitted to have, at what time and in what manner, in the conclusion of the generall pacification.

There

There have been several methods talk'd of at the several courts of finishing this great work. Some time agoe it seem'd to be resolv'd, and was allmost so declar'd, at the court of Vienna, that count Uhlefeld and count Kinsky return'd to Vienna for no other purpose but to receive their last instructions for carrying the negotiations to the Hague, and, in concert with the *maritime powers*, to conclude the general pacification. But this scheme of the court of Vienna has been attended with excuses from time to time, no communication made of any transactions, and so in the publick appearance it seems to remain at this time. At the time that this seem'd to be the resolution of the court of Vienna, we were told daily, from France in generall, that France would avoid this measure if they could, but that it was still insist'd upon at Vienna.

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The cardinal at this time in great confidence to my lord Walgrave, and with the uttmost secrecy from Chauvelyn, talks of a separate treaty of friendship between France and England, and this at different times has been explain'd, as you know. The cardinal at the same time confesses he acquainted duke d'Antin with this scheme, who was against it, and acknowledg'd to be a confident of monsieur Chauvelyn. The next occurrence is intelligence from 101 [Buffy], that monsieur Chauvelyn had sent to monsieur Du Theil, a project of a separate treaty between France and the emperour. We know how far Bartenstein has putt himself under the power of France; which being carried on by Du Theil from Chauvelyn, they three must be look'd upon as one, and ingag'd mutually in carrying on the same views and designs.

These matters remaining some time in silence and under a sort of suspense, this week's correspondences open a new scene; and 101 [Buffy] acquaints us that France insist'g upon it, the court of Vienna seem'd to be yielding to Chauvelyn's project of a separate treaty, and not to be carried to the Hague. Mr. Robinson in his last letters confirms this; and in his reasonings upon the present situation of affairs, with great *authenticity* as he calls it, accounts for this new disposition in the court of Vienna not to go immediately to the Hague untill the first *definitive* treaty *without the maritime powers* shall be concluded between the three principal powers of Vienna, France, and Spain.

If this proves to be the case, monsieur Chauvelyn has carried his point; and whether it be by imposing upon both the cardinal and the court of Vienna, who may not see his views and designs, but are drawn in by plausible representations; or whether they are more or lesse in the secrett, the consequence to us is just the same: for if the peace founded upon the preliminaries is made between the three great powers without the admission of the maritime powers, it

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cannot be suppos'd that so material a step is taken but to serve some particular ends and purposes; and as nothing is so naturall as, upon this new settlement of Europe, that the particular powers interest'd should desire to have their new possessions secur'd and guarantied in the best manner, it is not very easy to find a better reason for their declining the guaranties of the maritime powers, but not caring to ask what they are not willing to give; and by this means they will not be restrain'd by any new obligations from pursuing such measures as their inclinations, interests, or resentment may prompt them to.

I do not love refining too much, and I hope I am not too often guilty of it; but when I am upon this tender subject, I cannot help carrying my speculations a little further. And here I beg leave to recollect some occurrences that have passed in the course of late years, and what we have heard to have been the thoughts and language of the several courts now under consideration, as their passions or humours have variously operated. There was an observation made early in the course of the present transactions, that there seem'd to be a particular industry in the courts of France and Spain to endeavour to avoid making any mention of the quadruple alliance in the progress and conclusion of this pacification. The court of Spain, in their first heat and resentment upon the late preliminaries between the emperor and France, when they call'd upon us to assist them against such innovations, declar'd to us that they look'd upon the quadruple alliance as the basis and foundation, and even conditional existence, of all the alliances between the two crowns. France upon the last Vienna treaty declar'd it in us a breach of the Hanover treaty.

The court of Vienna has been very free upon our not making good our engagements to them in the late war. I may add one word of the regard the emperor thinks he owes to the Dutch. Upon the same account I will not draw the inferences which these several courts may in their way of reasoning make from these premises, if they should think it for their interest to act such a part; but there is one conclusion naturally follows, that the maritime powers being admitted into the definitive treaty sets all right, and heals all the pretended defects which may be alledg'd and started as time and occasion shall serve. This leads me to one further consideration, which I suggest purely for future deliberation. Is it not then material for us to endeavour with honour and decency to have the maritime powers admitted into the generall pacification? I shall not think it a favourable symptom if that should be avoided or postpon'd, upon any plausible pretence whatsoever, although we should never discover our motive for desiring it. If a previous convention should be insisted upon

upon between the three powers, and we should be told the maritime powers will be invited or admitted, as soon as it is proper and things are brought to perfection, I confess that would not remove my jealousy.

But I submit it to consideration, whether it may not be advisable for us to begin to think of treating separately with each of the severall powers, for mutual friendship, defence, and guaranties, without ent'ring into any offensive engagements against any other power. This hint may be taken from the overtures made by the cardinal to lord Walgrave. And if the same negotiation is sett on foot at the same time with the emperor and with Spain, and with the kings of Sardinia and the Sicilies, it may be possible to bring such distinct treaties to a conclusion in a little time, when no man can see through the difficulties and length of a generall treaty. But there seems to me to be one certain use of this manner of proceeding, if we are drove to it, to discover the true sentiments of each court with regard to us, which can scarce be doubted whenever we find difficulties both in a generall and particular negotiation.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Conversations with Chauvelin and the cardinal.

MY LORD,

Paris, October the 23, 1736.

WHEN I saw the Garde des Sceaux yesterday in town, I put him in mind of his promise to tell me what should pass between O'Bryan and him when they met next; for last Tuesday he said he had not seen him, and he denies having seen him yet. He would have me believe that the pretender's letter he had given me was a copy, and his confusion about its falling into my hands came on him again so strongly, that he hardly knew what he said. He only desired me to be easy, assuring me that the letter was of no sort of consequence, as to any effect it might have here or elsewhere. As I saw I should not get any thing more out of him, I seemed quiet about it.

Walpole
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Most secret.

Copy.

I took the opportunity, when the cardinal mentioned the joy the Jacobites had at the disturbances they exaggerated in Scotland, to touch in a slight manner upon the pretender's subject. I wanted to discover by the cardinal's looks whether Chauvelin had talked to him about his blunder, but I could perceive nothing that gave me the least reason to think it. I told him that I had unquestionable advice that the pretender's agents were very busy, as they always were upon the least alteration in Europe. He seemed to make light of

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it, talking of the pretender's party as quite sunk, but still, as it was natural, catching at every shadow, tho' nobody minded them: and in a very unaffected manner assured me that he neither had nor would have any thing to say to him nor any of his adherents; this I might depend upon. I thought it unnecessary to go farther till I had her majesty's sentiments upon what I wrote last on this subject, so let the conversation drop.

HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Observations on the pretender's letter—On the general situation of Europe.—The necessity that the maritime powers should become guarantees of the general pacification, and the impolicy of neglecting the interests of the Dutch, which are always inseparable from those of England.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hanover, October 28, 1736.

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HIS majesty having been so good as to communicate to me your thoughts upon an extraordinary discovery, made by lord Waldegrave, of the pretender's designs, from a mistake of monsieur Chauvelin, you will excuse the trouble of a few reflections from me upon it. It was certainly a most seasonable and important event. Lord Waldegrave's behaviour in an affair of such nicety, was prudent and judicious; and the orders sent to him, in consequence of it, seem to me, in the main, extremely right. But having said this, I must own I am not so much alarm'd as you appear to be in England; nor can I draw any such inference as you do from it.

It has occurred, more or less, to my knowledge, ever since the happy accession of this family to the throne, that no incident ever happened, or measure was taken, that disobliged or gave offence to any considerable power—no disturbance or tumult was made in England; but that the pretender flatter'd himself that the time was come for him to procure foreign assistance, and foment domestick disorders for his re-establishment: and it is notorious, that he has gone as far as Muscovy and Sweden, and made it plain and plausible there, that nothing was more feasible than his restoration. He was very busy and active in the Imperial court after the conclusion of the Hanover treaty in 1725. He thought the manner of our concluding the last treaty of Vienna with the emperour, was a favourable crisis for engaging them in his interest. He afterwards depended upon the late war which broke out between those two great powers, in case England had taken part in it. And there is nothing more natural for him, whose game is so desperate, to be reason'd, by his friends

friends and abettors, into a persuasion, and to endeavour to persuade others, that the circumstances of making this general peace, considering the situation of the two most considerable powers in Europe, either before or since the beginning of the last troubles, with respect to England, afforded a lucky opportunity to attempt his re-establishment; and that, if he neglected this, nobody knows when he may expect such another.

This I take to be the foundation of the pretender's schemes; and he has been encouraged in this way of thinking by his having, I believe, never receiv'd, from any person to whom he applied, an absolute refusal, but rather a put-off for the present, with this poor comfort, "*As soon as a proper occasion offers, we shall not be wanting to serve you;*" or something more or less favourable, according to the then state of affairs, and disposition of the times. For altho' no power will help him, without their own interest or revenge calls upon them for it, no power will send him away absolutely desperate and abandoned, as not knowing what occasion they may have to make use of him; and therefore, I do not at all wonder that, notwithstanding the influence and weight of the good offices of the maritime powers laid the foundation for the preliminaries upon which the general peace is to be concluded, yet the circumstances of negotiating this conclusion, exclusive of the maritime powers, joined with the ill-humour of the emperor towards them before the negotiation began, as well as the notorious indisposition of Chauvelin, with respect to England, and the accidental tumults in Great Britain, shou'd encourage the pretender to think, and to labour to have it thought, both by his British and foreign friends, that an attempt in his favour, immediately after the conclusion of the peace, cou'd not fail of success.

Having premised this in general, I am of opinion, that during the late war between the emperor and France, the Imperial court, in the great warmth and height of their resentment, for being what they call'd abandon'd by England, had transactions, and serious transactions, for a little while at least, with the pretender, not so much with an actual design of restoring him, as to make use of him to intimidate us. I am persuaded that the cardinal, by what he let fall even to lord Waldegrave, was founded by Vienna as to his disposition in favour of the pretender; and I don't doubt but the pretender's friends were acquainted with it. Things standing thus, and there being great likelihood, in August, that the peace wou'd immediately be concluded, by the appearance there was of the evacuations to be made, without delay, by the parties concern'd in the war, the pretender applies to France as the more natural

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tural and determined enemy to England. In the application, an intimation, I suppose, was given to that court, from what had passed during the troubles between him and that of Vienna, that the emperor wou'd not oppose France in it. The French minister, (and perhaps Chauvelin alone,) in putting off, but not rebuking, as France will never doe, the pretender's agent, gives him to understand, that if a declaration cou'd be attained from the Imperial court, (which he might be assured could be at this juncture,) that they wou'd give no opposition; something might be done.

The agent acquaints the pretender with this answer, advises him to apply to the court of Vienna for such a declaration. The pretender follows this advice, and writes to his agent at Vienna; who, according to the tenour and grammar-construction of the pretender's letter, seems to me to have sent his opinion, without having made any direct application to the Imperial court; that it was in vain to expect such a declaration, nay, that it was not reasonable; and that nothing that the pretender cou'd say cou'd produce such a declaration; that France must declare first; speak to the emperor first, or undertake something in his favour without speaking, or frame a project for undertaking something, then communicate it to the emperor; and to establish the reciprocal confidence; and without France acting in this manner, it is in vain for the pretender to hope that the emperor will make any declaration in his favour. He has reasons for managing the elector of Hanover; and it looks to me that either the agent at Vienna gives only his own thoughts without having spoken to the Imperial court, or if he has made his application, he has receiv'd an absolute refusal, which the pretender is to disguise to France, and, in order to persuade that court to undertake his cause first, and heartily espouse it, is to make them believe that he can depend upon the emperor, if France wou'd now declare and engage in his favour; which he makes the easiest thing in the world to compass, from the indifference of the Dutch, and from the general disaffection in England against his majesty. But that it is not reasonable to expect that the emperor shou'd declare himself beforehand, or that the pretender shou'd desire it of him; for all that part of the letter which relates to the emperor's declaration, is express'd in the future tense: in the beginning it is said, "*Qu'on eût tout le loisir de prendre les justes mesures.*" For what? why, "*pour decouvrir,*"—when? "*apres l'entière conclusion de paix, les dispositions de l'empereur,*" &c. and afterwards, "*ce que j'ai écrit ne suffira point,*" &c. and again, "*on pourra croire assez naturellement,*" with the future tense: "*je n'ose pas esperer que l'empereur voudra s'ouvrir à moi;*" and again, "*seroit il raison-*
 able,

able, qu'il le fît sur des idées & d'esperances vagues & generales qu'on lui représenteroit." So that I do not agree with you, that the application to be made by the emperor, was by the instigation of France, any otherwise than as a put-off for the present to *O'Brian*; and, by the literal expression of the pretender's letter, I shou'd think this application was not yet made; or if it has been made, it is to be conceal'd from France, as what wou'd be useless as well as unreasonable to do without any hopes of success untill France shall declare. And therefore I can by no means concur in your opinion, that this negociation of the pretender's with the courts of Vienna and France is carried on by the privity and reciprocal communication of both. And I really think, that although these courts have been, may be, and perhaps are at present (excepting the cardinal) not very well pleased with us; yett their opposition and rivalry, with respect to their own great views and interests, is so strong and unalterable, that it will be impossible almost for them to concert any measure, in confidence together, about his majesty, in favour of the pretender, both on account of his quality as king as well as elector. Their jealousy of being betray'd sooner or later by one another, will always keep them at a distance.

In this respect, however, it is certainly his majesty's interest and business to watch them all, and disoblige neither; and to take the strongest precautions against a design discover'd in this extraordinary manner, and attended with such remarkable circumstances: the orders were, to lord Waldegrave for that purpose, extremely right for his manner of discoursing with the French ministers. I think you will have a good deal of sincerity, with a small tincture of reserve and dissimulation, from the cardinal, not in favour of the pretender, or against his majesty, but in not discovering entirely what application has been made by, and answer returned to, the pretender. As to the *Garde des Sceaux*, whatever may be his protestations and asseverations of what has been, or will be his behaviour, or what has pass'd or shall pass with or relating to the pretender and his subjects, it is all *galimatias*; it must go for nothing, because it signifies nothing, any otherwise than lord Waldegrave's having had a proper occasion, which monsieur Chauvelin must know to be unavoidable, to clear up this point. *That* minister cannot be so reserved as he would otherwise have been; and we may be able to judge, from what he must be obliged to say, even for his own justification, of the present state of the pretender's views and hopes, in a great measure, whatever tricks the *Garde des Sceaux* may and will act afterwards as he sees occasion.

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But if I may take the liberty to say so, the (cautious) manner in which his lordship is ordered to talk to his eminence upon things that do not directly relate to the question, seems to me, as well as the whole tenor of the D. of N.'s dispatch, and your thoughts, to betray too much fear; and advantages, by any one but the cardinal, would be taken of such an agony and alarm as you seem to express: and although I would not, on this occasion, have said one word to any of the French ministers about our becoming parties to the definitive treaty of France, yet I am extremely glad that you are (for you will pardon me if I say I always suspected the contrary) of that opinion. But the use to be made of the discourses directed to be held with the ministers of France, which are certainly right, can at best be no more than a means of getting a faint and temporary ray of light to clear up the true causes and effects of the pretender's letter; and unless something solid be imagined, to divert our enemies already from being encouraged with the hopes of a disaffection at home, and the disaffected at home from being encouraged with the hopes of an assistance from abroad, this providential discovery will be of little service to us. But the means to come at that *solid good*, is a question that has not been asked me; and which I do not see yet very clearly pointed out by others; but yet I will waste a little time and paper upon it, although I am afraid to little purpose.

The pretender is an occasional evil that can do no harm of himself, but must be under the command and direction of others; and therefore he is more or less dangerous or despicable as his majesty and his government is more or less respected abroad, or revered and beloved at home; and I am afraid we have not that influence of friendship and power as we have had, and ought to have for our own security, among foreign powers and states; nor is there that zeal and affection amongst the people for the government as is necessary for the ordinary peace and quiet of it at home. How to recover a better state of health, both in our own and in foreign climates, is the great point to be desired and wished.

What you have hinted of our becoming parties to the definitive treaty of a general peace must be, and I always thought so, the foundation and corner-stone of the whole. And now the time is come that my thoughts on this head may possibly make some impression, I will open them more largely as to the great risk and disadvantage we may incur by our being entirely left out of the treaty of pacification; from whence will follow the utility of our being parties to it, and from that utility our security against any danger from abroad or fears of the pretender.

pretender. Shou'd we be left out of this general treaty, our situation with respect to the most considerable powers, (viz.) the emperour, France, and Spain, is such, that either of these three powers may pretend, (though very unjustly,) if they think it for their interest to do so, that they have no treaty of friendship, peace, and commerce subsisting with us.

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France, ever since we made the last treaty of Vienna in the manner it was done, without any previous concert or communication with her, may say, and I know monsieur Chauvelin has said, that the treaty of Hanover was dissolved, and they had no treaty subsisting with England. The emperor (though very unjustly) has often declared, that our not entering into the last war was a violation of the treaty of Vienna, and of all friendship between them and his majesty. Spain pretends it is very notorious that a new disposition of the dominions in Italy, contrary to that on which our last treaties, or the revocation of Castelar's declaration was founded, has vacated the treaty between her and us; all these are forced constructions, but still these constructions may be made use of as a pretext to justify any attempt that any of these powers may make, concur, or acquiesce in against his majesty's dominions. On the contrary, our becoming parties to the definitive treaty of peace upon the foot of the approbation given to the preliminaries, that is, by a confirmation of all our former treaties with the respective contracting parties, our reciprocal guaranties wou'd of consequence be renew'd, and our security against the pretender and our enemies from abroad stand upon the same basis as that for the preservation of the publick tranquillity and the balance of Europe.

But how are we to become parties to this general pacification, which you think must be concluded either by a congress taking in the maritime powers, or by a particular treaty between France and England? I must observe first, that I do not look upon all these as necessarily separate and distinct heads or means. For it is possible, and I think likely, that the emperor and France, after having combined the several acts that have pass'd together, and converted them into proper articles for a general treaty of peace, may sign and ratify it, and bring it to the Hague to be further strengthen'd and consolidated by the accession of the maritime powers. Or if it was necessary for our having a particular treaty with France for the preservation of the general peace, *that* may be done after the general treaty, and be sign'd and notified by the respective contracting powers, either with or without the accession of the maritime powers.

But to pass by these distinctions, it is agreed that it is our interest and business to become parties to the treaty upon which the general peace is to be

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founded and preserved one way or other. For this purpose our thoughts and inclinations have been sufficiently signified by the acts and approbation of the preliminaries, by lord Waldegrave's frequent conferences on this head with the cardinal, and by what has been said to count Kinsky and Ulefeldt before they went to Vienna; and it seems very plain to me that the Imperial court is extremely desirous that his majesty and the States shou'd become parties to it. On the other side, I have always thought the cardinal for it too, but both Chauvelin and the court of Spain against it, as they both act in this whole affair upon the same principles. Chauvelin was in his heart against this pacification; nobody doubts but that Spain was so too. Chauvelin consequently, as well as Spain, wou'd have it remain upon as loose and tottering a foundation as possible, that they may more easily, as occasions may offer, (after the cardinal's death,) shake and destroy it, according as it may best answer their particular views and designs. His eminence, overcome with Chauvelin's tricks and impositions, is disposed to have no general meeting for consolidating the peace by the accession of other powers.

The emperor seems at present to continue firm to make us parties to it; whether he or France will yield in this point, time must discover: but shou'd the definitive treaty be made without requiring the participation and accession of the maritime powers, I cannot for all that agree in your inference that such a separate treaty between the emperor and France is at all preparatory for their entering jointly into the cause of the pretender, or is made either by the emperor or the cardinal upon that principle or view; altho' our being left so alone may be a collateral motive for not encouraging both at home and abroad an attempt in favour of the pretender, if other necessary means corresponded accordingly.

But supposing then that the general pacification shou'd be finally concluded without us, it will cease to be consider'd what is to be done next. Why it naturally occurs to me, and I hope it does at last to you, that we shou'd fix an intimate and unalterable friendship with that power whose interest, whose preservation or ruin is, and I think, with respect to the affairs of Europe, must ever be, inseparable from our's. Of this you say nothing at all; and I have with great anxiety of mind often observed you and others of the king's servants extremely indifferent about our friendship with the States General; and that we must share in the first or second place the same fate with them. When I consider that a country no bigger than the third part of Yorkshire, that bore in the last great war half the expence of it, notwithstanding the villanous calumnys to
 the

the contrary ; that owes now on account of that war as many millions sterling as England does, and all on account of the same inseparable interests which she has with England, and must always have as long as the world continues in the same situation it is : when I consider the pensionary's last plan for the maritime powers employing their good offices for an accommodation, instead of entering directly into the last war, was of the greatest service to England for furnishing a good excuse for our not entering into it too, had the greatest influence upon the cardinal to dispose him towards a peace : when I reflect that the indolent ministry of Mr. Finch at the Hague, and a long series of neglect and contempt of the States, without observing the common marks of friendship and regard for them, had flung them entirely into the hands and under the direction of France ; and that I had (it is not proper for me to say it) by indefatigable pains brought the Dutch ministers, and by degrees more of the leading men, into a confidence towards his majesty, and to act, as far as their distracted situation and weak condition would permit them, in perfect unison with the king, I felt with a bleeding heart, at my return in England, from part of his majesty's ministers (and, pardon me from saying it, *from you*, who have the most to say among them) such a coldness and disregard for the States, that they did not deserve, and that our own interest did by no means require ; and that for no other reason but because the particular provinces cou'd not be brought to speak in so strong terms about the dangerous situation of affairs in Europe as his majesty had done ; although at the same time the States assembled at the Hague wrote a letter to the several provinces concern'd in much stronger terms, for taking the necessary means to prevent the imminent danger that threaten'd them, than what were contained in my memorial.

And indeed, dear brother, it was well the provinces declined coming to a strong resolution on that occasion ; for had they done it, the emperor wou'd have hearken'd to no terms of peace, and we cou'd not have had any foundation for encouraging the emperor to make the best peace he cou'd on account of not being able to serve him without the concurrence of the Dutch. Upon my return to the Hague, before I came hither, I had founded not only the pensionary and greffier, but also the pensionary of Amsterdam, about their disposition to accede to the treaty of general peace ; and even the last, whose opinion in this case is of the greatest consequence, gave me to understand that he was entirely for it, and made me a compliment in desiring my presence.

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But now all things are again on float, ill humours, jealousies, and distrusts to the greatest degree of England are uppermost on account of his majesty's letter wrote in favour of the prince of Orange, whom the provinces of Holland and Zealand call their pretender. This was foreseen and foretold to no purpose. And altho' the duke of Newcastle has in my opinion very prudently mention'd our endeavouring to re-establish a friendship and harmony with the States, and I mention'd to his majesty the making a confidential communication to the pensionary and greffier only of this affair, the king wou'd by no means consent to it; but I wou'd not press him, because I really think it is not at present a favourable juncture, and the pensionary's ill humour, join'd with his ill state of health, might make him give a disagreeable answer. But it is in vain to think of our accession to the great treaty without taking the Dutch along with us; and it is in vain to think of taking the Dutch with us while we despise them, tease them, and use them, at least as they imagine, very ill.

You will pardon this digression, for I look upon the Dutch and us to make but one body as to foreign affairs and the peace of Europe. They were by their riches and strength one half of that body; they are now at least an *arm* belonging to it; and if that arm is bruised and shatter'd, is it right to abandon it, or shou'd it not be cherish'd by proper applications? Because, shou'd that arm be mortified and destroyed, it might be the destruction of the whole body: and therefore we shou'd still keep the Dutch to us. But to supply their weakness and deficiency, we shou'd likewise endeavour to join other forces to us, whose interest and situation may dispose them to be useful as well as willing friends. But nothing of that nature can be named; for the notion which now prevails in England, of having no concern abroad, makes it immediately scouted, without being heard or explained; and therefore after having said so much on this head, I shall trouble you no longer upon it.

As to the second point, of preventing disaffection at home, and putting the people into a better humour than they are, I think they have been frighten'd by the Craftsman and other papers; and as that poison has of late greatly lost its strength, something might be done, or forborne to be done, to make the government more popular; but they are of such a nature as must be obvious to you and to greater than you, and if not proper to be taken notice of by you, and greater than you, it is impertinent for me to name. I shall therefore conclude this letter with saying, that his majesty's subjects here are highly delighted that the king has been with them two years together, and that he
 stays

stays so long with them this year, and particularly keeps his birth-day here. They brag of the great benefit it is to their town and country, and what gainers their merchants and tradesmen will be by this goodness of his majesty, and a thousand things of that nature, to shew the happiness and satisfaction of the people from the presence of the prince. All that I can add is, that I wish his majesty was like the Irishman's bird, and cou'd be in two countrys at the same time. Pardon this long and hasty scrawl from your's most affectionately.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

The king approves the measures adopted by the queen, and the earl of Waldegrave's conduct.

MY LORD,

Hanover, October 17—28th, 1736.

CREW the messenger brought me, the 10—24th instant, the honour of your grace's dispatch of the 8th O. S. with the several important inclosures, which have been all laid before the king. And I am to acquaint you, that his majesty readily concurs in the queen's entire approbation of lord Waldegrave's prudent and judicious conduct on so great and critical an event, as that of having received from monsieur Chauvelin's own hands by mistake so material a paper, fully explaining the pretender's views and designs against his majesty's government, in a copy or a translation of a letter from himself. The king is likewise well pleased with the orders that the queen has thought fit to send to his excellency for his further proceeding in this affair, by making suitable compliments to the Garde des Sceaux upon his professions of having never been a favourer of the pretender or his projects, and by talking confidentially to the cardinal in the manner which your grace has amply explained in your answer to lord Waldegrave's dispatch, in order to make the greatest use and advantage that can be for his majesty's service from this fortunate and accidental discovery.

Walpole
Papers.*Most secret.*

The king thinks it not unlikely that monsieur Chauvelin, having gained time by diverting lord Waldegrave from communicating to the cardinal his extraordinary blunder, may upon recollection, and full of mistrust as he naturally is, have apprized his eminence in a proper manner of the whole, and prepared him for what might be said by his excellency to the cardinal upon this subject. However the behaviour of his lordship towards monsieur Chauvelin, and the orders sent him by the queen in consequence of it, were no less judicious, and cannot fail of having a good effect with both these ministers: the Garde des

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Sceaux will be convinced of lord Waldegrave's having kept his word with him; and the cardinal will see that his lordship's forbearing to lay open the whole matter in confidence to him, was done for the sake of managing the Garde des Sceaux, which his eminency himself seems always extremely desirous should be done.

His majesty is likewise inclined to think with the queen that some notice should be taken to monsieur de Wassenauer of our having had intelligence from Rome, that the pretender is so weak and vain as to imagine that the emperor would be indifferent, and not oppose any attempt that should be made in his favour against his majesty's dominions; taking care that it be done in such a manner as not to give the Imperial court the least reason to imagine they are suspected, or that the king is under the least uneasiness on the account of the pretender's views and designs. And his majesty is of opinion, that an unaffected insinuation of this kind to monsieur Wassenauer is preferable to any thing being done more formally upon it by his minister at the Imperial court, altho' the king has ordered me to acquaint Mr. Robinson with his having received intelligence from Rome that the pretender is very busy in endeavouring to procure if possible some foreign assistance, for making an attempt against his majesty's government after the conclusion of the general peace; and to direct that minister to be assiduous in discovering what agents or friends the pretender may have at Vienna? whether they have been of late, or are busy or active there? and what countenance or encouragement they may meet with, and from whom? and to do it in such a manner as to betray no uneasiness, or the least suspicion of the emperor's favouring them.

As his majesty gave, in concert with the States, his approbation of the preliminaries, declaring his readiness to concur in the general pacification to be made upon those terms, on condition of having an article for the renewal or confirmation of all our former treaties, on the foot they stood before the beginning of the last troubles; so he continues still of the same opinion, in becoming, jointly with the republic, parties to the definitive treaty of peace, which of consequence renews the guarantys of his majesty's succession by those very powers upon whom the pretender seems to found his expectations. And the king hopes that the emperor, for the sake of strengthening the general peace upon which the security of his own succession so much depends, will think it absolutely necessary to insist upon demanding the accession of the maritime powers to the definitive treaty; and that the cardinal, in order to perfect and preserve his own great work, will concur with the emperor's sentiments on this head, notwithstanding

withstanding the artifice and endeavours of monsieur Chauvelin to the contrary, who too perhaps, after this late incident, will become more easy and pliant in this respect.

But the king does not see how he can, any other way than by the discourse which lord Waldegrave is directed to hold to his eminency, well appear more solicitous to be a party to the definitive treaty, or how he can take any step for that purpose with the States; for by the nature of their government they will not, and their ministers dare not, declare their sentiments on this head, untill all the acts, or a complete project of a general pacification, shall be laid before them for their deliberation upon it. Neither can his majesty see what use can be made at present in Holland of this material intelligence, unless this whole affair be communicated, as things of the most secret nature have often been, to the pensionary and the greffier. But the transaction between lord Waldegrave and monsieur Chauvelin is so new and extraordinary, that his majesty cannot determine, although he has a great opinion of the fidelity of the Dutch ministers, to make them as yet that confidence, especially at this time, when he has reason to believe that the States of Holland are (wrongfully indeed) extremely displeased with the late application made in favour of the prince of Orange; and consequently the pensionary their servant, must, as by all accounts he does, appear very uneasy and dissatisfied with it.

For the same reason the king is at a loss to know what can be proposed, while these ill humours are afloat in the provinces of Holland and Zealand, to remove the supposed coldness toward his majesty, and therefore thinks it a very unseasonable juncture to attempt to settle such a friendship and correspondence with the Dutch as is mentioned by your grace, and which is certainly a very desirable thing, untill they come to better temper than they seem to be in at present.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Conferences with cardinal Fleury and Chauvelin on the pretender's letter.

MY LORD,

Paris, October 30th, 1736.

I Have hitherto but barely acknowledg'd the receipt of your grace's dispatches of the 8th and 9th past, by Chalke the messenger. I am now to return my most humble thanks for her majesty's gracious approbation of what I had done with relation to the pretender's letter; and likewise to acquaint your grace with the

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the steps I have since taken in consequence of your most secret letter in answer to mine of the 11th past.

Your grace will have observed by what I then wrote, that, previously to my receiving her majesty's commands, I had taken some measures which were agreeable to, and answer'd a good deal the ends of the orders now sent me. However, as I could not speak so fully to the cardinal and Garde des Sceaux before I knew her majesty's sentiments, I laid hold of an opportunity last Tuesday, at Versailles, to discourse both the ministers separately in the manner prescribed by your grace.

I saw the cardinal first, and began the conversation with telling him that the same information I had mention'd to him of the pretender's agents being at work had reached her majesty's ears, with some additional circumstances to those I had then heard: that I found the pretender had actually design'd to apply to several courts, and particularly to this and the court of Vienna: that it was more than possible those applications may have been made before we had the information: that I was persuaded, however, they could make no impression upon him; the assurances he had given me put me out of all fear of his concurring in any measures to disturb us. But still as the queen had received advice that applications had been made here, it would be a great satisfaction to me to be able to inform her majesty of the whole transaction; and that he might depend upon the strictest secrecy, not only from me, but from the few to whom her majesty may think fit to impart this intelligence. I urged that it would be one of the greatest compliments and marks of friendship he could pay the queen, and would, he might assure himself, be received and look'd upon as such.

The cardinal with a smiling countenance began with repeating in the strongest manner the assurances he had already given me, of his having no thoughts of doing any thing to hurt us. That I might depend upon it he was no favourer of the pretender or his cause; and that he never would be so: that I might judge from former discourses that he had no eye that way, and that he was for living well with England according to the present establishment: that it is true applications are now and then made to him which he cannot refuse to receive; but his answer always is, that France is under engagements with England which he will not break: that France will not venture putting Europe into a flame for wild projects: that the pretender's party in England is nothing; and that any attempt would end in the destruction of the few Roman catholic families remaining there.

there. With such reasons, he said, he always quieted the people that proposed any thing of that nature. But, continued he, it is unnecessary to say more on the subject; take my word, there is nothing doing for the pretender. He may apply, but is not listen'd to. He protested most solemnly, that tho' the pretender, or rather the pope, had applied for money for the pretender, the cardinal had never given him one farthing, directly nor indirectly, during his whole administration. (I suppose this is meant of extraordinaries; for I have frequently heard say that Louis the XIVth had settled a yearly sum upon him, which was constantly paid, though I do not know how much it was.)

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At length, as I was pushing the cardinal to be still more explicite, and to know which way the other applications came, he told me he did not care to name names, because now and then things might be repeated undesignedly that might give ill ideas, and were of no use when known: that O'Brian's being the pretender's agent was no mystery: that still, as a mark of his regard to his majesty, provided I would assure him that it should go no further, (which I did,) he would own to me that all applications came from Rome: that Valenti Gonzague, the nuntio at the court of Spain, but stop'd at Bayonne on account of the disputes between the courts of Rome and Madrid, had in his passage made some motions here in behalf of the pretender, but was no ways listen'd to. He excused the pope's meddling in such matters, upon its being natural for him so to do; but insisting still that the pope's representations in political affairs had no weight, he concluded with begging me to trust him: *Comptez sur moi; je ne vous tromperai pas*: adding, that I might be guarantee of his veracity; and that he would upon no account soever expose me to a reproach in a case of this nature.

As I was unwilling to let the matter rest, I put him in mind of the confidence he had formerly made me, of his having rejected the pretender's offer to concern himself in reconciling France and the emperor: that it was very possible the pretender would not put himself forward to serve the emperor, unless he had reasons to expect a return. The cardinal allowed it; and was willing enough to throw out a slight insinuation of the emperor's dislike to us at that time. But he protested this was only surmise; for he said the pretender's proposal came directly from Rome; and that he did not know what means the pretender had used to get the emperor's consent to meddle in his behalf in an affair of that nature: that he had several reasons to decline the pretender's interposition between France and the emperor; first, as it would be disagreeable

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to England; and next, that as the pope would have hooked himself into it, he would have endeavoured to have alter'd the tenure of Parma and Placentia, which before the quadruple alliance were Roman fiefs. That though he, the cardinal, thought that treaty very harsh in several points; yet, as the king his master was a party to it, he would not give way to any scheme that might have brought its validity in question; which inevitably would have happen'd, had the pope and pretender been concern'd in regulating the possessions of those duchies.

This conversation took up all the time I could have with the cardinal last Tuesday, for he was call'd away; but as I am to see him next Saturday at Issy, I will not dispatch my messenger till I have been with him.

I must next inform your grace of my transactions with the Garde des Sceaux upon the same subject. I began with acquainting him how kindly her majesty had taken the assurances he gave me, and all he had said upon the subject of the pretender's letter that had fallen into my hands by mistake, of which, I told him, I had sent your grace an account. I thought it best to begin by compliments, knowing very well that if once I had dash'd him, he would not have recover'd, and I should have got nothing out of him. I enlarged upon the pleasure this accident had given me, since it afforded so strong a proof of his not being so ill disposed towards us as those who desired no better than to see us at variance were apt enough to insinuate. I laid my chief stress on generals, and got him into quite good humour. I then told him that since he had made me above half of the confidence, he ought to make the whole; that he could not imagine how well it would be received by her majesty. That what he had already said was enough to satisfy us that he neither encouraged nor would do any thing for the pretender; but still it was a curiosity very natural and proper in this case, to desire to know the thread of this negotiation.

As to our secrecy, he knew well enough we could keep our counsel. I flatter'd him a good deal this way, but to little purpose as to discovering the engines that have been employ'd. He still denied O'Brian's having given him the letter. He insisted that it was intercepted, and that he had had no application made to him in consequence of it; which he thought as odd as I did, considering the date of the letter. He retreated whenever I pressed to name names and places, till at last, in order to get rid of my solicitations, he assured me that he would still let me know, if any direct application should be made to him upon the subject of the pretender's letter. He beg'd that nothing might be said of it in England or elsewhere, since by that means he should be deprived of the

the method of getting this correspondence; for undoubtedly the channel through which it comes to him would be alter'd.

In this strain he ran on a good while, and at last desired I would return his most humble compliments to her majesty for those she was pleased to make him. He said I might assure the queen that he never was, nor ever would be a promoter or encourager of the pretender's interest; that he was now in the tenth year of his ministry, and defied all the world to say that he had ever given the least encouragement to Jacobites; that in his place he could not help seeing O'Brian now and then; but that his business to him was generally to recommend military men, or to get pensions for officers' widows. He added here, that at his first entering upon his employment, some of the pretender's agents had been for renewing projects the regent had had in his favour; but they were so ill receiv'd, that they had not applied since upon that bottom.

In fine, without entering into the particulars I would have had him, he said all that a man could possibly say to clear himself or his court from any imputation of being for the pretender. He urged, that the letter itself proved it sufficiently; and thought we ought to be satisfied with it. I must not omit to mention a very extraordinary hint he gave me about the memorial your grace will find in another letter: he begged that an answer might be given speedily to it, let it be what it will, to shew at least a regard for the nation. For, says he, delaying increases the ill-will of the traders against you, and it is not they alone that do not love you, but generally the whole nation; and I, that am looked upon as your enemy, am often forced to stand up and stop the violent measures proposed against you; and have frequently declared to them, that England would become a good friend to France, and I wished nothing more. Thus, says he, I let them cry and bawl, but I do not mind them. Only help me to withstand clamours, by using of us civilly, and you will find me as ready as any one (hinting, I fancied, at the cardinal) to enter into lasting alliances with you.

This is the substance, and indeed all that was any ways material, as much as my memory can serve me, of what passed between monsieur Chauvelin and me. A good deal of the complimentary part, on both sides, is omitted, being not worth repeating. Your grace knows enough of the man to judge what stress is to be laid on assurances from him. The only thing, as to myself, that seems to have arisen from this accident, is a sort of reconciliation and oblivion, on both sides, of the broils we have been in: and as long as the cardinal keeps

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my counsel (which I fancy he will do) I shall avoid, as much as possible, falling into squabbles with his colleague.

November 3d. I went this morning to Lffy, about ten, according to the cardinal's appointment, but had not so much time with him as I expected. Monsieur D'Antin's death, which happened yesterday morning, having made some alterations in the French king's journies to Rambouillet, his most christian majesty went there last night, and was to hunt there to-day, being St. Hubert's Day, but returns, after hunting, immediately to Versailles to finish the festival in his little apartments. Madame de Thoulouse being too much concerned for her father-in-law's death to do the honours of the festival at Rambouillet, this obliged the cardinal to return to Versailles before dinner, and shortened our conversation.

To enter, by degrees, into the matters I had not time to mention last Tuesday to the cardinal, I began about the affairs of Portugal; but, as monsieur Van Hoey could not be ready till next Tuesday at Versailles, we postponed the full consideration of that point till then. I spoke to him next of the general notion that, the differences between Spain and the emperor being now removed, the publication of the peace would soon follow; and therefore I thought it time to put him in mind of his promise to communicate to me the footing it was upon; and to explain himself as to what he expected from us, in case he had a mind to have the maritime powers concerned in the general definitive treaty. He began his answer by telling of me, that he had great reason to hope every thing that had retarded the conclusion of the peace would be soon got over; yet, till the return of a courier he had dispatched to Vienna, he could not be positive. He complained of the chicaning temper of both courts he had to do with; that he hoped now Spain would be more tractable; but he did not know whether that same notion might not encourage the emperor to be less so.

In this manner he put off explaining himself till he heard from Vienna. As to the definitive treaty, he was for it; and his majesty was master to have what share he pleased in it; that I might depend upon it he would not recede a tittle from any thing he had said to me on that point; that he continued in the same mind, that a strict union between England and France was the only security for the liberties of Europe; that it is what he wants; and, in saying this, he seemed to throw out a hint as if we were not so ready to engage with him.

him as he was to engage with us. Without laying much stress upon his insinuation, I assured him, that he would find his majesty very ready to concur in whatever he judged conducive to the establishment of a lasting peace in Europe; that when once he should let us into the whole transaction now on foot, he might better judge of our dispositions, than he could by reports, which, I was persuaded, were invented purely to keep us, if possible, assunder.

I laid hold of a pretence, that fell naturally in my way, to renew the discourse about the pretender. He said, he had told me his sentiments the other day; that I need not question him farther about it; that he knew the situation of the pretender's affairs; and, were they much more prosperous than it is morally possible for them ever to be, he certainly would not engage in his cause; so much regard he has for the engagements he has with his majesty.

Thus stands this case, as far as I have been able to hook out; I will do my utmost to discover more about it, and will not fail sending your grace the fullest information I may, by any means, be able to procure.

P. S. I am this moment told by a very good hand, that a marriage is agreed upon between the king of Sardinia and the eldest princess of Lorraine.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Buffy's opinion on the pretender's letter.

(Paris, Nov. 3, 1736.) * * * * * On Tuesday last I told [Buffy] the whole story of the letter given me by Chauvelin. The night before last he met me, and assures me he cannot discover any thing about the letter. He is persuaded it must be from O'Brian that Chauvelin had it; but persists it is of no consequence. He will follow this correspondence, and give us all the lights that can be. He knows O'Brian sees Pecquet frequently; he avers that is not worth minding: that the jealousy such a discovery may give us will put us, as reason requires, upon our guard; but that I may depend upon it the cardinal (and now he thinks Chauvelin) would not on any account venture to encourage or serve the pretender or any body else to our prejudice. He reckons we are masters to be well or ill with this court, though, by his discourse, I see he wishes the latter; I suppose in hopes of being still more necessary.

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THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Sends farther instructions.

MY LORD,

Whitehall, Oct. 29—Nov. 9, 1736.

I Receiv'd by exprefs, on Wednesday laft, the honor of your excellency's moft fecret letter of October 30th, Nov. 3, N. S. which I laid immediately before the queen. The queen was very glad to fee the ftrong affurances and professions that the cardinal made to you that he would never enter into any fcheme in favour of the pretender; and that whatever applications might be made from that quarter fhould receive no encouragement from him; and her majefty is inclined to believe, from the manner in which they were made, that they might be fincere. But as we have now authentick proofs that applications have been made by the pretender himfelf, and that very lately, to the French court, which is even admitted by the French minifters themfelves, it is highly neceffary, in the queen's opinion, not only to get the beft information and light poffible into thofe applications, by whom made, and what answer was returned to them, but alfo to put the French minifters, when a proper opportunity fhall offer, upon fuch meafures as may give the king a proof of their fincerity, and defeat the hopes the pretender may have conceiv'd of their affiftance. And her majefty is not without hopes, from what the cardinal faid to you, and from what monfieur Chauvelin himfelf let drop, that this may be brought about.

The queen was forry to find that your excellency had not been able to procure any further difcovery from monfieur Chauvelin with relation to the pretender's letter. And her majefty could not but obferve, that though that minifter was fo frank in his declarations about the pretender, and of his having never enter'd into any fchemes in his favour; and had even flung out, for the firft time, a fort of defire to enter into a lafting alliance with the king; yet every thing he faid on the fubject of the pretender's letter which he had given you by miftake was more evafive and chicaning than it was at firft, by infifting that he had intercepted it, when he had in effect admitted before that it had been given him, and (as it was to be prefumed from what he faid) by O'Brian; fo that the ftrong professions of the French minifters are the lefs to be attended to, when it was neceffary for them to colour a fact which they were determined not to explain. And therefore her majefty wifhes that your excellency had tranfmitted a more particular account of the manner in which you had executed fome parts of your orders, upon which in your laft letters you are filent.

Her

Her majesty thinks that one good effect of the late accident is that reconciliation and oblivion, that your excellency mention'd to have been occasion'd by it, of the late broils between you and the Garde des Sceaux. And though the greatest attention is not to be given to what comes from that minister, though in the strongest manner; yet your excellency will endeavour, if you can do it unaffectedly, to find out whether he had any meaning by saying, that if we used them civilly, he should find him as ready as any one to enter into lasting alliances with us. And you will in your further conversation with him, without reproaching him for not having given any satisfactory account with relation to the pretender's letter, give him to understand that the professions and admissions that he first made to you with relation to O'Brian, &c. cannot but greatly raise your curiosity, and must also raise that of your court with regard to the further applications that must necessarily be made to him from that quarter. And you may give him the proper assurances, in the queen's name, that the subjects of France in all their complaints, whenever founded, shall meet with all the justice and favour they can expect or desire.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Declares the reasons why he does not think the pretender's letter was founded on any encouragement from the emperor or France.—Views of Chauvelin in obstructing the conclusion of the peace.—Motives of the emperor for agreeing to a definitive treaty.—England ought to be admitted a party.—Chauvelin agrees to it, and states the proper measures to be taken for prevailing on the emperor and France to desire the accession of England and Holland.

DEAR BROTHER,

Hannover, November 11, 1736.

I May in a great measure refer you to what I wrote to you upon the perusal of your thoughts sent to his majesty relating to the pretender's letter, as an answer to your letter to me on that head of the 22d past, O.S. which I received the 8th instant, N. S. by Startley the messenger.

You will have seen how far my sentiments agree or differ with your's with respect to the various reasoning and inferences drawn from that extraordinary event. You will have seen that I do not entirely agree with you that the pretender's letter is founded upon any encouragement he has lately received, either from the court of Vienna or of France; or that there has been any concert or communication of thoughts between those two princes in favour of the pretender to which this application to France may relate: but that I am of opi-

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nion that something lett fall by the Imperiall court, in resentment for England's not declaring war against France, (although his majesty's private inclinations were at time well known to the emperour,) may have flattered the pretender's desires, and, joyned with the obvious reasonings upon the circumstances and situation of England with respect to other powers, if the generall pacification should be made without their having a part in it, may have induced him to found the disposition of those powers, and particularly France, to act in his favour after the conclusion of the peace, as a proper and convenient occasion for that purpose. In which case it is naturall for him to putt the hopes he has from other princes, and the situation of affairs in England, in the most advantageous light for his service.

You will have seen that I doe entirely agree with you, that, in case his majesty is not admitted as a party to the definitive treaty, and consequently not obtain a renewall and confirmation of all his former treatys on the foot they stood before the late troubles, such incidents have happened as may make the emperour, France, and Spain, though by forced and unjust constructions, to declare that they are under no obligation towards the king, if they have at any time a mind to undertake any thing to his prejudice. But I cannot agree with you, that if his majesty's participation to the generall treaty of peace be not desired or admitted, it is done with a design on purpose to exclude him for the sake of the pretender; or with a view of concerting and acting something afterwards to his majesty's prejudice, but upon quite different motives, which would have taken place had there been noe pretender at all to his majesty's crown. As I fully explained to you, Chauvelyn was against this peace from the beginning, Chauvelyn has clogged, as much as possibly he could, every step that tended towards the conclusion of it. And for the same reason Chauvelyn would, if it must be concluded, have it done upon as loose and precarious a bottom as possible; and for that reason would by all means exclude the maritime powers from becoming partys and guarantys to it. He has already explained the preliminaries in such a manner, as to declare that neither the kings of Spain or the two Sicilys, notwithstanding the cessions made by the emperour to them, nor even the king of Sardinia, are become guarantys to the pragmatic sanction, which all tends to weaken as much as possible this great work of the pacification, both with respect to its basis and duration. Monsieur Patinho has acted the same part as Chauvelyn has done, and for the same reasons; excepting that if the emperour would give the second archdutchess to Don Carlos, the king, or rather the queen, of Spain

Spain would doe whatever his Imperiall majesty would desire to strengthen this peace.

These are Chauvelyn's views; but he has, I suppose, made the cardinall apprehend infinite difficultys and delays, by the nature of the Dutch government, and the *desiderata* which should be started by England and Holland, that would obstruct the finall conclusion of the generall peace, the cardinall's own child, if it should be carryed to the Hague for the ultimate sanction of the maritime powers. The cardinall for some time resisted these impressions, and appeared extremely desirous of his majesty's and the States' concurrence for consolidating this work. The emperour in the mean while, sensible of the little dependance he can have upon France and Spain, showed a strong inclination of having the whole finished at the Hague by the concurrence of the maritime powers; well knowing how precarious and imperfect the peace would be, and consequently the pragmatick sanction that depends upon it, without such a concurrence. And I am fully perswaded that the declarations made by count Kinsky and Ulefeld, of their going to Vienna for no other purpose but to receive their last instructions for carrying the negociation to the Hague, were agreeable to the sentiments and instructions of the emperour at that time; and the excuses since made by the Imperiall court for not having made a communication of any transaction to us, have arisen from the uncertain state of their affairs with France, relating to the cession of Lorrain and the evacuation of Tuscany, and not from any concerted measure for excluding us from the finall conclusion of this affair.

If in the mean while, pending these difficultys about the execution of the preliminarys, monsieur Chauvelyn, who has always been for our exclusion, has perswaded the cardinall to be for making a definitive treaty between the emperour and France previous to any transaction with his majesty and the States; and if the cardinall, by holding the same language, has almost perswaded the Imperiall court to follow that method, I cannot think it proceeds from any ill-will even of his eminence towards us, much less of the emperour, but from the necessity of his Imperiall majesty's affairs, considering his embarrassed situation between the Turks and the Muscovites, which must force him to finish the peace on this side, as to the method, in any way, provided he can doe it in a satisfactory manner as to the conditions. And therefore if a definitive treaty should be concluded at Vienna between the emperour and France, and even Spain, without desiring the maritime powers to be partys to it, (and it is an usuall and naturall thing for a treaty between the partys concerned in the war

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to be absolutely made, before the guaranty and accession of other powers is ask'd,) I cannot imagine that such a measure proceeds from a concert between the emperour and those powers, in order to favour the pretender, or to be at liberty to doe us some mischief. The emperour's interest, his own safety, the preservation of the peace, and the support of the pragmatick sanction, will not suffer him to enter into such a concert with France at any time, I think; but to be sure not at this juncture; and although Bartenstein, under the influence of France, and acting in concert with Du Theil the French minister, under the direction of Chauvelyn, may be obliged to agree to this point of making a definitive treaty, it cannot be done avowedly with a design to spite or injure us. For they that are for preserving the peace, when it shall be executed, (as the emperour and the king of Sardinia,) will, sooner or later, be desirous of our guaranty; and they that were against making it, and making it lasting, as Chauvelyn has always been, and still is, and monsieur Patinho was, will, without doubt, endeavour to conclude it without the intervention or the guaranty of the maritime powers; and therefore France and Spain declining our guaranty (which, I am perswaded, the emperour will be glad to have as soon as he can conveniently come at it) does not, I am convinced, arise soe much from an aversion to their giving us a new guaranty, as it does from their aversion to have this peace guarantied by us. And if a previous treaty should be made between the three powers, and we should be told by them, and even by Chauvelyn, that the maritime powers shall be invited or admitted as soon as things are brought to perfection, I should have no other jealousy, but that Chauvelyn would afterwards labour as much to defeat that invitation and accession, as I am perswaded the emperour would be for it. I shall add on this head, that although the execution of the preliminaries has been negociated between the Imperiall and French courts seemingly in an amicable manner, and exclusively of the maritime powers; yett nothing has been more constantly repeated by the intelligence of 101 [Buffy], than that there has never been during this whole transaction, a cordiality or reall good understanding between those two powers, although both dissembled their jealousy of one another.

However, as I sayd before, I agree with you that if the generall pacification be concluded without our admission, and consequently without a renewall and confirmation of our former treatys, either of the three great powers, if they have a design to hurt us, may pretend, for the reasons explained in my former letter, and hinted in this, that they are under no obligations to us not to

to doe it; and I will not answer but that monsieur Chauvelyn may have such a thought, at the same time that he would exclude our accession and guaranty from the generall pacification. And therefore I entirely also agree with you, that the admission of the maritime powers into the definitive treaty fetts all right, and heals all the pretended defects that may be alledged and started as time and occasion shall serve; and consequently it is materiall for us to endeavour, with honour and decency, to have the maritime powers admitted into the generall pacification; but how to come at that desirable point is the question.

And here I cannot agree with you that it is either prudent or practicable to doe it, by treating separately with each of the severall powers for mutuall friendship and defense. It is not prudent; because our offering to treat with any of those powers, with whom we are to suppose that we are already in a state of mutuall friendship and defense, will betray our weakness and fears: and it is not practicable; because any separate negotiation with one, which cannot be kept a secret, will occasion alarm in the others, and new jealousys and intrigues, before they can be all brought to conclusion; and, as coming from us, it will make them think we are diffident of the goodness and security of our present treatys; it will start new conditions and explanations, especially with Spain, on account of our commerce and possessions, which she will never grant upon the same foot, if she once suspects that we are ourselves doubtfull of our present right.

This being the case, the only way to obtain what we may wish, is to gett admitted to the definitive treaty of the generall pacification; and the best way to obtain that admission is by a proper and unaffected application to the cardinall, which I think noe difficult matter to compass, considering the present intimacy and confidence which subsists between lord Waldegrave and his eminence.

It is now so notorious by the intelligence from all parts, that France designs if possible, to avoyd an assembly of ministers at the Hague for the finall conclusion of this great work, that lord Waldegrave may take an occasion to mention it to his eminence on that foot, without giving the least jealousy of the secret intelligence. In mentioning that matter to him, and the cardinall not denying it, his lordship may take an occasion to lett his eminence see how weak and precarious his own work will be without the admission and concurrence of the maritime powers, to make it firm and lasting. The cardinall in all likelihood, will mention to him the many difficultys and delays that may

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obstruct the conclusion by the variety of demands that may be made by us, but in particular by Holland for the sake of their accession and guaranty. In answer to which his lordship may lett his eminence see, that his majesty has nothing else to desire, besides that if he should become a party to the treaty, which is to be looked upon as the basis for the future pacification of Europe, it is very reasonable that there should be an article declaring a confirmation of all our treatys upon the foot they stood before the late troubles. This was the condition of his approbation and concurrence to the preliminarys, and this is all that will be desired, without any new demands or specifications for the king's guaranty of the definitive treaty; and that his majesty will joyn with his eminence in withstanding and diverting the States from any new and particular demands.

His lordship may take an occasion as it falls in his way, to shew why Chauvelyn may be against our admission, because he has always been against the treaty itselfe. If the cardinall should goe so far as to say, that it is absolutely necessary to make a definitive treaty between the partys engaged in the war, for the sake of the publication of the peace, but that the maritime powers shall afterwards be invited to accede, and guaranty it, it is hard to give a negative to this proposition, as being the usuall method of proceeding. But his lordship may insinuate, that an article should be added to that treaty, by which the contracting partys may oblige themselves to communicate immediately the sayd treaty to the maritime powers, and to desire their accession to it; in consequence of which an article will be inserted for the renewall and confirmation of our former treatys. This may possibly be managed in such a manner by lord Waldegrave, as to make the cardinall himselfe think it necessary; and if something like this should be once agreed and settled with the cardinall, proper soundings and insinuations may be made to M. Waffanar, or at the court of Vienna, by which the emperour may think it is equally necessary to have something done immediately that may assure him of our accession and guaranty. Altho' for my own part, I am of opinion that sooner or later both the emperour and Spain must come to us to concurr in strengthening the generall pacification upon the terms upon which it is to be concluded, after the preliminarys shall be executed. These thoughts are hasty, and I believe very imperfect; but this letter is already too long to enter into a more extensive explanation of them.

HORACE

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Lord Waldegrave cannot obtain any positive information from Chauvelyn.

MY LORD,

Hanover, October 31—November 11, 1736.

HARTLEY the messenger brought me, last Thursday about noon, the honour of your grace's secret letter of the 22d Oct. O. S. which, together with the several inclosures, has been laid before the king.

His majesty finds by lord Waldegrave's most secret letter of the 23d Oct. N. S. to your grace, that there is very little hope of his excellency's being able to get from monsieur Chauvelyn a true account of the pretender's letter, either with respect to the means of his coming by it, or as to what he had done, or was to do in consequence of it. Notwithstanding the rank his lordship has over him, by his having put it himself into his lordship's hands by an extraordinary blunder, the frequent experience we have had of the Garde des Sceaux' tergiversation and looseness, as well as ill-will towards England, makes the king apprehend that lord Waldegrave will not be much the wiser with regard to this important affair from that minister's discourse, when his lordship shall have put in execution the orders sent him by your grace on the 8th of October.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Difficulties of obtaining information from the cardinal and Chauvelin.

MY LORD,

Paris, November 17th, 1736.

I Am very sorry that the last accounts I sent of my transactions with the French ministers have not altogether answer'd your expectations, but I must beg leave to tell your grace, that I have done all I possibly could towards getting out of them what I wanted to know; and when one cannot get all at once, I have observed that with patience it generally comes out. I must remark to your grace, that one gets little by asking questions, and that all that is to be had must be by putting the cardinal to talk upon the matters you want to be inform'd of, and if you light upon a lucky moment, he will then say more in a quarter of an hour of his own accord than can be got out of him in two hours by asking him questions. Besides, he does not love it. He himself has told me many times that he cannot bear *des questions*. He says they either put him upon equivocating, or make him break off the conversation.

I shall

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Draught.

Walpole Papers.

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I shall make it my business to get lights by degrees, and hope to get all those you want. I thought the making you easy, as far as assurances could do, that he neither had, nor would have any thing to do with the pretender, prejudicial to us, was as much as could be well expected at first. I will do what I can to get more authentick assurances; and the orders you have sent me in this last dispatch may, perhaps, enable me to do it.

As to the *Garde des Sceaux*, I was persuaded he would not let us into the true secret of the pretender's, or his agent's, application to him. That the more I press'd him, the more I was expos'd to hear his prevarications; and as I could not tell him my mind upon such topics; I thought it was better to take general assurances, than to shew a distrust which he would attribute to fear, and serve no other end than to give him more frequent occasions of alarming us.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

The king approves his grace's and lord Waldegrave's conduct, and sends his further commands.

MY LORD,

Hanover, Nov. 7th—13th, 1736.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Draught.

WALTON the messenger brought me, the 15th instant, N. S. the honour of your grace's most secret letter of the 29th past, O. S. inclosing a copy of lord Waldegrave's most secret dispatch of the 30th October and 3d instant, N. S. and of what your grace wrote the 29th past, O. S. by the queen's orders to his excellency in answer to it; which have all been laid before the king: and I am ordered to acquaint you that his majesty thinks, that the diligence and address which lord Waldegrave employed, to come at a full discovery of what was prescribed to him by the orders which your grace sent him in your dispatch of the 8th past, O. S. were very proper to answer that end, and carried him as far into the knowledge of the points which we are so desirous of having cleared up, as could well be expected, according to the occasions that had then offered in his conferences with the French ministers, and considering the nature and temper of the persons with whom he had discoursed.

As the motive for sending his excellency those orders arises from an event of the greatest consequence to his majesty's government, the king was no less pleased with the zeal exerted for his service in repeating and inculcating so earnestly as your grace has done, by your dispatch to him of the 29th past,

past, O. S. that he should endeavour to procure a more precise and particular account of what may have lately passed between the pretender and the French court, and to discover how far the project of a separate treaty, which is supposed to be in agitation between the emperor and France, and to which Spain also may become a party, is likely to succeed: altho' his majesty's experience of monsieur Chauvelin's behaviour for so many years will not allow him to expect any thing better than evasive and chicaning answers from that minister upon any material point whatsoever.

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But the king is inclined to have a favourable opinion of the sincerity of the cardinal, in having declared with so much frankness to lord Waldegrave his resolution to do nothing in support of the pretender's interest or cause; nothing having ever in the least occurred of any steps taken by his eminency during his administration for so many years that could seem to have a tendency that way. Yet his majesty questions whether he will be brought to give a more particular explanation than he has already done, of the applications that may have been made by the pretender, or his agents, to France, or of the answers that France may from time to time have returned to them. However his majesty is of opinion that his ambassador at Paris should omit no opportunity of founding, sifting, and leading his eminency to a precise discovery of a matter of so much importance; as also of what turn the cardinal intends to take, supposing the emperor and Spain are come to an agreement for the execution of the preliminary in winding-up this great work of a general pacification, by secret or publick treaties with or without the accession of other powers, that his majesty may be the better able to judge what he is to rely upon, and take his measures accordingly. The king depends at the same time upon lord Waldegrave's prudence, that, in making these frequent instances to the French ministers upon points so grave and serious, he will take care to do it in such a manner as not to betray the least uneasiness or fear, either with respect to the pretender's designs, or at our being excluded out of the definitive treaty for a general peace.

Your grace having taken notice, in your aforesaid dispatch to lord Waldegrave, of what has been mentioned in some of Mr. Robinson's late letters relating to a definitive treaty, as what may be made use of by his excellency to find out, in discoursing with the cardinal, his eminency's final intentions on that head, the king has commanded me to refer you, for her majesty's consideration, to what Mr. Robinson has wrote in his last dispatch to me of the 7th instant, N. S. (of which I don't doubt but he will have sent a duplicate to lord Harrington,) upon the disposition of the Imperial court towards his majesty,

both

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both with respect to the pretender and the conclusion of the pacification, which in the main gives his majesty a good deal of satisfaction.

These several circumstances, joined with the orders which your grace has last sent to lord Waldegrave, and by comparing the lights he may be able to maintain in the conferences he will have with the cardinal in consequence of them, with the intelligence which his excellency may likewise procure by other secret means, will, his majesty hopes, clear up these material points so far as to enable him to form a clear and decisive judgement upon them.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Chauvelin declares that he gave the pretender's letter by mistake.

Walpole
Papers.

Copy.

Extract.

* Chauvelin.

(Paris, January 2, 1737.) Finding him * thus dispos'd, I asked him whether he had of late heard any thing from the pretender's correspondent; for I could not help being a little curious since the accident of the letter that fell into my hands. He said he had not of late heard a word from that quarter: if he had, he would have told me of it. He then took me by the hand, and in the most emphatical manner said, You may depend upon it, that my giving you that paper was by meer chance. There was no artifice in it. I will own to you, I was at first surpris'd when you mention'd it to me; but assure yourself, I have ever since look'd upon that mistake as a lucky one for me, since it gave me so full an opportunity of convincing your court that I neither am nor have been a favourer of the pretender, or of his adherents. I have reason to believe your court thought otherwise of me; but surely now they cannot suspect me.

I give your grace an exact account of this conversation. You will judge as well as I can of the dependance that can be had on this man's professions; but I look upon these as an infallible sign of his humiliation and of his fears.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Thinks it necessary either to gain Chauvelin, or to obtain his dismissal.

MY LORD,

London, December 30—January 10, 1736-7.

Waldegrave
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Secret.

I Had the honour of your lordship's of the 3d of January, N. S. and altho' the story you entertained me with was ridiculous enough, yett it is a strong indication of the prevailing opinion of the world where you are, that our friend stands

stands upon very slippery ground when such inventions are thrown out and receiv'd, to prepare mankind for any such sudden change.

Upon the subject of that person it is very hard to know what to say. There is nothing more certain than that a change there is so much to be wish'd for, that 'tis almost impossible we should have the worst of it. At the same time it is as certain, if he is like to stand his ground, that nothing should be neglected to gain him, if that were practicable: your lordship knows how far that experiment was tried, and how it ended. His last advances and professions seem to encourage another attempt, but from the character of the man, it is scarce to be supposed that he meant any thing but to make fair weather under his present difficulties and distresses. What then is to be done? That depends upon a knowledge of the true situation of the person, and upon being able to form a judgment of what will most probably be his fate; and that, I confesse, from the weakness of his superiour, is both difficult and hazardous, lest, by giving him time, he should recover himselfe, and afterwards discover any part that was taken to his prejudice.

Your lordship, therefore, who is upon the spott, can best observe and judge if he is falling, and you can do it with safety. You must strike whilst the iron is hott; and if you can venture and can succeed with the old man, you cannot do a greater piece of service. In the mean time, as all who play fair with sharpers are certainly undone, you must pay dissimulation with dissimulation, and be as civill to him as he can possibly be to you. But I am giving your lordship instructions, who have shewn you do not want them; you know the plea, and I dare say will misse no fair opportunity.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Cannot give any definitive answer until the king's arrival.—Wishes the cardinal and lord Waldegrave a happy new year.

MY LORD,

London, Dec. 30—Jan. 10, 1736-7.

YOUR lordship will have heard of the ill fortune his majesty mett with in being taken short at sea with contrary winds, and drove back into Holland, where he now is waiting for a more favorable and I hope a more fortunate opportunity to make his passage into England. This situation makes me incapable of saying any thing upon the great affairs that are in suspence, which I hope you will represent in the most proper manner.

Waldegrave
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Give me leave, my lord, to desire you to be the messenger of my most sincere compliments to the cardinal upon the revolving year. Accept the same yourself; and let his eminency and your excellency be persuaded that these wishes, that bear the face of form and the season, are the sincere sentiments of, my lord, your lordship's most faithful servant.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Motive of sir Luke Schaub's journey to Paris.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Particular.

Draught.

(Paris, February 6, 1737.) Sir Luke Schaub has been some days here with one of the principal magistrates of Basle. They are both deputed by that town to adjust some differences between the French and them relating to the fishery. Sir Luke Schaub was attended by his colleague at the several conferences he had with the cardinal; and his eminency assured me that not a word was said but upon the subject of their mission. The affair will be ended to-morrow, and the magistrat of Basle sets out the next day for his town, and sir Luke says that a day or two after he marches for England. I thought it proper to send you this account by reason of the letter you wrote to me when sir Luke came over.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Buffy is going to England.—Probability of Chauvelin's dismissal.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Private.

Draught.

(Paris, February 6, 1737.) In my private and particular letter to the duke of Newcastle you will have seen most of what I could say on Buffy's score; all that I have to add is this, that he will open himself with the greatest freedom to you, but to you alone. Our friend, in presenting Buffy to me, said he would charge him with particular compliments to you. I don't know how far he may trust him; but I hardly believe that in his present ticklish situation he will venture to say much, or send any besides general messages and compliments. The whole town and court say publickly that our friend will not stand his ground long; but, considering the old gentleman's irresolution, I dare answer for nothing. Du Theil's return from Vienna is thought will be the critical time; for they say that he is the only one capable of executing the office till another be appointed, and the only one to whom all the papers can be delivered up. Some think he will have the place; for Pecquet will undoubtedly be discarded, if Chauvelin is.

As

As to Buffy, you may make what use of him you please. His instructions with respect to the opponents in England is to be civil to such of them as shall be so to him; but to avoid entering into any of their cabals. You may direct him which way you shall judge proper with regard to them. He is artfull, and by his means you may, if you think it worth your while, discover many of their projects. The first instant, there was a year due to 101 [Buffy]. I paid it him the same day; for he does not care to run an hour in arrear. I have drawn for it upon you as usual. He will talk with you about a gratification he has been some time asking for. His going over, I told him, puts an end to my solicitations on that score.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Dismission of Chauvelin.—Amelot appointed his successor.

MY LORD,

Paris, February the 22d, 1737.

IN a postscript to a letter I wrote the day before yesterday to Mr. Couraud, I added a piece of news I had just received, viz. that monsieur Chauvelin had been that morning dismissed from all his employments. The same was confirmed to me soon after with these circumstances, that monsieur de Maurepas went on Wednesday morning, between six and seven, to monsieur Chauvelin's, and by the king's command demanded the great seal, and an act of dismissal in form for his place of secretary of state for foreign affairs. Both which being complied with, monsieur de Maurepas added, that it was the king's pleasure he should go immediately to Gros Bois, there to remain till further orders; and that there was an officer of the gray mousquetaires, monsieur de Jurnillac, to see him thither. These forms were not long in going through, for monsieur and madame Chauvelin, with the officer of the mousquetaires, set out for Gros Bois by seven.

Hardwicke
Papers.

Secret.

Copy.

Though monsieur Chauvelin and his friends had reason enough to fear that it was not the cardinal's intention he should hold his post long, yet none of them thought his fall would have been so sudden. Monsieur Chauvelin thought it so little himself, that Tuesday night he sent part of his family to Versailles, and was to have returned there the next morning at seven.

The cardinal was at Issy when these steps were taken, and set out between ten and eleven the same morning for Versailles. I went thither yesterday, but did not get back time enough to write last night. The cardinal desired me to acquaint my court, that his most christian majesty had thought fit to dismiss monsieur Chauvelin from all his places; and that monsieur Amelot de Chaillou,

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one of the intendants of finances, was to be secretary of state for foreign affairs: that he was persuaded, from this gentleman's good character in the world, that he would discharge the duties of his new employment with honour and probity; and that I might assure myself he would contribute his best towards the maintenance of good harmony between the two crowns.

As this change will of course put a stop to the current of affairs for some days, I must beg your grace's patience till the new minister is a little settled in his office, for executing his majesty's commands relating to the violence committed by a French man of war in the West Indies against some of our merchant-men. Monsieur Daguesseau the chancellor has the seals restored to him, which the people are much pleased with, for he is reckoned a very honest man; and the seals are the better part of the income of the office of chancellor, which without them was little more than a bare title. I here enclose to your grace Mr. Keene's letter, which arrived the night before last from Spain. They would have been here on Saturday, but were detained by the badness of the roads.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Conversation with cardinal Fleury on the dismissal of Chauvelin.—Good consequences to be expected from that event.

MY LORD,

Paris, February 22, 1737:

Hardwicke
Papers.

*Most secret
and particular.*

Copy.

I May in this letter with your grace much joy of the event that we have so impatiently expected. At last the most violent enemy we had is fallen. There are but few but rejoice at it, and those that do not are afraid to shew their concern. I complimented the cardinal yesterday from myself upon it. His eminence took it very well, and was obliging enough to tell me, that I had a greater share in the change than, considering circumstances, it was proper for the world to know; and therefore he had not told it any body: that, as he look'd upon me as *un bonnête homme & son ami*, the account I gave him some time ago of monsieur Chauvelin's behaviour to me had struck him: that he had at the time opened his heart to me as far as he could: that I must have seen plainly it was not then a time of day to make any éclat; but what I then said to him had put him upon enquiring more narrowly into the man's dealings than ever he had done before, and by that means had made such discoveries as not only confirmed all I said, but brought to light many other matters of the most perfidious nature. This he bid me keep to myself. However, I think I am bound in duty to acquaint his majesty with it, tho' I beg this may be known to as few as possible. By degrees I reckon I shall be able to learn all or most of

of these facts ; but the cardinal was in too much hurry yesterday for me to have a long conversation with him.

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The cardinal continued his discourse by saying, that he was persuaded most courts in Europe would be pleased at the alteration : that he had seen enough from me to be sure our's would. I assured him he was in the right ; and that I look'd upon this step as what would restore a confidence and correspondence between us, that could never have been had whilst Chauvelin was employed. He wished it might be so : this he said he was sure of, that he and I would have much more ease and quiet than we had had this long while. In fine, he said many obliging things to me, not worth troubling your grace with. He then told me that monsieur de Chaillou, a *conseiller d'état*, would be appointed to succeed monsieur Chauvelin : that I was the first he had told it to, for it was not to be declared till the French king had been at council. He also gave me a short character of that gentleman. He said he was of a good family *de robe* : that he would answer for his honesty : that he was known to be a man of sense : that he was very modest and well behaved, one that would do what he would have him and no more. It was true, he said, that he (the cardinal) had once been deceived, meaning in monsieur Chauvelin ; but he hoped he should not be so the second time. He told me he had once thought of monsieur de Monti, as a man well versed in foreign affairs ; but as, according to the constitution of his country, several matters must be done by the secretaries of state that require their being of the robe, he had chosen the other ; or else with respect to foreign affairs, he would have preferred monsieur de Monti.

By all I know of monsieur de Chaillou, he answers the character the cardinal gave of him. He is not a man of many words, and has a little impediment in his speech. I suppose him to be an intire novice in foreign business ; but as he has parts, he will soon have enough to receive and execute the cardinal's orders, which seems at present to be his eminency's intention. I found Pecquet in the cardinal's antichamber, when I came out from his eminency. He look'd as one that was to share his master's fate, as it is generally thought he will. He had a bag of writings the cardinal had sent for.

I am very glad that monsieur de Buffly was not here, probably he would have fared the worse for it ; for every body takes it for granted that all those in the offices that had any share in monsieur Chauvelin's confidence will be dismissed.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

On the dismissal of Chauvelin.—Conversation with the cardinal on that subject.

(Feb. 22, 1737.) In my most secret and particular letter to the duke of Newcastle, you will see the fullest account I can give of most of what passed in the conversation I had yesterday with the cardinal upon monsieur Chauvelin's dismissal: however, I thought it more convenient to keep some particular circumstances to relate to you, than to say all in that letter. In the first place, as to this event, which I look upon to be of the utmost consequence to us, you may have seen by several of my late letters that I thought him a going; but considering whom he had to do with, I was always afraid, and durst answer for nothing. When I went into the cardinal's closet, he came up to me smiling, askt me if I was not pleas'd with him, *N'êtes vous pas content de moi.* I assured him I was, and all the world would be so. When we were sat down, it is hardly to be imagined with what venom he talked to me of Chauvelin, chiefly of his ingratitude. To be sure he has made some discoveries of his villanys that he does not think fit yet to publish. He askt me how I thought this would affect you.

I told him plainly that now it was in his power to establish a perfect union and good correspondence between you; for whilst Chauvelin was in place there was so general a diffidence of him, that nobody would engage in any measures that could possibly get one day or other into his hands, and would have been defeated, only because they came from the cardinal. His eminency thought the thing reasonable: he owned he had been imposed upon a long time, butt there was no remedy for the past. He with warmth said, that man had impudence enough to make me the author of all the ill steps, and to brag that he had set them right; to assume good letters to himself that I had wrote. I told him so, said the cardinal, before the king's face; and he could not contradict me. Our conversation was so often interrupted that he could not say more in that strain. All I can say of monsieur Amelot de Chaillou is, that he seems to be the very reverse of Chauvelin, and that must be a good character.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Sir Luke Schaub's mission related simply to the affairs of Basle.—Bussy's return desired by Fleury.

SIR,

March 5, 1736-7.

THO' I have little worth troubling you, I would not lett my exprefs go without a line. By my letter to the duke of Newcastle you will see the best account

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account I can send of our situation here since monsieur Chauvelin's removal. All that I have to add is to acquaint you that Sir Luke Schaub set out last Friday for England. The cardinal assured me in the strongest manner that nothing passed between them besides what related to the affairs of Basle, for which he was sent hither by that republick, and he succeeded in. It is remarkable enough that that transaction occasioned a discovery of several of monsieur Chauvelin's practices in sending orders unknown to the cardinal.

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I question whether Buffy will stay long with you; the cardinal told me he wanted him back: that as he had been at the head of monsieur Dutheil's office, since that gentleman was sent to Vienna, he was at a loss what to do for want of him. I said little, as you will easily believe, on the subject; for which reason I trouble you with nothing else at present but the assurances of the perfect respect with which, &c.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

General satisfaction at the dismissal of Chauvelin.—Joy of the cardinal.

MY LORD,

Paris, March 6, 1737.

THOUGH I cannot yet give any very particular account of the changes that are likely to happen further in this court by the dismissal of Chauvelin, yet, as it is natural to suppose that his majesty may be curious to be acquainted with the appearances, and to have the best information I can send upon this important event, I would not omit the first opportunity of letting your grace know what I have learnt from the publick, and what I have got from the cardinal upon this subject, in a conversation I had with him this morning at Issy.

Hardwicke
Papers.
Most secret.
Copy.

As to the publick, there are very few that do not fall upon monsieur Chauvelin; and it seems almost every body's business to find fault with his whole administration; and most of those that have any sort of access to the cardinal load him with praises for his resolution in getting rid of so false a colleague. I observe that the cardinal is much pleased with the general approbation his conduct has met with, both in the expulsion of Chauvelin and in the choice he has made of monsieur Amelot; for so the new secretary is to be called, without the addition of Chaillou, which was a distinction from others of the same name, but unnecessary now on account of his place.

The town will have it that the Condé and Conti families are uneasy at this change; not from any regard to Chauvelin, but from their own apprehensions that the count de Toulouse may be brought into the administration. Mon-

sieur

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fieur le duc says nevertheless, that he would not on any account whatever take the least share in publick affairs: but that, should the cardinal have any thoughts of bringing monsieur de Toulouse into business, all the legitimate princes of the blood ought to represent against it. For my part, I don't see any thing like this, at least for some time.

As to monsieur Chauvelin, I do not yet hear any thing besides general accusations brought against him; tho' I am assured people are at work to discover particulars, which, if made out, will probably occasion his being sent farther from this capital than the place he is now at. The only apparent mark of the court's displeasure, since his dismissal, has been the orders sent to monsieur Chauvelin to have all the badges of his office of Garde des Sceaux, and Vice-chancellor, with which he had adorned the inside as well as the outside of his house, taken down, that no record or trace may remain there of his having enjoyed those places.

As to the cardinal, he seems to rejoice anew every time one sees him, at the step he has taken. He told me how much he was now at ease: that his business, which sunk him before, was now an amusement to him; and that he should in a few days bring all his affairs into such a method, that they would be done with great exactness and little trouble. Here he launched out in encomiums upon monsieur Amelot, which gave me occasion to mention to him the letter I had received from Mr. Stone by your grace's order, preparing me for his majesty's commands to his eminency and monsieur Amelot upon this occasion, which had been prevented the last post day by the unhappy accident of my lord chancellor's death, lord Talbot. His eminency took his majesty's intentions, and some compliments I made from my knowledge of them, in the politest manner; not doubting but all obstacles were now removed which might otherwise have hindered a strict union between the two crowns.

The cardinal then entered confidentially into a sort of detail of his projects. He told me he intended to give one day in a week to each of the four secretaries of state, to treat with them separately on the affairs of their respective departments: that nevertheless monsieur Amelot should have access whenever he had business: that, besides this, the four secretaries should meet at his lodgings once a week: that such things as were proper should be communicated to them all, that he might have an opportunity of knowing their several sentiments upon them; and that he was persuaded there would now be good harmony between those gentlemen, since the man was out that kept them asunder.

When

When this discourse was ended, I took occasion to talk to him about his ministers in foreign courts. I mentioned the rumours about monsieur de Vaugrenant's being thought to have had private dealings with Chauvelin. He said he did not suppose it; and it looks as if he would not soon be removed, as the town will have it: but Sennetere at Turin, and Toulay at Venice, will, I believe, be recalled out of hand. Not that he suspects that any thing was clandestinely done by them, but that he looks upon them as having no other merit than their devotion to Chauvelin; for he seems to think, that if there have been any private dealings between Chauvelin and the king of Sardinia, they have passed through Solari's canal.

The cardinal is highly displeased with monsieur de la Mina; he cannot speak of him with patience in any capacity. He looks upon him to be quite ignorant in business, without any sort of breeding, and will not even allow him to be a foldier. Prince la Torella has also quite lost himself with his eminency. The Italian petty ministers are much in the same way; Chauvelin had got hold of them all, and they have unadvisedly, as well as the Spaniard, shewn their concern at his disgrace, which the cardinal will not forget in haste. Your grace may expect to hear more of these matters, by degrees, but all cannot be got out at once. Whatever comes to my knowledge worth his majesty's notice shall be transmitted without loss of time.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The cardinal anxious to receive an answer from sir Robert Walpole.—Apologizes for his silence.

SIR,

March 17th, 1737.

I Have not much to trouble you with by this express; however, I must not omit acquainting you that I don't think that 101 [Buffy] will be sent for back so soon as I expected; the office he was wanted for is put into a method to go on at least for some time without him.

The cardinal, I believe, expects to hear from you upon the letter I had the honour of writing to you by his direction in November last. He did not directly say it. We were talking last Tuesday of the affairs of Europe in general, and of his hopes of settling a lasting peace; he said, Mr. Walpole *connoit tout mon plan*: that he had laid his whole scheme before you: that you know he had no engagement with the emperor beyond those contained in the preliminaries: that this defensive treaty was where it was at the time I wrote: that he had no

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engagements with the king of Prussia: that those with the palatin family were merely to prevent war: that hitherto nothing had been said to him from us. I thought it then necessary to put him in mind that you had waited a great deal longer than could have been imagined for the king's return; and that I had made him your excuses thereupon: that since that time his majesty's indisposition had probably prevented your writing; and now your parliamentary business took up a great deal of your time, so that I did not wonder at your silence. With this he appeared satisfied; and as I was not desired, nor did engage, to give you an account of this conversation, you may either take notice of it, or let it alone, as you shall judge most proper.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Rejoices at the disgrace of Chauvelin.—Satisfied with Buffy's behaviour.—Is desirous to know the cardinal's sentiments, and to concur with him in promoting a strict union between England and France.

MY LORD,

London, March 7—12, 1736-7.

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Private.

YOUR lordship will not very much wonder that we have been behind hand of late in our foreign correspondence, considering how fully we have been employed in our domestick * broils and contests, the most troublesome I ever knew, and, from the great object of division, the most dangerous that could have been attempted; but we have got through them, and I doubt not shall be able to gett the better of all such fatal and pernicious projects.

I come now to mention what your lordship will have reasonably expected to have heard of some time, I mean the arrival of monsieur Buffy, who has hitherto behaved himself entirely to our satisfaction; and I make no doubt will continue to do so as long as he stays among us. The removal of monsieur Chauvelin was welcome news here, and to all the world who wish success to the cardinal's administration. He was such a perpetual clog upon the wheels, and acted upon principles so directly contrary to all his eminency's professions and practices, that his best designs were often frustrated, and almost always render'd dilatory and uncertain. And as there is nothing that I have always desired more, and do now most earnestly wish, than to establish and cultivate a perfect good understanding and confidence with the cardinal, if his eminency will be pleased to explain himself to your lordship upon what points and in what manner he proposes to settle and confirm a perfect friendship and union

* Alluding to the motion in parliament for encreasing the establishment of the prince of Wales.
between

between our royal masters, for their mutual honour and interest, he shall find on my part all the readiness and sincerity he can possibly desire.

I do not desire in this manner to know what his eminency's views and intentions are, with any design to avoid entering into a closer and more explicit correspondence, or to make any advantage of learning first from the cardinal his thoughts. But as the whole system of carrying on the generall pacification has been in his hands, and the final and definitive conclusion must be under his conduct and direction, it is impossible for me to suggest or begin any negotiation, untill I know from his eminency upon what basis and foundation he proposes to proceed; and, when his thoughts are explain'd, he may depend upon a ready concurrence to promote the common interest of the two crowns; which I think can never be so well secur'd as by a strict friendship and union establish'd upon proper and just foundations. And I confess I am impatient till I can know from your lordship his eminency's further thoughts upon this important and necessary work.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Cardinal satisfied with the reasons for not writing.—Approves of Buffy's conduct.

—Will take into consideration the proposal to renew the union between the two crowns.

SIR,

Paris, March 30th, 1736-7.

I Was honoured in due time with your letters of the 7—18th instant, and communicated the contents of it to the cardinal last Wednesday at Issy. His eminency was very sensible of the many reasons you had to postpone your writing, and expressed himself very handsomely upon the last, of which he had received a full account from monsieur de Buffy; and of the superior manner, *la supériorité*, with which you extricated yourself from an affair of so dangerous a tendency. I then toucht upon the account you gave me of monsieur de Buffy's behaviour since his arrival in England, and how satisfied you was with him. The cardinal answered, When I sent Buffy, I knew little of him; but now I can answer for him, and for his good behaviour during his stay there. He added, Buffy was no friend of Chauvelin. The next passage relates to the satisfaction Chauvelin's dismissal gave you in particular, and in general to all who wisht well to his eminency's administration. This the cardinal took exceeding kindly. He said this so general an approbation was a great comfort

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to him ; and he desired me to thank you in the best manner for your good opinion of him.

The remaining part of your letter, tending to shew your readiness to concur with his eminency in any just and reasonable measures for to establish and cultivate a perfect good understanding between our royal masters had an entire approbation ; and your observation, that as the whole plan of the pacification was now in his hands, and under his conduct, it was more proper that he should propose the means to bring this about, than for you, who being hitherto unacquainted with his designs and views with relation to other courts, might propose things that would be inconsistent with his other engagements. This observation, I say, was thought very just ; the cardinal could not but allow it to be reasonable. He told me he must take a little time to consider, before he could give me a direct answer ; and I reckon next Tuesday to learn more of his mind upon this subject. He desired nevertheless, in case I wrote to you before we met again, that I would assure you from him of the sincerity of his desires to cultivate a perfect friendship with you, which he made no doubt would be a mutual advantage to our masters. I told the cardinal that captain Porteous' affair was now out of your hands, and that whatever was done with the murtherers would be now the act of the nation, and not of the administration.

The cardinal told me in the utmost confidence that he had discovered that Chauvelin had wanted to settle a private correspondence with you, by the means of mademoiselle de Mezers and the Oglethorps : but he supposed you knew Chauvelin too well to trust him. He beg'd of me not to mention it to you ; so no notice is to be taken of it.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Waits for the cardinal's proposals.—The king will confer on his lordship one of the first vacant garters.

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Private.

(London, March 23—April 3, 1736-7.) I had the favour of your lordship's of the 30th instant, N. S. yesterday ; and as affairs seem now to stand, I think it unnecessary and improper for me to enter into any particulars, untill the cardinal is pleas'd to speak to you again ; not at all doubting but you will take all occasions to satisfy him that I do by no means decline being more particular, but wait only for his sentiments, who can only dictate what principles and measures are most agreeable to his views and engagements ; and that he may be assured of my readiness to co-operate with him.

The

The chief occasion of my troubling you now is to expresse the pleasure with which I acquaint your lordship, that the king has commanded me to tell you that he is determin'd to give your lordship one of the first blue garters that he shall dispose of. I always take so great a share in every thing that tends so much to your lordship's satisfaction, that I most heartily congratulate your lordship upon this singular mark of his majestie's just sense and great regard to your lordship's good and faithful services.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Cardinal proposes to admit Amelot into the secret correspondence.

(April 3, 1737.) You will see, by my dispatch to the duke of Newcastle, that I could not do much business yesterday with the cardinal. However, his eminency said he had considered of the letter I had communicated to him, and that I might assure you, that he wisht for nothing more than to promote the restoring a good harmony with England, which he lookt upon as more necessary every day for keeping a proper ballance in Europe; and he would impart to you his farther sentiments upon the means to bring this about. He then told me that I might depend upon it that monsieur Amelot was as desirous as he could be to contribute to a strict union between our masters; and asked me thereupon, whether I thought you would have any objection to monsieur Amelot's being admitted into the secret of any negotiation that might be founded on this correspondence. I answered that I did not suppose you would dislike it, but that I could not take it upon myself to be positive till I had wrote to you. The cardinal thought I was right, because of the engagements we were reciprocally under of secrecy; and therefore desired me to sound you upon it. Tho' I am perswaded you will give your consent, and that you would not have disavowed me had I engaged for you in this point, yet, as I judge his majesty is in less haste to treat with France, than the cardinal, I believe, is to treat with us, I was glad enough of a plausible pretence to gain some time, and to receive your farther thoughts on this matter.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Conference with cardinal Fleury, who lays open his plan for a private treaty between England and France.—Uneasiness and dejection of the cardinal, probably derived from the private amours of Louis the Fifteenth.—Frustrated in his attempts to remove Bachelier.—Situation and inefficiency of the council.

SIR,

Paris, April 13, 1737.

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I Was honoured by the last messenger from England with your letter of the 23d past. The account you send me in it, by the king's command, of his majesty's gracious intention to give me one of the first blue garters he shall dispose of, affords me the greatest satisfaction. Give me leave, sir, to entreat you to lay at his majesty's feet my most humble thanks for this publick mark of his favour and approbation of my conduct, and to assure the king that the pleasure I feel on this occasion is highly improved by the hopes I am in that it will make me more usefull to his majesty's service, from the additional consideration it will procure me here.

I am now to give you an account of the conversation I had with the cardinal upon the secret transaction between you and him. I thought as you did, that we might keep silent till he should explain himself further than he had yet done, and till I had your answer concerning monsieur Amelot's admittance to that confidence; and, for that reason, I did not propose to myself to say any thing more on the subject till I had heard from you. But he began himself, and of himself, for I had not lain any thing in his way to engage the discourse.

He began with a repetition of his desire of settling a good and perfect union and understanding between our masters; that neither of them wanted to enlarge their possessions; but it behoved both to enjoy in peace and tranquillity what they had, and to secure the same, as far as they could, to the rest of Europe: that, in consequence of the discourses we had had on the subject, he thought nothing would better answer that purpose than a private treaty between England and France, under the strictest and most inviolable secrecy, for a reciprocal guaranty of the rights and possessions of both crowns, and for a mutual defence; to which general articles might be added, if thought necessary, for confirming all former treatys; as likewise engagements might be taken not to make any new alliances contrary to the present treaty, or without the mutual consent of both parties. The principal object of this treaty, according to the cardinal, was to prevent the ever-growing power of the house of

of Austria, or its representatives in Germany; and to hinder their encroaching upon the rights of the princes there; in fine, to keep them down to the constitution of the empire: but he did not explain himself as to the means.

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† Illegible.

His eminency then added, in a misterious sort of way, and not at * * † that he wish'd I would insinuate to you that he thought measures ought to be taken to prevent Tuscany being annexed to the inheritance of the house of Austria; that, in his opinion, it should rather go to the duke of Lorain's brother, and to the younger branches of it, in case that fail'd; in the same manner Loraine would have done had it remained in that house. For he could not but think that the emperor would be too powerfull in Italy, if Tuscany should belong to the same prince who was possessed of all the emperor's present and future dominions. For he talked of several contingencys by which the possessions of the house of Austria might be increased, by contracts between family and family, particularly that of Wortemberg, which, in case of failure of issue male, may belong to the emperor. He wisht I would, as I said before, sound you on these heads, and know what you thought of them. Whilst we were talking thus, the cardinal was called upon by the king, which put a stop to our conversation.

I cannot say I was sorry for the interruption; for I judged he rather wanted to know what we would do, than to be explicit himself. I told him, as we were rising up, that I would not fail to acquaint you with the general notions he had thrown out, and hear your sentiments upon them; but that I still thought he must let us know how far he is engaged with the emperor and the duke of Lorraine, before we can say any thing to the purpose. I assured him again of your readiness to concur in just and honourable means to preserve the equillibre in Europe, and to establish a solid union between the two crowns. I must acquaint you here, that I observed, in the conversation I had afterwards with monsieur Amelot, that the cardinal has talkt to him of this affair; for he spoke to me, in general terms, of the usefulness of an alliance between England and France, to keep the emperor within bounds, and to prevent his being too powerfull in Italy; and used several of the same turns the cardinal had done. From this I should judge his eminency is in earnest; Amelot will certainly be so if the cardinal is; for I don't know any body that will put him off from it.

It may not be improper to make use of this conjuncture to give you some account of my notions of the cardinal's present situation. I must own I apprehend

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hend he has something that hangs heavy on his spirits, and that wares him inwardly. Every body observes that he seems more mistrustfull, and to open himself less than heretofore. I have now and then thought the same, but attributed it to his being quite tired and wearied. But this I have very particularly remarked, last Tuseday especially, that in talking to me, as he often does in the utmost confidence and without constraint, tears came in his eyes, and he remained thoughtfull and dejected for about a minute; but upon recollecting himself, he resumed his natural good-humoured look. Sometimes I have imagined these motions proceeded from a decay not to be wondered at in a man of his years: others, who have observed it as well as I, are of opinion that he is concerned at some gallantrys of his master's, which he may apprehend will in time lessen his power over the French king.

Some assure me, and I have the same from a particular friend that is in the way of knowing it, that the cardinal had discovered, some time ago, that mon-sieur Bachelier, a favourite valet de chambre of the French king's, had had private dealings with Chauvelin, and for that reason wanted to have him out, and has tryed at it, but hitherto without success. Another reason the cardinal has for getting Bachelier out is, that nobody doubts of his having been the person trusted with the king's amours, first with madame de Mailly, and since with the duchess of Rochouert, a good pretty young woman between fifteen and sixteen; tho' what passes on these matters is in the most private manner imaginable, yet at court, this especially, things of such a nature will transpire. It is generally believed that the cardinal never toucht in the least of the amours. It is said that his eminency has contented himself with representing Bachelier as an improper person to be about the king; that something ought to be done for him, but he was unfit for the place. They add, that upon all the cardinal's representations on this subject, the king keeps silent, which is his way with the cardinal when he will not do what he is desired: this, I am assured, has been the case now for above a month. To something of this kind I rather attribute the cardinal's uneasiness than to any other cause. Perhaps the experience the cardinal has of the insufficiency of his master's present grand council, may make him thoughtfull, which, together with the weight of business he has been forced to bear since Chauvelin's dismissal, should have sunk his spirits, and made him sensible of the difficulty of carrying matters in the way we have at this time.

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You know the present council of state is composed of the duke of Orleans, the cardinal, marshal d'Estrées, monsieur d'Aguesseau secretary at war, monsieur Orry the controleur general, and monsieur Amelot the new secretary for foreign affairs. The duke of Orleans is deeper in his devotion than ever. Marshal d'Estrées has been a good seaman, now much decayed with gout and age; he is never consulted but in the marine affairs. D'Aguesseau is reckoned to know less of the affairs of his own office than any that preceded him in it, and nothing at all of any other business. Orry and Amelot are the only two he seems at present to confide in, and the only ones of the board he can do any business with. My opinion of both is, that by the help of their commis they may be able to reduce into form any plan the cardinal may propose to them; but that neither of them have knowledge or experience enough of foreign affairs to offer any thing of their own towards settling a good understanding with their neighbours, or in order to molest them. What time may do with Amelot, who is but a beginner, I cannot say; but Orry will hardly improve, tho' I cannot think him so free from ambition as the cardinal does: but taking them in the light his eminency seems to see him, I think that his chief aim is to put the affairs of this court, with respect to other powers, upon a footing to go on by themselves, and to remove, as far as he can, all likelihood of broyles, which he would find hard to carry on without calling in for assistants he has no mind to; and this may be his view in seeking to be easy with us: and the town talks of several who push at getting into the administration.

Monsieur de Noailles is the man that pushes most. He makes his court with the utmost assiduity both to the king and cardinal; but I believe both know his intriguing temper and turbulent spirit too well to admit him. Torcy, the cardinal tells me, does not think of getting into business any more. The bishop of Ambrun shews too much eagerness to be admitted; and yet I protest I do not see how business can go on here in the hands it is. Forgive the length and incorrectness of this letter; I thought, at this juncture, you would forgive both, and not dislike my sending you, in the utmost confidence, my notions on their situation here.

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ROBERT TREVOR TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Agitation in Holland on the proposal of sir John Barnard to reduce the interest of the national debt.—Absurd rumours that sir Robert Walpole projected and promoted the scheme.—Reasons against the reduction.

DEAREST SIR,

Hague, April 19, 1737.

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Papers.

Particular.

I Was honoured the day before yesterday with your excellency's of the 1st instant O. S. and cannot return you sufficient thanks for the pains you have given yourself to inform me of the true nature and state of the question now under the parliament's deliberation, in relation to the national debt, which can scarce create more discourse and agitation in the city than it does here. I was very glad to see, by your excellency's account, that whatever may prove the issue of this project, its modality is consistent with the principles of liberty and justice; for, besides various stories that fly about here, I confess I was very little edified with the turn and tendency of some pamphlets, far from absurdly or awkwardly wrote, which the greffier lent me, on this topick; and which plainly assert the right of the legislature to alter publick contracts, according to the publick rate of money, without the tender of a reimbursement, or the creditor's fresh consent; quoting (probably partial and imperfect) extracts out of the preambles of the acts of parliament that regulated the preceding reductions from 6 to 5, and from 5 to 4, wherein no other reason is assigned for such reduction, but *whereas the common rate of interest is come lower, &c.* However, the epithets with which your excellency accompanys Bernard's scheme, viz. of *impracticable* and *unjust*, sufficiently assure me that the author abovementioned did not write the sentiments of the government.

The bare weight of the landed interest seems to me a sufficient solution of the reception which this idea has mett with in your house. However, I cannot conceal from your excellency, that the bulk of mankind, notwithstanding your brother's apparent neutrality, or rather opposition, do him the honour of being the projector and promoter of this scheme; having no idea, they say, of a majority against his real will and sentiments. The same refiners look upon the two first members of Bernard's scheme to have been flung out only to serve for a foyl to the third, and to make people hugg themselves in that, by comparing it with the greater danger they had escaped. Some few go so far with their speculations as to flatter themselves that this scheme, whether it passes or not, will have a quite different effect from that which it appears designed to procure;

procure; and, by unsettling people's minds, and unhinging that implicit faith which they have hitherto had in the publick funds of England, will deter them from giving such exorbitant premiums to have a share therein; which very premiums may afterwards be turned against themselves, and be made a reason and a means of either reimbursing them at par, or of depreciating their interest. For my own part, were I considerably affected (as the Lord knows I am not) by this reduction, I should, however, submit myself to the decision of my law-givers, and content myself to move along with the croud. However, I am too ingenuous to dissemble from your excellency, that, had I been in a situation which properly called upon me for my opinion, I should, in the light I see this question at present, have been against the *fonds* of the affair; and been glad to have prevented it from being ever discussed at all. My sense of the impertinence of my opining thus dogmatically, on a point no wise of my cognisance, obliges me to subjoin some of my reasons for thinking as I do.

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1. All matters of a pecuniary nature are so delicate and serious, that they will not bear being discussed and canvassed with the same freedom as other points of government; and there are thousands of innocent persons who are the dupes and victims of the least motion of this nature. And it is visible, that a speech in parliament about the funds will cause a greater vibration in property, backwards or forwards, than all the lies and artifices of stock-jobbers without doors could do; and consequently discussions of this nature seem contrary to that stability, certitude, and confidence, for the establishing whereof the late bill against stock-jobbing seems judiciously calculated.

2. I think the natural method of liquidating the publick debts by the surplus of the publick taxes, for which every body was prepared, and on the foot whereof every body might frame their computations and take their measures, was more eligible than the present violent remedy; as the former, by operating gradually and regularly, gave the payd-off creditor time to turn, not only his money, but his passions, genius, and facultys, to some other means of subsistence; whereas, the present reduction will fill the state with desponding, desperate, and dangerous subjects.

3. I prefer a saving to the publick, which arises from the annihilation of the capital of its debt, to one which arises from the reduction of the interest of the same. For, besides that, an individual, who is reimbursed his capital, has many more ways and means in his power of shifting for himself, than one

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who, without any ready money, has his income reduced, I am apprehensive, that in stormy and troublesome times, such a vast weight of discounted funds as we are now like to have in England, should any misfortune threaten or befall us, would terribly depress people's spirits, and greatly clogg the necessary measures for our defence; which consideration makes me wish that we would rather make all clear as we go.

4. I am far from thinking, that the nominal rise of stocks can equitably be looked upon as any real profit accrued to the original lender. Had the same sum, at the same distance of time, been invested in land, or almost any other property, the same, or perhaps a greater proportion, would now be wanting to make its equivalent; so that, instead of saying that 112 l. now, is more than 100 l. was formerly, I should choose to say, that a modern guinea is not so valuable as a guinea was at that time; and consequently (forgive the expression) that there are more of them go to the hundred. I confess, that the nature of all contracts upon the foot of redemption, makes it just and necessary, one day or other, to replace my old guineas with the modern ones. But, considering the service of the loan, and some hardships of the lenders, I think it neither generous, nor indeed politick, to be too eager or ingenious to distress or plague them before their time.

5. I am apprehensive that, should this project pass, and the reduction of great part, or of all the 4 *per cent.* redeemables take effect, the relief now promised and held out to the other *classes* of the subject may not, in the common opinion, prove immediate or sensible enough to answer their expectation, authorised in good measure by the present language of the government and parliament. A disappointment of this kind, added to the resentment of the reduced creditors, appears to me a thing to be well worth avoiding, considering the foariness and giddiness of the present times.

6. Your excellency must not be surpris'd, from such a black-blooded whigg as myself, to hear one consideration more, which is, that since all diminution of the current value of money proportionably raises the value of all stated incomes, the provision of the crown, which at the time it was granted (estimating it at a million) was equivalent to little more than twenty millions, will, upon the foot at present proposed, outweigh a capital of three and thirty millions. However, I do not insist upon the solidity of this argument, not being clear in my own opinion, whether the crown has yet a proportionable share of influence in our government.

I heartily

I heartily ask your excellency's pardon for the length of this impertinence; and I wish you may not think you have rather been reading a protest, than a familiar letter. But the truth is, that it is nothing but the effect of that freedom to which your excellency's condescension and candour have long habituated me, and of my desire to preserve this privilege in spite of the long absence which has deprived me of all opportunities of exercising it otherwise than by letters, that has prompted its contents. I acquainted Mr. Slingelandt with what your excellency said to me about Spörck. He begs his humblest thanks to you for your kind intentions. His poor sister is reduced to the last extremity; and he himself has been confined within doors this month with a fluxion on his face.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Is willing by the king's approbation to open a secret correspondence with cardinal Fleury.—Proposes to admit monsieur Amelot and the duke of Newcastle into it.

MY LORD,

London, May — 1737.

YOUR lordship may very well wonder at my long silence, and the cardinal not without reason be uneasy at the long delay I have given to his eminence's last overtures for beginning and carrying on a private negotiation between the two crowns in the manner proposed by his eminence. My only excuse is, the great weight of business in parliament, which has taken up and employ'd all my thoughts and time; which now being in the main happily got over in our house, I beg you will excuse me in the best manner you are able, and make this renewal of our correspondence acceptable to his eminence. Not that I was the least uneasy at this interruption, because I observ'd that matters were not yett come to such a maturity as might make it practicable to proceed upon any particulars that tended towards the finishing the great and desired work: I mean that untill the present negotiation that has been so long carrying on between the courts of France and Vienna is perfected, and the contents and purport of it made known to his majesty, it seems to me impossible even to lay the foundation of a particular treaty between his majesty and the most christian king. We must be greatly governed and influenc'd by the terms and conditions of the present treaty.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

There is one thing most certain, which the cardinal may be assur'd of and depend upon. We have no treaties with any prince or power, but what are publick and known; and consequently his majesty can be under no engagements prejudicial or disagreeable to any of his allies. And his majesty proposes that this may be the basis of all his future treaties to be renew'd, confirm'd,
and

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and enter'd into anew with the several powers of Europe, that he may enter into no engagements that may be offensive to, or contravene the conditions or obligations that he is at present under.

Upon this foot his majesty is ready to hear, receive, and to proceed upon any proposition that the cardinal has to propose for settling and establishing a perfect and sincere friendship between his majesty and the most christian king. And as it cannot well be supposed, but his majesty's concurrence, approbation, or perhaps guarantying in some manner the present treaty between the emperor and France, will be ask'd and expected, the communication of this treaty, and the explanations which his eminence shall be pleas'd to make upon this occasion, will naturally lead to the beginning of this private treaty, which is the object of our present consideration.

Neither can I make the least doubt but that the cardinal will think it just and reasonable to give his majesty the same satisfaction concerning any treaties which the christian king may have entered into with any other princes or powers, wherein there may be any thing contained to the prejudice of any of his majesty's rights or possessions: for instance, the treaties made with the courts of Madrid and Turin, or either of them, upon entering into the late war, if there are any articles to which his majesty has most just objection, it cannot be doubted but that the cardinal will do his majesty justice, and give him all reasonable satisfaction in every particular.

Your lordship will be able to convince the cardinal, that there is no affected delay in this proceeding, nor backwardness to settle a sincere and perfect friendship between the two crowns; but in truth the particulars must arise and move from the cardinal alone. And in order to putt the business into some form of proceeding, the king readily consents that monsieur Amelot be admitted into the conduct and management of it, as far as the cardinal thinks proper; and for the same reason it will be necessary that the duke of Newcastle has likewise a share in it: the secret will not be in the least hazard from that confidence, but the correspondence more regular in our way of business.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.

Admits the duke of Newcastle into the secret correspondence.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

(London, May 1737.) I hope no jealousy or inconvenience will happen from the long delay that has attended this correspondence; I tell you the truth in my other letter; and if the cardinal is sincere, and means any thing, you may safely go on with him. It was absolutely necessary to take the duke of Newcastle

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Newcastle into this affair; your letters to me could not passe unobserv'd. You know too well not to be sensible this method made all easy, and monsieur Amellott is a sufficient pretence to the cardinal. I thank you for the trouble you have given yourself about the pictures. I have no thoughts about any of them.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.
Doubts the accuracy of Buffy's information.—King of France's irregularities.—
Cardinal's vexation.

MY LORD,

Paris, May 22, 1737.

WHEN I dispatch'd my last exprefs to your grace on the 11th instant, I had been pretty much out of order for some days, and was still a good deal indisposed, which hind'ed me from answering your grace's private and particular letter of 4—11th past, by Crew; and as I did not see any thing in the contents of it that required haste, or on which much could be added to what I had already wrote to your grace, I thought it would be more proper to get some farther light into what 101 [Buffy] communicated to sir Robert Walpole, than to send you barely my own opinion of it.

Hardwicke
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

After all that I have been able to learn upon that head, I must own to your grace that I take that project to be entirely a composition of 101 [Buffy], grounded upon the papers he carried from hence. For I can neither see from what he could have it here, nor can I imagine that Du Theil would send him any such sketch from Vienna. That this project was at least never agreed to is plain, if what the cardinal and monsieur Amelot told me yesterday be true, that the project for the treaty between France and the emperor was not finished till the 13th instant, N. S. To which this circumstance was added, that as the finishing this project was the term set some time ago for Du Theil's return hither, he is reckoned to be actually on the road.

The account the cardinal and monsieur Amelot gave me of the reason of Du Theil's return is, that he has been tired this good while of the slow proceedings of the Imperial ministers; and that he took this so much to heart, that he had been sick of the *maladie du pais*, and pressed so hard for leave to come home, that it could not be refused; and therefore, so long ago as December last, in monsieur Chauvelin's time, leave was sent him to come back as soon as the project of the private treaty between the emperor and France was perfected; and that Du Theil was so bent on his return, that he sent word about a week since that, his business being now done, he would set out on the 15th or 16th instant.

These

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These ministers seem to be differently affected with monsieur Du Theil's leaving Vienna.

The cardinal says he is sorry for it, because l'Estang, who remains there, is not versed enough in business to be able to carry on the negociation to conclusion, should new difficulties arise. Monsieur Amelot is glad of Du Theil's return, because he wants him in the office; for he has no sort of confidence in Pecquet: on the contrary, he looks upon him as Chauvelin's spy, and one who will mislead him as often as he can in the business of the office. Amelot has owned this to me; so that I take it for granted that as soon as Du Theil is here, Pecquet will be dismissed. I have, as often as I had the least occasion, given a helping hand to confirm both the cardinal and monsieur Amelot in this disposition to turn off Pecquet, and I hope I shall gain my point; but cannot be positive that *ior* [Buffy] will succeed, tho' I hope he will. I have taken occasions to speak of him to Amelot, as a young man of parts and ready in business; which I thought was the best way of serving him, since he wants such a man. He told me he had heard a great deal of good of *ior* [Buffy]. The cardinal, to my knowledge, has a good opinion of him; commended again, yesterday, his prudent conduct in England, his manner of writing, his giving bare relations of facts; and called to mind his proper behaviour at Vienna, in troublesome times. Your grace may imagine that in all these cases, where *ior* [Buffy] has been mentioned to me, I was much on my guard, and took care that all I said should seem to proceed merely from my friendship for an old acquaintance, who has met with hard usage from monsieur Chauvelin, and in this light it was very well taken.

I must now return to the treaty of which your grace sent me the copy. I have already given my reasons why I do not take it to be genuine. It is nevertheless very probable that the paper given sir Robert may contain pretty near the substance of the articles of agreement between the two courts. Whether they are already signed, or only intended to be signed, is a point I am a good deal more in doubt about. The cardinal, in speaking of Du Theil's return, said the project of the treaty was only perfected, and not signed. If this be true, it looks as if they did not intend to sign their treaty for some time. For I can hardly believe that Du Theil would leave his work to be ended by another, if nothing but the formality of the signature was wanting, which would not take up many days. It is very possible he may have been glad of any pretence to delay concluding entirely, to keep the court of Spain from any knowledge of the

the engagement France is under with the emperor about the allodials of Parma, Placentia, and Tuscany; for when once the treaty is signed, Spain would insist upon arrangements being taken for settling the allodials, and would soon discover how this court has acted towards that of Madrid. For this reason the signature of the separate treaty between the emperor and France may have been delayed; or if it is signed, which from Du Theil's return I should suspect, the emperor and France must have agreed to keep it private, and consequently 101 [Buffy] could hardly have got into the secret, which could be known but to very few in the offices here.

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As to the act of commerce between Germany and France, I cannot make much out of it; for I hardly think the emperor would engage with France in measures which must so highly disoblige the maritime powers. Besides, it seems so contradictory to all the cardinal has said to me of his fears of the emperor's views of extending his commerce, of his desires to engage with us to keep the emperor within bounds in all respects, that I fancy this article may have been projected by monsieur Chauvelin, in hopes of getting the emperor to disoblige us, or to draw on a long negotiation upon it, which would have retarded the consummation of the work. For this reason I do not think this article is genuine; and if one is not, it takes off from the probability of the other.

A word the cardinal let drop to me yesterday, should make me believe that the treaty is not yet signed, nor even perfected, if I could believe implicitly all that comes from his eminency. Upon my enquiring of him accidentally whether all was yet settled relating to Lorraine, he told me it was not; adding in the utmost confidence, that the emperor wanted to have it specify'd in the treaty that Lorraine and Bar were yielded up to France as a consideration for his most christian majesty guarantying the pragmatick sanction. The cardinal said he could by no means consent to this assertion, that it was unnecessary to mention any consideration; and that it was not usual in treaties to give reasons why things were done. He was not disposed to explain this matter any further; but it look'd to me as if he suspected that the emperor's view, in desiring the cession of Lorraine to be mentioned as a consideration for the guaranty of the pragmatick sanction, was to invalidate the French king's title to Lorraine, if in time to come any difficulties should be made on the part of France about that guaranty. This passage shews a suspicion, which may sooner or later set this and the Imperial court at variance.

I am fully as impatient to have 101 [Buffy] here as he can be himself; I plague the cardinal and monsieur Amelot every day I see them about getting

Period VI. Cambis away, and go every two or three days to Cambis himself to hasten him.
 1734 to 1737. His baggage sets out next Monday, the 27th instant, for Rouen, where a ship
 1737. waits to carry his effects to London.

To conclude this letter, I must acquaint your grace, that tho' the cardinal seems in very good health, the world will have it that he is interiorly out of order, and that he has of late met with several mortifications from his master. According to the scheme he told me of, he has been endeavouring to get the king to mind his business more than he has used to do. It has been therefore necessary to restrain him from rambling, as he has done for this long while; and in order to it, I am assured by good authors that La Peyronie, a favourite surgeon of the king's, was got by the cardinal to represent to his master, that the exercise he used was too violent; that the long suppers he made at night, and the quantity of champagne he drank, would prejudice his health. La Peyronie urged that in his duty and his conscience he was obliged to give this advice, not only from himself, but as the opinion of the physicians who had the honour to belong to his majesty, who feared for his life if he did not alter the course he was in. But these admonitions, instead of having the desired effect, have put the king out of humour with the advisers, and have rather occasioned more irregularities in outward appearance than heretofore. Generally the *voyages*, as they call them, de Rambouillet, used to be settled six weeks beforehand, that the ministers might order their affairs accordingly; but now the king goes and comes in a manner as his fancy leads, which is an obstruction to public business, and vexes the cardinal much. This is not publicly taken notice of, but is only whispered. From hence some people seem to conclude that the cardinal has not so much credit with his master as he had before, which hurts the old man. Every body observes that the French king falls away visibly, and has by no means that healthy look he formerly had. I cannot help attributing the cardinal's lowness of spirits to something of this nature.

May 24th. Since writing what goes before, I was this morning with the cardinal at Iffy. He told me, with the appearance of great pleasure, that he hoped the war between the emperor and the Turk would be prevented: that the Porte consented to let Azoph remain in the hands of the Muscovites, and to have the congress in any neutral place. He spoke a good deal in his confidential manner of the ill consequences of the emperor's aggrandizing himself at the expence of the Turk; but as he said nothing new on the subject, it is not worth repeating. He then told me in the utmost confidence, that the project of his treaty with the emperor was pretty near settled: that Du Theil sent it by a
 courier,

courier, who arrived here two days ago: that it was not signed, and would require several amendments. He added that he would communicate it to me next Tuesday at Versailles, or sooner if he could; and that I should see there was nothing in it beyond what he had constantly told me. He then spoke pretty peevishly of the *mauvaise foy* of the Austrian ministers, and he certainly seems in earnest when he touches that topick. The queen of Spain and his eminence are no better to appearance than they have been, and monsieur de la Mina is not likely to promote a closer understanding between the two courts.

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We had a short touch upon the Palatine succession. He continues still in his notion that as soon as his project of pacification with the emperor is signed and compleated, we must jointly with France take measures to prevent *voyes de fait*, and Imperial sequestration. He speaks with concern of the dangers that may arise from any increase of the king of Prussia's strength; and seems very ready to support his majesty's pretensions to Ostfre, upon proper security being given to the Dutch about Embden.

The cardinal told me afterwards that Chavigny was to set out immediately for Copenhagen; and that I might depend upon it he would play no tricks. He then asked me how we had been satisfied in England with Chavigny's secretary? I answered I had neither heard good nor ill of him. The cardinal's reason for the question was, that the secretary pressed for a gratification. He thought Chavigny might have afforded it out of the several considerable ones he had had. He seemed to complain of those that pressed him about it; and by all I could judge, Chavigny is not over-well with the cardinal at this time; and if he had not been publicly named, and part of the money advanced, he would hardly be sent to Denmark.

My cypher man came last week from Rochfort; he excused his not having wrote to me, since nothing had happened in the French navy worth our notice. If any thing should, I shall hear from him. I could not avoid letting him have fifty livres of the 200 that remained in my hands upon his account. All he gave me for it are the inclosed lists of the French ships, which is hardly worth sending.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Converses with the cardinal on the subject of the private treaty.—The cardinal's vague and uncertain statements.—Approves the admission of Amelot and the duke of Newcastle into the secret.

SIR,

Paris, May 24, 1737.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

Draught.

I Was honoured last Sunday, the 19th instant, with your letter of the 5—16th instant, by Du Commun the messenger; and last Wednesday, the 21st, I acquainted the cardinal with the contents thereof, at which he seemed much pleased; but as that was a publick day, he desired me to put off the further consideration of the letter till this morning at Issy, where I went according to his appointment.

I there read over to his eminency those parts of your letter that were proper to be shewn him, and had his sentiments in general upon the several passages we discoursed upon. In the first place, he seemed sensible that the occupations you have had of late in parliament could not allow you leisure enough to think of foreign business. He expressed himself very handsomely upon the success you had, and desired me to make you his compliments upon it. He then entered very readily into your reason for expecting that he should propose the plan for a particular treaty between England and France, which, considering circumstances, must in a great measure depend upon his transactions at Vienna. He remarkt particularly the declaration you make of the king's having no treatys with any person or power but what are publick and known; therefore his majesty can be under none that can be prejudicial to his allies; and as this assurance shall be the basis of all future negociations, whether they be for making new treatys, or for the confirming or the renewing of old ones, we were sure of proceeding on a safe bottom. In this place he repeated the same he has often done, that France was in the like situation with respect to us: that he had no engagements of any kind whatsoever prejudicial to his majesty's interest, or to his rights and possessions: that when he should communicate the treaty with the emperor, we would see he had acted fairly with us all along.

Your letter mentioning particularly the treatys he had made with the courts of Madrid and Turin at the beginning of the last war, he said those treatys were merely relating to the carrying on the war jointly against the emperor, and to the advantages the allies of France in that war were to have: that there was not a word tending to prejudice his majesty in any way whatsoever; and that at a proper opportunity he would give his majesty all the satisfaction that could be reasonably

reasonably required on any of these heads. We discoursed upon the case suggested in your letter which might naturally lead to a beginning of his private treaty, *viz.* if his majesty's concurrence, approbation, or perhaps guaranty should be demanded for the treaty now depending at Vienna. He said little to this point, from whence I judge that no resolution is yet taken about it; he told me in general, that we should know all.

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Finding that I could get no more out of him, I reduced the matter to two parts; first that he is to communicate to us his treaty with the emperor, and propose the plan for the new treaty he wants to make with his majesty: and he agreed to do both as soon as he is able. But I should guess by his way, that his negociations at Vienna are yet far from being at an end, if some day or other, out of weariness, he does not take a resolution to conclude at once. The cardinal was very well pleased with his majesty's consenting that monsieur Amelot should be in the secret of this private negociation; and he gave in most readily that the duke of Newcastle should be the same, since it would put the transaction, without any danger to the secrecy of it, into a regular channel.

I own, sir, I am still at a loss to guess at the cardinal's reasons for having so great a mind to make a new treaty with us, perhaps the very day after he shall have signed one with the emperor. But when I reflect that they signed one here with Stanislaus the 28th of September, and that they signed the preliminaries with the emperor in five days after, the 3d of October, which were directly contrary to each other, I wonder the less at any thing they propose.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Cardinal's uneasiness at the king of France's conduct.

(Paris, June the 5th, 1737.) The French king's ramble, and his seeming to be determined to be no longer tied down to days in his journeys to Rambouillet, continues to occasion great variety of talk in town and court; and every body will have it, that the cardinal is extremely uneasy at this sudden turn of life of his master's. I am assured, that when the cardinal represented to the French king the inconveniency that arose from this uncertainty to publick business, and the trouble it gave the ministers to be fetcht back on a sudden from the different places they went to when he left Versailles, that he answered coldly, *Ils sont faits pour se trouver où je suis*, and would allow of no reply.

Hardwicke
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

Another sensible mortification I am assured the cardinal has had is the French king's refusing to dismiss monsieur Bachelier, a favourite valet de chambre,

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* Chauvelin.

chambre, whom the cardinal has his reason to suspect had too great a power over his master, and to have been concerned in the cabals to bring * him back again to court. But I find now the cardinal gives up that point of getting Bachelier turned away, at least for the present; and that they have had an eclairessment, and are reconciled. But this is looked upon only as patch'd work; and it is believed, by good judges, that the cardinal must get Bachelier out within these three months, that is to say, before the court goes to Fontainebleau, or that he will meet with such disagreeable usage, which will either break his heart, or force him to retire from court. These are things of too delicate a nature for me to touch upon to the cardinal, and his own pride will, I fancy, keep him from beginning with me on the subject. I have observed a lowness of spirits in the cardinal, which certainly proceeds from some such cause. As I hear more of this, I will not fail to acquaint your grace.

LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Laments the want of a consistent plan in opposition to distress the minister.—Praises the conduct of the prince of Wales.

DEAR SIR WILLIAM,

June the 9th, 1737.

Egremont
Papers.

* * * * *

Since Du Noquet is to send you this letter by no conveyance that is not extremely sure, I will speak openly to you upon one part of your's. It has been plain to me for some years, that nothing but the hand of fate could shake the men who domineer over you. I am afflicted at it, because the principles and methods of government will not be changed, nay, cannot by them; and because, if any thing can be demonstrated in politicks by reason, and be supported by the authority of example, it is this, that these principles and methods of government must impoverish the nation to a degree ruinous and insupportable, with consequences, some of which are easily foreseen, and others as certain, tho' not equally obvious. I am afflicted at it, because the long continuance of these principles and methods of government, which have been continued long already, must wear the true notions of the English constitution out of the heads, and the true spirit of it out of the hearts of men; and because it is evident that the consequence of this must be, a little sooner or later, either falling into national confusion, the seeds of which, very thick sown, are not so hard to point out; or submitting tamely and silently to indirect, which is in many respects worse than direct tyranny, and which leads inevitably to it. The word tyranny is not too strong; for whenever will prevails constantly

and

and without controul or account, the will of a prince or the will of a minister, whatever forms are preserved, tyranny is established. I am piqued at it, because this could never happen; nay, the progress towards it could never have been such as we have seen, and see; if there had not been industrious, active, impudent perseverance, for bold or resolute, are words too good, on one side, and negligent, uncertain, timid opposition on the other. Do not imagine, that to think in this manner is to presage, like a splenetick man, evils that will never happen; think rather, that he who is out of the fray, sees the progress of it in every part, and foresees, upon the whole, the event of it better than he who is in it can. How many measures have been pursued or neglected in my time, and almost in my time*, the consequences of which pursuit or neglect are felt severely at this hour; and yet these consequences, when they were foretold, passed among honest intelligent men, as contingencies too uncertain to be opposed to immediate expediency; or as the dreams of melancholy persons, or as the artful misrepresentations of the ill-affected.

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* So in the original.

You say, my friend, that the affair of the prince alarmed the minister purely because of the state of the king's health in that point of time. I believe so; but I believe likewise, that this affair would have alarmed, and have done more than alarm him, in whatever state the king's health had been, if it had been the first measure of a scheme of conduct wisely formed, and concerted among all those that stand in opposition to the present administration. If a scheme of conduct had been formed and concerted to follow this measure, in the case of losing as well as carrying the question, I incline to believe you would have carried it; for nothing gives success like hope, and nothing gives hope like the assurance of having a good second game to play. I applaud extremely the prudence and dignity with which his royal highness conducted himself, as well as the firmness he has shewn since; the marks of duty he gives to his parents, and the coldness of the good breeding he exercised towards their servants, and I suppose towards those of his own who voted against him. The rest of his behaviour, his taking dutifully what is given him, the assurances he gives that he will not treat for more, that he will not ask for more, is too finely spun for my gross sight; it will keep him where he is, you where you are, and Walpole where he is. It affords, indeed, an example of most polite moderation; but I do not imagine the persons he and you have to do with, capable of being won by such amiable proceedings; and for the minister, he is not such a changeling as to think this circumstance unpleasant, or to disquiet himself about resentments, against which he has so much time

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time and so many means to provide. I am apt to believe that he would think the circumstance much more unpleasant, and have more disquietude about future events, if the prince was at this time retired to Southampton house: for instance, if he lived there, with all the œconomy of a private nobleman, and was surrounded with friends that might adorn the court of a prince; if his language and his conduct expressed the utmost personal duty to his parents, and yet the freedom of a British subject. Those among you who imagine that a contrary conduct carries terror with it, and will produce overtures of reconciliation, are like Picherol, in Rabelais, who fauntered about at the city gate, and did nothing but enquire whether the storks, for they were to bring with them all kinds of good fortune, were coming; or like the bowing dean, who waits on foot in the dust or the dirt, the arrival of his patron who is to promote him to a bishoprick.

I could not help saying thus much to you in the freedom, the confidence, and the warmth of friendship, and therefore you will excuse it. Interest, personal interest I mean, I have none in any of these affairs; for, however they turn, my situation will be the same; and, I dare say, you do me the justice to be persuaded that, if it was in my power to alter it, I would not, after all that has passed, neither by the means of my enemies nor of my friends. I look often back on the parts I have acted, and on the events of my life: in the former I discern many mistakes, but no iniquity; no one step was not directed originally, or brought immediately to the true interest of my country. This consciousness takes away all regret as to the events of my life, since the worst of them have been owing to things that I should do again upon the whole, if I was again in the same circumstances, tho' not quite in the same manner in some cases. If I live, I will continue a year or two more as I am, perhaps longer, for other persons' sakes, not for my own. But if my lord St. John lives longer, and Dawley is not soon sold pretty well, I shall have a just reason for doing what I desire to do, that is, for retiring absolutely from the world, and into a sort of life where, free from care of all kinds, I shall live by myself, and to myself, and be lost to mankind before I cease to be one of their number.

* * * * *

ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.
*Interesting conversation with cardinal Fleury, on the supposed decline of his influence,
and of Bachelier's favour.*

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MY LORD,

June 26, 1737.

IN answer to your grace's most secret letter of the 9th instant by Brettle, I am to acquaint your grace that I have executed the orders therein contained; and talk'd with the cardinal upon the rumours that have gone about relating to his own situation with his master. I had, this good while, sought for an opportunity; being persuaded, if I could find a proper one, the friendship he professes to me would entitle me to mention any such matters that touch'd him personally, especially when they are so generally talk'd of, tho' in a whisper, as these are, or rather have been, these ten days. Every one says, the cardinal has gained his point, and that Batchelier will be dismissed.

Hardwicke
Papers.

*Most secret,
and apart.*

Copy.

I took a pretence to talk to him on this subject, from an account he gave me of a piece lately printed in England, under the title of an Apology for monsieur Chauvelin, of which Buffy had sent him a translation. The piece itself was at monsieur Amelot's office, and the cardinal referred me to monsieur Amelot for a sight of it, tho' he told me it was not worth reading. He said it was too ill-writ to be Chauvelin's own; he judged it might be the performance of some of his emissaries; but he could not make out how the piece came to appear first in English. However, the cardinal said, he despised all such fetches and contrivances; and above all, the lies set about by Chauvelin and his emissaries to justify himself, and to have it thought he had still some friends at court. But Chauvelin was so well known here and abroad, and being now at a distance, he and his emissaries would now be more cautious than they had been. He run over several instances of his vanity and his ingratitude. In fine, he layd all reports, and every thing that of late had been suggested to the disadvantage of the administration, in matters either foreign or domestick, to Chauvelin's account. I entered fully into all his reasonings, which I am persuaded are true and just; and I put him in mind that it behoved him to be on his guard against all those who had been Chauvelin's confidants, for if they saw the least probability of disgusting him, they would not miss the opportunity. The cardinal seemed sensible of it, and said he had them narrowly watched.

I then told him that my zeal for his honour and for his welfare, now that he had nobody to controul him, or that could pretend to share the glory of his good works, and the friendship he had always expressed for me, made me take

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the liberty to mention to him matters that had been much talk'd of about the town. I disclaimed, in the strongest manner, all sort of curiosity in the questions I should ask him; and assured him that my respect and my good wishes for his person were the only motives; and therefore I hoped he would not take any thing wrong I could say to him on so nice a subject as I wanted to be informed upon. The cardinal, in the most obliging manner, bid me speak out, and that he would give me all the satisfaction he could; that he looked upon me as one of his best and truest friends, and that he would open himself entirely on any thing relating to himself.

I then asked at once, whether there were any grounds (and what they could be) for the reports that had gone about Paris, of there being a coldness between him and his master. He answered me directly, that all that had been said of coldness was entirely false; for if there had been the least, I should have seen the effects of it before it had been talk'd of; that he did not remain at court out of ambition, or any desire of gain; that nothing but his tenderness for the king his master, and a suitable return, could engage a man of his age to remain in so painful and laborious a place as that he has; that if the king had altered in the least towards him, the next moment he would have taken his leave, and retired; that he had done it once before, at a time when he might have been more necessary for the good of his master and of the nation than he could be at present; and therefore, if he had the least disagreement now, he would have retired. I answered, that I hoped he did not tell this to many; for that those who might want to get rid of him would be more industrious in their endeavours to create uneasiness, which, on some occasions, might be unavoidable, considering the voyages of Rambouillet*, and the opinion that prevails of Bachelier's being a favourer of Chauvelyn and of his adherers, and of his familiarity with the king.

* Seat of the
 count de
 Thoulouse.

The cardinal will not own his having any apprehensions of the Rambouillet journeys, for he looks upon all that gang to be in quite opposite views to Chauvelyn's; besides, there will hardly be any more Rambouillet till after Fontainebleau. He avoided explaining himself with saying, that ever since Chauvelin's dismissal, and chiefly since the reports of Bachelier's favour, Bachelier came constantly every morning to his levee, where none but his own servants were admitted; that he constantly ask'd Bachelier if the king was stirring, but never said another word to Bachelier, nor Bachelier any more than "yes," or "no;" that one of his own emissaries, who is in appearance great with Bachelier, told the cardinal that Bachelier was under the greatest

greatest concern imaginable, and said to him, "*Je suis perdu, parceque le roy ne m'a pas dit un mot.*" The cardinal could not help discovering his pleasure in giving me this account, which was a plain proof of his having been uneasy and in pain at Batchelier's practices.

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After this, the cardinal went on a good while in assuring me that he never was better with the king in his life; and gave me to understand, that he was as much master as ever; but that he did not care to shew all his power or his resentment at once; that the generality were much mistaken in their notion that the king's familiarity with those servants that are most immediately about his person, gave them any power over his mind; that it was sufficient for the king to suspect they had any view of getting out of their sphere, for him to check them at once; and this he looks upon to be the cause of the king's change towards Bachelier.

He then repeated all he had said before, of his resolution to quit the court, if once he had the least disgust; he added, he did not value what the envious part of the world might say of coldness between the king and him; that he alone could judge of that, and he was quite easy and satisfied. I wish'd him joy of it, and told him he made me very happy in hearing it; for I could not help being much concerned at the stories I had heard on this subject, tho' I could hardly credit them; for, if I had, I should not have forborne so long saying something to him on the subject. He then told me, with an air of confidence and friendship, that, if I thought any of these lyes had got over into England, I might assure the king they were without grounds. I thank'd him again for this mark of his attention toward us; and told him I was persuaded his majesty would have been very uneasy if he had thought any thing of this kind, which might have reached his ears, had been grounded; for I had reason to know that his majesty had his eminency's ease and satisfaction much at heart. I added, from myself, a good many compliments proper for the occasion, particularly upon the ill consequences that would unavoidably attend the pacification of Europe, if he should, at this juncture, give into other hands the work he had so prosperously conducted hitherto. He thanked me for my friendship in the most cordial manner, and gave me sufficiently to understand, that those who hope to create uneasiness between him and the king would be the dupes of their attempts.

Before I left this subject, I touch't very slightly upon * * † the world has, and which are I suppose well-grounded, of some inclinations the French king has to

† A word is here by mistake omitted in the copy, probably, suspicions.

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have mistresses ; but, as I found the cardinal did not care to engage in a conversation on such a point, I drop't it. The cardinal, I am well assured, does not think the objects of consequence enough to mind them. The first inclination is reckoned to have been madame de Mailly, a youngish, good-natured, rattle-headed, unthinking creature, not at all handsome, but famous for many low gallantrys. It is taken for granted, that Bachelier recommended her to his master. It is thought that the cardinal was no otherwise displeased at the choice, than from its having been procured by Bachelier ; for she is incapable of intrigue, and more unlikely to create a passion. * * * *

* * * *
She is niece to madame de Mazarine, who was far from pleased with the preference shewn to madame de Mailly, from, I suppose, the little prospect there was of any of her family reaping any benefits that usually accompanys such cases. The other lady now talk'd of is still less dangerous to the cardinal, tho' handfomer and younger than the first. She is married to the duke of Rochechouart, eldest son to the duke of Mortmart ; is now between fifteen and sixteen, and a meer girl. Her husband does the functions of gentleman of the bed-chamber in his father's room, who for several years has left the court.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Cardinal declines giving public satisfaction for the distinctions which the French ambassador at Venice paid to the pretender's son, but expresses his resolution not to give him an abbey in France, though at the solicitation of the pope, out of respect to the king of England.

SIR,

Paris, August 7th, 1737.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

Draught.

YOU will see, by my letter to the duke of Newcastle, relating to the satisfaction I have demanded for the extraordinary distinctions to the pretender's son, by the French ambassador at Venice, how little reason we have to expect any sort of publick reparation from hence on this occasion. I can scarce help thinking the cardinal tolerably well-inclined to do it ; but he has not resolution enough to take a publick step, which he thinks would be generally censured by all those of his cloth ; and tho' he would be thought of a different stamp from most others of it, he stands, in some measure, in awe of them. I did all I could to remove his scruples, but to no purpose ; however, in lieu of doing his majesty justice in the present case, he seems to have a mind to make the king a kind of atonement, which, if ever known, would appear more odious in the eye of those he seems most to apprehend, than the other.

His

His eminency, after making many excuses for confining his satisfaction to severe reprimands to the ambassador and consul, and to a compliment from monsieur de Cambis, said he would trust me, under the strongest ties of secrecy, with a matter which must convince the king of his particular regard for his person and interest, and of his desire to cultivate the strictest union betwixt us. The case is this; the pretender's second son is some way or other qualified for the enjoyment of ecclesiastical benefices; the pope has for a good while solicited the cardinal to give some considerable benefice here to this son of the pretender's; and it is an usual thing for the French king to confer benefices, from time to time, at the pope's recommendation. By cardinal de Besly's death, which happened ten days ago, the abbey of St. Germain des Prés, one of the most considerable in France, being of 7 or 8 thousand pounds sterling yearly value, become vacant; the pope's nuncio renewed his application, and pointed out this benefice as a fit one for him. The cardinal avoided giving a direct answer to the nuncio; and I am persuaded he does not intend such a benefice should go into those hands, but had a mind to make a compliment to the king, as if it was out of regard to him that he does not comply with the pope's request. The cardinal then added, that he knew he should be frequently pressed on this score; that if his bestowing any benefice on the pretender's son gave his majesty the least uneasiness, he will not certainly do it. He therefore desired I would write to you on the subject, to know his majesty's thoughts; and that I might depend upon it, he would follow whatever the king required in the case. He observed the delicacy of the question, with respect to the king as well as to himself; he insisted on the utmost secrecy, and that I should write to you alone about it.

You will be as surprised at reading this account, as I was when the matter was opened to me; but, as I really think it proceeds from a disposition in the cardinal to live well with us, and that he lays himself infinitely more open in making this proposal, than we do in hearkening to it, no harm can come from it. I thought it would be more civil, and more likely to turn to good, to keep up a kind of secret intelligence between you and the cardinal, than to have declined charging myself with this commission, which the cardinal looks upon as the strongest proof he can possibly give of his respect for the king, and of his confidence in you.

SIR

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE.
Is highly gratified with the cardinal's refusal to provide for the pretender's second son.

MY LORD,

London, August 7—18th, 1737.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

I Am favoured with your lordship's of this date, N. S. and I have in a proper manner acquainted the king with the contents. It were very much to be wish'd that his majesty might have had publick satisfaction for the publick affront that was offer'd to him by the ministers of France in foreign courts. But if that is not to be obtain'd, wherein you must still follow the directions you receive from the office, it must be confes'd that the cardinal gives the king a great proof of his personal regard to his majesty in the communication he has made to your lordship of the pope's sollicitation in favour of the pretender's second son, and the refusal his eminency has given to comply with that request.

So publick and so beneficial a regard to the family of the pretender must have been look'd upon by all the world as a strong declaration in his favour, and as it would have carried along with it such real and essential advantages, so conspicuous and so permanent, it could have been but one construction, which the cardinal avoiding, and placing that confidence in the king, as to acquaint his majesty with it by your lordship, is an obligation that the king most gratefully acknowledges, will religiously keep the secret, and hopes the cardinal will continue in this friendly disposition to his majesty, (which indeed the king does not at all doubt,) never to give such publick encouragement to his enemies and mortification to his friends, as to lett the court of France in some manner adopt and provide for the younger branches of the pretender to his crown. Your lordship will make my best compliments to the cardinal, and assure him on my part of all possible returns of regard, honour, and esteem.

You will be all surpriz'd abroad with the confusion that our royall family is putt into here by the birth of a young princeffe. It is a subject that I shall not choose to enlarge much upon in writing; but rather take an opportunity when I give this to Mr. Thompson to talk with him upon the subject. But it is most plain they were determin'd to bring matters to a rupture.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Draught.

(Paris, August 29, 1737.) Mr. Thompson has executed your verbal commission, I am truly sorry that affair is in so bad a way. Monsieur de Buffy, the cardinal told me, had wrote upon it in a very decent manner. He says that

that all London was racking their brains for the reasons of the prince's leaving Hampton court so abruptly, but nobody had yet found out a good one. Period VI.
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The news-papers tease me to death with their green ribbons; I wish you would think of stopping their mouths, and let them see they mistake the colour. To save you, sir, the trouble of another letter in a day or two, I take this opportunity to acquaint you that after to-morrow there will be the four months allowance to the S———*, and they have already been to put me in mind of it; and I shall then take the liberty to draw for the value of 100 louis-d'ors. * Sicilian abbots.

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.
Cardinal solemnly promises to give no support to the pretender.—On the Venetian affairs.

SIR,

August 30th, 1737.

I Received, on the 26th instant, the honour of your letter of the 7—18th by Mr. Thompson, and yesterday being the first opportunity I had, I acquainted the cardinal with his majesty's and your sentiments upon the confidence his eminency had made me of the pope's solicitations in favour of the pretender. I made proper compliments on the occasion, which the cardinal received in the very best manner, entering into all the reasons that could be suggested against his giving, tho' at the pope's request, such marks of his regard for the pretender's family, desiring me farther to assure his majesty that he would never do any thing that could be disagreeable to him. To this he added, that I might depend upon it that he would never give the pretender or his adherents any cause to expect favours from hence. He observed how strong a proof this ought to be of his sincere desire to live well with the king; I vouched that it was esteemed as such. He recommended again secrecy; I assured him of it in the most solemn manner; and thus an end seems to be put to the pretender's hopes from hence of a support of that nature.

The cardinal spoke to me next, in the like confidential manner, of the proposal made to him by the Venetians, of which you will find an account in my letter to the duke of Newcastle on that subject: but as some things his eminency let fall in conversation as his private thoughts may not be thought proper for an office letter, I therefore beg leave to trouble you with them. His eminency, after many assurances that he had no private view in wishing the matter should be made up, and protesting that it will be exactly the same to him

Waldegrave
Papers.

Secret.

Draught.

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him if the king should not at present be disposed to put an end to it; however he could not, from his attachment to the king, help saying, that he finds this affair, if not made up amicably, will create a great deal of ill blood, and occasion clamour in the world, which, in his opinion, ought to be prevented, if it can be with decency: that undoubtedly it will set all Italy against us, and these by their intrigues may engage others to be out of humour, hinting as if the court was not favourably disposed for us. In this case, he owned that nothing of this could hurt us essentially; but still he wisht the dispute at an end. He again protested he did not mean to influence his majesty's judgment on such an occasion, and that he would be very well satisfied with whatever part his majesty should think fit to take. I verily believe that these hints of the cardinal did not proceed from any intention to allarm us into a compliance, but more from his natural disposition to peace, than from any other object. For as to the Italians themselves, he knows they are not to be feared; and the emperor, he must be sensible, will not take part in such an affair, tho' I have reason to believe his minister, Schmerling, will do us all the mischief he can. But as his commission here will be soon superceded by prince Lichtenstein, he cannot hurt us much.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE QUEEN.

Situation of the French court.—Intrigues of Bachelier, the king of France's valet-de-chambre.—Views of cardinal Fleury.—Intelligence from baron Gedda.—Reflections on the state of Europe, and on the conduct to be pursued by England.

MADAM,

Hague, September 27, 1737.

Walpole
Papers.*Most secret.**Draught.*

* Gedda.

AFTER having returned your majesty my most humble thanks for your most gracious letter of the 6—17th instant, I will proceed to give you an account of what I have learnt from my friend G——*, of the situation of the French since I passed that way, and of the cardinal's views and dispositions with regard to the rest of Europe.

I acquainted your majesty from Paris that his eminency had been uneasy at Bachelier's, the valet-de-chambre's, intimacy and intrigues with the French king; suspecting that they were carried on in concert with, and in favour of monsieur Chauvelin; that his eminency had attempted to remove him without success; but that he had made him tremble, and submit to be confined to the king's *menus plaisirs*, without pretending to intermeddle with affairs of state. This, monsieur G. says, continues still to be in a great measure the state of the closett; that his eminency is absolutely master; that, however, Bachelier, considering

considering the great age of that minister, and depending upon the steadiness of the French king's favour towards him, cannot forbear (but without pretending to the least influence or direction at present) carrying his thoughts to a future administration, and suggesting some reflexions on that head to the French king himself, as well as to others in his confidence; and monsieur G. having gott into his acquaintance, Bachelier had ventured to unbosom himself to him to the following effect. That he stood in great awe of the cardinal's superior power, and would take care to manage it: that he could not deny his former intimacy and attachment to Chauvelin, as having received great civilities from him, as thinking him an able minister: that, in consequence of that friendship, he had endeavoured to serve him, and had contracted an aversion to the family of Thoulouse, enemies to Chauvelin; but that he had since found such a general hatred to him in persons of all ranks and degrees, and particularly in the ministers of state; that it was impossible to think of his return again to the scene of business; and as no one particular person occurred capable in all respects to discharge that weighty employment of prime minister of France, he had entertained in his mind, and even suggested to the king, for taking place after the cardinal's death, a scheme for constituting a councill of seven for the administration of affairs, whom he named to monsieur G.; but this latter could only recollect to me the names of Torcy, Maurepas, Argençon the younger, Monti, and the marshal d'Estrées. But he (Bachelier) had made no great progress in it yett. Monsieur Gedda told me that he had in confidence, and with an assurance that no ill use should be made of it, imparted this notion and discourse of Bachelier's to the cardinal, who seemed to laugh at it, but could not help discovering some anxiety upon it.

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As to his eminency's views with regard to foreign affairs, monsieur G. thinks that he will endeavour by smooth and dissembling language to serve the great designs of France, to domineer in Europe as much as monsieur Chauvelin did, as far as he can find it may be done without new troubles, and consistent with the preservation of the peace of Europe: that the present union between the emperor and France is by no means cordial and sincere, whatever the appearances may be: that his eminency could not conceal his uneasyness at the emperor's success against the Turks, by taking Nissa in the beginning of the campaign, nor his satisfaction at the shock which prince Hilbourghausen suffered: that his eminency is extremely jealous of England's predilection and attachment to the Imperial court: that the French would therefore be glad to separate the States from us, and flatter themselves that the coldness between the

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Imperial court and the Dutch may contribute towards it : that they would likewise endeavour to gain Denmark and Sweden, in order to have an influence in the North, and to attach both the kings of Sardinia and Spain to their interest, and check the emperor's power in Italy. But the necessity of giving subsidies to the northern powers, which the cardinal does not care to do in time of peace, is a restraint upon his views on that side ; and the resentment of their catholic majesties, for having been lately abandoned by France, affords little hopes of being able to succeed there at present ; nor will the king of Sardinia run hastily into engagements with France, untill another opportunity shall offer fairly for increasing his possessions in Italy.

When monsieur G. was upon the subject of France's being desirous to gain Sweden, I asked him in what manner and by what means the cardinal proposed to do it ? Whether he had learnt the nature and tendency of the instructions to be given to monsieur St. Severin ? He replied, that his eminency had faithfully promised him that he (St. Severin) should be directed not to have any thing to do with the faction there, that is in opposition to count Horn. I then asked him, whether he had demanded Carteja's return from thence, before the arrival of the new minister ? He owned that he had ; but that he could not prevail with the cardinal to consent to it. I made use of this way of questioning monsieur G. to answer the end of the secret intelligence with which his majesty was pleased to trust me, without giving the least cause of suspecting the means of obtaining it ; and from his own discourse and reflexions upon what I asked him, and what he had observed in France, I found it no difficult matter to make him see that Carteja's stay at Stockholm was designed on purpose to introduce monsieur St. Severin into the acquaintance and confidence of the French faction there, in order to concert and settle the proper measures for ruining, if possible, the credit of count Horn, and of his friends, at the meeting of the dyett in May next. In talking to him of the chancellery of Sweden, and sounding him about the disposition of the persons belonging to that office, I found him sufficiently apprised of the bad intentions of the secretary Kluikistrom, and of his attachment to the French party ; and monsieur G. gave me to understand that count Horn and monsieur Von Kocken were so sensible of the infidelity of that commis, that means were taking to gett him out of the secret of affairs, by giving him another employment.

As to monsieur G. himself, he gave me the strongest assurances of his being fully convinced that it was for the interest of his country to preserve a good understanding with his majesty ; and that Sweden, by entering into particular engagements

engagements with France, exclusive of England, would only become a dupe to the ambitious views of that crown, without reaping any advantage to themselves; which, joined to the great obligations he has personally to the king's goodness towards him, should, he said, always make him watchful of the French intrigues, keep him firmly attached to count Horn and his friends, and make him act in confidence with Mr. Finch. But as he desired, that the private transaction between him and me, relating to his majesty's goodness, should go no farther, he would have a particular correspondence with me for affairs of the most secret nature; and for that purpose I had already prepared against his arrival, and have given him a cypher.

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I make no doubt but these considerations will keep this gentleman in the strongest manner firm to his majesty's interest; and that even his ill opinion of the cardinal, and his personal resentment against him, would contribute to fix him, if necessary, in that resolution. For altho' they parted in appearance extremely well satisfied with one another, promising a mutual and perpetual friendship; yet his eminency having been prevailed upon by the insinuations of Chauvelin to withdraw, for some time before the removal of that minister, his former confidence and kindness to G. so far as to speak much to his disadvantage, it has never been forgiven. And altho' monsieur G. since Chauvelin's disgrace, has thought fitt to dissemble his resentment, and to return, in appearance, to his former intimacy with his eminency, in order to discover his views and intentions; yet monsieur G. cannot forbear talking to his particular friends against the old gentleman's weakness and tricks, which he has derived from Chauvelin, as if he had been bitt by him; retaining the venom, altho' he has discarded the beast; and adopting the same notions in the conduct of foreign affairs, as far as the natural meekness of his temper and the desire of preserving the peace will permitt.

This is the substance of monsieur G.'s account of the present situation and disposition of the French court; and I hope your majesty will excuse my extending this letter, altho' too long already, with some few observations upon it.

Altho' the cardinal may affect to treat Bachelier's imaginations about a future administration in France, as trifling and chimerical; yet the boldness of a valet-de-chambre, to conceive and vent schemes of government, and of persons fitt to govern, and to remain still in the same favour and confidence with the king, notwithstanding the attempts made to remove him, deserves great attention. And should not the cardinal, before his death, be able to

distinguish

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distinguish one person as proper to succeed him in the sole direction of affairs, and fix him, as such, in the confidence of the king; or else to establish a council, for the joint administration of all matters of consequence, before he dyes; it is very probable, considering the narrow and reserved genius of his most christian majesty, who has the greatest affection for the persons with whom he has contracted the greatest familiarity, that Bachelier, if he has spirit and resolution, will have the most to say, upon the cardinal's demise, in putting the wheels of government in motion, and perhaps in the direction of the whole machine. And besides that he will soon feel the strength of his own credit, he will have people enough about him to encourage him to make a proper use and advantage of his master's affection for him; and therefore, in all events, whatever may be the cardinal's views with regard to a successor, or whether his life or understanding may, sooner or later, suddenly fail him, if Bachelier should continue in his post and credit with the king, it seems very necessary that some means should be found out to gain him; and, in order to that, it may be recommended to lord Waldegrave to gett an acquaintance and confidence with him; but in so prudent a manner as not to give any jealousy or offence to the cardinal: and this seems so much the more necessary, because the discoveries that may be made by him, are of that nature as may not come to the intelligence of 101 [Bussy].

I do, in a great measure, concur with monsieur G. that the impressions made by Chauvelin upon the cardinal, relating to several persons, as well as to the management of foreign courts, are not entirely removed with him. For, altho' the insinuations from several quarters abroad, and especially on the part of England, of Chauvelin's malicious, false, and untractable temper, added weight to the discoveries made of his domestick intrigues, and contributed a good deal to his disgraces, yet the great influence and superiority which he had gained and maintained over his eminency, had taken so deep a root, and had governed the helm without controul for so many years, that the cardinal is ashamed to own, by pursuing entirely new measures, and a new management, that he had been so long imposed upon, and a dupe to his own creature. Besides that, the variety of tricks and turns practiced by the other were of some use and advantage to extricate his eminency from the difficulties that his proposed measures and negociations, which he wanted sometimes resolution to pursue, had involved him in. At the same time my friend G. could not conceal from me, by the great pains he took to draw in the strongest colours his ill opinion of the cardinal's sincerity and designs, that he did it chiefly

chiefly with a view to divert us from ever having the least concern with him ; as being justly apprehensive that a good understanding between England and France would have such an effect, to prevent future troubles and to preserve the peace of Europe, as would make particular alliances with the northern powers, and consequently with Sweden, of little weight and consideration to both ; whereas, a great jealousy, distance, and coldness between his majesty and France may give an occasion for one of them to make a treaty with Sweden that may be for the advantage of that crown in their present low and distressed state.

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Having ventured thus far, I will presume to trespass upon your majesty's patience with my weak notions upon the present state of Europe. Considering the imperfections of the definitive treaty of peace, for want of the accession of Spain and Sardinia to it ; the uncertain consequences and conclusion of the war with the Turks ; the great age of the cardinal, and his undetermined views with regard to the other powers of Europe, as long as Spain continues in her present calm, or rather sullen situation ; and his anxious thoughts about the future administration of France, as well as about the daily declension of the French king's health, with one child only to support that succession : considering the little advantage there can be at present in making alliances with the northern crowns, who will, upon the least offer of that nature, expect advantages which we are not able to give, and will make use of any approaches from us to alarm France, in hopes of procuring subsidies from that crown : considering the present unfortunate coldness and ill-humour between the emperor and the States General ; altho' I think the bias of this republick for France grows daily weaker, and increases towards England : I say, all these considerations seem to chalk out a natural and obvious conduct to be observed by us at this juncture ; which is, to live in the strictest union and confidence with the States, and in peace with all our neighbours, if we can ; to be attentive to discover the views and conduct of other powers, and particularly of France, whose schemes and notions must have, one way or other, an influence upon the rest of Europe ; and, with respect to that court, not to shew a forward inclination for a more particular intimacy with it ; nor, by any means, to reject or check any advances that the cardinal may make for a better understanding with his majesty ; taking care, on the one side, not to become the dupe to any specious offer or insinuations ; nor, on the other, by an affected coldness, to create in him such a jealousy and distrust of us as may make him form alliances, and find out means to give us trouble. To conclude, the intelligence which may be

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be obtained from 101 [Buffy] by proper questions, which incidents and the circumstances of things may suggest from time to time, will be the best guide to the councils and measures to be pursued by England, relating to other princes and states, and for laying hold of such occasions as may offer for our particular security, and for preserving the balance of Europe.

LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

On the rupture between the king and prince of Wales.—Censures the conduct of the prince, and the advice of his counsellors.—Considers England as rapidly advancing to a state of slavery.

October the 13th, 1737.

Egremont
Papers.

I Writ to you very lately, dear sir William, and having heard from Calais that my letter was sent safely into England, I suppose it come safely by this time to your hands. This shall be forwarded with more precaution still; for I shall not forbear saying, in answer to yours of the 13th of the last month, things very unfit for the inspection of clerks of the post-office. Tho' I am informed very irregularly and very imperfectly of what passes in the island of Great Britain, yet, by what I have heard, it seemed plain to me that an entire rupture between the father and the son has been long unavoidable. I have therefore waited to see what the immediate occasion or pretence of this rupture would be; for I always believed the counsellors of his royal highness would think it of great importance to render this not only plausible, but popular.

I thought that such an occasion or pretence might have been founded on the proceedings of last winter; but I saw things at a distance, and they who saw them nearer, judged otherwise. The settlement on the princess was not then made; this and other reasons might concur to make them judge and act as they did at that time. But I am at a loss to find the plausibility or the popularity of the present occasion of rupture. He hurries his wife from court when she is on the point of being delivered of her first child. His father swells, struts, and storms. He confesses his rashness, and asks pardon in terms of one who owns himself in the wrong. Besides that all this appears to me boyish, it is purely domestick; and there is nothing, as far as I can discern, to interest the publick in the cause of his royal highness. But notwithstanding this, extreme severity on the other side, and the prejudices of mankind against those who exercise this severity, may have, perhaps, that effect. I think truly they will have it, if the prince shews, upon this occasion, firmness in his character, and decency in his behaviour; one without any mixture of humour, or air of obstinacy;

obstinacy; the other without any thing low, or, if I may say so, unprincipely. The resolution he has taken to pay his debts, and to live like a man of quallity who has a good estate, deserves great commendation; there is honour, sense, and dignity in it. He may build, on this foundation, great reputation; and great reputation is great power, especially in one of his rank. If it was not so, my friend, it would scarcely be worth our esteem; since popular fame is strictly and truly, what a man weak enough to be fond of it, even for its own sake, called it, *fama consensu stultorum improborumque excitata*.

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As little as I concern myself att present, and shall do the rest of my life, in these affairs, and in their consequences, I could not help saying thus much, in answer to the account you give me of the scene that passed whilst you was att London; and all I shall add is this: It gave you inwardly, I suppose, much the same emotion as a scene of Tom Thumb would have done. But you are too wise not to know, that they who are on the stage must keep the countenance their parts require in a tragi-comical farce, whilst they who are in the pit may laugh their fill. "*Nous mourions de rire, si nous ne mourions pas de faim,*" was the burden of a French song during the great distress of this country in the last war that Louis the fourteenth waged.

It occurs often to me, when I think of the state of our own country, of the characters of persons, and of the conduct of affairs, it is impossible to have any concern for Britain, and not to lament the near approach of general beggary and slavery that threaten her; for I think the latter must and will go hand in hand with the former. And tho' I have as little of the spirit of party * about me as any man living, which you know to be true; yet I cannot forbear saying, that these are the fruits of those principles of foreign and domestick policy, that a number of men who called themselves whigs, and who lived on the credit of that name, and on the folly and obstinacy of those who called themselves by another, began to plant almost half a century ago, and have continued to plant and to propagate ever since. The progress of both was covered long from publick sight by a specious veil that dazzled the vulgar: but the progress has been so gross, and the veil has been worn so thin, of late years, that he must be stark blind who has not seen it. I fear it is seen; and if it was not, there would be room to hope, tho' effectual remedies were yet unattempted; if it is, all hope seems to be cut off. The patient who knows his

* How little did the noble writer know himself and his own disposition, if he really believed what he here says!

distemper,

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distemper, and chuses rather to bear it than to go thro' the remedy, is incurable.

You say, that the monopoly of money in a few hands discloses itself manifestly. Is not power engrossed in a few hands as well as wealth? Things are brought to this pass. Whilst you have weak princes on the throne, some cabal or other will draw the whole wealth of the nation, and the whole power of the state, to itself. Whenever you have an able prince there, he will soon find means of being, directly or indirectly, the proprietor of both. * * *

THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

Gives the substance of frequent conferences with the cardinal, who is dejected and overwhelmed with too much business.—Pretensions of the Spanish ambassador La Mina.—Explains the situation of the court in regard to the emperor, and the frequent altercations between them.—Cardinal not on good terms with the court of Spain.—La Mina offends by endeavouring to introduce the queen of France into business.—The cardinal courts the king of England, and proposes an alliance with England to restrain the overgrown power of the emperor.—Denies that he is negotiating a treaty with Spain and Portugal.

MY LORD,

Fontainebleau, October 29, 1737.

Walpole
Papers.

Most secret.

Copy.

I Am, in this letter, to give your grace the most particular account I can of the several broken conversations I have had with the cardinal since my last dispatch to your grace by express. I call them broken conversations, because I have not had one above a quarter of an hour at a time. As I had no particular matters to treat with him besides our American contestations, when I had said all I could on that subject, the rest fell in as it were by chance, till some of the French ministers, or others whom he had appointed, came accordingly to him.

What I have observed most, in the frequent visits I have made him, has been his lowness of spirits and dejectedness; which I attribute in a great measure to the multiplicity of business which goes through his hands; and this because he will have it so. I advised him in a friendly manner, and as much as I could, against taking so much pains. He thanked me, but said he could not help it; that several were not satisfied unless they talked to him; and that I knew as well as he the numbers of people whom he could not avoid seeing and hearkening to, as long as they would stay with him. These are chiefly the princes and princesses of the blood, who are all here, and teaze him continually in behalf of their friends, and of those who are in their service.

Next

Next to these is monsieur de la Mina, who is in constant broils with the door-keepers of the French king's apartments, about his pretensions as *ambassador de famille*, which he insists upon in the most absurd manner, and which, far from gaining him any advantage, or even the least appearance of superiority over other ambassadors, tend more to put him upon a level with the king's valets de chambre. Whenever he is refused admittance, he appeals to all present, threatening that monsieur de Vaulgrenant shall be used in the same manner at Madrid; and then runs to complain to the cardinal, who is sure to receive him coldly on such occasions; and thus they get out of humour with one another. La Mina I know rails constantly, where he dares, and very indiscreetly, against this government, which the cardinal is informed of, and has told it me in confidence; from whence I judge there is no sort of understanding between the two courts. His eminency assures me, that he has not heard a word, either from monsieur de la Mina, or monsieur de la Torella the Neapolitan ambassador, relating to the part Spain will take in the definitive treaty, since they acquainted him with their having received full powers and instructions for that purpose.

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As to the situation of this court with the emperor; it is plain they go hand in hand in some things; but I find they are not without their inward grudges. The cardinal, talking to me three days ago of the haughtiness of the Imperial ministers, gave me, in the utmost confidence, an instance of it; which I find to be a fact he had hinted to me before, and which I mentioned in my letter to your grace of the 11th instant. He said, that upon some dispute about the Low Countries, count Harrach had sent to monsieur de Joinville, and complained, that the French had carried off some people at a barrier belonging to the emperor, and had imprisoned them for having exacted duties, as is pretended, on the French territories. Monsieur de Joinville answered, that he had not been informed of the affair, and that he would write to his court about it; but in the mean time he could not suppose but his court had good reasons for the steps they had taken. To which count Harrach replied, that if the emperor had not been engaged in a war with the Turks, France would not have acted in this manner. This occasioned a pretty warm dispute between the Imperial minister and the French resident, of which the latter sent an account hither. The cardinal, exceeding angry, sent orders immediately to Joinville to declare to monsieur de Harrach, and to monsieur de l'Estaing to say the same at Vienna, that his most christian majesty scorned to take any such advantages as the count had supposed, but would support his rights in every

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case that required it; and that if the emperor sent troops to support his people in their encroachments, France would do her best to repel them. In consequence of this, the French officers on those frontiers are ordered to have a superior force in readiness, upon occasion, to repel those that count Harrach might happen to send to molest the French barriers. This, joined to Schmerling's present ill-humour, and to his telling every body that this court rejoices inwardly at any disadvantage the emperor or czarina have of late met with, proves at least a great jealousy between France and the emperor.

From the foregoing part of this letter, your grace sees my reasons for thinking the cardinal is far from being well with the court of Spain. He has talked to me since of the indulto, and of the Spaniards seizing every body's ships; they have lately taken three belonging to the French. But the greatest grievance of all is, their having a madman here for their ambassador. The cardinal gave me one instance of it, under the strongest assurances of secrecy, which is, that la Mina has wanted to get the French queen into business. Your grace knows her character, and the little weight she has here. I had observed la Mina whispering to her, and that she was much embarrassed; but I should scarce have imagined the reason of it. The queen has since told it the cardinal. This may serve as another proof how agreeable la Mina can be here. As for monsieur de la Torella, he does not enter into any of these intrigues: he is here chiefly for show. La Mina uses him ill, and he resents it as much as he dares.

ANDREW STONE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

*Illness of the queen.*Walpole
Papers.

(Whitehall, November 11, 1737.) Tho' my lord duke of Newcastle does not doubt but your excellency will receive from other hands an account of the queen's illness, his grace has ordered me to send you the following relation of it, which he would have done himself if his attendance at St. James's, which is very constant, would have allow'd him time to write. On Wednesday morning last her majesty was taken ill, after walking, with a goutish disorder in her stomach, accompanied with a vomiting, and continued very much indisposed the whole day. In the evening Dr. Broxholme was sent for, who, being apprehensive of an inflammation in the bowels, advised bleeding; and between Wednesday evening and Thursday night, her majesty, at different times, had thirty ounces of blood taken away. Yesterday, at noon, the pain was very much abated, and there were great hopes that the violence of the distemper was

was past; but one bad symptom still continued, viz. that nothing that her majesty took, either of medicine or nourishment, stay'd at all upon her stomach, nor have any methods that have been used been able to procure a stool. Last night, sir Hans Sloane and Dr. Hulse were sent for; and Dr. Hulse watch'd last night with her majesty, which she pass'd with very little rest; and has been, this whole day, in the same condition. This afternoon blisters were laid upon her legs, in order to draw down the goutish humour from the stomach; and her majesty took a medicine in which Dr. Hulse has great confidence, but does not expect that it will operate till towards to-morrow morning: it is a purge made up in pills, and mix'd with opium. Dr. Hulse speaks chearfully; but you will believe, from the account I have given, that all hearts must be fill'd with the most melancholy apprehensions.

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Sir Robert Walpole has had constant accounts, by messengers, of her majesty's condition. If there is no alteration for the better to-night, another messenger will be dispatch'd, and relays of horses ordered to lie upon the road, to bring him to town.

P. S. 12 at night. I am just now come from St. James's, and am very sorry to be obliged to add, to the account I have already given your excellency, that the same symptoms continue without any the least alteration. The messenger is sent to Norfolk.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

The queen indisposed.—Forwards a draught of an answer to Geraldino for his approbation.

(Claremont, Tuesday morning.) I conclude you will have heard that the queen kept her bed yesterday with the gout. She had been much out of order on Sunday, occasioned by going to church, and dining in publick. She is, I hear, better this morning. It was impossible to execute my commission about the duke of Montagu; but I will be sure to do it the first opportunity. I had waited on you this morning, but am to have the honour of the duke of Grafton, and my lord and lady Burlington, at Claremont to-day. I will be with you to-morrow, if we don't hunt; but in that case, must deferr it till Thursday morning.

Orford
Papers.

I here send you a draught of my answer to Geraldino, made, I think, conformable to the minutes, and the pieces on which they were founded. I send every thing to you that is necessary for your information, and begg you would carefully peruse my answer, and make such alterations as you shall think proper,

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per, that it may be putt into French, and dispatched. I hope you continue in good health. I am heartily sorry that I am prevented from waiting upon you this day.

THE DUKE OF CHANDOS TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Condole with him on the illness of the queen.

Orford
Papers.

(Cannons, Nov. 12, 1737.) I have just received the terrible news the town is so much alarm'd with. The sincere respect and affection I have for you fill me with such grief, that, tho' I cannot be silent, I know not how to express myself upon it. I condole with you from the bottom of my heart on the very great and severe loss you are about to receive; I beg of God that his providence will continue still in their full vigour those noble spirits and abilities which have for such a number of years so wonderfully supported you under the many heavy trials you have had. That this misfortune (great as it is to every one) may be attended with no personall ill consequences to yourself, is the most ardent prayer of, &c.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

On the illness and danger of queen Caroline.

London, Tuesday, November 15th, 1737, 12 o'clock at noon.

Walpole
Papers.

MY absence in the country is the only reason you did not hear from me last post. The melancholy occasion of my now coming will have reach'd you before this; but tho' it is as dismal a story as ever was told, it will be some satisfaction to you to have a short detail of what has pass'd, and some little comfort to know the present situation of matters.

The queen was taken ill last Wednesday. By all her complaints, and the symptoms that were confess'd at that time, it was explicitly declared and universally believed to be the gout in her stomach. Her illness was at once so violent that Broxholms was consulted, with Tessier. All the usual and known remedies were plentifully given, but without any effect; for her vomitings continued very frequent, and nothing at all staid in her stomach, and nothing pass'd through her, which last continues still to be the case. The necessity of giving the strongest and hottest medicines, made them think it necessary to bleed freely, which was done three times in the three first days, but all without any visible effect. The case was thought so desperate that sir Hans Sloan and Dr. Hulse were, on Friday, sent for, who totally despaired. Necessity at last discover'd and reveal'd a secret which had been totally conceal'd and unknown.

known. The queen had a rupture, which is now known not to have been a new accident. Surgeons were sent for, and Mr. Ranby was at first alone call'd in: he, upon first sight, insisted upon further assistance in his profession, upon which Buffieure and Skipton, a citty-surgeon, very eminent and able, was sent for. They found a great outward inflammation upon the rupture, and immediately lett out that matter, but proceeded further, and made an incision into the cavity of the body near the rupture, from which flow'd immediately great quantities of corrupted matter, and fetid and offensive to the highest degree; and of this noisome kind was what the queen now vomited. All hopes given over, and a mortification judged most certain. Upon further opening, they found the cawl only affected, of which they have twice cutt off the parts; and they are all now positive, physitians and surgeons, that the guts are in no part, nor in the least degree, touch'd. As they have made evacuations of matter from the wound, the vomittings have ceas'd for several hours; as new matter has been bred, her vomittings have returned; but what she has now taken has staid with her nine, and once eleven, hours.

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Her present situation is this: She slept last night better than ever, has not vomitted since two in the morning, has not the least feaver, and her pulse so mended, that they pronounce it now a good pulse; and neither her vomiting nor the matter that comes from the wound has any longer the least smell. They gave her this morning part of a gentle purge, which is divided into three parts, to be taken at three hours distance: the first has staid its time, and the second is given, but nothing has yett pass'd by stool. She has just now made a great quantity of urine, the first, that I can learn, that has been seen of some time. In these circumstances, the physitians all agree that they gain so much ground, that they are full of hopes, but can pronounce no certain safety till a stool comes, which they are now attending.

In this fatall crisis nothing can be said, but we must truly lament what we scarce dare to think of. But will it ever be believed, that a life of this importance (when there is no room for flattery) should be lost, or run thus near, by concealing human infirmities?

Incurata pudor malus ulcera cerat.

I must have done; our distraction and grief wants no relation. I am oppress'd with sorrow and dread.

SIR:

MEMOIRS OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Is desired to prevent the princess of Orange from going to England.

St. James's, Tuesday, half past one.

UPON coming hither I find the family in the greatest confusion with regard to the princess royal. I learn little or nothing was said to her by the last post; but if her royal highness has not quite forgot this house, she will not wonder that those that only could, and from whom she might reasonably have expected it, did not dare to send any particular account, when the whole fatal secret was concealed even from those who were to administer relief. It is now apprehended here, that the princess royal upon the first news, which to be sure will be as bad as can be, may, in surprise and distraction, think of coming over. I write this on purpose to desire that you will use all your reasoning, skill, and influence to prevent any such attempt. It is said you must assume authority, altho' you have none. You will inform her of the whole truth, as you shall, in discretion, think it will have a good or bad effect for the present purpose. I am told she is now at Gumberg, where you must go as soon as you receive this. A messenger is sent with this, that you may see this before the post arrives.

ANDREW STONE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Farther account of the queen's illness.

Walpole
Papers.

(Whitehall, November 18th, 1737.) Your excellency will receive, I doubt not, by this post a more particular account than I am able to send you, of her majesty's present condition; which, tho' not past all hope, is bad enough to fill every body with the greatest concern, and with the most dismal apprehensions for the consequences of it. Her majesty was so well on Wednesday night, that the physicians, as well as the surgeons, thought there wanted very little to enable them to pronounce her out of danger. This favourable and flattering prospect continued till yesterday about four o'clock in the afternoon, when there was a great alteration for the worse. Her majesty grew sick at the stomach, and the wound (which in the morning was thought to be healing) made a fresh and a very large discharge, which left her very weak, and was attended with a feavorish disposition. The queen had, after this, but an indifferent night, and continued to have something of a feavor this morning, which, they say, is now gone off; and that her majesty is much easier than she was. Dr. Sandys of Cambridge has attended her majesty since Tuesday

last; and it was hoped, that a prescription of his might have had some effect towards removing the principal complaint; but it has had hitherto no success. The physicians have still some hope, that the strength of her majesty's constitution (which has appeared and still appears very great in this severe tryal of it) may yet surmount the violence and inveteracy of the distemper. I do not hear that they have lately made any alteration in their prescriptions. Publick prayers are ordered to be put up in all the churches in and about London and Westminster for her majesty's recovery.

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Your excellency will have the goodness to forgive the unnecessary trouble I give you by this letter: and if the accounts I presume to send you upon this melancholy occasion should differ from those you may receive from other hands, I flatter myself, from your usual indulgence, that you will take no notice of it in your letters to England.

HORACE WALPOLE TO LORD HARRINGTON.

On the queen's death.

MY LORD,

Hague, December 10th, 1737.

IN answer to your lordship's most melancholy letter of the 22d past O. S. with the sad and cruel news of the death of our most incomparable queen, your lordship will permitt me, who was often not only a witness, but an unworthy partaker of her great and extensive goodness towards mankind, to join my unexpressible grief and concern to that of many many thousands, as well foreigners as subjects, for the irreparable loss of that sacred person, in whom such rare and superior virtues of a comfort, mother, and queen center'd in such perfection as to tend at the same time to promote that great point of view, which she had always uppermost in her heart, the inseparable interest of the king and the publick weal.

Having said only thus much on this lamentable occasion, (and indeed, my lord, grief, altho' unequal to the subject, will not suffer me to say more,) I shall conclude with letting you know, that I shall take the first opportunity of a fair wind to return, on board the yacht which is arrived for me at Helvoet-fluys, into England, and lay myself at his majesty's feet; offering, in the meantime, my most ardent vows, in common with those of the rest of his majesty's most faithfull subjects, that the king, agreeably to that greatness of mind with which he has ever governed us, and as the most gratefull thing that can be done in memory of her whom we all so justly lament, may mitigate his pain and anxiety for this great separation of so dear a part from him, so far as not

Walpole
Papers.

Copy.

to

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to endanger that precious health which is so necessary for the welfare and preservation of his people and the peace of Europe. I have, pursuant to your lordship's commands, putt myself and family into mourning suitable to my station and the occasion.

LORD TYRCONNEL TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

On the queen's death.

(Belton, December the 24th, 1737.) I was this day honour'd with your's, for which I return you many thanks. I must beg pardon, if I cannot omitt this opportunity of renewing your grief and expressing my own, not inferiour to itt, for the death of our late most gracious queen, whose loss can never be sufficiently lamented, and whose meritt and virtues you yourself would want words to exprefs.

With grandour amiable, with power affable, from whose presence none ever went unpleas'd or unoblig'd away!

She quitted the stage of life with all the dignity she had ever acted the greatest part on itt. A great example to teach us how to dye, as well as how to live; and by a martyrdom in her death, which she bore with the most amazing constancy, patience, and fortitude, deserve the eternal crown she now wears in heaven, as much as, by her great and truly royal virtues, she did adorn the temporal one she wore here.

I design being in town att the meeting of the parliament, and shall ever esteem itt my greatest happiness, as it is my duty, to serve my country to the best of my power: I will never knowingly hurt itt, or any body that is a freind to itt.

M E M O I R S
OF
SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Original Correspondence and Authentic Papers.

PERIOD THE SEVENTH.

From the Death of Queen Caroline to the Resignation
of Sir Robert Walpole.

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LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Bitterly censures sir Robert Walpole, whom he considers as the cause of the king's resentment against the prince's friends.—Laments the want of uniform consistency in opposition.—Invectives against the corruption used by the minister.—Yet is of opinion that he is not alone supported by corruption.—Hints at the misunderstanding between Walpole and the duke of Newcastle, and proposes a coalition with the Pelhams.

February 3, 1738.

YOUR's of the 28th and 31st of December is come safely to my hands, as I hope that this will to your's. I thank you very much for the clear state you represent to me of things that must affect the friends I love, and the country I love, to a great degree, and which concern me therefore in this respect, tho' they do so in no other. I cannot wonder that the same man, who has so often, nay so constantly, sacrificed the national interest to his avarice, his ambition, and his fears, should sacrifice to his passions the peace of his master's family, and take that opportunity to make this master declare a proscription

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against all those who oppose his minister ; for those general words in the message include you all, and mean no less. But I am surprized he should so directly, and so personally, push things to extremity against one who may be his master some time or other. Since he has done so, he opens a scene that may be tragical to him, if it is well acted ; and surely it may be well acted, when the principal actor is so well disposed. The French have a proverb which is true in private life, *Que la bonne compagnie chasse la mauvaise*. Inverted it would be true likewise, *Que la mauvaise chasse la bonne* : but, in this case, it should seem, the good may have the advantage if they please, since the others have only his habit for them, and since his reflexion is against them, and makes him ashamed of them. A multitude of prompters will confound the actor, and destroy all consistency of behaviour and conduct ; but is it impossible then to prompt by concert, and, since his confidence is well placed, to prevail on him to listen to no other prompting ? The very aggravation of his little defects by some people att this time, should be the strongest proof imaginable to him of the necessity of correcting them. In short, when I consider what use I have seen and see actually made of very uncouth characters, I am not without hopes that a good use may be made of this. When I speak of prompting by concert, I do not mean a concert so extended as must be formed in some cases ; I mean a concert of a few intimately united with those in whom his greatest confidence is placed. Such a concert, conducting his conduct with wisdom, industry, firmness, and perseverance, would make his cause as powerful as you wish it, and still more popular, as you think it cannot fail of being.

I am of your mind that the queen's death must make a great alteration in the inward state of things att court ; but this will not decide in favour of the publick ; nor indeed any thing less than the power of developing to the publick the mystery of one of the weakest and wickedest administrations that ever was. Such a concert, with such a person to figure att the head of it, might bring this about. I know what will be objected ; the different characters and views of the men who must concur in bringing this about, and the supposed impossibility of prevailing in these days against a man who has the purse in his hands. I saw much of the first when I was among you ; and I lamented the want of that which you now have, a centre of union, a superior authority among yourselves, under whose influence men of different characters and different views will be brought to draw better together, and your measures being more systematical, your efforts will be far stronger, I hope irresistible. The other objection I heard every day made, or insinuated, during the latter part of the time I was in Britain ; and

I must

I must suppose it was urged as a reason for submitting to the little tyrant who has domineered so long over you; because nothing can be more absurd in the mouth of men who do not submit, but continue to act against him. For if it is impossible to stem the tide of corruption, and prevail against the man who holds the purse; it is absurd to make the attempt, and more absurd to persist in it. But I saw then, or thought I saw, that it was not his own strength, the purse alone that supported him; and I hope you will see this verified by his fall.

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* * * * *

I return to mention a thing I forgot above. I love the chancellor much, and I should therefore be very sorry to see him become the crutch of a battered minister. If he has engaged to a certain degree with the Pelhams, and if the duke of Newcastle's breach with Walpole is irreconcilable, why should not these circumstances be improved? Why should not you cultivate such a coalition, being in friendship with one lately, and having old habitudes with the other? Adieu, my friend, I am to you, and to all that belong to you, as sincerely devoted as the heart of man can make him.

ROBERT TREVOR TO HORACE WALPOLE.

On the Spanish depredations.

(March 1738.) What your excellency has been pleased to tell me in confidence, of the diversity of opinion in the council, has raised my curiosity to see the new answer. Great geniuses, I know, are fond of maintaining paradoxes. But between your excellency and me, I cannot think the treaty of 1667 (the clause mentioned by la Quadra for making us participate in the treaty of Munster excepted) regards his catholic majesty's dominions in America; any more than it does his Britannic majesty's dominions in Germany; or that the term *contrabando* can relate to cocoa, logwood, or pieces of eight, which is expressly defined by the 24th article to signify only *arms* and warlike stores. The word *colonia* is indeed to be found in some general descriptive abuses of this treaty; but then it is followed by the restriction of *ubi negotiatio ac commercium ullo antehac tempore consuevit*. From that of 1670, *la liberté de navigation* may be said to be defended; but I confess this position appears to me too palpable, as well as too sacred, to become us to condescend to prove it by chapter and verse; and I would as soon quote the authority of Euclid to demonstrate that two and two make four, as the terms of any treaty to evince the right of British ships to a free and unmolested passage through the ocean.

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Private.

BENJAMIN KEENE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Regrets that the negotiation with Geraldino was concealed from him.—Difficulty of treating with the Spaniards.—Desires positive instructions.

SIR,

Segovia, August 2d, 1738.

I Shall take the liberty to refer you to the literal account I send to the office by this occasion, of all that has passed here, in consequence of the orders I received by the last messenger; and shall only by this return my humblest thanks for the confidence you have been pleased to repose in me by the honour of your letter of the 2d of June, and add some few particulars which it might not be proper to mention in my dispatches.

I am extremely sorry that it was not thought convenient to give me notice of this transaction at its very beginning; for tho' I might not have been more successful than I am at present, yet I should at least have saved you the disappointment that must be felt upon Geraldino's assurances falling to nothing. I can't well comprehend why he desired the project might be kept secret from me; and I must now confess to you, that la Quadra himself spoke to me about it whilst we were at Aranjuez, and made the same objections he does at present. I replied, that I had no knowledge of the matter; but that if he found any difficulties, he would do well to acquaint his minister with them, and empower him to negotiate upon the plan, and bring it to its perfection. But from that time to the arrival of my messenger I never heard of it from home, nor from La Quadra, who, I suppose, perceiving me to be ignorant of the matter, did not think it worth his while to mention it to me any more.

This previous notice gave me an occasion of speaking very freely to monsieur de la Quadra, without compromising monsieur Geraldino. And it was in answer to my reproaches that he positively told me he had wrote to Geraldino, in May last, that the project would not do in the form he had sent it; as you will see in my letter to the office. To whose account this shuffle must be placed, I shall not determine; tho' I have thrown out my thoughts upon it in my most private letter to the duke of Newcastle.

As to monsieur Geraldino, I have used him as I would wish to be on like occasions, and have been so tender of him as not to reply, that an account formed in the presence of a Spanish minister can never be said to be formed without the knowledge of the Spanish court. If Geraldino had not been so sure of success, I much doubt whether, from your knowledge of these people, the account would have been remitted hither as it was; or at least some arguments would have been

suggested

suggested to me to support the parts most liable to objections. You would naturally have suspected, that a court like this would never agree roundly to any proposition; but even had it been a more advantageous one, they would have altered it, not to submit to what they call *laws* and *impositions*, and consequently you would have prepared against such alterations.

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The great difficulty, as I conceive, consists in *this*; that if there be an equality between the two nations, we shall not have it in our power to shew we have had satisfaction for the sufferers, if we talk of such a satisfaction in a compromised account; they will throw us into the old round-about way; and if we insist upon an advantage in forming the account, these people who have sifted it to the bottom, will not agree to such advantages. And since the fear of an approaching war has not engaged them to accept the plan as it came, I know of no argument that can be made use of in our favour on this head, but what would have hardened them in their resolutions.

If our allowing their credit against us to be so large may have served as a lure to get them to come into this method, the reduction made from it afterwards, which it is impossible to conceal from them, has wiped off the impressions of the former. And whatever negligences this country may have been guilty of in a past reign, they who treat with them in the present will not find it easy to blind them: and in the case before us, it is plain, they have known how to take advantage from our large concessions.

I must now speak a word or two about Montijo, who has had the chief hand in this affair. He complains that it has been carried on in an obscure way, and insinuates that Geraldino has been imposed upon. When I first treated with him upon it, "Let me talk freely to you," says he. "I know the situation of your ministry. Nobody loves or admires sir Robert Walpole more than I do, nor endeavours more to imitate him in my little sphere. I see how affairs stand. We must not press too hard upon your administration; they are not all of the same sentiments: if we do, a war is inevitable. But on the other side, can it be expected that we should let ourselves pass for ignorant dupes, as we must if the convention had been signed in the way it is presented? The king has no mind to a war with England; but do not insist upon his losing his honour, to preserve the peace between the two crowns."—Montijo thinks he has found out this medium; but I acquaint him with my fears that he is much mistaken.

Although the first messenger I may receive after the arrival of this may bring me orders to retire from Spain, I have taken the liberty of recommending Mr.

Castres

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Castres to be a plenipotentiary, if, contrary indeed to my expectation, that commission should be set on foot. Mr. Stert, I imagine, will be glad to stay in England, and treat with the claimants; and if any one not thoroughly informed of affairs should be sent hither to assist me, I may possibly meet with as much trouble in putting them into a right method, as to endeavour to convince the Spaniards of what is reasonable. Besides, as I have frequently been indisposed of late years, and must of necessity know the court, when affairs require it, as they perpetually do, the commission may be at a stand for some months together, unless my colleague be as well instructed of the nature of the commission as myself. These are reasons I have not crowded into my letter to the duke, tho' I take the liberty to mention them to you, and to beg your protection for a man of as good sense and as much virtue as can be met with.

I have also mentioned in my letters Montijo's promises to agree that our navigation in the Indies shall be put upon a known, open, and secure foot for the future; and I perceive by him, that the method he laid down when I dispatched a courier on the 17th of May, will be a little more or less what they will insist upon. Be pleased therefore to give it a turn in your thoughts. It does not appear to be unreasonable in the main. And as to our disputes about the limits of Florida, I confess I have but a very general idea of them, and must beg for clear instructions and orders. For it is such a thing to treat with people who press hard towards the conclusion and determination of an affair, and yet not to know how far one may yield to good reasons, or how to support indifferent ones for any considerable time.

As I flatter myself you regard me as a creature of your own, I am in no fears that my way of writing thus freely will offend you. Neither shall I trouble you with the assurances of my having done my utmost on this occasion; since both my duty to the publick, my regard to my own reputation, and my particular attention to your commands have all obliged me to exert the little capacity and address I may be master of. Give me leave only to add the professions of the inviolable respect and attachment with which I have the honour to be, sir, &c.

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DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.

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*Thanks him for his kind interposition.—Conference with Fitzgerald.—Firmness of
sir Robert Walpole.*

1738.

MY DEAR LORD,

Kensington, August 25, 1738.

Hardwicke
Papers.

I Must begin with returning you my thanks for your late great goodness to me. It is impossible to give greater marks of your particular affection, or of your undeserved regard, than you have done by the manner in which you have executed your kind commission. It has, I hope, answered your own intentions. Every thing seems well; and, by a continuance of your advice on one side, and interposition on the other, as well as from the inclination of both parties, I dare say, it will continue so.

We have had our conference with Fitzgerald: he has made and given in a compromise: there are no very material alterations, except that he refuses to admit, in the convention, that the *libre navigation dans les Indes Occidentales* should be adjusted in the conferences *selon les traites*. He insists that *dans les Indes Occidentales* should be left out. Upon which sir Robert spoke with all the firmness imaginable; and we all told him, without that, it was in vain for him to expect we should or could agree. He took time to consider; and is to give Mr. Walpole his answer to-night. Sir Robert is very positive not to yield; and said, very rightly, that if we did, all the world would say, we had given up our rights for 95,000 l. when we were in a condition to force them to admit them. I have agreed to meet you to-morrow at Peterham at lord Harrington's. Sir Robert and all of us beg you would not fail to be there; for to-morrow's meeting will determine the fate of this great affair. Pray, my dear lord, do not fail to come. Horace begs you would be there by twelve o'clock.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO LORD HARDWICKE.

*On the Spanish proposals.—Differs with the Walpoles and Keene on the meaning of
the treaties with Spain.*

MY DEAR LORD,

Claremont, October 22d, 1738.

Hardwicke
Papers.

I Am still giving you more trouble, which, tho' you may not like, I am persuaded you are not displeased with the true cause of it. I send you Mr. Keene and Castres's letter; the original I have sent to sir R. I found, the other day, both he and Horace understood, or seemed to understand, that letter to propose the substituting the treaty of 1667 to be observed in the West Indies for all ships within such a distance. But you will find, upon considering it, it

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is quite otherwise. Mr. Keene does, indeed, propose the same method for examining, &c. the passeports and sea-letters; but as to the other conditions and penalties, they are quite different. By the treaty of 1667, if it doth not appear, by the sea-letters, that there are contraband goods on board, no other examination of the ship or cargo is to be had; if there are, nothing but the contraband goods to be forfeited. As to the first case, I don't very well see what Keene proposes; whether the ship, not having a suspected cargo mentioned in the sea-letters, should be forthwith released; but as to the latter, he expressly proposes that the ship should be declared lawful prize, if she either has any goods of the Spanish West Indies, or a cargo fitt only for the Spanish plantations: what that is, I am at a loss to know. You will see my thoughts in the paper of considerations upon this point, and what instructions I think may be sent to the plenipoes upon it. For, in all events, I think we should first propose the articles of the treaty in general, as in the draught, and then, upon the objections of the Spaniards, admit or propose these or some other expedients. I submit the whole, most willingly, to your better judgment; but am of opinion that the instructions should go att the same time that we send back the treaty, that it may appear that, tho' we consented to their *alterations* as immaterial, we still intended to insist upon the freedom of navigation in a proper manner.

Burrel and Bristowe have been with sir Thomas, and afterwards with sir R. Bristowe, I hear, was disposed to accept the cédulas. They are to be with sir Thomas to-morrow; and intend, as I am told, to ask a meeting with the king's servants.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO LORD HARDWICKE.

Acquaints him with the death of sir Charles Turner.—Requests him to continue the deputy teller.

MY LORD,

Houghton, November 25, 1738.

Hardwicke
Papers.

THE loss of the oldest friend and acquaintance I had in the world is the melancholy occasion of my giving your lordship this trouble. Poor sir Charles Turner, the best of men and the best of friends, died here, at my house, yesterday morning. He had lately been very ill; was thought quite recovered, and indeed appeared so; was here two days, in all respects brisk and gay; went to bed at ten o'clock, awak'd at twelve with sickness and purging, but, having the benefit of nature both ways, without any help or remedy, fell to sleep again and slept till six, when he call'd up his man again, and in great swiftness, order'd a clean shirt, would get out of bed, and, in putting on his clothes,

clothes, died in his man's arms. A sudden end to a most valuable life; but, *serius aut citius.*

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But it is in vain to lament his fate; the reverse of the medal shows me the benefit accruing to your family, which I congratulate your lordship upon. And as he had a deputy in the office, a most deserving man, whom I recommended to sir Charles for his merit, integrity, and capacity only, I had not patience, till he should make his application to me, to defer letting your lordship know, that you cannot do yourself and family a greater service than by doing the justice to Mr. Lawton to continue him deputy teller. My manner of recommending him will convince your lordship of the good opinion I have of him.

This misfortune makes a vacancy in the corporation of Lynn, which may put off my journey for one day longer than I intended, for I must see my principal friends there before I leave the country; but I hope to be in town on Friday or Saturday at farthest.

1739.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO BENJAMIN KEENE.

Convention approved by the cabinet council.

(Whitehall, January 26th, 1738-9.) You will have heard, from my office, that Harte the messenger arrived on the 15th instant with your dispatches of the 14th N. S. transmitting the convention and two separate articles signed by you and monsieur de la Quadra, which I laid immediately before the king. His majesty having been pleased to order them to be considered by the lords of the council, I send you inclosed a minute of their lordships' humble opinion offered to his majesty thereupon, which the king has been pleased to approve; and the proper orders were immediately given for the exchange of the ratifications, which was accordingly made yesterday, by my lord Harrington and myself, with monsieur Geraldino.

Waldegrave
Papers.

Copy.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you with his majesty's approbation of your conduct in this long and difficult negotiation; and congratulate you upon the success of this first step towards the renewing of the good correspondence between the two crowns; which I hope will be perfected, by the dispatch and good success of your commission, for effectually preventing for the future those

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unjust depredations which occasioned the late misunderstanding between them. And his majesty hopes, that the strongest orders will be immediately sent to the West Indies for putting a stop to those proceedings; for which you will accordingly make the proper instances, and acquaint his majesty's governors and officers in America with the success of your applications for that purpose.

Minutes of the council who approved the convention.

Whitehall, January 22d, 1738-9.

Lord Archbishop of Canterbury.
Lord Chancellor.
Lord President.
Lord Privy Seal.
Duke of Grafton.
Lord Chamberlain.
Duke of Devonshire.

Earl of Pembroke.
Earl of Hay.
Lord Harrington.
Sir Robert Walpole.
Sir Charles Wager.
Duke of Newcastle.

Mr. Keene's letter of January 14, N. S. transmitting the convention and two separate articles, and a paper containing the alterations in the said convention, and separate articles from the draught thereof, transmitted to Mr. Keene; and monsieur la Quadra's letter of January 10, N. S. to Mr. Keene, inclosing a declaration signed by monsieur la Quadra; and the said declaration, with Mr. Keene's answer to monsieur la Quadra's letter, were read.

The duke of Newcastle acquainted the lords, that monsieur Geraldino had sent him copies of the ratifications, which, he said, he was ready to exchange; and that he had received orders from his court to send a copy of the above-mentioned declaration, signed by monsieur la Quadra, and sent to Mr. Keene, to be laid before his majesty previous to the exchange of the ratifications; the receipt of which also, he desired, should be previously acknowledged.

The copies of the Spanish ratifications were read.

Their lordships were humbly of opinion, to advise his majesty that the proper directions should be given for ratifying the said convention, and the two separate articles, and for exchanging the ratifications.

Their lordships having been acquainted with the application from the proprietors of the ship Sarah, taken by the guarda costas, &c. are humbly of opinion, that the proprietors should be desired to send their proofs, that the proper application may be made for satisfaction; and that orders should be sent to Mr. Keene to take the proper steps for procuring satisfaction; and that the memorial already received should be transmitted to Mr. Keene.

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JOHN ORLEBAR * TO THE REV. H. ETOUGH.

Address carried in both houses.

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* Commis-
sioner of
excise.

(Ruffel-street, February 3d, 1738-9.) Soon after you wrote your last letter to me, you might perceive that, by the prorogation of the parliament, my answer to it must be suspended till this time. The scene open'd on Thursday, with a good deal of warmth in both houses. The particulars of the debate in the upper house I have not had so good an account of as in the other. The address was moved for in the house of lords by the duke of Portland, and seconded by lord Hobart. In the house of commons the motion was made by Mr. Hanbury Williams, and seconded by Frank Fane (who is to be in the money chair). The speakers in opposition were Mr. Pulteney, sir William Wyndham, Mr. Littleton, sir Thomas Saunderson, lord Baltimore, Mr. Waller, Shippen, and sir John Barnard. In this debate the merits of the convention were anticipated, and many hard words given to it. The speakers on the other side were only sir Robert Walpole, Mr. Pelham, Danvers, and Jack Howe. The house sat till between seven and eight. The question they divided upon was for leaving out the greatest part of the words of the motion, so as to reduce the address to nothing but thanks for the speech, and a promise to raise the supply. The division was 141 against 230. The great objection against the convention is, that the future security to the trade is left to be settled by plenipotentiarys. I understand that the treaty is to be laid in a few days before the parliament. I apprehend the dissenters will certainly apply, but can't find with any certainty whether the p——e's affair, or the civil list, will come on or not. Sir Robert Walpole looks as well and as chearful as I have known him at any time.

Extracts of Letters from JOHN ORLEBAR to the Rev. HENRY ETOUGH,
relating to the parliamentary proceedings on the convention.

(March 3, 1738-9.) The grand debate in the house of lords is pretty well over. Tuesday was entirely spent in hearing the merchants, and examining Mr. Stert; and Thursday in debating till eleven o'clock. Lord Cholmondeley moved the question, which was an address of thanks and approbation. He spoke very well; and it is said in general that the whole debate was an extreme fine one, conducted with great dignity and decency as a national concern, and not personal or ministerial. The duke of Ar——le, who spoke two hours, was the only

Etough
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Period VII. one who, as I hear, took much freedom with the ministry. Lord Ch——d's
 1737 to 1742. speech is prodigiously applauded, as very fine and very artful.

1739.

	Present.	Proxies.	Together.
The division was of lords	71	24	95
	58	16	74
Majority	13	8	21

The speakers as follows

1. Lord Cholmondeley.	2. Lord Talbot.
4. Duke of Newcastle.	3. Lord Carteret.
7. Bishop of Salisbury.	5. Lord Romney.
10. Lord Chancellor.	6. Lord Gower.
12. Lord Hervey.	8. Duke of Bedford.
15. Lord Ilay.	9. Duke of Argyle.
	11. Lord Lonsdale.
	13. Lord Chesterfield.
	14. Lord Bathurst.

Lord Sc——gh, you perceive, did not speak, but he divided with the minority; and so did the duke of R——t——d, lords Berkeley, Rockingham, and Peterborough, and the bishops of Lincoln, Litchfield, Gloucester, and Oxford. The duke of Bolton was with the majority. This is as particular an account as my information enables me to send you. I don't find that the address is printed; if it should be, I will send it to you.

Etough
Papers.

(March 10, 1738-9.) I sit down to satisfy your curiosity as far as I am at present able. The grand question was not determin'd in the house of commons till nine o'clock last night. I having attended this morning at the office, (but no board there,) and being engaged for this afternoon with uninforming sort of company, cannot be very minute or particular: what I can tell you is in general as follows:—Tuesday and Wednesday were taken up in hearing merchants, and examining Mr. Stert: no division either day. Thursday, at noon, the debate began in the committee. Mr. Walpole moved for addressing the king to the same purport as the address of the lords. He spoke more than two hours; was seconded by Mr. Campbell, who acquitted himself very well. The debate is said to be a very good one, and decent, except the speeches of three or four young gentlemen†, who took great personal libertys. The speakers were in this order, as it was reported to us yesterday morning by sir Thomas; but

but I have since heard that lord Cornbury spoke, and imagine it was after Mr. Period VII.
Lindsay. 1737 to 1742.

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. Mr. Walpole. | 3. Sir Thomas Saunderfon. |
| 2. Mr. Campbell. | 4. Lord Gage. |
| 5. Mr. How. | 7. Mr. Pitt †. |
| 6. Mr. Knight. | 10. Sir John Barnard. |
| 8. Mr. Henry Fox. | 12. Mr. Lyttleton †. |
| 9. Sir Henry Lyddalle | 15. Mr. Grenville †. |
| 11. Mr. Pelham. | 16. Mr. Shippen. |
| 13. Sir Charles Wager. | 18. Mr. Waller. |
| 14. Mr. Selwyn junior. | 20. Dr. Lee. |
| 17. Mr. Cornwallis. | 22. Mr. Bootle. |
| 19. Mr. Lindsay. | 24. Mr. Bohun †. |
| 21. Attorney General. | 25. Sir William Wyndham. |
| 23. Lord Tirconnel. | |
| 26. Sir Robert Walpole. | |

Noes 188
Yeas 89
—
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The house divided between twelve and one at night. The numbers were, Ayes 260; Noes 232. It is apprehended that several pairs went away. Mr. Pulteney declared that he was so much fatigued with the attendance, that he could not attempt to speak so late; but intended to give his reasons for disagreeing with the motion, upon the report. Accordingly he began the debate yesterday, which I hear was a very hot one, and that he declared, if the motion was agreed to, he would quit the service of the house; and that Mr. Sandys and fir William Wyndham threatened in some measure the like. I hear too that there were some high words between the latter and fir Robert Walpole, but cannot make much of that report. The speakers yesterday, we are told, were the following, but don't know in what order they spoke, except that Wynnington answered Mr. Pulteney exceedingly well; and so did fir William Yonge Mr. Fazakerly, and fir Robert Walpole fir William Wyndham.

- | | |
|---------------------|--|
| Mr. Wynnington. | Mr. Pulteney. |
| Colonel Mordaunt. | Mr. Walter Plummer. |
| Sollicitor-general. | Mr. Ereskine, brother to late lord Marr. |
| Mr. Tracey. | Sir Edmund Isham. |
| Mr. Hervey. | Mr. Willimot. |
| Lord Glenorchy. | Lord Baltimore. |
| Lord Advocate. | Mr. Ord. |
| Sir William Yonge. | Sir John Cotton. |

Sir

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Sir Robert Walpole.

Mr. Fazakerley.

Mr. Sandys.

Sir William Wyndham.

The division was at nine o'clock

Yeas 244

Noes 214

Majority 30

A great many went away in pairs. Fifteen Scotch members were in the minority; eleven of which they say are generally so; and four placed to the duke of Argyle's account. I believe I did not tell you that lord Dartmouth was in the majority in the house of lords; nor that the duke of Leeds was for the first time in the minority. Lord Raymond, I think, I did mention in the minority. The address I may possibly send you on Tuesday; and, if I can get it, the lords' protest. I have not read the latter, and till I do, I am at a loss to think what reasons can be given for not agreeing to that address, which seems, on the favourite point of no search, to express the very sense of the most clamorous opponents. It is thought that no question could have been carried that had not been so strong on that point.

Etough
Papers.

(March 17, 1738-9.) I don't know whether I mentioned lord Stanhope to you before. I can't give you a satisfactory account of the majority being so much lessened, or rather the minority increased. I forget now what the numbers were on the division the first day of the session; but, I believe, if you compare that division with what was on Thursday was se'nnight, you will find that the court had pretty near the same numbers; and possibly their numbers might afterwards not increase any thing near so much as their opponents, because their friends usually attend better at first, and the utmost strength of their enemies was certainly collected at the latter division, upon the assurances that were given by their leaders of the certainty of their success if they would all come up; which drew 'em all out of the country, even those who used to be most backward in their attendance. This, I must own, does not thoroughly satisfy me, because, upon the efforts that were made, I should think the numbers must have increased on both sides; therefore I imagine there must have been several members who usually vote with the court that fell off on this occasion, but have not picked up any of their names, except our countryman sir Roger, and Mr. Whitmore. Mr. Knight, you mention, is pretty steady to the ministry: Mr. Bohun is the same. You guess I don't know which is the proper way

way of writing his name. In the last division, on Friday, Sloper was asleep till the house was begun to be told, and they would not let him go out after he was awake, so he voted against his inclinations; otherwise the numbers would have been 245 against 213. The patriots stick to their resolution of non-attendance. They stay in town for the call, but are a disbanded people. I hear of none but lord Cornbury and sir John Barnard that come to the house, unless on private business.

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JOHN SELWYN TO THE HON. THOMAS TOWNSHEND.

Of the debate on the convention with Spain.

SIR,

March 10th, 1739.

THE great contest about the convention being at least for the present determined, and in a way that may have farther consequences, I cannot forbear troubling you, even at Midgham, with some account of it. I ordered the address from the house of lords to be sent you; that proposed to the house of commons is to the same effect, and you shall have it when it has been presented. They were both designed to quiet the minds of the people; and I own I think they should have that effect, since they obviate the objections made to the convention. But I mention them now only to inform you upon what we debated. Mr. Horace Walpole opened the debate on Thursday morning at half an hour after eleven, with a full and clear explanation of the convention; and after having spoke two hours and a quarter, but so well that few people thought him tedious, concluded with the motion for the address, and was seconded by Mr. Campbell of Pembrokehire, who did as well as Mr. Walpole left him room to do. Sir Thomas Sanderfon began the opposition with a great deal of pompous nonsense. My lord Gage, Mr. Knight, Mr. Bootle, sir John Barnard, sir Charles Wager, Mr. Bohun, Mr. Greenville, Mr. Lyttleton, and many others whose names you would be tired of reading, all spoke. Mr. Pitt spoke very well, but very abusively, and provoked Mr. Henry Fox and sir Henry Liddall both to answer him; and I think that sir Henry, speaking entirely from the honesty of his heart, did honour both to himself and those with whom he voted. Sir Robert Walpole, in answer to sir William Wyndham, ended the debate at half an hour after twelve at night: then we divided, and our numbers were, for 260, against 232. Mr. Pulteney, not having spoke that day, opened the debate on Friday about one upon the report. His speech was merely inflammatory, and in it he took leave of the house. Mr. Sandys did the same, and after many very indifferent performances of other people, sir William Wyndham

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ham got up about nine at night, and, after a very eloquent invective, declared the parliament a faction, and took leave too. Sir Robert Walpole answered him, by exposing the indecency of such a behaviour and of such language, for which people had been sent to the Tower; and concluded the debate about ten. We divided again, and our numbers were 244 and 214; many people being absent, and most of them upon bargain. Old Sloper fell asleep, and was counted with the minority. The prince attended the greatest part of both days, and declared, that since a national point could not be carried, he would drop his own. Agreeably to the resolution of the three gentlemen whom I have named, and in conjunction with them, the whole party have agreed to come no more to parliament. It is the opinion of the ministry that sir William Wyndham intended to be sent to the Tower; it is also said, they all hope to be taken into custody at the next call, and not to make submission; but how far they will carry this, and what will be the event of it, time must shew.

With great injustice to colonel Mordaunt, I forgot to say that he spoke yesterday extremely well. The duke of Argyle got the duke's Campbell from us.

JOHN SELWYN TO THE HON. THOMAS TOWNSHEND.

Parliamentary debate on the dissenters' bill.

Sidney
Papers.

(April 7, 1739.) Sir Robert's speech, without one word to the merits of the question upon the unfitness of the time, and in the way of humour upon the Tories not coming to defend the church, was a very good one; and lord Heaton's brother was not bad upon those who were then missing, though their great abilities had often been the support of the church, particularly one gentleman, who formerly brought in the bill against the damnable sin of schism.

BENJAMIN KEENE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Laments the infatuation of the English.—Ill effects of the South Sea Company's conduct.—Prejudices of Spain.—Acknowledges the information received from his letters.

SIR,

Madrid, April 24, 1739.

Orford
Papers.

COULD any thing encrease the sense I have of your singular goodness for me, it would be the letter you were pleased to write me of the 19th past by the last messenger, whilst you were scarce gotten out of the hurry and confusion that the most pernicious malice could raise against the late transactions. As to my own part, I must take the liberty to confess to you that this single instance of the height of the folly and madness a sensible nation may be push'd

to

to against its evident interest, is sufficient to disgust me against all publick business for the future. But I would not have you think from hence that I am capable of making a bad prospect still worse, for want of patience and resolution in going thro' the remaining part of the work, however convinced I may be that there is scarce one circumstance that could possibly prevent the success of the future negociation but what actually exists in its full force.

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As I have been very explicit in my letters to the office upon our present situation here, I have nothing in particular to trouble you with on that head. I have nothing better to write, and I believe you will think I can have nothing worse. It is some years since that I both thought and wrote that the South Sea Company's affairs, and particularly this money dispute, would throw the administration under considerable difficulties. Every set of directors has been shifting off the bad day upon their successors; and when they could hold it out no longer, they took refuge in a general court, and by providing for their own security, or rather for avoiding a little clamour, they have, I fear, put the company's affairs into an irretrievable condition. Had the last general court been somewhat more pliable, and the temper of *our* nation allowed of the retreat of our fleet, and thereby prevented the present ill-nature in *this*, we might have had an appearance of getting something tolerable about our navigation in America, and matters at least would have gone on smoothly during our conferences, and some favourable accident might have happened in the eight months providentially to our assistance. But as the company is stiff, Spain will not be less so; and one may be sure that a court, who not many years since declared all its treaties with the greater powers in Europe null and void by a single declaration, will not be over-scrupulous in executing her *last* in suspending a company they abominate to such a degree, that if their agent was not the king's minister, he would not have access to any of the Spanish ministers, to speak a single word upon their concerns. It is with the company as with the rest of the nation; no minister can possibly please them, till they are happy enough to be an over-match to all the powers in Christendom, and oblige them to give us all we want, and refuse them all they desire, be it just or not.

I return my humblest acknowledgements for the hint you are pleased to give me about my own conduct with the Spanish plenipotentiaries in taking matters *ad referendum*; and I must beg of you not to deprive me of your private letters, under the least apprehension that I may be tempted to act in a manner different from my orders, in consequence of any expression they may contain. On the contrary, they always explain the loose general expressions office letters are

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usually composed of. And, tho' it is not necessary, I must beg leave to assure you, that every single paper I ever had the honour to receive from you in your own hand, is kept apart, in order to be burnt the moment I shall set out from Madrid for England or elsewhere.

Upon the whole, sir, I hope nothing will be done here that may make me forfeit the honour of your protection; since with it I must take the liberty to add, my private affairs are full in as bad a way as my public ones. But in all cases I will endeavour to give you the most convincing proofs of the fidelity and attachment, &c.

LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Asserts that the British ministry are desirous to negotiate with Spain, through the mediation of France.—Condemns the augmentation of troops.—Approves the secession, and exhorts the opposition to persevere.—Declines writing any more in the cause of opposition.—Commends the conduct of the prince.—Discordant views of the whigs and tories.—Bitterly arraigns the character and conduct of sir Robert Walpole.

Egremont
Papers.

(July the 23d, 1739.) I have settled myself in the same habitation, after more than two months of silly and teasing negociation, and after apprehending more than once, that I should have no settlement at all. My lease is for the live of a widow, or the term of her widowhood. She will not marry, I think, because she would lose by it the best part of a small revenue; and tho' she be younger than I am, she is old enough not to be courted for her beauty. The tranquillity you wish me, my dear sir William, I think I shall have; my mind is tempered for it. Few things give me regret, fewer fear; and the objects that could principally affect me with trouble are at a distance: I see them imperfectly, I hear them faintly.

I have not been, nor am, in the way of political information; but, as far as I know, there is no reason to alter the opinion I was of in England concerning the part this government would act, if the obstinacy of Spain drove things to a rupture; and you took up arms purely to repel usurpation, injurys, and insults, and to assert a plain and incontestable right, which the French claim as well as you, to a free and independant navigation. It is said, that your ministers ask to negotiate with Spain, under the cardinal's mediation*, and that he accepts it. I dare to say he would not suffer this right on the part of France to be

* This assertion was ungrounded; France offered her mediation, but England rejected it.

made a matter of treaty. But if you will make it such on your part, it is not a mediator's duty to hinder you. The great augmentation of your land forces makes no impression; people wonder what you mean. He that should say, you have an invasion to fear, would be laughed at almost as much as he that should say, you meant to chase guarda costas with horse, foot, and dragoons. What then do your government mean? I believe you or I could answer the question better than any foreign politician.

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The account you gave me in your's of a conversation with our friend P. did not surprise me; it only renewed an affliction I have often felt on the same account; for, tho' I love the man, tho' I look on myself to be perfectly indifferent to him, the step* he was so fond of, and grew tired of so soon, is the only one that you could take of any meaning or tendency; if it is supported decently but strongly, soberly but resolutely, it must have a good effect. If it is not supported so, the case will be as bad, with a little more dishonour to particular men, as if it had not been taken. In one case, and in the other, the plain and necessary consequence would have been, or is, to leave the honour, interest, and constitution of their country at the mercy of an avowed faction, with the most profligate man in the nation at the head of it. Such a remonstrance as he mentioned would be, no doubt, a proper, one of the properest measures that could be taken to justify and support the secession. But what then does he mean by saying, it would ruin the whig party? The whig faction it might break; and what has he, and you, and every honest man, meant by the opposition you have carried on, and by your coalition, but to break the whig and tory faction both? The whole body of the whigs must be re-united, he says; and this great measure, of the city remonstrance, must be executed by the torys alone. I forbear any remarks on a discourse as wild as a dream. Surely, a man of his parts must be fascinated, as you say, to talk in such a stile. I hear he has talked of something he expects from me; but I have desired he may be told, that I will write nothing. He thought my very name and presence in England did hurt. What hurt then would the bare suspicion do, that a paper, designed to explain and justify the secession, and to point out the true end of it, came from me? Since you are all separated, I am willing to hope that it is to hold separately the same language, and to pursue the same measures at once in different places; and that your separation will continue no longer than is necessary for this purpose. Any thing of the kind you expect will have its effect, perhaps, more strongly after the minds of men are so prepared; and I need say nothing of it to you here, because you will hear of it

* The secession.

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* The prince
of Wales.

another way; and I think no one but you should hear of it any way, till it appears without any possible notices of the quarter from whence it comes.

I own to you, that this fresh mark of uniformity of sentiment and steadiness of conduct, in a certain person *, gives me great pleasure, and the more because the attack was made by surprize: keep him right for his sake, for your own, and for your country's sake. In all events the weight of that person must be greater every day, if he confirms, in the opinion of mankind, his character of steadiness and truth. Adieu, dear sir, take this to be the speech of a departed friend, who writes to you from another world, who had some experience of the world, and who takes no farther interest in it, besides that of a concern for his living friends.

Of all the causes of your present publick misfortunes, which are easy to be traced, a principal one is this: The whigs have always looked on the protestant succession, and the torys on the restoration of the Stewarts, as sure means to throw the whole power of the government into the hands of one or the other of them, and to keep it there. I am confident the latter would have found themselves deceived: the former were encouraged and confirmed by the weak conduct of my lord Oxford; by the characters of the late and present king, different indeed, but suited to their purpose; and by the absurd behaviour of the torys, which no experience can cure. Thus party has become faction, distinguished no longer by principle, whatever may be represented, but by personal attachments *. Had great men been at the head of the ruling faction, your liberties had been lost without a chance to save them. Their characters would have imposed, and a successful administration might have hindered men from seeing the invasions made on liberty. Walpole's character could impose on no man. All the power, and all the wealth of Britain has not been able to deck him out with a little dignity, nor to procure him common respect. A narrow capacity, good as far as it extends, but confined to the lowest and worst arts, to the tricks of domestick government, has rendered his administration one of the wickedest and weakest, the most hateful, and the most contemptible that our nation ever saw; and thus many chances to redeem yourselves from his tyranny, and to restore good government, have been created: the last, that which I hope still subsists, is the fairest that any infatuated minister could give against himself. His male administration ap-

* These assertions are a full and ample refutation of his much laboured Treatise on the State of Parties at the Accession of George the First, and fully demonstrate the absurdity of any attempt to reconcile the two leading parties.

peared so flagrant, that faction could not save him without avowing faction. You pulled off the mask; at least, you shewed mankind the turpitude of this proceeding, and you appealed to the nation; for your secession is such an appeal, or it is the most pompous nothing I ever saw or heard of. To go back from this, would be to admit what you have appealed against. For your own sakes, and for the sake of your country, you must go forward. You may do so by the strongest and most irreproachable measures; you may bring the dispute to fix on this single point, the personal interest of Walpole, in the eyes of the whole kingdom. If you persist, it must rest there at last, and there is not a man of spirit left in Britain, if it can rest there long.

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THE EARL OF WALDEGRAVE TO THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE.

The cardinal offers to guaranty the immediate payment of the 95,000 l. from Spain, provided the English Squadron is withdrawn from the Mediterranean.—Declined.

MY LORD,

Paris, August 15, 1739.

THE importance and great secrecy of the contents of this letter oblige me to make use of my own hand, and to send it to your grace directly. Being the day before yesterday, at Issy, talking, in my usual manner, with the cardinal upon the present times, and representing to him, in the strongest manner I could, that the only way to shorten the war between his majesty and Spain, was for him not to meddle in it; he made me a pretty extraordinary confidence, of which I am to give your grace an account. Before I begin the relation, it is necessary to observe to your grace, that, in order to keep the cardinal in ignorance of what I write, or may now and then presume to advise, at this juncture, I protest to him I am as much for peace as he can be, provided we can get a salvo for our honour, and reparation for our injured property; and he seems so satisfied with what I tell him in this sense, that he frequently asks my private opinion as to means to make up the difference; and it is in such kind of discourse that I have often opportunitys of making judgment of his intentions.

It was in a discourse of this nature that he mentioned the French king's interposition, and his proposing and becoming answerable to the respective courts for the 95,000 l. and for the withdrawing of our squadrons. Your grace has seen, in other letters of mine, how I have treated this matter; and I have since received, with great pleasure, from your grace, an account of his majesty's gracious approbation of what I have done on that subject. Tho' he seemed

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seemed beat out of that project meerly on my opinion, that it would be time lost to think of it, yet, when I saw him last, he resumed the subject, not, as he said, from himself, but from suggestions from Holland; and, in order to convince me it was so, injoining me to the strictest secrecy, he pulled a small letter out of his drawer, and read part of it, saying, it was from one of the most considerable men in Holland, who was of opinion, that if his eminency proposed the payment of the 95,000 l. and becoming guaranty for it, and the withdrawing of our fleet, both within a short and limited space, the war might still be prevented. This I saw was underlined. The cardinal then read over a little to himself, and coming to another underlined place, he read aloud, and it was to this effect: that Spain might send out her flotilla under convoy of a French squadron of men of war, and that the English would not attack them. This seemed asserted as a matter out of dispute. Whether it was exactly so in the letter, or turned so by the cardinal, I cannot pretend to say.

The cardinal then lookt fully on me to ask what I thought of it. I began with the first proposition, and abused the author, whoever he was, that cou'd be stupid enough to imagine we should so much as listen to such a proposal. I urged all the proper reasons that occurred to me on the subject; and the cardinal allowed I was in the right. He asked me what I thought on the 2d part, about a French escort to the flotilla. I said, his Dutch correspondent must be a very odd one to imagine such an expedient; that I did not pretend to be versed enough in maritime laws to say what might be prescribed in such cases, or if any case of this nature had ever existed; but that I should be sorry to see one started now: that I was persuaded a proper regard would be shewn, on all occasions, to the French flag; but that, at the first aspect, I thought a neutral squadron, protecting the goods and effects of an enemy, could be lookt upon but as an auxiliary to the enemy, hired by the enemy for that purpose, and consequently ought, by the rules of war, to be treated as an enemy, and acted against as such, if he should, in the open seas, pretend to oppose our taking our enemy's effects. I mentioned the case of a majority in number of an enemy's subjects on board a neutral ship destroying the neutrality of such ship, and making it lyable to be taken; concluding from thence, that the majority of power and strength ought to have the same effect. The cardinal turned it off as an odd project which he did not think of putting in execution; and that what he threw out was more to convince me of there being more dispositions in Holland to peace, than to join with us in this war against Spain.

Your

Your grace will easily believe that I was very curious to find out who this famous letter came from, and to whom it was writ; for, by the stile, it was not writ to his eminency. I suspected immediately, and I am persuaded, the letter was wrote to Van Hoey, and by him left with the cardinal. If my eyes did not fail me exceedingly, it was signed Lynden. The character is small, and I had but a glimpse on the turning over a sheet, for the cardinal seemed exceedingly cautious lest I should look upon his paper, and I was as carefull not to give him any cause of suspicion. I know this monsieur de Lynden is great with Van Hoey, and carries on a private correspondence with him. Your grace will be better able, from the knowledge you may have of his dispositions, to judge whether he is a likely person to inspire and advise notions so contrary not only to our interest, but to the mutual welfare of his majesty and the States, whose interest seem at this juncture inseparable from one another. I am persuaded I need not put your grace in mind of the delicacy of this intelligence, the manner I came by it, the possibility that my eyes may have deceived me, and the probability that nobody else could know of the letter but myself, make it of the utmost consequence at this time, and in my station, that I should not be suspected. Few things go to Holland but what Fenelon finds out and writes back here. Your grace's prudence will, I dare say, obviate all my fears. I gave a hint of this, by the post, to Mr. Walpole, without naming names. Your grace will see, by the inclosed copy of my letter to his excellency, what I say to him on the subject.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

General state of affairs in regard to Spain and France.—Urges him to continue at the Hague.

MY DEAR BROTHER,

London, August 3—14, 1739.

YOU cou'd not expect, whilst I was in the country, that I shou'd have any thing worth troubling you with; nor had I any opportunity of reading your dispatches untill I came to town; and, upon the perusal of them, I have nothing to offer, but to lament the melancholly situation of the country where you are, which may immediately affect their best friends, and must finally involve them in all the consequences which may arise from the impotent or indolent spirit which governs all the councils there. You will learn, by the accounts that are sent you from the office, how matters stand with us in Spain and France, where they are both fully apprised, by what has happened, that our fleets are under hostile orders with regard to Spain. Mr. Haddock's stopping and

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and searching the French ship going into Cales, and taking his letters from him, (without committing the least violence of any other kind,) which has been complain'd of by the cardinal to lord Waldegrave, proves his orders are to stop and seize every Spanish vessel going into or coming out of Cales. Ogle's cruising with four large ships upon the coasts of Spain, and Vernon's being order'd to continue for some time in those seas with nine men of war, plainly denote the uses and services which these squadrons are design'd for; and as the Azogues and Buénos-Ayres ships are daily expected home, it cannot miss observation, that they may probably fall in with some of our squadrons, whether they are order'd into Cales or the Bay of Biscay; of this they are so sensible in Spain, that Mr. Keene, in his last letter, says, they are under the greatest apprehension for the Azogues in Spain; and the Spanish merchants here in London have offered 30 *per cent.* for insurance, which they can no ways procure; and this is a certain fact.

The cardinal has, in one of his usual conversations to lord Waldegrave, mentioned the Azogues as an affair he hopes we will not think of, but not as a matter of form, but purely confidential to lord Waldegrave; he declares himself under no engagement with Spain, but strongly insinuates what we may apprehend if we attack Spain. The letters that came from France this week, go further in that stile than ever; and I think it ripens apace.

Cambis is expected here very suddenly, and I think his orders will open the whole scene; for I imagine he will have orders to insist that we shall neither take the Azogues nor flota, or galeons coming home, nor stop the flota that is now preparing to go out, which France, as the cardinal has already said, has so great a share in, that they cannot suffer the wealth and treasure of France to be taken, tho' on board Spanish ships. In short, we live here in daily expectation to hear that the Azogues are either got in or taken; and it seems as if the latter was not thought the least probable. By the intelligence from 101 [Buffy], it is expressly said that Fenelon has orders to propose to the States a joint mediation with France, between us and Spain. Surely they will not immediately accept the office of mediators, to put themselves out of the capacity of allies.

But, as this grand affair seems now to draw to a sudden crisis, forgive me if I think you should not leave your present station, for some weeks at least, untill it is more certainly seen what we are to expect. To leave an embassy, where you have been so long employ'd, a little abruptly, at this critical hour, may not be thought so right; and it may so happen, that you yourself wou'd

wish to be in Holland again, at the time of the final decision of what part the Dutch will act. I do not mean to carry this any further than to the end of this summer, by which time it will be seen what must be expected. This way of reasoning has prevented my saying any thing to the king about Mr. Trevor, for I cannot think you will repent spending August and September where you are. The parliament will certainly meet this year in November, before which time I shou'd be very sorry not to have you here. When the time comes, I will certainly do my utmost to do Mr. Trevor the best service I can.

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This letter is endorsed, in sir Robert Walpole's hand,

"Paper from Spain by Mr. K."

It contains a *good justification of Spain.*

It was probably written to Mr. Keene by one of the Spanish ministers, and sent by him to sir Robert Walpole.

(Sir,) The experience of the evils caused by the war, teaches us to know and desire the advantages of peace. But it is a school where our lessons are dear bought and cruel. And the bare name of *peace* has something in it so sweet and agreeable to human nature, that it is to be fought for and coveted without feeling the miseries of so calamitous an instruction. War being (according to the opinion of all prudent persons) a work of necessity, and not merely of our will, I have never been able to comprehend, to this day, what necessity could drive your brave nation to declare a war, which all impartial people have thought to be far from a necessary one.

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The complaints of both nations were reciprocal. Each of them accused the other of insults. And if the Spaniards had the liberty of making speeches in the presence of their sovereign, they would not want eloquence to prove the justice of their cause. Your merchants, by studied declamations and artful discourses, represent the excesses of our guarda costas to be much greater than they are: but they conceal, dissemble, or diminish the abuses they are guilty of in our commerce. They bawl out against the unjust depredations of the Spaniards: *they feign, I know not what slaveries and cruelties committed upon their sailors, without expressing any circumstances of time, place, and occasion, which are generally lookt upon as necessary means to procure relief and credit to any assertions whatsoever.*

I cannot doubt, from your ingenuous temper, that if we could as freely communicate our thoughts to one another as we have formerly done, you must allow, that what vexes your merchants most is, that the Spaniards will not let

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them have their full liberty to carry on a contraband trade, by which they gain such immense riches. The unruly passion they have for these unjust gains, makes them despise the other advantages, tho' very great ones, which the friendship of the Spanish nation has all along granted to them. Were it not notorious to the world, what is meant by the cry of FREE NAVIGATION, one might believe that the Spaniards were publick violators of the law of nations. In such a manner do your dextrous popular orators in parliament exaggerate these matters. But neither they themselves, nor their auditors, in the warmth of their attempts to get from us all they desire, can possibly be ignorant of such points, in our favour, as they think proper to bury in silence.

But, let that be as it will, when the sovereigns of both crowns were treating with zeal and good faith, in order to adjust the respective differences between their subjects, according to reason and equity, to make satisfaction for their losses; to quell their complaints; to establish their ancient treaties; and to prevent disorders for the future; what necessity was there to abandon an amicable convention, already signed and ratified, to substitute in its place the declaration of a cruel war? How much less destructive and expensive would the preserving the peace have been to your nation? How much more profitable would our friendship have been to you, always of great advantage to your trade, even allowing the vexations you pretend to receive from the Spaniards to have some foundation of truth?

The war we are at present engaged in, according to my poor opinion, is the most proper means imaginable to weaken and distress both the contending parties; whilst the other powers that look on gather the fruit of our dissensions. But I cannot comprehend how your nation, by the method she proposes, can effectually secure the advantages in her trade that she aspires at, and to do herself that justice which she says Spain has refused her. Various are the successes of war, and no one knows the party that the elements themselves may take. Their rage must have the worst effect upon those who are most exposed to their power. The princes, our neighbours, keep themselves in a profitable state of indifference, because our mutual destruction is their interest: but if they see that fortune favours your arms, they will become jealous of you, and be more active in taking proper precautions against your success, than in pitying and preventing our disgraces. They will then turn their thoughts how to quash your pride and oppress your power; and if they shall not be able to reap the fruits of your victories for themselves, they will, at least, endeavour to hinder you from enjoying them.

Spain

Spain is not destitute of means to procure friends and allies; and its inhabitants are so nice of their honour, that they will prodigally, and without the least reserve, contribute their treasures, and even their estates, to revenge themselves, and chastise your haughtiness. Ruinous as this may prove to them, they will think all well employed to see you humbled. England does not want very powerfull rivals and competitors, who will look upon your losses as so much gained to themselves, and as their own losses whatever successes you may have in your present undertakings. Of this sort we shall certainly find some who are well-disposed to enter into operations against you, particularly if we allure them with the same advantages that have encreased your power to the pitch it is.

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At least, in this ill-judged war, can you deny that, over and above the loss you must necessarily sustain from the interruption of your commerce with us, and the difficulties and danger you meet with in carrying on that with other powers, you are obliged to expend immense sums of money which you will not repay yourselves. And even when, by the help of these treasures and the success of your arms, you shall have made many rich prizes and great conquests, you must, at last, make restitution of them; because the other powers will oblige you to it: and you must grant it, either out of love or necessity of a peace, without which your trade itself will turn to your disadvantage; and you had better abandon it than pay so dear for preserving it.

Your houses of parliament, that make such loud complaints against the Spaniards, and impute several crimes to them that never can be proved, why do they forget the just pretensions of Spain, and the promises of his Britannick majesty? Does the usurpation of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, continued for so many years, give less motives of complaint than the pretended losses of your merchants? Are the damages they have suffered greater than those caused by that usurpation? There never can be a solid and durable peace between Spain and England as long as Gibraltar and Port Mahon are under the British dominion; nor can *La Florida* be in any safety as long as the new colony of Georgia is allowed to subsist. Another obstacle to peace is, the *Asiento* treaty, and the annual ship, which is of so universal prejudice to our commerce. But if Gibraltar and Port Mahon were once restored to Spain; the new colony demolished; the *Asiento* treaty annulled; and the huts, built near the Bay of Campeachy, taken away; then, and then only can the important and salutary end of a sincere and lasting peace be procured between the two powers. But as it is just that the benefits and advantages of peace should be reciprocal on

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both sides, Spain might yield to England a free navigation to and from its colonies, under some proper precautions, to prevent an illicit commerce in the Spanish West Indies. Spain likewise might consent, in acknowledgement of the restitution of the above-mentioned places; the demolition of the colony of Georgia; and the annulling the Asiento treaty, to a proportionate equivalent in money, to be paid on the effects of the flotas and galleons, on their arrival in Spain, considered for the term of — years, at the rate of — *per cent.* on all sorts of effects they bring. Spain likewise might yield up to England the right that the Guipuscuan, Biscayners, and other subjects of his catholic majesty have to the cod-fishing at Newfoundland; and, after all, re-establish again the convention at the Pardo; and shew all possible condescensions to the demands of the English; making, for this end, a clear and specifick treaty of peace, and another treaty of commerce.

If your prince, in virtue of his royal word, and in attention to our notorious justice, would think seriously upon the restitution of those places, and on the rest of the foregoing articles, I am certain that he would find the Spanish ministry in the best disposition imaginable to treat and conclude an accommodation so much to the advantage of your trade, that you should want nothing that you could reasonably ask for. And, for procuring this great and good end, there is no occasion for mediators and guarantees; the good faith and mutual equity of the parties concerned would be sufficient of themselves. I thought proper to insinuate this my idea to you, as conducive to the tranquillity of mankind, and agreeable to the prosperity of two nations, who suffer as much by their dissension, as they gain by a mutuall good understanding. Peace would soon repair our losses, and turn the expectations of our rivals into scoff and ridicule.

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Cannot prevail on the king to appoint Mr. Trevor plenipotentiary.—Embarrassments on that occasion.—Arrival of the Azogues.

MY DEAR BROTHER,

Chelsea, August 21, 1739.

Walpole
Papers.

I scarce know what to add upon the subject of Mr. Trevor; for I am very sure all that can be said to the king, at present, will signify nothing; for I have truly said and represented every thing that has been suggested to me, or cou'd occur to me, in the best and strongest manner I am able; but all to no purpose. But I find, by a long conversation this day with Mr. Trevor, and the great pains he took to convince me of the reasonableness of his demand, that

that he supposes there is something still wanting, on my part, that might make this matter succeed; which, I give my word, is in no degree the case. This brings it to a short point, for Mr. Trevor to determine what he will do; and upon this I have told him my opinion but too plainly: but now I think you become a little concerned in the immediate decision of this question; for I am afraid every body will be of opinion it is impossible for you to leave the Hague before somebody or other is there to relieve you; at this juncture, it can be nobody but Mr. Trevor that can do the business. But this consideration will, just now, have no other effect upon the king, but to make him very angry with Mr. Trevor, and order us to think immediately upon somebody else; and the result of the whole will finally, with the king, fall upon you; which I think Mr. Trevor should not bring upon you. Dear Horace, consider it well; for if Mr. Trevor is resolv'd to make his stay never so short, it seems to me he has no option, just now, but to comply with the king's terms, and leave his future fate to a more favourable season. And until this point is settled, any orders about the yacht will too much disturb us at Kensington, and may occasion something disagreeable.

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We had before heard of the refusal of the trinkets in Denmark, by a manner you know of, but represented in a very different light, as if rejected with some scorn and resentment. Mr. Titley will do well to return them by some favourable opportunity, but lord Baltimore seems a very improper hand, and will afford matter of much ridicule, if explained in St. James's square.

You will have heard of the arrival of the Azogues at St. Andero; there is reason to believe that there are two ships still at sea, with a pink from Buenoes Ayres, and a very rich ship from Vera Cruz; notice is sent to our cruisers of this intelligence, but we have heard nothing from any of them since they were upon their stations. Lord Harrington will send you an account of a very sad transaction of the king of Sweden. What is to be done? Is the king of Prussia to be spoke to? If it is adviseable, who can be sent, or who would care to go?

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

King refuses to appoint Mr. Trevor plenipotentiary.

DEAR BROTHER,

London, August 28, 1739.

Walpole
Papers.

I Have forgot whether I acquainted you before, that I had endeavoured to prevail with the king to make Mr. Trevor envoy and plenipotentiary upon your return, and that his majesty had refused the latter in a pretty peremptory way. However, at your instance, I yesterday renewed the attack, and in the strongest and

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and best manner I was able, laboured to convince the king of the reasonableness and necessity of its being done; but was so far from succeeding that he rejected it in a manner not to be express'd. I told him, Mr. Trevor had declared he cou'd not possibly go without it; but that availed nothing: so that you must lay aside all thoughts of the plenipo, and upon that foot Mr. Trevor must determine for himself.

I this day hinted to Mr. Trevor my thoughts that he had better consider of it, and if he might be appointed envoy, which is agreed to, he should take the advice of his friends, whether it was not better to conform at present to the king's sentiments, upon hopes of a more favourable opportunity, than to throw himself at once out of all business, which he might live to repent. But I am afraid my advice had no other effect upon him than to make him suspect my friendship. He talks of waiting for some provision at home, not dreaming of the number of competitors for every thing that he will think worthy of him. I have no more to say, but that I have most sincerely done my utmost to serve him, and he must now determine for himself.

I send you a letter I received from the lord chancellor, the latter part only relates to you; it was occasion'd by a discourse of your coming home. You will see his sense, and it is indeed the sense of every body here. I know your wishes and desires, and will endeavour to gratify them; but for some short time, I think, you must have patience. We think and talk of nothing but the Azogues: a few days must clear that point, and then we must look forward.

LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

(Enclosed in the preceding letter.)

Dissuades the return of Horace Walpole from the Hague.

Walpole
 Papers.
 Extract.

(Powis House, August 10, 1739.) Permit me to say one word upon the subject of Mr. Walpole's quitting his employment of ambassador to the States General at this juncture. It has run much in my head ever since Tuesday; and tho' I should be extremely unwilling to object to any thing that he may be desirous of, I cannot help thinking that it will have a very odd appearance, and furnish very disagreeable constructions in our present situation. It is possible that little is to be expected from the Dutch: notwithstanding that, it may be necessary to preserve the show and outside of a good harmony, and to avoid the giving colour to say that their coming into us at any time is totally despair'd of. When king William was upon the point of entering into the war against France,

the first thing he did was to send over a minister of the first rank and consequence to Holland, I mean my lord Marlborough; but if what is now talk'd of should be done; it will be acting the reverse of that part: and that at a time when, if France intends to declare herself, that country will probably be the scene of her greatest skill and dexterity. I ask pardon for saying so much upon a subject, of which I am far from being master of all the circumstances; but I trust you will excuse my opening my thoughts to you, and at the same time believe that I am, with the greatest truth and respect, &c.

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HORACE WALPOLE TO SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

*Regrets Trevor's disappointment.—Is unwilling to continue any longer at the Hague.
—Laments the influence of Hanoverian measures.—Affairs of East Friesland.*

DEAR BROTHER,

Hague, September 1, 1739.

YOUR last letter gave me much uneasiness for more reasons than one. The disappointment of my friend Trevor affects me greatly, not only on account of my affection for him, who has many good and rare qualities, but for the sake of the publick. The situation and conduct of the States is of that consequence to England, and to the balance of power in Europe, that this place cannot be without an able and agreeable minister from England. Can we find out, you'll say, nobody fit for such an employment but one man? I really think not, unless you are resolv'd (censure the vanity of my saying it) to keep me here always. I must own I am made to believe by some, that my continuance here is much desired, and that the apprehensions of my departure is extremely dreaded. That is a good sign in those who are well inclined; but whether that will have any great effect to make these people act to any purpose, I can't tell.

Orford
Papers.

I am extremely obliged to lord chancellor for his compliment, in comparing my continuance here to the mission of lord Marlborough upon the breaking out of the last war. But the case and circumstances are by no means the same. King William, perceiving that he could not live long himselfe, sent his lordship into Holland both as ambassador and captain-general of the British forces, that he might make it the interest of the person who would certainly have the credit and power in queen Ann's court to pursue the war that was necessary for preserving the liberties of Europe. King William had no other object but the liberties and balance of Europe; but, good God! what is the case now? I will tell you in confidence; little, low, partial, electoral notions are able to stop or confound the best conducted project for the publick.

I plainly

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I plainly see that all Europe will soon be in a general combustion, and that France must be absolutely master, unless some plan of united measures be formed to prevent it; and I see as plainly that if any advantage be proposed for any prince or power, whose assistance may be necessary for the common cause, we shall never agree to it, without some advantage is to be given to us as elector. We have jealousies of one power, aversions to another prince, contempt for this or that state; we have pretensions or desires of our own, that must either be made ingredients in any scheme for the publick good, or that scheme must not goe on. I cannot at present foretell in what instances this will be the case; but experience has shewn that this has been the case, and that we must always expect it.

I cannot justify the emperor's giving into the war against the Turks; but his engagements with Russia, and the danger of driving that power into the interest of France, made it, I am assured, necessary; which certainly was a consideration of a publick nature. His Imperial majesty obtained the consent of all the princes of the empire to give their contingent; but one considerable elector having refused to give his, others of that rank followed his example, and the princes that had even agreed to give their contingent to carry on the war, refused on that account to pay it. The emperor is now quite undone; he has neither men nor money, and perhaps the sums he proposed to gett from the empire might have saved him: and I dare say, if he is forced to make another campagne, we shall be as backward in giving our contingent, unless something be done for us in favour of our pretensions to Ostfrize, which will be impracticable; and which, if it could be done, would disoblige the king of Prussia, the king of Denmark, and the States Generall; all powers necessary for preserving the libertys of Europe, tho' the first is, I am afraid, lost.

The States Generall look upon the town of Embden, in Ostfrize, as the only barrier they have on that side for the security of three provinces. They have, and have had 100 years for that purpose, a garrison in that town, by the consent of the people, but on condition of being protected by the States in their privileges against the encroachments of their prince; and England ought, as well by interest as by obligation, to support the States in this affair. The emperor has of late years supported the prince against the people, to vex the States; but ever since the last treaty of Vienna, he has, by a formal declaration, promised to put an end to the differences there. In order to doe that, this matter has been committed to the cognisance of the elector of Hanover. His sub-delegates have been appointed, and have lived in the country a long while at the

the charge of the people, without doing any thing but in concert with the Imperial court to favour the pretensions of the prince of Ostfrize, in opposition to the people, which is understood to be done here with a view that the prince of Ostfrize may favour the pretensions of the elector of Hanover to the succession; which the States are extremely jealous of, and are at this time extremely uneasy at this conduct.

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If we could have consented that the king of Prussia might have had some part in the succession of Berg and Juliers, that affair might have been put in an amicable way of negociation; but the notion that no prince should have any thing unless we should gett something too, destroyed all schemes that might have accommodated that troublesome dispute; and now France has certainly found means to gain the court of Prussia by some engagements in that respect, and will keep him in case of a war.

If France shall come to quarrel with the maritime powers, by threatening one or the other first, in which case we must each make it a common cause, and consider of measures and troops to be provided; I am persuaded that some motive in the advantage of the Hanover troops will interfere, and certainly delay, if not disappoint, the reasonable measures and plans that may be upon the tapis for the public good; and therefore, altho' I think we are undone if we shew the least want of spirit and vigour at this juncture, here or in France, yet unless some means can be found out to prevent our little electorate views from interfering with the common cause, I cannot see what good I can doe here. I shall be push'd by certain questions and propositions, which I shall not be able to answer; and which, if remarkable, and represented by me in my dispatches, will have noe other effect than that of increasing displeasure in England. In the mean time nobody has credit or courage enough to speak plainly upon these heads in their respective departments; and if you venture to doe it sometimes, 'tis in a cursory manner. You receive a short answer; domestick affairs employ your time and your thoughts; and the foreign mischief continues.

This is too notoriously the case; and I am afraid will even be so much the case, that I see no remedy for it. In the mean time, those that serve abroad have noe comfort; they are liked and disliked, not according to their fidelity and diligence, but by humour and fancy; and were I not your brother, you would soon hear, nay perhaps you doe hear, of me, with my friend Trevor, in the list of those who are of noe consequence, but to receive their pay which is grudged them. And therefore I must freely own to you, that dangers and difficultys from abroad doe not discourage me; but the not seeing the least likelihood of

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right measures being pursued at home to obviate or withstand them, although such measures might be found out, that is what disheartens me. And to speak plainly at once, I have been often upon the point of taking a resolution not only to retire from hence, but from all publick employment and business: there is but one reason in the world that has prevented me from doing it, which perhaps you would not believe if I told it you.

While I am employed, I will serve with the utmost diligence; but I see nothing but disgrace and disappointments: and as the world ever judges by events, and not from conduct, I am sensible of what I am to apprehend from my continuance here. However, I should be glad to know how long this servitude is to endure, that I may take my measures accordingly.

P. S. I send in my dispatch of this day a printed paper here in French given about by the Spanish ambassadour to the regents, pretending to prove that we first violated the convention in severall particulars. The original came from our friend Geraldino, and I am perswaded was framed by him.

Extracts of Letters from ROBERT TREVOR to HORACE WALPOLE.

States the objections of the king to appoint him envoy and plenipotentiary.—The ineffectual attempts of sir Robert Walpole to conquer the king's inflexibility.—His own resolution to decline the office of envoy, and final compliance at the exhortation of Horace Walpole.

Walpole
Papers.

(London, July 3—14th, 1739.) Sir Robert has just now touched to me, and that of his own account, upon my own affairs; and I was a good deal struck to hear him say, our royal master had boggled a little at the terms which he had proposed in my favour; but, as he at the same time assured me he would do his utmost to gett this rub over, I am not yet much alarmed at it, especially as I dare swear your excellency's powerful intercession in my behalf will not be wanting. What I have most at heart is, that the point may never be brought to a formal contest; as in that instance I must prove either the victim of my own modesty in acquiescing, or of my own firmness in declining: a dilemma which, I pray God, may never happen to me or any other of your excellency's friends and humble servants, and whose back is so little able to bear it as mine.

(August 10th—21st, 1739.) What lord Harrington and Mr. Weston have told me since I wrote last convinces me, that either I must have mistaken your brother, or that he must have mistaken you upon the article of your return; and

and indeed sir Robert himself told me yesterday at his levee, that you had renewed your instances on that head; and he should therefore move the king, as this day, upon my affair, and would exert his utmost credit towards getting it settled to my satisfaction; adding, however, at the same time, that he scarce expected to succeed therein; and said a good deal to induce me to take up with the five pounds a-day, which, I must confess, rather frightened me, than persuaded me. I am just now setting out to the duke of Marlborough's for a day or two, and upon my return I shall know my destiny; and should it, as I too much expect, prove to be a hard one, I must conjure your excellency betimes to think of continuing me in your service and under your protection here, upon your return; and in this case I shall not think of returning at all to the Hague, a gold medal being scarce worth crossing the seas twice for. However, I will still flatter myself that your excellency's friendship will screen me from this mortification and disappointment; and that the object which has been held out to me for so many years will at last be put into my possession. The enjoyment of it indeed cannot add to, neither shall the miscarriage diminish from that cordial attachment and devotion with which I profess myself, &c.

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(London, August 14—25th, 1739.) The strain of my late letters will have prepared your excellency for the contents of this. Sir Robert, upon your last instances, took occasion to move our royal master yesterday morning upon my subject; and used, I do not question, all possible topicks to represent my case to his majesty in the most favourable and advantageous light; but, alas! my disgraceful planet and personal insignificance turned the scale against me, and his majesty was pleased to value my services, or rather his own character, at the Hague at five pounds a-day, and *no more*. Your excellency, who is no stranger to the several dreams I have been encouraged to keep up my spirits and flatter my imagination with, during many years of a most zealous and faithful, and, if not very important, not very chargeable, service, cannot but pity me, to be at last ordered to make brick without straw.

Had I indeed a fortune of my own, out of which I could make up the difference, I would sacrifice it, sooner than let the world see how cheap our royal master holds my past and future endeavours to serve him. But for want of that, I have no resource left, but to conjure your excellency to continue me your friendship and protection, until an opportunity may offer for putting me into some situation at home of serving his majesty, without creating him any extraordinary expence.

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When your brother this morning signified to me this mortifying result of his conference, I was forced to tell him that it was impossible for me to accept of the conditions offered; as I knew it to be, by my own experience, a loosing bargain: that the king's will must be done; and that I hoped at least my present condition would not be altered till it could be bettered. To all which he gave indeed the strongest assurances of his personal good-will; but, I must add with the greatest anguish, gave me as little hopes of my ever finding myself tolerably easy and accommodated at home, as his majesty's present pleasure does of my doing so abroad. Upon the whole, your excellency sees I have nothing left but the intercession of friends and relations, accompanied by a modest deprecation and a firmness on my part, which I hope my conscience as well as my humour will bear me up in, towards getting over this unexpected, and I may say undeserved, rub in life. Till it is got over, your excellency is too equitable, and too much my friend, to expect me to putt myself to the charge and fatigues of twice crossing the seas only to make a ridiculous figure at the Hague for a few weeks, and then return to my nothingness. In which condition I shall have this singularity to boast, that I shall be the only man in England who, after six years attachment to your excellency, finds himself in worse circumstances than when he devoted himself to you. Your excellency's personal friendship and confidence will indeed, if continued to me, in great measure console me under this misfortune, and invariably preserve me in those sentiments of duty and gratitude, with which I profess myself, &c.

P. S. (*Most private.*) *Entre nous*, I do not think your excellency's return to England so near as you seem to wish it. Some *privy councillors* oppose it strongly; and your brother even seems to second their notions. I am glad he does not think that he wants you here himself; and since he, as it were, countersigns *their opinion*, I shall stifle a certain consideration, which my indelible fidelity to your excellency, and some transient observations of my poor visionary brain, would otherwise have induced me to throw out to your excellency in that absolute confidence wherein you have often treated me, and I never yet belyed. Pray burn this leaf, whether you understand it or not. Adieu.

(London, August 20th—31st, 1739.) I am just honoured with your excellency's favour of the 28th instant N. S. and hope from it that the cordiality of your representations in my behalf will at last furnish sir Robert with arguments sufficient to convince his majesty how necessary as well as reasonable the footing was, upon which he had proposed to have me established at the Hague
upon

upon your taking leave of that station. Hitherto indeed that unlucky affair stands as when I troubled your excellency last; I not thinking it time to recede from my pretensions, nor your brother to mention them to the king. Your excellency's departure, whenever it draws very near, will naturally bring matters to their crisis. In the mean time I have the satisfaction of finding all my friends and relations think not only my expectations, but my present demurrer highly reasonable. Your excellency, and all to whom I am known, will, I dare say, acquitt me of any view of personal lucre in the terms I insist upon; and I appeal to your excellency, who is so well versed in foreign residences, and in that of the Hague in particular, what services or credit I could do my master there; labouring, as I must do, not only under narrow and dirty circumstances, but under the mortifying flurr of being valued by him at a cheaper rate than any envoy that the crown of Great Britain has had in Holland for these forty years last past; and that at a time when *some other courts* affect to make compliments to the States, by conferring favours and honours upon the ministers they have residing with them. But all this is too much upon so trivial a to-pick as myself.

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The escape of the Afogues does not seem to mend our tempers at home, tho' upon the whole I do not know whether we ought to be sorry at it, or not. Our insurers put 30 *per cent.* into their pocketts, instead of losing 70; and the old cardinal will be less teased and animated by his countrymen to make a common cause with Spain, at least for the present. *Interea fiat aliquid.*

(August 21st.) Your brother had a long conversation with me this morning after his levée; the conclusion of which was, my persevering to hope that our royal master may, upon reflection, and proper representations of the nature of things, and of his service at the Hague, be induced to let things go on there upon the precedented foot; whilst sir Robert seemed to despair of his relenting; but without being able to convince me of an event so destructive of all my views and hopes. If, indeed, his majesty can be served as reputably, and yet cheaper, by another, I must submit; but there is a possibility of one contingency, against which I fear my philosophy will not be proof; which is, to see, after I may be laid aside on account of this damned difference between five and eight, some other happier mortal gratified with the whole, and usual pay. But I find I relapse into the impertinence I would have corrected in the beginning of this letter; so adieu.

I hope

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I hope your excellency will receive an agreeable answer about the yacht you desire; for between you and me, I cannot but most humbly think, notwithstanding all the opinions you may have received on the other side of the question, that the cockpit is just at present a stage more worthy your excellency's presence, than the *chambre de Tréve*.

(London, August 28th—September 8, 1739.) I will now presume to tell you, in that personal confidence which, I flatter myself, is established betwixt us, that the opinion of the chancellor's and the duke of Newcastle's having not only a set of ideas, but of friends too, distinct from those of your excellency and your brother, is so prevalent here, even amongst sensible and unbiassed men, that when I heard the officious dehortation of your return, and the insinuation of the necessity of an ambassador's presence at the Hague, was started and urged from the *other side of Holborn*, I confess my first thought was, that the true key to it was their desire of your absence from hence, and a view to leave your excellency to do your worst with the Dutch, as we have left Vernon to do with the Spaniards. But when I found your brother relished and adopted this piece of advice, I thought it high time for me to wean myself from those chimerical prejudices, and to leave your excellency to his directions, and your own more intimate knowledge of things and men; nor should I at present have trespassed upon your time with this explanation, were it not to convince your excellency how absolutely you may command me to speak, as as well as to be silent.

I shall now proceed to answer the other parts of your excellency's letter, that relate to my own affair; and that, by telling you, I hope things were at their worst when I wrote my last, and that they at present rather bear a better face than otherwise. Your brother has since honoured me with some farther discourse upon it; which might indeed have been spared, as I, from my heart, believe both of us were before perfectly convinced of what the other laboured to persuade him; namely, the equity and expediency of my demands, on one hand, and the cordiality and seriousness with which your brother has recommended them, on the other. The conclusion of the whole has been, and is still, that I shall decline giving a categorical *oui* or *non*, untill the affair be brought nearer an extremity than it seems to be at present; and sir Robert has not only let me hope, that he will, upon any favourable occasion, resume the point with the king, but also recommend it to lord Harrington to lay hold
 of

of any handle he may meet with, to represent the meritts of the case to his majesty. Should these last attempts prove ineffectual, I must indeed come to an option between that terrible dilemma of sacrificing my present fortune to my future hopes, or my future hopes to my present fortune, small as it is; and should I have courage enough to pursue my own inclinations, and declare for the latter; I hope, my education, services, principles, attachment to your excellency, and a seat in parliament, which the duke of Marlborough has been so kind as to offer me, may enable me to keep my ground in the eye of the world; if not procure me better terms on English ground, than I am like to obtain on foreign.

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The only thing that staggers me in this way of reasoning is, that I gather from some of your excellency's correspondents here, that you seem rather inclined to have me take the other resolution, and by temporising and submitting, hope for better things. Your excellency may depend, that your advice will, if possible, outweigh all other considerations, whether dictated to me by humour, passion, or interest; but I am somewhat sorry you could imagine, it would work more effectually upon me, if conveyed thro' the canal of Mr. Weston, lord Harrington, duke of Marlborough, or any friend living, than through your own; if you do, you do yourself, as well as me, a great piece of injustice. As this whole unlucky affair must very speedily be brought to an issue, I shall beg leave to suspend, a post or two longer, returning any answer to your excellency's kind invitation to the Hague; and shall conclude this with presenting you your worthy friend sir Richard Ellys's compliments; than whom, I can assure you, no body here seems more struck with my present situation, nor preaches up to me a more resolute behaviour under it.

As I was going to subscribe this, I am honoured with your excellency's subsequent favour of the 4th *proximi*, with the fresh proof of your goodness and confidence; which I now return you inclosed. The way of thinking against which you would guard me, I protest, I am altogether free from; and do from my heart believe, sir Robert has recommended and backed my affair as cordially and as strenuously, as he can be expected to do any point in which the *summa rerum* is not directly and essentially concerned. I have assured him himself of this, in the most solemn manner, as often as ever he has seemed to suppose my suspecting his sincerity and zeal in my behalf; and I may appeal to every friend and relation to whom I have been forced to recount my doleful story, that I have constantly cautioned them against entertaining the least surmise of my cause not having been heartily pleaded.

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As to his majesty's personal opinion of me and my services, I must submit to it, however mortifying it may be; and shall only say, I had rather incur his reproaches on that score than my own; but I do not know why I call it mortifying, since your excellency is pleased to rank yourself in the same predicament. I pray to God, that our zeal in his service may ever be as little wanted, as you seem to think it is relished by him.

Your brother has, I believe, another affair upon his hands, in which he takes no great glee. Upon Gore's death, he recommended the duke of Marlborough to the king for successor to that regiment; and the thing was as generally presumed upon, as my establishment at the Hague; but hitherto clouds and darkness hang upon it. Either the king has been drawn into some promise of that favour to some other officer, unknown to your brother, or else two great men are to be gratified at once out of this vacancy, if the thing be possible: I mean lord Harford and the duke.

P. S. Would your excellency care to throw together such topicks in favour of my proposed establishment at the Hague, as your own experience in foreign service, and knowledge of the last-named station in particular, may suggest to you, in an ostensible letter to your brother or lord Harrington, for them to make use of, if a favourable moment offered with our master?

(London, September, 1739.) I did not trouble your excellency by the Thursday's post, having been down at lord Albemarle's on a party with the duke of Marlborough: since my return, I find myself honoured with your's of the 11th instant N. S. which, I hope, I cannot more satisfactorily answer than by acquainting you that I am just returned from making your brother a visit at Chelsea, wherein I told him, that if *he* found it inconvenient that I should peremptorily insist upon my point with the king, I would submit to any thing. Upon which he was pleased to reply, "That it was handsomely and wisely said;" and gave me hopes, he would nevertheless do his utmost to serve me, and make his last attempt to-day or to-morrow; so that a few days must now determine the matter. In the mean time I shall set about such preparations as must be necessary even upon the foot of the worst issue; and pursuant to the rule I have laid down to myself, and pursued for some years past, use my utmost endeavours to consult and forward your excellency's conveniency and desires.

Hitherto I have not heard it considered, whether I am to be named and receive my credentials, instructions, and appointments, (such as they are like to be,) before I set out or not. It would indeed be some convenience and advantage

tage to me to do so; and I shall just propose it; but at present my spirits are too low to allow me to expect any success. The step I made this morning at Chelsea, will, I hope, leave your excellency no doubt of my being perfectly convinced, that if any person can persuade the king, it must be your brother; and that if he can, he will. Should the undertaking exceed even his credit, I must and am content to play *forcé*; but must caution your excellency, and all my wellwishers, from wishing me joy of such a graceless, tasteless, and ruinous piece of preferment, as is like to fall to my share.

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1739.

(London, September 11—22, 1739.) I expected to have been able to have acquainted you by this post not only with my fate being finally decided, but with my having fixt a day for my journey; but, besides the incident of your brother's indisposition, who has had a slight return of his last fever, a *mésentendu* has happened between him and me, which must be cleared up before I can sett forward. The declaration I made him last Friday, of my having brought myself to the resolution of submitting, in case he should find it finally inconvenient for me to insist peremptorily upon my present terms; and which declaration your excellency will have seen, by what I wrote you last post, was relative to his renewing his efforts, and making one more attempt upon his majesty's goodness, has been unhappily understood by your brother, as a positive, pure, and unconditional acquiescence, on my part, in the terms his majesty has already offered me; and accordingly sir Robert has told lord Harrington, to whom I have indeed since explained this affair, that he need give himself no farther trouble about my business, as I had agreed to go upon the foot of 5*l. per diem*. I was over this morning at Chelsea to rectify your brother in the construction he has put upon my declaration; and as his illness would not allow me the honour of an audience, I shall renew my attendance every day till he shall be better.

In the mean time I depend upon your excellency's seconding me in my two present demands. The first, that a farther and ultimate *tentative* may be made in my favour; and 2dly, upon a repeated and final repulse, that I may at least be *forthwith* named envoy; and receive my instructions, credentials, and appointments, before I leave England, and not be sent away *comme j'y suis venu*.

P. S. I have opened this letter to add, that I am this minute informed, that this morning lord Harrington took occasion, from your demand of a yacht, and, I believe, with your brother's privity and approbation, to move my affair

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once more to the king; and was seconded by the duke of Newcastle, who happened to be present; but his majesty persisted in his inexorability; but came, however, into my being immediately named, and commissioned; and the instruments are now beginning to be prepared; so that I hope to be able to sett forward by the end of this month, tho' with a most heavy heart.

(London, September 17—28, 1739.) I was prevented by company and business from acquainting your excellency by last post that I had kissed the king's hand the day before, upon my nomination to the Hague; and I may now tell you that I propose having that honour again next Sunday, or the Thursday following, upon my taking my leave; and I shall certainly embark with the Tuesday's or Friday's mail, which will be as soon or sooner than I shall get my *viaticum* out of the exchequer; tho' sir Robert has indeed, in the kindest and handsomest manner, been pleased to direct the utmost expedition, and even to have me gratified with the immediate payment of all my arrears due to me as secretary; of which, and many other marks of his friendship, I do and shall retain a most lively memory. As I flatter myself with the prospect of so soon kissing your hands at the Hague, I forbear troubling you with any intelligence or speculations about the present disjointed times.

HORACE WALPOLE TO LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.

Censures the manner in which the declaration of war against Spain is drawn up.—

Complains that the duke of Newcastle did not pay sufficient attention to the remarks of sir Robert Walpole.

MY LORD,

Cockpit, October 14, 1739.

Hardwicke
Papers.

HAVING, since I had the honour of seeing your lordship, perus'd the draught of a declaration of war against Spain, which the duke of Newcastle had been pleas'd to send me for that purpose, I must own to you, very freely, that I wish it had been digested in another method. For, altho' the omission at first of the most material stipulation in the convention is, in a great measure, by the insertion of some words, supply'd, but not so fully as I could wish, yett there are, with humble submission to better judgment, in my poor opinion, some things in the sequell of the draught not proper for a declaration of war to be made in the king's name; and other things largely expatiated upon, which, if proper, ought to have preceded the nomination of the convention, and which are lyable, in the place they now stand, to disagreeable inferences with respect to the convention, and to our proceedings in parliament last year.

year. I will, if I can, explain myself so as to be understood, altho' it may be somewhat difficult, unless your lordship has a draught of the declaration before you.

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After having mentioned the violation of the convention on the part of Spain, and that at least that court has colour'd that violation with pretences voyd of foundation, and has published orders for the seizing ships, effects, &c. contrary to the exprefs stipulations of treatys, even in case of a war actually declar'd, which so far seems to be very well; there follows then, in the said draught, a paragraph beginning with, *whereas the evils above mentioned have been principally occasioned by an unwarrantable claim that the guarda costas may stop, &c.* a ratiocination to shew that such a claim is contrary to the treatys, and particularly to that of 1670, &c. Now altho' this is very true, yet methinks it is not agreeable to the dignity of the crown to enter, by a declaration of war, into an expostulation and proofs, by reasoning that the conduct of Spain and the pretensions upon which it is founded is unjustifiable. 'Tis sufficient for the king to state the facts, and to assert those facts are colour'd with frivolous and groundless pretensions; for the nature of them speaks plainly the injustice of them, and the prejudice to the commerce of England.

2dly. After discantation upon the unjustifiableness of the pretences of Spain to stop them, &c. the draught proceeds to take notice of several other infractions relating to our commerce in Old Spain, contrary to the treaty of 1667, which are indeed very true. But surely, my lord, the violations committed contrary to the treaty of 1670, as well as those contrary to the treaty of 1667, if they are to be mentioned, should have been mentioned (in order to make the proceeding of the administration, both with respect to the convention itselfe, and to the defence of it in parliament, and what they are to doe in consequence of those proceedings, now consistent with one another and of a piece; I say, those things should, in my poor opinion, have been mentioned) in the draught antecedently to what is said there of the convention as the grievances complained off, and that those causes of complaint are to be remov'd, is actually stipulated in the convention; and all infractions contrary to treatys, and, among the rest, those of 1667 and 1670, are, by the convention, to be redress'd.

Therefore, whatever is to be mentioned as done contrary to those treatys, and which were to be remov'd or prevented for the future by the exprefs orders of the convention, should have been stated in the first place, and the

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violation of that convention should have followed, to show that Spain would not execute what had been thereby stipulated, nor redress, in consequence, the notorious grievances complain'd of on our part, altho' she had solemnly agreed to do it. For indeed, my lord, all the ratiocinations about the groundless pretensions of Spain to stop, seize, &c. (which I really think improper to be mentioned by the king in his declaration of war, but in general terms only), as well as the infractions relating to commerce, contrary to the treaty of 1667, are stated in the draught as independent of the convention, and in a manner as if that treaty had taken no care at all of them; and, thus stated, are made such strong provocations that the reader will be immediately led to think and say, why were not these injuries reveng'd sooner? and for this reason, because the true causes of our not having enter'd into a war sooner on account of the political situation of Europe, are not, and indeed cannot, in an act of this nature, be stated at the same time. But had our grievances from unjust depredations committed by the Spaniards, by their seizing, stopping, searching of ships, &c. contrary to treaties, and on groundless pretences been plac'd in the front of the declaration; and the violation of the convention, calculated not only to procure satisfaction for past damages, but to prevent the like injuries for the future, immediately follow'd, his majesty's reasons for declaring war against Spain would have appear'd in as strong a light, with this difference only, that the administration would have continued to act conformably to themselves; their proceedings in council and in parliament would have had an immediate and natural connection in the whole series of the affair from the beginning to the end.

Whereas, my lord, without being partial to my brother, (who, I can assure you, knows nothing of this letter or observations,) and without giving into his strong inferences about his grace's unkind intentions in forming the draught in this manner, I can't forbear saying, that I was struck, extremely struck, with the perusal of it, as what seem'd to favour and support the notions of some favourite lords to his grace, that are in opposition, rather than to justify the advice and proceedings of those with whom he is tyed in the ministry, and with whom he has concurr'd in the council and management of affairs. But what is still worse, I am told this draught has been approv'd in council; however, as it is not actually and finally settled, nor sent, I suppose, to the press, I think, by the addition of some words in the beginning, and by the transposing of some paragraphs, it may be, as to the substance, the same; and

indeed,

indeed, with respect to the very expressions, by altering only the method, which is no reall deviation, and will not be remember'd or observ'd by others.

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My lord, this letter is grown into a greater length and trouble to your lordship than I intended, which I hope you will pardon as proceeding, I am sure, from an honest intention, tho' perhaps from a very weak judgment, and because I have often had experience of your lordship's goodness and indulgence to him who is, &c.

LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Condemns sir Robert Walpole for not going to war before, and considers him as the cause of national ruin and national dishonour.

November the first, 1739.

GERALDINO having no more a share in dispatching the couriers between London and Calais, I conclude Du Nocquet will be able to convey my letters safely by them, or by the sloops, and that I may venture to write the more freely, as well as more frequently, to you, my dear friend. You heard from me some time ago, and you have doubtless the letter I writ, and the papers I sent to that valuable, or rather invaluable, young man Polwarth. A great deal of what is there contained will be out of date, if it be true that your resolution is taken of returning to the house, as I hear from my neighbourhood that it is. Concerning this resolution I presume not to decide; all I can say is, that the tranquillity of the summer prepared me to expect it. I see some concomitant resolutions that may have been taken att the same time, which, if they go together, and are executed alike, may support the honour of the secession, and promote a crisis, necessary, in my opinion, and that I believe of every thinking man, to save your country from ruine of every kind, from absolute beggary *, and the most abject servitude.

Egremont
Papers.

There are other things contained in those papers which will not be out of date, even if this resolution be taken. You must mate the insolence, and stop, att least, if you cannot punish, the treachery of Walpole. I scruple not to use the word treachery, for he is a changeling, if he is not a traytor to Britain. If you cannot do one of these, you are undone. I do not mean as a party; that consideration is too low for such conjuncture, but as a nation. I do not see

* Strange contradiction! He accuses Walpole of having brought the nation to *absolute beggary*, and yet he abuses him for his opposition to a war which increased more than tenfold the national debt.

your

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your state so near as you do, but have the mortification to hear every man I see express contempt for a country they have been used to respect and even to fear. I have been asked, many times within this month, how it came to pass that we suffered ourselves to be insulted and pirated upon so many years together by the Spaniards; and to be bantered all the while by the trifling clauses in treatys, made by ministers who did not dare at that time to make a single reprisal? We took the Fleuron; France immediately made reprisals very justly, and has brought our court to redeem their folly with their money; for this capture costs you, I believe, 5000 l. France and you are not at war for this. France has disputes frequently with Spain, particularly about territory and encroachments in the island of St. Domingo. Has France born the least insult, the least invasion, the least menace from the Spaniards, without opposition or reprisal? Not one; and yet the amity between the two crowns subsists so well that your ministers seem afraid of it. From these instances, and others, men argue, unanswerably, that how little soever Walpole may think it for his interest to engage in a war, he might have reconciled, some years ago, his interest and that of his country, if he had not been resolved not only to postpone the latter to the former, but to give it up.

I have been asked, what is meant by the great armaments made in Britain, which they say are absurd, whether the ministers mean a war or not? a war with Spain, that is. For if the meaning be to give the law to the people of Great Britain, not to the Spaniards, augmentations of land forces are necessary to do it effectually, and the éclat of a great fleet to cover the design. In short, I should afflict and tire you if I repeated the twentieth part of what I have heard on this subject. I will conclude, therefore, this head by telling you what I take to be a great truth, that there is not a man of sense who does not think you betrayed by a minister who is, on what motives he best knows, in a concert with your adverse party, and who does not rather despise than pity you for bearing it.

Your parliament being to meet in about three weeks, I conclude this letter will find you returned to London, where I wish you health and success: half this wish will be enough for me; my private affairs are as much broken as they can be, and I neither take nor will take any share in publick affairs. What have I then to do with success? but I have still something to do with health, and even of that I have been often deprived of late. Almost all the warm sentiments of the heart are dead in me except that of friendship; and if I take any concern for what passes in the world, it is on the account of my friends,
 whom

whom I think friends to their country, and not on my own. Adieu, dear Wyndham, I embrace you and your's with a heart that will be devoted to you as long as it beats.

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LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Speaks of the return of the seceders to parliament, without giving his opinion.—

Condemns Walpole.—Ridicules the danger from the pretender and the jacobites.—

Justifies himself from a suspicion of holding a treasonable correspondence.

(November the 18th, 1739.) Your's of the 23d of September O. S. is come safe to my hands. The common stile and matter of epistolary correspondence would want an apology indeed, if it was employed between you and me: our confidence in each other's friendship needs none of what the French call *petits devoirs* to support it; and I would no more write to you about trifles, than I would write seriously to a coquette or a petit maître. I felt much concern in reading your letter; if the spirit of the gentlemen is subdued, and they are grown indifferent about the preservation of the British constitution, *conclamatum est*. A people cannot be saved against their will; and Walpole, or your kinsman, may use them like the slaves they are, and deserve to be. It gives me some pleasure, amidst all my real grief, to think that the man of that country whom I love the best has done his utmost to save it. This gives me pleasure; and believe me, dear sir William, it will give you a pleasure to your latest hour, which they who conspire to ruine their country never knew. I see a glimpse of light, thro' all this darkness, in the hope you have that you shall keep one person steady to the principles of his and your late conduct. If you cannot save your country, do not drop your protest against the men and the measures that ruine it.

Egremont
Papers.

I say nothing to you about foreign affairs; what I could say about them relatively to Britain, I have said in former letters. Never nation was so bantered, so imposed upon, and so lyed, as your's. They who lyed so impudently, when the Spanish treaty of Vienna was made, in order to have a pretence for arming att home, and keeping foreign troops in pay, may lye again with the same view, and the same success; tho' I think it impossible they should procure any better informations than that you mention, to colour what they advance. Nothing can be, I dare say, more foreign to the present politicks of all the councils of Europe, except those of his holiness, or perhaps the queen of Spain, than the cause of the pretender; and yet this trite expedient may be again employed. Dan. Pulteney used to say, that the pretender would never subdue us, but his name would.

I thank

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I thank you for sending me the account wherein I am mentioned for a correspondence with persons I never heard of before. I have desired a friend, who is going to Paris, to take such notice of it as it deserves to my lord Waldegrave; and to add, that tho' he and I know how much these idle reports of invasions are to be despised, yet as we have seen them politically employed for many purposes, and may see them so again, I promise his lordship that if my name be mingled in any of them, I will instantly repair to Paris to receive his orders, as little as I care to leave my retreat, and go from thence to London, as fast as post-horses can carry me to Paris, and winds waft me from thence. You will do me a favour, my friend, to speak in the same stile, if an occasion that deserve it offers.

My health has tottered a good deal since I came last into this country, but begins, I think, to strengthen, tho' we be in the decline of the year, and tho' the season be more remarkable for epidemical distempers than any that has been known.

You are now to be sure in town, and you see what you have to expect for the publick: little good, I fear; but much honour to yourself, and to those gentlemen who backed you in the measure you took last session, and who will pursue with you the ends of it. The eyes of mankind are upon you. Let me hear from you, at least of you. As retired as I am, and as indifferent as I am grown, I look abroad with curiosity and impatience to learn what becomes of the wealth, honour, and liberty of a country I must always love, in this decisive moment. We are told here that lord Harrington is to be general of the marines, and Horace secretary of state; and that the latter and sir John Norris are to be made peers. These promotions, the hundred gun ships you put into commission, and the horse and dragoons you raise, may well frighten Spain. Adieu. I am most faithfully and entirely your's; my kindest wishes and best respects attend all your's.

 1740.

LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Highly approves sir William Wyndham's conduct and patriotism.—Condemns the conduct of some in opposition.

Egremont
Papers.

(New-year's day, 1740.) I cannot begin the year better than by writing to you, and therefore will send this letter to take its chance for a passage at Calais, without waiting for another conveyance. I make no reflexions on the contents
of

of your letter of the 11th of November, because I can make none but what you make yourself in it. You are in a melancholy scene; but I am sure you experience now that advantage which a virtuous conduct alone can procure. When our conduct has not been such, if we fail of success, we fail of all: but when it has been such, we are sure to gain something—more ease. Inward contentment inhances publick joy. In the other, it makes some amends for the want of it. What shall I say further to you, my friend? When men are so far from acting on generous, noble, and wise principles, that they avow the most ungenerous and the meanest, and pride themselves in the most foolish, they neither can be served, nor deserve to be so; and the greatest sacrifice a good man can make to the publick is, for the sake of the publick, not to break with them.

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The two young men you name have not only the principles but the flame of publick virtue, and it is for that I admire and love them. When these principles are in the head alone, they are notions, principles from which to reason, and they serve oftener to judge of the conduct of others than to influence our own. But when they are in the heart too, they become sentiments, principles of action; and they unite the powers of the whole man in pursuit of every laudable purpose. I write to the lord, make my best compliments to the other. May you find more to walk steadily with you and them in those paths which wisdom, not cunning, points out; for as they direct to different means, they direct to different ends. I have seldom known a cunning man an honest man, and as seldom a wise man a knave. I am perswaded that our cunning men will be the bubbles of their cunning, and that the measure, so full of good purposes as they pretend, will serve only to unmask them of their patriotism, and shew the true visage of faction that lies behind it. But be this as it will, if the constitution of Britain can be saved, and the weak and wicked administration altered, you are just in the way to bring this about, on the principles layed down, and according to the solemn engagements taken twelve or fourteen years ago. If one must perish, and the other subsist, no matter under whose name or direction. May you, and those who concur with you, have the virtue of which I doubt not, and then you will have the honour to be the last of Britons. I wish for you as I wish for myself. I judge for you and of you, as I judge for myself and of myself, how little soever the unthinking, trifling part of mankind may discern it.

The British constitution of government is at a great crisis, which must turn either to life or death. The disease cannot be long borne. God knows whether

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the remedys can. When I recall to my mind the several causes, and the gradual progress of their effects, which have brought us into this state, I am ready to apply to our times what Livy said of his, *Ad hæc tempora, quibus nec vitia nostra, nec remedia pati possumus, perventum est.* On this supposition I think myself happy to be what I am, a stranger in my own country, a sojourner in a foreign land. You ought to think yourself still happier, not because you have escaped a great part of the losses I have sustained, and the troubles I have gone thro'; but because you are still in a condition to speak and act in defence of the noblest cause a virtuous man can undertake. Adieu, my friend. May the providence of God protect and favour you, and such as you; and I doubt not but this will be, if in truth the Supreme Being does govern the moral world by the interposition of particular providences!

LORD BOLINGBROKE TO SIR WILLIAM WYNDHAM.

Virulently abuses the conduct of sir Robert Walpole, both in managing the negotiations and in conducting the war.

Egremont
Papers.

(January 25, 1740.) Since I writ to you not very long ago, your letter of the 25th November and 4th December came to my hands, my dear sir William. I inclined to think many years ago, and have been confirmed in the opinion for some time, that the great end and visible progress which has been made towards the destruction of the British constitution, and the extinction of the spirit of it, has not been owing so much to the shifts of a minister in distress, or in fear of being so, as it has been to a formed design and established system. The men in power have pursued it, and many of those out of power have only waited the opportunity of pursuing it. This is infamous, but it is not strange; there is no need of great acuteness to discover that no ministers can govern long in Britain, unless they govern whilst the constitution maintains any degree of purity and vigour: nor that it is much more easy, as well as profitable, to govern ill than well. From hence the system, which has been almost avowed in words, and which has been so very emphatically in actions, whose declarations are many times as explicate, and always more sure, than those that are contained in words. That such a system should be formed or adopted by faction, nay by contrary factions, I am not surprized; but what surprizes me is, that any man, or faction of men in power, should wantonly sacrifice the honour and interest of their country to those of another, in a case where they can reap no conceivable private advantage by it, and where they might, by a contrary conduct, have confirmed

confirmed themselves in power, and acquired some degree of publick approbation, without the least discomposure of their original scheme.

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I agree that if any private job was to be done, or connived at, against the national interest, and in favour of some other to which the prince on the throne might be supposed affectionate, sir Robert would not fail to make his court. This we have seen. But how can it be supposed in the present case, that the prince on the throne should think it his interest to favour Spain at the expence of Great Britain, unless sir Robert has persuaded him that it is so? But then the question returns, why has he persuaded him? He may think that Philip II. is on the throne of Spain; that an invincible armada will invade his kingdom; that the pretender is actually in it; and that a formidable party, composed of all sir Robert's enemys, is ready to take arms against the establishment. But his minister knows, I believe, that Philip V. is on the throne of Spain; he must have heard something, even from Wager, of the weakness of the maritime forces of Spain; his brother may have informed him that the pretender is at Rome; and as he is well enough apprized of the state of things at home, he must know that the Jacobite party in Britain is an unorganized lump of inert matter, without a principle of life or action in it; capable of mobility, perhaps, but more capable of divisibility, and utterly void of all power of spontaneous motion.

I said that Walpole might, by a contrary conduct, have confirmed his authority, and have acquired some degree of publick approbation. I think I said right; for tho' it has been said and thought, and thought perhaps by himself, that authority would be more divided in case of a war, and the event of a war might influence the state of things at home to his prejudice, yet it is evident he had nothing of this kind to fear. After negotiating his country into a necessity of making war, and then endeavouring to prevent it by the most scandalous, and in him the most impudent treaty that ever was made, he is continued, with as much authority as ever, at the head of the administration of the government, and the direction of this very war is by consequence left to him. What then is it that ties up his hands? Spain may be hurt, and cruelly hurt, many ways: why is not one stroke given, no nor aimed to be given? Why does he not endeavour to shut those mouths by his efforts in a war that were opened against him by his negotiations? I could ask many questions of this kind, but I protest I could answer none of them, unless I supposed him a pensioner of Spain, or a silly, as well as a proud and obstinate creature; so silly as not to see his advantage, which every man, even in this country, sees for him; so proud and obstinate, that he determines, after having escaped vengeance for

pervverting

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pervverting the intentions of parliament by his negociations in consequence of them, to deserve it still more by disappointing the hopes of the nation by a languid war.

And is this, my dear friend, the man in favour of whom the spirit of enquiry ought to *subside*, when he gives greater occasion for it by his manner of beginning the war, than he did even by that of concluding the negociations, if in truth he has concluded them? Is this the man, the machine of whose power *no one is likely to have reputation enough to shake*? Is this the awful man, against whom little intrigues, warily carried on, must be alone employed? Is this the man, the hero, whom the king of terrors alone can subdue? If this man be so great, how little must others be! An European dwarff may appear a giant, but it must be att Lilliput.

The papers you mention may expose again to publick view the turpitude of your minister; and the more that is shewn, the more will the turpitude of those who will, and need not, bear him, be shewn too. You are, however, in the right to publish the part you and P. design to publish; and I shall be obliged to you, if you please to direct that it may be sent me. Make my best and kindest compliments to P. I rejoyce in his fame, and I applaud your intimacy with him. Believe me, it is no small service to the commonwealth to fan such fires as his. He is in the right to profit of your experience and judgment; and you are in the right to profit of his activity and vigour. Every age has something to lend to another. It is no small satisfaction to me to hear that your fit of the gout is over; as much concern as I have for you personally, and no man has nor can have more, even this concern encreases as the want the publick has of your assistance encreases daily. I thank you for making my compliments to the gentlemen you mention, and on the occasion you refer to. On any other occasion, I believe, I have very few compliments to make in the country where you are. No matter for that. My affection for the British nation and government is founded on principles that the injustice, the ingratitude, and treachery of particular men cannot shake; and I have often had the pleasure, such as it is, of observing some persons, whilst they imagined that they hid their game from me, and made use of me, against my intention, to serve their particular ends, who in truth hid nothing from me, and of whom I made some use, more in several cases than they intended, to serve the general and national end. Adieu, my friend.

SIR

SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO GEORGE BUBB DODINGTON.

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1737 to 1742.*Expresses his surprise at Dodington's behaviour in regard to the election at Weymouth.*

1740.

SIR,

June 17, 1740.

MR. Pearce showed me yesterday a letter you were pleased to write to him before you left the town, the contents whereof extremely surprised me, in requiring an explanation of Mr. Pearce of his past and future behaviour, and in being wholly silent about Mr. Ormius, concerning the next election at Weymouth. I must declare I think the behaviour of those two members of Weymouth wants no explanation. I have, therefore, given them the strongest assurance of my friendship and support against every body that shall think fit to oppose those gentlemen, that deserve so very well of all the king's servants; and I do accordingly recommend them both to you and Mr. Tucker, to be joynt candidates with the present members, and I desire you will, in justice to Mr. Tucker, acquaint him with my request and resolution.

Melcombe
Papers.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

Debate in both houses on the address.

(November 22, 1740.) There was a division in the house of commons of 226 against 159, upon an amendment proposed to the motion for an address, which was, upon promising the king to raise the necessary supplies, to add some words to this effect—*After we have enquired into the application of the money given the last session: but that amendment was afterwards mollify'd in appearance; and it was proposed, instead of saying, after we have enquired, to say, and we will enquire.* Mr. Bromley made the motion for the address, and was seconded by young Selwyn. Both of them, I am told, performed very well. I don't hear that there was any thing very particular in the debate; only Pitt and Lyttleton very warm, which occasioned sir R. to be so too. Mr. P—y moved the amendment; but, by reason of his health, left the house some time before the question was put. That part of the address that congratulates his majesty on his return, is an amendment too proposed by him, and not objected to on t'other side. The speakers were the general teasers on one side, and on t'other only four or five of the most considerable. D—ing—n, and all his new party that were present, were in the minority, but two of them were absent.

Etough
Papers.*Extract.*

In the other house, the D. of A—le got possession of the house by starting up before the speech was well ended in the reading to the house after the king

was

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was gone; and moved for an address in his stile of general assurances to support the king against all his enemys, without answering, part by part, the speech, as has been usual. He was seconded by lord B—st. Lord Holderness made the motion for an address in the usual way, and was seconded by lord Hyndford. After a pretty long debate, which turned chiefly on point of order, the previous question was put on the D.'s motion, which was carried in the negative by 66 against 38, and then lord Holderness's motion was agreed to. This is the best account I am able to give you of the opening, and I believe it is better than you expected, as it exceeded my hopes.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

Debate on the subject of the army.

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Papers.

Extract.

(December 22, 1740.) The debate, your oracle mentioned, was upon the subject of the army, in a committee. The point disputed chiefly was the method of raising the new forces; the most advantageous manner of doing which, it was insisted, would be by enlarging the companys, and not raising new regiments: not but that some gentlemen in the debate declared they thought the present number was sufficient. The D. of A—le, in the other house, had the day before abruptly open'd the same question; and after displaying a great deal of military history, concluded in the same opinion, which ended in a motion for a resolution of that house, according to that opinion. The soldiers of that house did not undertake to clear up the matter, in opposition to his grace's assertions; but the civil lords, D. of N—le, lord Ch——r, and lord Ch—ly, managed the debate on this foot: that they were assured the gentlemen of the army were much divided in their opinions on the point, and therefore it would be improper for that house, by a vote, to determine the method of increasing the army: so a previous question was put, and the negative carried by a majority of 24 or 25.

In the committee of the house of commons, on Wednesday, general Wade took upon him, as a soldier, to argue the point; and from the conduct of king William and the duke of Marlborough, as well as his own arguments, gave a good deal of satisfaction. There was, however, a division of 252 against 197. Mr. P—y and sir R. both reserved themselves for the next day; when, upon the report of the resolution of the committee, there arose another debate; and there being fewer in the house that day, the resolution was agreed to by above 60 majority. In these debates, as in all other strong ones, there must, as you may suppose, be some invidious things thrown out; but in the main,

main, I apprehend 'twas decent enough. The great D—d—n opened the opposition with a very unequal speech. We suppose now the heat of the session is over. 'Tis expected the place-bill will be proposed, but not opposed in the lower house.

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Substance of SANDYS's speech, 13th of February 1741, on moving to remove *sir Robert Walpole from the king's presence and councils*; taken by Henry Fox.

MR. Sandys lamented the miserable condition of the nation, engaged in a war, without any ally abroad, and under the pressure of an immense debt at home; said he would enquire how we came into this situation, and then make the proposal which he had before acquainted the house with his design of making upon that day.

Walpole
Papers.

In enquiring how we came into this unhappy state, he would first our foreign then our domestick affairs, and lastly the conduct of the present war. As for the first, we had abandoned and lost our old and natural allies, and this by the treaty of Hanover; for tho' it was often said indeed*, that all the misfortunes of our foreign negotiations were primarily owing to the treaty of Utrecht, yet he was of another opinion, and had the highest authority for saying that we had, since that time, and during this administration, been, with respect to foreign powers, in a most desirable situation; for such was the description of it, in the late king's speech to his parliament in 1724, as charmed every English ear: but this happiness did not last long. The Vienna treaty was made in the beginning of the next year; and we, who might, by a very little dexterity, have duped France, who has duped us so often, instead of doing so, by the treaty of Hanover, flung ourselves into her arms; and England's affairs seem ever since to have been managed by a French interest. Fleets sent, one to the Baltick, another to the West-Indies, to insult, and only to insult, the czar and the king of Spain. The three pretended secret articles of the Vienna treaty, which produced that of Hanover, were the setting up the Ostend company, the taking Gibraltar, and the placing the pretender on the throne. But when Gibraltar was besieged, what assistance had we from

* (N. B. He likewise mentioned the congress of Cambray, the sending back the Infanta, and our refusing the mediation; but I took no note of what he said on these subjects.)

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France? He was inclined to believe no help was so much as demanded, because we knew none would be granted. Dunkirk repaired, was likewise an instance of their faith. He then mentioned the preliminarys, and the act of the Pardo, and then the first complaint from the merchants of depredations, when the parliament thought fit to recommend pacifick measures only. Then follow'd the treaty of Seville, by which Spanish troops were to be introduced into Italy. Don Carlos went thither; but we gained nothing. Commissarys only were appointed: and when the parliament, in 1732, address'd to know what progress they had made, his majesty's answer was, that they were to meet in four months; but by the delays of Spain, the conferences were not opened till 1734, a proof of Spanish fidelity; yet we had introduced the Spanish troops according to our treaty with the emperor and States General in 1731. We then guaranty'd the pragmatick sanction, and engaged to support the emperor in all his dominions, but saw him lose Sicily and Naples, saw France get Lorraine, and the power of the house of Austria, which had been ridiculously magnified in order to vindicate the Hanover treaty, pull'd down, and brought into its present low and miserable situation.

That great man, admiral Vernon, saw this, and advis'd against France in this house; for which reason it was contriv'd that he should not be of the next parliament; and he was likewise deny'd his rank. Then came the second complaint of depredations, and the year following the convention; on which occasion he repeated most of the objections made to that treaty, which he called one of those expedients on which the minister seem'd to live from year to year. When this was broke, the order was at first for reprisals only, sir Robert W. being then at Houghton, and negotiations, as he believes, still going on; but soon after followed the present war.

As to domestick affairs, he began with stating the national debt in 1716, then mentioned the debts of the army, which, computed at 400,000*l.*, came out, by the ingenuity of the commissioners appointed to state them, to be two millions; then the S. S. scheme, in which too we followed a French, with this difference, that our S. S. did us harm and no good, and their Mississippi paid their debts; he then stated the debts and sinking fund in 1727, and said that the national debt was exactly the same now as it was then, altho' the sinking fund had since that time produced no less than 15 millions, spent in Spithead expeditions and Hide-park reviews. Then he came to the entrance into and conduct of the present war. Vernon, a country gentleman, was the only man who could be found fit and willing to be sent to the W. Indies, but yet

was

was not perfectly restored to his rank, as he now hoped he would be. He went, satisfied with fair promises of being supported and supplied, and failed from Plymouth on the 3d of August 1739, with letters of reprisal only, for the war was not declared till October. In September, some bomb vessels had been sent after him, but no provisions or stores. On the 15th of January, those bomb vessels arrived at Jamaica. On March the 18th he writes for more supplies. His letters on the table shew'd how ill he was supplied, and likewise his opinion of what he might have done, had he had more of those land forces which were deny'd him, tho' Mr. Sandys knew no use they were of at home but to oppress the people. America was the only place to act on the offensive in.

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He then mentioned Haddock, and that there were complaints for want of supplies there too; he spoke of the escape of the Cadiz and the Ferrol squadrons; he commended Haddock's care in furnishing the trade with convoys, but complained much of the want of them from hence, and of cruisers in the channel.

These things being thus, he would name the author of them; for tho' he had considered the difficultys and envy of personal attacks, yet he should obey the voice of the people, and act, he said, like an honest man, and like an Englishman, in making this motion (he himself a private man, protected only for his innocence) against one, armed with all power and authority, who usurped a regal power, and had aimed at and possessed himself of a place of French extraction, the place of sole minister, for such he was acknowledged to be by all the world, and would take it ill to have it disputed upon any other occasion. If parliament had given a sanction to some of the acts he had mentioned, lord Oxford had, notwithstanding such sanction, been accused by that gentleman. Parliaments were not infallible; but, like other courts, upon finding they had been led by false informations, might alter their opinions. But why must all these things be imparted to one man? Because he was known to have taken ev'ry thing, ev'ry branch of government into his own hands. For his part, he had received personal civilities from him, and had no private cause to wish him ill; but he could not but think it necessary for the welfare of this country, that he should no longer continue in his majesty's counsels who had bewildered himself in treatys, and broke his word with ev'ry court in Europe; he therefore moved that an humble address, &c.

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THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH TO THE REV. DR. BURCH.

Containing sir Robert Walpole's account of the debate on the motion for his removal.

My worthy friend Mr. Fowle, who married sir Robert Walpole's niece, was very deservedly much in his esteem and confidence; in a letter from him, dated February 7th, 1756, it is thus written:—I lately met with, prepared by sir Robert Walpole himself, a narrative of the motion against him, for an address to his majesty for the dismissing him from his council and presence, a copy of which is herewith inclosed. An exact transcript follows.

On Wednesday the 10th instant, February 1740-41, Mr. Sandys stood up in his place in the house, and acquainted them that he intended, on Fryday following, to open a matter of great importance, that personally concerned the chancellor of the exchequer, and therefore he hoped he would be that day in his place. Sir Robert Walpole immediately rose up, and thanked Mr. Sandys for the notice he gave him, and said he would not fail to be at that time in the house; and concluded with—*nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa*.

Accordingly yesterday, at about one o'clock, Mr. Sandys opened what he had to say, by expatiating in general terms on the ill state of our affairs both at home and abroad, which proceeded, as he pretended, from the negotiations and treaties ever since the year 1725, when the treaty of Hanover was made; from the debts not being paid; and from the present management in carrying on the war with Spain; and concluded, that as sir Robert Walpole had been minister ever since that time, and sole minister, he must have been the chief adviser of the measures pursued; and therefore moved that an humble address should be presented to his majesty, to remove sir Robert Walpole from his councils and presence for ever. He was seconded by lord Limerick. After that a motion was made, that sir Robert Walpole should be immediately heard and then withdraw.

This was strongly opposed, on the account of the unprecedented manner of proceeding, in charging a gentleman in general terms, by speeches only, without stating particular facts as crimes, or bringing any evidence to prove them, or him to be the author and adviser of them; and then to expect that he should withdraw; and after that other members may be at liberty to stand up and alledge other things, in the same general way, against him, without his being present to hear and make his defence. In a little time the egregious absurdity of this motion made the proposers drop it without any division.

Afterwards a great and a long debate ensued upon the main question, and fir Robert Walpole's friends exposed, in a strong and masterly way, the violence and injustice of proposing to have a member of the house, and a person of his high station, punished by the loss of his character and reputation, by general allegations, which were not proved to be crimes, and which had received, in former examinations and debates, the approbation and consent of parliament; and in making fir Robert Walpole the author and adviser of the things alledged, as prime or sole minister, without any other evidence but that of notoriety or common fame. After a debate which lasted till near 3 o'clock this morning, the main question for the removal of fir Robert Walpole from his majesty's councils and presence for ever was put—Yeas 106, Nos 290.—Great numbers of the Tories went away, and many of them that stayd voted against the question.—Thus far is fir Robert Walpole's account.

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The following is a list of those who voted against the motion, and who withdrew.

Voted.—C. Gore, T. Gore, fir H. Packington, H. Mackworth, P. Mackworth, B. Mansell, Banks, Rolles, Marshall, Southwell, Bowes, lord Cornbury, fir William Heathcote, Perry, William Moor, Rutherford, Cartwright, Whichcote, lord William Manners, Noel, Noel, Viner, fir G. Oxenden, Compton, Sibthorp.

Withdrew.—Shippen, lord Guernsey, E. Harley, R. Harley, fir E. Bacon, Wodehouse, Taylor, Taylor, fir H. Northcote, fir William Courtney, fir C. Mordaunt, fir J. Dashwood, lord Quarendon, Hilton, Vernon, William Noel, Brown, Fenwick, lord Gage, C. Stanhope, fir N. Curzon, Prowse, C. Pelham, fir H. Smithson, Wright, Smith, Wigley, lord Chetwynd, H. Waller, Chaffin, Carew, Proby, Levinz, lord Andover, Houblon, Bathurst of Gloucestershire,—of Sarum, lord Arch. Hamilton, lord Baltimore, lord Carnarvan, fir William Irby, Evelyn, Eliot, Montagu.

Had all these, agreeably to the constant tenor of their opposition, voted for the motion, the majority would have been reduced to 263, and the minority raised to 176.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

Account of the debate on the motion to remove fir Robert Walpole.

(February 14th, 1740—1.) Sir Robert had yesterday a triumph at least equal to, if not greater, than ever he had.—A motion was made in both houses in the very same words—to address the king to remove him from his councils

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and preface for ever. That in the house of commons by Mr. Sandys, seconded (as I was told it was to be) by Littleton; in the other house, they say, by lord Carteret, seconded by lord Abington. I have not been particularly informed of what passed in the house of lords; but in the other house, as I learn from some of both sides, no motion was ever worse supported: even all the life and spirit was against it. Lord Cornbury, Mr. Harley, Mr. Bowes, and Mr. Southwell, spoke against it; and the two Mr. Gores, aldermen Perry and Marshall, Mr. Mackworth, sir Herbert Packington, and sir George Oxenden, divided against it. 'Tis supposed that thirty or forty of the Tories did not vote at all; among whom, Shippen and the lord mayor are reckoned. 'Tis computed that there were once near 450 members in the house; but upon the division, there were only 106 for the address, and 290 against it; which, with the tellers and speaker, make but 401. The numbers upon the division in the other house were 89 against, and 47 for it. As this event has given me the utmost pleasure, I dare say it will give you no less; and therefore would not delay giving you an account of it, till I could be more particular. I look upon the business of the session to be now over; and that the minority will immediately disband. It was said, before this question came on, that the Tories disliked it, and called it a blood-sucking measure; it seems to me an infatuation to persist, when they were not sure of all hanging together.

ROBERT TREVOR TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Apprehensions in Holland on the motion for the removal of sir Robert Walpole, and joy on its defeat.

Walpole
Papers.

(Hague, March 7, 1741.) Never did the English mail bring more agreeable news than that of the 17th past O. S. People here did not know how much they loved sir Robert, till they had frightened themselves into the thoughts of losing him; and now they have recovered a little from their panick, they hardly know how to express their joy sufficiently; and I can assure you, it is as well behind my back as before my face, that his health is now daily toasted here.

CHARLES YORKE TO PHILIP YORKE.

Debate on the motion for removing sir Robert Walpole.

Hardwicke
Papers.

Thursday evening. You cannot conceive how much pleasure and information I received from your exact and accurate accounts of what passed in both houses of parliament on Friday last. I should imagine, if what
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one heard of lord Carteret's inclinations before was true, that he moved the question in some sort against his opinion. I find it is agreed on all hands that Mr. Pultney spoke indifferently. But I am told much better things of sir Robert, and that in that particular only do the other relations of the affairs which I have seen differ from the committee's dispatch. Indeed, I cannot help thinking but he must have had the greatest reason in the world to exert himself, because it is impossible he should be otherwise than in good spirits; for, before he could rise to speak, he must have heard the event of the motion in the house of lords, and have understood the temper of many of those who compose the minority in the house of commons.

He then adds, that the protest of the house of lords was drawn up by Bolingbroke.

THE EARL OF WILMINGTON TO GEORGE DODINGTON.

Congratulates him on his success at Melcombe and Weymouth.

SIR,

Chiswick, May 16th, 1741.

I Came here yesterday morning, and in the afternoon received, with great pleasure, the favour of your letter from Bridgewater; and am most sincerely glad you are chose and returned a member for it, tho' I could have wished it had been in a less expensive and more agreeable manner: but I hope all your trouble and expence is now entirely over for that place. It wou'd be the greatest satisfaction to me if I cou'd flatter myself with the same hopes with relation to Weymouth; for tho' I am most heartily glad you have had success there, yet I cannot help apprehending, that the election there will be attended with a petition. The duke of Dorset is at present at Knole, but as soon as I see him, I shall obey your commands. Lord chief baron Lant joins with me in congratulating you on your success.

Melcombe
Papers.

GEORGE DODINGTON TO THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD.

Returns for the new parliament favourable to the opposition.—Enforces the necessity of opposing.—Censures sir Robert Walpole as the cause of the country's ruin.

(May 30th, 1741.) The cast of this parliament is, I think, pretty well decided. We only want to know the event of our friends endeavours in Scotland and some few other places: but tho' I am not sanguine, yet, I am fully persuaded, all which remains will not add above ten more to the balance, on the ministerial side, of the computations I have already made. And if these computations are at all to be depended upon, this, I believe, is the most equally balanced parliament

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parliament that ever was returned in England, upon paper I mean; but how far paper may alter that equality I cannot pretend to determine. I know your lordship thinks with me, that upon the complexion of this parliament the fate of our country depends. I know you are in earnest in the engagements we have taken to keep the crown steady on the king's head, and to fix it in his posterity; by endeavouring to stop the total dissolution of all the ties, public and private, that bind a free people, by which dissolution only this minister governs*.

GEORGE DODINGTON TO THE DUKE OF ARGYLE.

Sends lists of the returned members, and makes a calculation of the respective strength of the opposition and administration.—Thinks the complexion of the new parliament will be favourable to opposition.—Lays down plans of conduct and attack.—Visits Pulteney, and complains of his backwardness.

Melcombe
Papers.
Copy.

(Eastbury, the 18th June 1741.) The elections are over; and our success in them has, I must confess, exceeded my most sanguine expectations. Upon the most exact examination and enquiry, I am convinced that Providence has, once more, put the fate of our country into our own hands, by realising the endeavors of the better sort of people, undeserving as we are of such a blessing from the unparalleled profligacy of the highest and lowest orders of men amongst us. Cornwall gave the first foundation for any reasonable hopes, and Scotland has brought the work to such a degree of perfection, that it would be, now, as criminal to despair of success, as it would have been, before, presumptuous to have expected it. The share your grace has had in this last great and decisive part gives me all the pleasure, both in my private and public capacity, that can be felt by an honest man, and one whom your grace is pleased to honour so particularly with your protection.

When I am considering how absolutely the fate of our country depends upon the behaviour of the parliament, it is with concern (and more particularly when I am writing to your grace) that I find myself obliged to confine the meaning of that term to the house of commons. But so it is, and that it is so, is one of the crimes of this administration, which has almost irretrievably disabled one of the hands given for our defence, under the frivolous pretence

* Dodington had totally forgotten, that he had uniformly supported that very minister whom he accuses of "having governed by the dissolution of all ties, private and public," from the commencement of his administration till 1740, when his disappointment at being refused a peerage, or his subserviency to the duke of Argyle, drove him into opposition.

of strengthening the other. Your grace knows I always thought any additions to one house, at the expence of the other, instead of strengthening either, was, in reality, weakening both, when they come to act together, which is their mutual destination; and that neither can acquire any real strength but what they gain from the prerogative, which it is their duty at all times to watch and co-operate against.

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Be that as it will, to be sure, at this crisis, we have nothing to do but to confine our considerations to the house of commons. They consist, you know, of 558, upon paper I mean, without any abatement for the deaths, absence, or double elections of the members before they meet; all which points shall be stated to your grace, that, from the game Providence has put into our hands, you may see how much it is our duty to make a proper use of it.

The numbers returned for England and Wales are 513; and with this I send your grace a little book, the first column to the left contains the members each county sends; in the middle are the names of the places and the members; those I judge for us, in red ink: the first column to the right has the members I reckon for the court; the second those for the country in each county; in the last column, all the doubtfuls. So that when the first and second columns to the right do not make up the first to the left, there stands a doubtful person in the last column for the same county, which compleats the number the county sends. Thus you will be able at once to see not only the numbers, but the persons whom I reckon for and against us, and will form a much better judgement of this whole affair, from your own judgement, than I can.

But, as these 513 seats cannot be full at first, we must consider what abatements are to be made on account of deaths, absence, double returns, and double elections, before the parliament sets down. The alterations it may undergo soon after its sitting, by the decision of double returns and controverted elections, (if not timely prevented,) is easy to foresee. The abatements then in all amount to about 28, of which 5 vacancies being occasioned by double returns, I put them to neither side; the remaining 23 I suppose to be 12 on the one side, and 11 on the other. So that you see the majority returned is 8, and the majority that may now sit is 9 in our favour. If the court is supposed to have all the doubtfuls, then the majority in their favour is 9, to be again diminished by what has been done in Scotland, which I am advised here not to inform you of, because there is a report spread amongst us (I believe it comes from the court) that you have had some hand in it. To this may be added, in a
case

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case of the utmost extremity, and if we were to put the whole to the push, those whom some of us can call off upon such an extraordinary occasion, and where their appearance might be decisive; and also those who will naturally go with a going game. Some few there are of the first sort; and of the last, (as soon as they see daylight,) God knows there are always enough. The court members will also be diminished, if they are forced to undertake any thing upon the continent, (which there is too much reason to apprehend) from those of their members whom they must send abroad.

I have nothing more to add upon these dry calculations, which I hope you will understand. But if they are right, or near it, nay if the minister has a certain majority not exceeding 10 or 20, or even 30, is it not time, my dear lord, to ask the question, ay and to have it answered too, are we, or are we not in earnest? Your grace and I have lived together in a manner that leaves no room for us to ask that question of each other. But it must be asked of those of the first quality, weight, and eminence amongst us; because it is now entirely in their hands, and upon their exerting themselves incessantly, warmly, and efficaciously the whole depends. If the remainder of the summer be not made as much a scene of action as the beginning has been, we are still but a rope of sand united, dispirited, unapplied, fitter to throw dust in people's eyes and blind them, till rain comes upon them, than to defend them.

Our chiefs only can in their different districts consolidate, encourage, and enliven us; shew us the strength and extent of our interest to confirm and encrease our resolution; keep us out of temptations, and arm ourselves against them; concert among themselves, and then communicate such measures as we may not only own but wish with honour. This they, and they only, can do. If they do, I think they have almost a certainty to save their country; and all the glory, and great part of the advantage, will be their's. If they do not, I am sure all the disgrace and infamy must, and I hope a heavy share of the destruction they will have suffered to cover us, will fall upon themselves.

In order then to see if the gentlemen under this description are really in earnest, I should propose that 8 or 10 of them should meet at a stated time and place, and correct and verify their lists by each other. From these lists, thus verified, a general one should be made, which I would call the doubtful list, consisting not only of those who may be thought doubtful to the cause in general, which I presume will be but few, (for in my list your grace will see that I give almost all such to the court at once,) but of those also who, from relation, connexions, natural timidity or mistaken candour and impartiality, cannot easily

easily bring themselves up to do justice to their country, tho' they will go so far as to oppose all future attempts of the minister to hurt it. These, therefore, should be particularly considered with the properest methods of coming at them, that the gentlemen, at their return into their different districts, may be the better enabled to apply to them in order to animate and confirm them, and bring both these denominations of doubtfuls to one solid and uniform determination of acting.

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The meeting should then proceed to fix two points at most (one of which I could wish should come from the Tories) to employ the beginning of the session. I know your grace does not think me impertinent enough to propose these points; but thus far I will go, that if it shall appear that we can bring a tolerable number of good troops together, (which I am convinced we can, and keep them too, if these and the following measures are steadily pursued,) then I say that I am entirely of opinion that we should begin by attacking, and that vigorously too; but not upon the choice of a speaker, unless our numbers should appear to be, what I am confident they are not. My reason is, because it is not a point of the utmost consequence to carry, but it may be so to lose; and there is nobody so totally disregarded but who, in a matter purely personal to himself, can make some impression more or less upon the adverse party. And my reason for attacking, with the numbers which I am confident we have, is from the nature of our body compared with that of the court party. We are but a militia with some spirit at best; they disciplined troops regularly paid, joining in the principles as well as the service of their master; taught to think, and making great proficiency in their learning, that every thing that is advantageous is right. There is great reason to fear that such principles, inculcated by power and supported by profit, will spread, on the one hand, if no check be put to them; and on the other, that the spirit of our friends, supported by honour and integrity only, may flag and diminish, unless timely brought into action. Those who give an ill minister time, give him every thing: he knows his danger, and will spare nothing to prevent it. We should consider, when vice has the sole disposal of the rewards due only to virtue, how formidable the attack must be; how hard to be withstood. But if we give it time to employ all its temptations upon a body unprepared, unconnected, insensible of its own strength and extent, it is not prudence, but presumption, to imagine that it can be withstood at all. Therefore I am for putting our body into as good order as the time will permit, (and that is a good deal,) and then carrying them into action.

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The last thing required of these gentlemen is, that whatever measures they should agree upon, they should, in their different districts, communicate to almost all such as they expect either to take part in or support them. Implicit faith and obedience without knowledge, is neither good divinity nor good politics in a free country. It is never willingly submitted to even in courts; but upon corrupt motives, and amongst independent gentlemen, we must not expect that it will be submitted to at all. I much doubt, in oppositions particularly, if there does not more mischief arise by disobliging people, and furnishing plausible handles of desertion from want of communication, than there does from the indiscretion or treachery that may be the consequence of communication.

This is all I wish to have done before the session; and if this, or something of this kind, be not done, I shall hope but little from the event of it. Immediate application and activity are the soul of our undertaking: without them we had not had the ground to stand upon we now have.

If I am told that what I propose is impracticable, that men of quality will not leave their necessary business, or more necessary amusements, to run about fixing what was never fixed, and settling what was never settled, but at all times greatly left to chance and accidental opportunity to determine; I answer, it is very true, it has been so, and that is the very reason why courts and ministers always have, and, I believe, always will prevail. Let them tell me, how they can employ their time better than in endeavouring to rescue their country from the brink of destruction? If they can't tell me, and yet cannot give themselves the trouble to employ it that way, let them take this piece of advice at least, not wholly to throw it away; and if they are not ashamed to do the minister's business, don't let them be ashamed to take their reward, but throw off the mask and own their master. This is not a time to be habitually vicious, and virtuous accidentally, and by fits and starts only. Providence has been pleased (unmerited as it is) to give us a glimpse of day-light, sufficient to encourage virtuous labour with a prospect of success. The country, under the pressure of habitual corruption and the late torrent of bribery, that at once* overwhelmed her, has done her duty, and returned a sufficient number of independent gentlemen (if rightly managed) to restore her by slow degrees to her former dignity and reputation. If, therefore, the great men will not now do their duty, let them not impute the effects of their criminal indifference and inactivity to

* The writer did not see the corruption and bribery till he was out of office.

Providence,

Providence, or our country. In the last case it would be injustice, and presumption in the first.

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It is impossible, my dear lord, in considering a subject of such delicacy and extent, but that many observations must arise upon the great variety of methods and events that may contribute to abate the numbers and edge of the opposition, as well as continue and encrease both. I will mention a few of the most obvious in all these cases, in as succinct a manner as possible.

The first, and, I trust, the only way the minister has in his power to silence all opposition at once, is to do right; to administer the government, in conjunction with his fellow-servants, honestly, ably, and impartially. But you and I well know * that his understanding is so confined and depraved, that tho' we don't wish for one man who would not sacrifice all his views and resentments upon that sole condition, he does not think it would gain him five; and if he did, those five would of all mankind be the objects of his scorn and derision: so that there is no great danger that the opposition should die a violent death from that expedient.

That wonderful expedient of bribery and corruption in private is one of the great arts by which he shews his superior genius; his promises, so notoriously fallacious, is another. But the first is such an insult to a man of honour, and the office, supposed to be conveyed by the last, known to be held by such a slavish tenure, that one would think there wanted but little virtue and less capacity to guard against either.

The last I shall mention (and I should injure him much if I did not mention it) is his great talent at dividing and sowing dissensions, even among his own creatures, if he discovers the least propensity to esteem, friendship, or real union in any one thing, but a servile dependence upon himself. This in the opposition, where he cannot reach himself, is done by others. The lie is propagated by one friend to another by his agents. This we are well acquainted with, and I think that gentlemen who are new to these vile arts should be a little cautioned and prepared against them, before they come where they will certainly be practised upon them.

These, I take it for granted, are some of the chief artifices that are not only under consideration, but already in actual operation, to diminish and divide us.

In order, therefore, to defeat the effect of these practices, when we do meet, I think our first endeavours must be to create as total and entire a separation between the parties as possible. This is of the utmost consequence, both to the

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younger and to the most eminent and distinguished amongst us. As to the younger, what can the unguarded learn but a total dissolution of manners? the vain, but extravagance? and the private country gentleman, but to despise and repine at his own situation, loaded with taxes to support the profusion he sees them riot in? As to the more distinguished, it furnishes materials for suspicion, foundation for lies, and countenance to the belief of them. What can an audience composed of all denominations, coming from all quarters of the town, think, when they hear gentlemen charging a ministry, with a force of argument and eloquence truly Roman, as the last and most profligate men, and the moment after the debate is over laughing and mingling with the very persons they have so justly and forcibly inveighed against, supping with their families, playing at their houses, crowding their assemblies, taking (and I fear, making) part of all their diversions? Must not the bulk of mankind that see, or are told of, this behaviour, conclude, that it is all representation and not reality; a trial of skill only in the noble science, where the masters, as soon as they leave the stage, are laughing together at those who thought them in earnest, and going home to share the money of the house?

But in proportion as I would wish this separation entire, our connexion and habitude with each other should encrease; it should be chearful, communicative, and, above all, frequent. The most eminent amongst us should call us together, countenance us, and enliven our meetings. They should sometimes condescend to entertain, as well as instruct, and shew us how gracefully pleasure and politeness, true wit and humour, became men of honour and quality, without descending to the manners of a porter, or the language of the stews.

Particular care must be taken that gentlemen of private fortunes, or even of large ones, who have no establishment, and possibly little acquaintance in town, should not be left to shift for themselves. They must be taken care of by those who are habituated there: and in order to make that easy to both sides, decent frugality must be the cement of our society; and above all, that simple destructive emulation of tables should be entirely exploded and suppressed. And here I must thank your grace, and a few more of our noble friends, who have set this on foot, not only by your approbation, but example; and tho' your elevation and fortunes make expence indifferent to you, have, for noble ends, condescended not only to accept, but to give us such entertainments as we can afford to return frequently, even with that foolish mistaken appearance of equality which we are so simply fond of, and cannot help affecting.

Clubs,

Clubs, above all things, should be countenanced and encouraged, and no private engagements should take place of them; but particularly that instituted to watch over and defend elections: upon this the whole depends. I am sure they are so far from being strong enough to garble us, if we resolve to prevent it, that we can garble them, if we set heartily about it. Therefore all earliest endeavours must be used to inculcate the attendance upon this club, and to make it infamous to desert an election.

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The pompous and assuming manner in which the minister and his dependants affect to talk of himself, should also be a little considered. I own I think them in the right; because I know 'tis of great consequence to seize the imaginations of mankind, and very often what is asserted with an imposing confidence, is believed with an unexamining credulity. But for my own part, who never saw his capacity in a light either to be despised or envied, I cannot conceive why we should acquiesce in the assertion, and propagate the delusion.

I shall mention but one point more, which calls for, and, I am afraid, will baffle our most serious and most united endeavours. It is, to extirpate the name of Whig and Tory from amongst us. Those two simple sounds are more worth to the minister than all his boasted abilities, and have cost the nation more than his rapaciousness: there is a fascination in them that is astonishing. Your grace and I have often agreed that, in the course of our acquaintance, we never met with a set of gentlemen of more extensive honour and benevolence, truer lovers of their country, or more zealous to serve it, than the principal of the Tories. They have broke thro' the charm, but it still has power over the bulk of them. Several of them have the same good qualities; but if the name of Whig comes across them, it locks up all their faculties, and they cannot exert them. They stand, like knights-errant of old, under sudden enchantment, with their arms extended, and their mouths open, in the very attitude to act and speak for the man when the charm comprehended in that syllable seizes them; and they can do neither for the Whig. This I have experienced, and lately too, from the bulk of them, as I have the very reverse, and as lately, from some of the most eminent amongst them, which I am very proud to acknowledge, and should be more so to deserve. To them and to their example I leave it, to open the minds of their friends, and to extend their notions.

But, on the other hand, we, of the other simple denomination, should assist them to the best of our powers; but chiefly by not being what we blame, and acting upon the same narrow principles which we complain of; and above all, that foolish manner of discourse, which I have complained of to your grace, must

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must be put an entire stop to; which is, that we are such immaculate Whigs, that if any change should happen, we should be as sorry as the minister that a Tory should be employed; and would use all endeavours to keep any share of the administration out of their hands. How impudent is this! What man, or body of men, will act with another, to be made professedly the scaffolding of his fortune, and then swept away with the rest of the rubbish? Beside, is it not as unjust as impudent? If gentlemen have served their country steadily and disinterestedly; if, by their honest endeavours jointly with our's, the administration should recover its former lustre, and the posts of the publick once more become the posts of honour, why have they not an equal right to pretend to and enjoy them in their turn? Were I uncharitable enough to assign any meaning or motive to these discourses, I could find none but an eagerness to get into place, accompanied by the fear of being disappointed by a more deserving rival. If the Tories profess restraining the prerogative; defending and augmenting the rights and liberties of the people; and preserving the protestant family on the throne, at the expence and hazard of their lives and fortunes, (and the most eminent among them do profess this,) what farther is required to the political creed of a true Englishman? And, if they act invariably up to what they profess, I will pronounce them, not only true Englishmen, but eminent ones too; and, for my own part, I shall look upon them as my brothers in pretensions, and my elder brothers in merit; the first, I am sure, they are entitled to from us all, and I hope they will meet with it.

I think I have taken notice of what seems the most absolutely necessary to be done, both before and after the meeting of the parliament, in order to confirm and consolidate our friends, and to obviate the attempts of the minister upon us. The first part, I own, I think of the greatest consequence and importance; but your grace knows that your poor servant is neither of rank nor weight sufficient to act any part in it; but that it may be done, and successfully too, by those who have both, is what I am enthusiast enough to be entirely convinced of. I think the meeting should be held, with all convenient speed, at London, as the place of the least observation; and if, after gentlemen had talked with their friends in consequence of this meeting, they should drop into the Bath (as most of them usually do) in the autumn, they might communicate the success of their endeavours, and would come to parliament armed and prepared against all events. But if the summer is given the minister to confirm his own friends, and break into our's, and if they think, by coming up 10 days before, to communicate what they have not time to concert, and to consolidate

solidate those they have not time to get acquainted with, for my own part, I give it all up: nothing short of an entire coalition will carry us thro' with success: that will do it. But, in order to convince the bulk, on both sides, of the sincerity as well as the necessity of this coalition, after several uncouth accidents that I need not enumerate, the great ones must meet, take fresh engagements with each other, and publish and press those engagements and that union upon all their followers; otherwise 'tis impossible to get them up to town in a manner to expect success. Popular and national points unconcerted, uncommunicated, will not do; they have been tryed, and with what event? They must be convinced, that as the labour and hazard is equal, the advantages, should they succeed, should be so too; and upon whatever self-denying principles some particulars may act, the only sure way to make bodies of men conform to an unity of action, is to convince them of an unity of interest resulting from that action. And this is my firm opinion.

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Never was your grace's presence, I think in my conscience, more necessary to the service of your country than now, notwithstanding all the great things you have done for her formerly and of late; but, considering where you are, the fatigues you have gone through, I will not put you down among those who I think ought to meet with all convenient speed; tho' I most ardently wish you to be at their head. They are, of the lords, Oxford, Thanet, Cobham, Gower, Bathurst; Chesterfield is abroad, and poor lord Carlisle's family employs him too disagreeably, as I hear; of the commons, lord Noel Somerset, Mr. Pulteney, Mr. Sandys, sir John Barnard, sir John Cotton, sir W. W. Wynn, Mr. Fazakerley, Mr. Thomas Pitt of Cornwall, who has managed those elections with great success, and who is the prince's man; and somebody must be had from that quarter, from whence I foresee many inconveniences will arise, that will give us some uneasiness in the course of business.

I go to London for a few days, merely to try if I can stir any body to act there, tho' without expectation of success. After that I can do no more, but entirely take my leave of it, unless your grace can find a way to convey any commands to me that may give me weight and authority enough to awaken any of them to a sense of their duty at this critical juncture. I will execute any thing you send me; and shall think it neither trouble nor loss of labour, to go after people; particularly I will willingly make a visit to lord Bathurst or Bruce, if you have any instructions for them that may put things in motion: for I again say, that he, of the considerable ones amongst us, that now refuses

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to act, betrays his country in my opinion, and does half the minister's business for him.

I do verily believe, this country may, by great pains and industry, and by slow degrees, become once more restored to its former grandeur and reputation. The glory of doing it, the infelt satisfaction that will result from the gratitude of this, and the applauses of future ages, I willingly resign to those whose exalted rank and capacity make it not only graceful, but incumbent on them to attempt it. If they do, I shall think the proscription I have gone thro', and the pains and expence I have been at, well employed: if not, I can, with patience and resignation, sit still, and take the fate of my country, with great gratitude to God, that while he has left my wishes for the publick at large, he has been pleased to contract my private ones, more than my fortune. To his goodness, my dear lord, I heartily recommend your grace; that he would preserve you long in health, to unite us by your authority, to instruct us by your experience, and to animate us by your example, to perfect this great work which you have so generously engaged in, and so nobly supported; and from which (whatever others may do) I am sure you will never withdraw the foot that you have set foremost. I shall not send this letter, unless I find a safe conveyance to send it from London.

P. S. (London, 3d July.) I got hither 22d of last month. I found no body of consequence but Mr. Pulteney and lord Carteret. The last I do not visit, and the first I called upon as I came into town. He favoured me with a visit the next morning: the next day I waited upon him, and had above an hour's conversation with him alone. I pressed all the points upon him, that I have mentioned to your grace. He agreed as to our numbers; but was very cold and indifferent as to all the rest. "He saw no use of a meeting, or concert; would by no means undertake to write to or summon gentlemen; (lord Gower is in the neighbourhood;) thought a fortnight before the session would be time enough; that if popular and national points were gone upon, people must follow them without farther preparation; that he would meet, if he was sent to, but would rather his friends would let him know what was resolved upon, and he would take his part; that he was weary of being at the head of a party; he would rather row in the galleys, and was absolutely resolved not to charge himself with taking the lead:" and a great deal more to the same purpose. I combated his objections as well as I was able, and as much, and possibly

possibly more, than was proper; but very ineffectually. Since that I have never had the pleasure of seeing or hearing from him till yesterday, when we dined together at Mr. Jeffries, with Harry Furness and lord Limerick, all of whom are excessively uneasy at these his resolutions; and have, separately and together, said all they could to prevail on him to send to people and to act, but all to no purpose. I believe, indeed, I am not a proper person to persuade Mr. Pulteney; but I wonder they should not; so the whole is over; and I entirely take my leave of it. After what has past, nothing can be done without an entire coalition and concert; that cannot be had without a meeting of the principals. He will not bring about that meeting. If it was brought about, and any thing concerted, to be in consequence communicated, the execution must be in the house of commons. He will take a part, but will not undertake to take the lead, and charge himself with the execution of it. Nobody else can do it, I am sure they cannot; and from many and very certain reasons, I am sure they cannot. So that I have entirely done with it, and will never meddle with affairs either in or out of the house, unless your grace commands me. Your commands I will obey; your behaviour to your country is such as intitles you to the services of all honest men, and particularly mine, who have had the honour and advantage of seeing it so near. The minister is a good deal startled at his parliament. When they talk seriously to persons of note and knowledge, they don't pretend their majority is above 16. How they reckon them I know not; but I well know, that if we take proper measures, sixteen and nothing is the same thing; but if we do not, it is the same as sixty.

The news from Carthage came a few days before me. It seems universally agreed, that the land-service has been ill performed. The ministry are divided, as I find by their creatures. Walpole has a great mind to lay the miscarriage on Vernon; the chancellor and the duke of Newcastle, upon the land-forces. I would have had a paper immediately wrote, while the minds of mankind were in agitation, shewing the miscarriage was his own, who declared against the war at first; and, when the nation would have it, had neither the modesty to alter his opinion, nor the honesty to suffer those to carry it on, who were able and willing to undertake it. I would have proceeded to justify Vernon, who was not his choice, and let the blame lie (tho' gently) upon those who were his choice, which must have reduced him to the necessity of taking the very unpopular side against Vernon; or else to follow up and appear to be drove into approving it. This also I proposed to Mr. Pulteney,

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but had not the good luck to succeed. They are resolved to send as many fresh troops as will make the number the same they set out with. But the worst news is behind; which is, the report of an alliance between France, Spain, Sardinia, Sweden, Prussia, and Bavaria. There seems but too much reason to fear something of this nature; and I am told the French troops are ordered to march into Bavaria.

* * * * *

I set out for my solitude on Thursday the 11th, from which I shall not stir, but by your command, till the day before the session. For God's sake come as soon as possible; indeed it never was more necessary.

Nil sine te validum, nec amabile quidquam.

THE DUKE OF ARGYLE TO GEORGE DODINGTON.

Highly approves his sentiments and plans.—Is determined to persevere this session, and, if unsuccessful, to retire.

Melcombe
Papers.

(Caroline Park, August 15th, 1741.) I have received my dear Mr. Dodington's letter, which gave me great pleasure and great pain. I am persuaded, as you say, that Providence has put power into the hands of those who may save their country if they please; and yet who, for one reason or other, will not do it. I most heartily agree with you in every word your letter contains; and am astonished that when our friend sees the turn the elections have taken, he should retain the same way of thinking he was in when he had reason to believe they would have gone against us: such things we may lament, but cannot help.

You and I, and indeed many more, have done our duty; but I think we are still obliged to attend this session of parliament; and if some gentlemen are pleased to persevere in the sentiments their actions have explained for some time past, I think we may then retire with honour; and that is the part I shall take the liberty to act. I have not heard from any of our friends since I have been in this country, and consequently know nothing of their sentiments. I intend to set out for Adderbury the eighth or tenth of September at farthest, when I shall see Cobham and Bathurst, and then you shall hear from, &c.

I believe there are several gentlemen who go from this country that I shall be able to put into your hands.

THE EARL OF CHESTERFIELD TO GEORGE DODINGTON.

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List of the new members highly favourable.—Condemns the conduct of Pulteney and Carteret.—Prodigious influence of Pulteney.—Forms plans of opposition in parliament.—States the difficulties.—Is resolved to follow the duke of Argyle.

SIR,

Spa, September 8th, 1741.

Melcombe
Papers.

HAVING at last found a safe way of sending you this letter, I shall, without the least reserve, give you my thoughts upon the contents of your's of the 30th of May O. S.

By the best judgement I can form of the list of this present parliament, and I have examined it very carefully, we appear to be so strong, that I think we can but just be called the minority; and I am very sure that such a minority, well united and well conducted, might soon be a majority. But,

Hoc opus hic labor est.

It will neither be united nor well conducted. Those who should lead it will make it their business to break and divide it; and they will succeed. I mean Carteret and Pulteney. Their behaviour for these few years has, in my mind, plainly shewn their views and their negotiations with the court: but, surely, their conduct at the end of last session puts that matter out of all dispute. They feared even the success of that minority, and took care to render it as insignificant as possible. Will they then not be much more apprehensive of the success of this; and will not both their merit and their reward be much the greater for defeating it? If you'll tell me that they ought rather to avail themselves of these numbers, and, at the head of them, force their way where they are so impatient to go, I will agree with you, that in prudence they ought; but the fact is, they reason quite differently, desire to get in, with a few by negotiation, and not by victory with numbers, who they fear might presume upon their strength, and grow troublesome to their generals.

On the other hand, sir Robert must be alarmed at our numbers, and must resolve to reduce them before they are brought into the field. He knows by experience, where and how to apply for that purpose; with this difference only, that the numbers will have raised the price, which he must come up to. And this is all the fruit I expect from this strong minority. You will possibly ask me, whether all this is in the power of Carteret and Pulteney? I answer, yes; in the power of Pulteney alone. He has a personal influence over many, and an interested influence over more. The silly, half-witted, zealous Whigs consider him as the only support of whigism; and look upon us as running head-

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headlong into Bolingbroke and the Tories. The interested Whigs, as Sandys, Rushout, and Gibbon, with many others, are as impatient to come into court as he can be; and, persuaded that he has opened that door a little, will hold fast by him to squeeze in with him, and think they can justify their conduct to the publick, by following their old leader, under the colours (tho' false ones) of whigism.

What then, is nothing to be done? Are we to give it up tamely, when the prospect seems so fair? No; I am for acting, let our numbers be what they will. I am for discriminating, and making people speak out; tho' our numbers should, as I am convinced they will, lessen considerably by it. Let what will happen, we cannot be in a worse situation than that we have been in for these last three or four years. Nay, I am for acting at the very beginning of the sessions, and bringing our numbers the first week; and points for that purpose, I am sure, are not wanting. Some occur to me now, many more will, I dare say, occur to others; and many will, by that time, present themselves.

For example, the court generally proposes some servile and shameless tool of their's to be chairman of the committee of privileges and elections. Why should not we, therefore, pick out some Whig of a fair character, and with personal connections, to set up in opposition? I think we should be pretty strong upon this point. But as for opposition to their speaker, if it be Onslow, we shall be but weak; he having, by a certain decency of behaviour, made himself many personal friends in the minority. The affair of Carthagea will of course be mentioned; and there, in my opinion, a question, and a trying one too, of censure, lies very fair, that the delaying of that expedition so late last year was the principal cause of our disappointment. An address to the king, desiring him to make no peace with Spain, unless our undoubted right of navigation in the West Indies, without molestation or search, be clearly, and in express words, stipulated; and till we have acquired some valuable possession there, as a pledge of the performance of such stipulation: such a question would surely be a popular one, and distressfull enough to the ministry.

I entirely agree with you, that we ought to have meetings to concert measures some time before the meeting of the parliament; but that I likewise know will not happen. I have been these seven years endeavouring to bring it about, and have not been able. Fox-hunting, gardening, planting, or indifference, having always kept our people in the country, till the very day before the

meeting of the parliament. Besides, would it be easy to settle who should be at those meetings? If Pulteney and his people were to be chose, it would be only informing them beforehand, what they should either oppose or defeat; and if they were not there, their own exclusion would in some degree justify, or at least colour, their conduct. As to our most flagitious house, I believe you agree there is nothing to be done in it; and for such a minority to struggle with such a majority, would be much like the late king of Sweden's attacking the Ottoman army at Bender, at the head of his cook and his butler.

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These are difficulties, the insurmountable difficulties, that I foresee; and which make me absolutely despair of seeing any good done. However, I am entirely at the service of you and the rest of my friends who mean the public good. I will either fight or run away as you shall determine. If the duke of Argyle sounds to battle, I will follow my leader; if he stays in Oxfordshire, I'll stay in Grosvenor-square. I think it is all one which we do as to our house; your's must be the scene of action, if action there be; and action, I think, there should be, at least for a time, let your numbers be what you will.

I leave this place to-morrow, and set out for France; a country which, in my conscience, I think as free as our own: they have not the form of freedom, as we have. I know no other difference*. I shall pass a couple of months in rambling through the southern provinces, and then return to England, to receive what commands you may leave for, &c.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

Parliamentary proceedings on the motion for an address.

(December 10th, 1741.) There was a division in the house of lords, upon the motion for an address, of 83 against 43. The D. of A—le spoke in the debate; but I don't hear that he shone much: but Lord C—d did, what with argument, and what with wit. In the other house, on Tuesday, there was no division: an amendment was proposed by lord N—e S—t, seconded by Sh—n, who declared that he loved divisions; but that motion was dropped, upon sir Robert Walpole's coming into another amendment, proposed by Mr. P—y, who declared against dividing; and observed, with a witticism, that dividing was not the way to multiply: in the same humour, upon speaking of

* This assertion proves the powerful and malignant influence of party, when so enlightened a man as Chesterfield could, merely from a splenetic opposition to the minister, maintain that France was as free as England.

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headlong into Bolingbroke and the Tories. The interested Whigs, as Sandys, Rushout, and Gibbon, with many others, are as impatient to come into court as he can be; and, persuaded that he has opened that door a little, will hold fast by him to squeeze in with him, and think they can justify their conduct to the publick, by following their old leader, under the colours (tho' false ones) of whigism.

What then, is nothing to be done? Are we to give it up tamely, when the prospect seems so fair? No; I am for acting, let our numbers be what they will. I am for discriminating, and making people speak out; tho' our numbers should, as I am convinced they will, lessen considerably by it. Let what will happen, we cannot be in a worse situation than that we have been in for these last three or four years. Nay, I am for acting at the very beginning of the sessions, and bringing our numbers the first week; and points for that purpose, I am sure, are not wanting. Some occur to me now, many more will, I dare say, occur to others; and many will, by that time, present themselves.

For example, the court generally proposes some servile and shameless tool of their's to be chairman of the committee of privileges and elections. Why should not we, therefore, pick out some Whig of a fair character, and with personal connections, to set up in opposition? I think we should be pretty strong upon this point. But as for opposition to their speaker, if it be Onslow, we shall be but weak; he having, by a certain decency of behaviour, made himself many personal friends in the minority. The affair of Carthagea will of course be mentioned; and there, in my opinion, a question, and a trying one too, of censure, lies very fair, that the delaying of that expedition so late last year was the principal cause of our disappointment. An address to the king, desiring him to make no peace with Spain, unless our undoubted right of navigation in the West Indies, without molestation or search, be clearly, and in express words, stipulated; and till we have acquired some valuable possession there, as a pledge of the performance of such stipulation: such a question would surely be a popular one, and distressfull enough to the ministry.

I entirely agree with you, that we ought to have meetings to concert measures some time before the meeting of the parliament; but that I likewise know will not happen. I have been these seven years endeavouring to bring it about, and have not been able. Fox-hunting, gardening, planting, or indifference, having always kept our people in the country, till the very day before the

meeting of the parliament. Besides, would it be easy to settle who should be at those meetings? If Pulteney and his people were to be chose, it would be only informing them beforehand, what they should either oppose or defeat; and if they were not there, their own exclusion would in some degree justify, or at least colour, their conduct. As to our most flagitious house, I believe you agree there is nothing to be done in it; and for such a minority to struggle with such a majority, would be much like the late king of Sweden's attacking the Ottoman army at Bender, at the head of his cook and his butler.

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the balance of power, he said he did not know how it was abroad, not being in secrets, but congratulated the house, that he had not for these many years known it so near an equilibrium as it now is there. He and sir Robert spoke two or three times a-piece, and agreed upon going into the state of the nation the 21st of next month. There was a division yesterday, upon a motion made by sir W. Y. upon the return for Bossiny, against which Kit Tower and Mr. Sabine are petitioners; and carried for the motion, only by 222 against 215. In the majority were, alderman Heathcote, out of friendship to Tower; sir William Morrice gained, as 'tis said by lord Abergavenny, for what reason is obvious enough; and Ned Rudge, how accounted for I don't know; and Clive the lawyer: and I am told that four of the sitting member's friends were shut out at the division. This account I leave to your reflection. The consequence of it is, that the return is to be brought up to-morrow; when, I suppose, 'twill be more fully attended, and another division may happen. 'Tis supposed that more than 500 members are in town; and I have heard, that at a hotch-potch meeting of Torys and patriots t'other day, 210 were present, and 25 sent excuses, who were willing but not able to attend. So much for these points at present: if any thing considerable happens soon, you will again hear from me.

I forgot to mention, that a great struggle is expected for the chairman of the committee of election: Dr. Lee is proposed on one side, and 'tis doubted he will make a considerable party: the old chairman is reckoned to have made himself many enemies by the freedom of his wit, especially among the Scotch; and 'tis imagined that he will be dropt for Mr. Clutterbuck, in hopes that the latter's character may gain him a fairer chance.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

Divisions in the committee of elections.—Expectations of a favourable return.—On the Westminster election.

Etoough
Papers.

(December 17th, 1741.) As impatience of knowing what has passed at Westminster since my last, may give some anxiety in our present doubtful situation, I proceed with my account. On Friday the return for Bossiney was ordered to be taken off the roll, and the return of Messrs. Tower and Sabine filed in it's stead—Yeas 224, Nos 218. Alderman H—te, who, I suppose, had been schooled in his return into the city from his Wednesday's vote, not only changed sides, but spoke on the contrary side with fury; and our sir
Roger,

Roger, who was in the minority on Wednesday, (how that came about I don't know, unless it was because Tower may have some interest at Houghton Regis,) was likewise in the minority on Friday: and I have heard, that between those two days, he was given to understand by our D—ke, that he was not to expect his interest, if he did not give every vote as required. On Monday there was a division, upon the day for hearing the Denbigh election, which was carried by the petitioner's friends, 201 against 193. The chairman of the committee of elections was chosen last night: and may this not be a decision of the majority! For Dr. Lee 242, for Mr. Earle 238. This I was informed of last night, but without particular observations on the division; and well hoped that this morning I might hear of ten or a dozen at least, either Scotch members, lawyers, or others, who might either be prejudiced against the old chairman, or have some other reasons for inclining to the new one, without being enemies to the new administration. But all I can find of that kind is, that Mr. Mel—sh was in the majority, upon a promise that on that condition the petition against him should be dropped; and Tom H—v—y, whose motive I have not heard assigned; and Mr. Clive, who was steady in the affair of Boffiney, and was thereon thought to be determined; and Mr. Y—k for Richmond. Are we to be concluded by this tryal? I, who love always to give myself hopes, as long as one can reasonably do so, am at present fond of flattering myself, and our friends, that out of the absent members, who are in town, but from sickness or other accidents in their family, were disabled from attending, the greater number would have been for Mr. E.; and I reckon the whole are not fewer than 20 or 30.

Of our friends I know Hanbury Williams, Laroche, and White were kept away by illness; Col. Bladen, by the loss of his wife's daughter the day before; and Strickland, by the death of his wife: but as this is but conjecture, as to the majority of the absentees, and as 'tis natural to hear of the sickness, &c. of friends, more than the other party, nothing can be concluded from it with certainty, without knowing every one's name, and the reasons of his absence: but then, may we not likewise suppose, that there might be half a score or more capricious (such as Mr. Y—k), or a sort of neutrals in party, so far as that can be, who were drawn into this majority by a preference of the doctor's character in their own minds, but yet, upon material points, may be determined otherwise by reason. These fancies, I own, may be deceitfull: whether they are or no, time must discover; but, supposing the partys at
present:

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present are so near an equality, may we not hope that the new elections may give strength to the ministry? There may be reason to count that Turner may be chose for Yorkshire; and more, that lord Middlesex will be for Suffex, Nesbit for Huntingdon, a friend at East Grinstead, two at Malton, one at Droitwich, one at Bendley, and one at Westlow, if sir Charles Wager keeps his seat for Westminster; not to mention the vacancys that will be occasioned when admiral Vernon makes his election of what place he will serve for. But the great turn of all will depend upon the determination of petitions; and which way those will go is hardly to be guessed yet. It won't be long e'er we have a specimen of it in the Westminster affair: if that goes well, we need not despair. The witnesses that were examined on Wednesday seem to have done no great service to the petitioners; but I believe they did not on that day come to the closing of the pole, and the exertion of the military power: these are points upon which great threatenings are made. I hear of one drawback, by a compromise being made for Carlisle, that baron Hilton is to come in upon terms of indemnity to the mayor. This is all the news, and my remarks or rather conjectures upon it, that I can now furnish you with. I wish my next account of matters may be more to your satisfaction: what occurs you may expect to hear of.

P. S. I think, of the adverse party, only Doddington and Lyttleton are chose for two places, besides what I have taken into my calculation, and the double return for Cricklade; and I don't recollect any vacancy on that side but Herefordshire.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

Etough
Papers.*Extract.*

(December 26, 1741.) I passed sir Robert Walpole on Monday last, near Whitehall (he in his charriot, and I in mine). Upon the little view I had of him, and to say truth, I did not like his countenance. I have heard since, that he had that morning a long conference with the K—, from whence he might be then returning. I have not heard any one mention how he holds up; but, o' my conscience, under our present situation, both at home and abroad, no body's spirits but his, in such a station, could keep up. May his spirits and power never fail, so long as his constitution enables him (and may that be long too) to go through the weighty business that lies upon him!

EDWARD,

1742.

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EDWARD WALPOLE* TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

*Relates the offer of an additional 50,000l. a year to the prince, who rejects it.—**Thinks that event favourable to sir Robert Walpole.*

MY LORD,

London, Saturday, January 9, 1741-2.

Devonshire
Papers.

FOR fear your grace should not be inform'd the earliest possible of a transaction of great consequence, I think it my duty to trouble you with it. The K—, a few days ago, sent lord Cholmondeley to bishop Secker, authorized by him to desire the bishop would go to the P— of W—, and let him know, (not by way of message in form, but only as an intimation,) that if he would return to his duty, and lay himself at his feet, asking his pardon, and, in writing, acknowledge his offences, (in general terms only,) he would grant him his other 50,000l. a year, pay all his debts, and not give him the least trouble about any of his servants, friends, or dependents, but would receive them all as friends in common with the rest of the court, and never enquire any farther into any part of their former conduct. I must observe, that the offering to pay the debts was not mentioned till the bishop asked if that was not to be done; to which lord Cholmondeley answered, that it was not part of what he was directed to say; yet from what the K— had been pleased to intimate several times in the course of his conversation, he would take upon him to answer for it that the P— might understand it so, and depend upon it. To all this the P— ordered the bishop to say, that he would listen to no proposals of any kind till sir R. Walpole was removed, because he thought sir Robert had injured him.

This is the whole. If any body else has wrote to your grace, I hope you'll pardon the trouble I give you. It would be wrong, in a letter that may possibly fall into wrong hands, to say any thing as to such opinions as perhaps your grace would think worth knowing upon this occasion. What must naturally occasion a variety of opinions, even among the best and ablest, is its being now an objection to sir Robert, that nothing but he stands in the way of this happy reconciliation. Some lovers of their own ease may reason in this way, but I believe sir Robert thinks himself obliged to stand it now more than ever. I am sure I do, if my fortune and life depends upon it. The K— is every

* Second son of sir Robert Walpole.

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hour better to him than the last; and I believe every body of any consequence sees it.

I have told my story very awkwardly, as I can't say what I would, and write this in too much haste, having but just learnt the particulars. The heads of the P— party are outrageous, and think this stroke has put us under the greatest difficulties; and well they may, for in my conscience I think, notwithstanding some people think it a terrible thing to have a person of that great power and consequence declare himself so particularly against sir Robert, that it is the thing in the world that must establish the K—g with his minister's credit the most. I beg pardon for this manner of writing; but I am much concerned, tho' no way dismayed at this event. As to our numbers, we certainly gained strength; and I do not doubt shall meet stronger in all respects than we did last. It is most probable we shall upon any question (this of the P. being thus stifled) be 15 or 16 majority. Mr. Dodington will lay 1000l. *he himself* has got over 7 of our friends. I believe he does the D. of Dorset great wrong.

SIR ROBERT WILMOT TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

State of opposition.—Sir Robert Walpole determined not to resign.

MY LORD,

Queen Square, 12th January, 1741-2.

Devonshire
Papers.

THOUGH the opposition at present triumphs in a majority upon the division about the Westminster election, when it was imagined sir Robert would exert his utmost strength—though Nugent carried with him into the country a body of suspected friends, in order to keep them out of harm's way, as they call it—notwithstanding lord Gage and Dodington have laid their heads together, and that his lordship offers even to stake considerable wagers that all the stories he tells are true—and though Littleton and Pitt are determined to blow up Carleton-house rather than not have a chance to do more mischief;—this same opposition, with many heads, seems to be neither so powerful nor so unanimous as it would fain appear.

If lord Doneraile and lord Carpenter had voted in the Westminster election, as they have declared they will do for the future, I believe that question had not been lost at that time. Lord John Sackville, sir Conyers D'Arcy, sir C. Wager, both the Mr. Archers, Mr. Selwyn, Mr. Williams, Mr. La Roche, Mr. Caswell, Mr. Mitchell, and some others, whose names I could not learn, withdrew, or did not attend, though they were all in or near town; and I have not heard the name of one or two of *their* friends who was in or near town, and did not attend that day. Of the new members, who are to take
their

their seats next meeting, the court has a majority of seven. Captain Rutherford being taken off adds another, and if the last Westminster election be declared void, we gain two more for the *state of the nation*. Whether any, and what converts have been, or, before the 21st instant, shall be made, I cannot pretend to say.

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Sir Robert was to-day observed to be more naturally gay and full of spirits than he has been for some time past. The same observation was likewise made of Mr. Pelham, whose steadiness seems to be that excellent mortar that binds my lord president, my lord steward, my lord chancellor, and even his grace of Newcastle himself.

It is generally agreed that sir Robert will never give up, nor bring any body in, if he can possibly avoid it; and that his majesty will never forsake him; that the Tories would come into any terms; and that the patriots, being sensible of that, are so afraid of being left in the lurch, that they only wait for the first good offer. It is well known that Pulteney carries with him but four members, and that lord Carteret has few followers besides the Finches. Pulteney's terms seem to be a peerage and a place in the cabinet council if he can get it. How far Mr. Pelham's friendship for him may facilitate either of these things, I will not pretend to judge. If somebody must be brought in, it's thought lord Carteret will unsay all he has said, and be heartily glad to laugh at the great Argyle. People do not think lord Ila and his grace hate one another so heartily as they pretend. I cannot put an end to this subject without saying there never was a time when your grace's presence and council were more necessary or more wished for.

SIR ROBERT WILMOT TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

Address and efforts of opposition on Pulteney's motion for referring papers to a secret committee.

MY LORD,

Queen Street, 23d January 1741-2.

THE minutes of the house of commons will inform your grace of the extraordinary proceedings in that house on the 21st instant. I must take the liberty to congratulate your grace particularly upon an event of that day, which cannot but be very satisfactory to you, when two votes would have certainly given to this nation one and twenty tyrants. I have good reason to believe it was entirely owing to my lord Hartington that sir Thomas and sir James Lowther voted for their king and country. Never was a plot better concealed. Some of sir Robert's friends actually went away early, not expect-

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ing any thing ; others never came. The opposition were collected to a man, but I believe not above one and twenty knew for what. Sir William Gordon was brought in like a corps. Some thought it had been an old woman in disguise, having a white cloth round his head. Others who found him out, expected him to expire every moment. Other incurables were introduced on their side. Mr. Hopton, for Hereford, was carried in with crutches. There was one and one in the same condition on the court side.

When Mr. Pulteney made the motion, your grace may imagine sir Robert dispatched messengers to all corners. The three lord Beauclerks would not come, because the duchess was not buried ; Mr. Treby, Mr. Thompson of Scarborough, Mr. Caswell, one of the Martins, and Mr. Ashe, were ill, and could not stir out ; Mr. Bowles was forgot, and sat diverting himself at Garraway's coffee-house ; Mr. Sheppard had that very morning asked leave of the house to go into the country for his health, and was gone. Besides others, whose names I could not learn.

Sir Robert exceeded himself : he particularly entered into foreign affairs, and convinced even his enemies that he was thoroughly master of them. Mr. Pelham, with the greatest decency, cut Pulteney into 1000 pieces. Sir Robert actually dissected him, and laid his heart open to the view of the house. Mr. Winnington, sir W. Yonge, and H. Fox, spoke incomparably well. I must not forget Mr. Coke, who, I am told, spoke in a most agreeable manner and with great spirit. By an exact calculation, I'm told that of the fifty who were away the court has 37 ; but I'm afraid will lose Heydon and another double return. The army comes in on Friday. It's thought the court will carry it by a handsome majority, for these times. As the bomb is burst, and no mischief done, I hope the danger is over ; and after a proper question has been carried by fifteen or twenty, some of the sons of Fergus and others will certainly desert a starving vanquished army.

GEORGE DODINGTON TO THE EARL OF WILMINGTON.

Earnestly exhorts him to take part openly against sir Robert Walpole, and to advise the king to remove him.

MY LORD,

Pall Mall, Monday, January 25th, 1741, past 10 o'clock.

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Copy.

THE very unfeigned respect and duty I have for your lordship, which makes it difficult to say some things to you, forces me to lay them this way before you, at this very critical period.

I suppose

I suppose it is agreed that this man, or this country, must sink. Let us suppose, by giving him time, he should re-establish himself. I presume it is clear he can govern (after what has happened) no other way but by military force, or by the most corrupt and profligate means and men. I presume your lordship would not (if he would let you) continue in such an administration. Would it not then be too late to quit it with effect to your country? Would your strongest, would any efforts then bring about what slight ones now cannot fail to effectuate?

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If he should fall, will it be consistent with your glory and interest to have gone on with him to the very last, without having it known that you were instrumental to the delivery of your country from him? Is it not become necessary that you should give the public some demonstration that your going on so long with him proceeded from no other motive but the want of an opportunity to rescue it out of his hands effectually, without throwing the king's affairs into confusion?

I have many good reasons to believe that C.* is (and has been for some time) strongly at work with N. and C. to deprive you of the honour of this great event, and our country of the advantage of it. Be pleased to consider what a diminution this would be to your glory, and what a loss to our country. For you know, from what I have had the honour to explain to your lordship, that you, and you only, can settle the king's affairs, at this crisis, upon that extensive bottom; and his person in that universal affection of all his people, where only lasting prosperity and advantage for the one, and lasting security and glory for the other, can be found. How fatal to both, therefore, to let it slip!

* Cartéret.

Remember, my very good lord, how dear your over-caution fourteen years ago cost your country; and then—Let me with the utmost humility, with the most unfeigned duty and respect, with the most sincere and unaffected desire of pardon for this great liberty, and with assurances (to induce you to grant it) that I will never again presume so far; let me humbly and earnestly, for God's sake, for the sake of your own glory, for the love of your king and your country, which I know is sincere and ardent in you; let me entreat your lordship to go to the king without loss of time, and say to him what your own honour and excellent understanding shall suggest to you upon the present occasion. You are unsuspected by him on all sides: he cannot in thought object any thing to you with relation to his son; you, and you only, have all the talents and all the requisites that this critical time demands to effectuate this great event, and save your country, if it be to be saved.

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* The pre-
ceding letter.

THE DUKE OF DORSET TO GEORGE DODINGTON.

Endorsed the 25th January 1741-2.

(Whitehall, past 3.) I can see no manner of harm in sending this paper *, but as it is, I think it is not possible for my lord to take it otherwise than amiss †.

SIR ROBERT WILMOT TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

Several members on the side of government absent, and others prevented from attending.

MY LORD,

Queen Street, January 26, 1741.

Devonshire
Papers.

SINCE my last, I have received the following information. The princesses, hearing that lord Sidney Beauclerk was at St. James's that night, the 21st instant, went to him and desired him to go directly to the house. He said he had never a black coat; however, they insisting upon it, he went to lord Walpole's, where two other members were (very ill), intending to go at the proper time through lord Walpole's door ‡ into the speaker's chamber, and so into the house. But it was so contrived, that when the question was going to be put, the lock and keyhole were so stuffed with sand and dirt that it could not be opened. The sick gentlemen could not go round; and his lordship, not having a black coat on, thought it would be very indecent to come into the house any other way. * * * * *

MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

Chippenham election lost.—Complains of desertion.

January 30, 1741-2.

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Papers.

I Wrote by the last post, and then said that we were upon the Chippenham election. We debated a point in relation to the disqualifying votes till twelve o'clock, and we lost it by one, though there never was a clearer case in the world. Lord Donerail voted against us; and unless our affairs change much for the better, I don't imagine we shall often have him again. However we may, for all this, carry the election. But we have a parcel of such shabby

† The duke of Dorset judged right in supposing that lord Wilmington would not be pleased with Dodington's letter, for it is certain that at this time his lordship expected to be placed at the head of the treasury, and he well knew that Dodington, who was not in the secret, was not to be included in the new arrangements.

‡ An apartment near the house of commons, which belonged to lord Walpole (eldest son of sir Robert Walpole) as auditor of the exchequer.

fellows

fellows that will not attend. To speak plainly, I am afraid we have only a majority of about 14; and as a great many of our people will not attend elections, and that others make a point of it, they will, I really think, get the better of us by determining all the elections in their own favour. We have now heard the merchants two days, which they protract as much as they can, and fix the next hearing to the day that we should go upon the supply, in order to prevent the passing any money.

The house of lords had general Anstruther before them on Thursday, in relation to a complaint that none of the head officers were at Port Mahon. Upon a motion of the duke of Argyle's, but what it was I don't know, the numbers were 57 to 69. After we had carry'd it, lord Hervey moved to address the king to order some of the officers over. Lord Lymington voted against us.

MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

Increasing strength of opposition.—Anxiety of sir Robert Walpole.

DEAR SIR,

London, February 2d, 1741-2.

I Received your letter last night, and send this by the messenger who sets out with the bills to-night. Sir Robert told me that he would write to you also; but I find he is extremely impatient to have you come, and thinks that you will be of great service to him. He has hitherto kept up his spirits tolerably well, but I think I can perceive that he is now uneasy; and indeed I am afraid he has very good reason to be so; for I really believe, and so do most of his friends, that the other party, in three weeks time, must get a majority by the alterations in elections; for we have a great many people that have declared they will not attend them any more. Lord Middlesex for one; and lord John has hardly attended any yet. We hope we shall secure Chippenham to-day, and I wish we may. We were yesterday till seven upon the merchants' petition. It was the third day that we have had them at our bar, and we have made no progress in it. Mr. Sandys moved to have them heard again on Wednesday. Sir Robert moved that the committee of supply might be also fixed for Wednesday. He said that he thought it was of much more consequence than the merchants' petition, which was protracted in order to stop the supplies; that he was determined on Wednesday to take the sense of the house whether the business of the nation shou'd be done or not. So I imagine we shall have a long day. If we carry it, we shall go upon the army, which they have endeavoured to keep off, because they don't care to put a negative upon it.

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SIR ROBERT WALPOLE TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

Announces his resolution to resign.—New administration partly formed.—Gratefully acknowledges his grace's friendship.—The king's firmness to support him.

MY LORD,

London, February 2, 1741-2.

I Was unwilling to miss this opportunity of the messenger that carries back the Irish bills, to give your grace an account by a safe conveyance of what will immediately happen within the space of three or four days. It is determined that the king shall to-morrow, when he passes the malt-act, direct the two houses to adjourn themselves for a fortnight, to give time for settling a new administration. I shall go up immediately to the house of peers with the title of earl of *Orford*. Lord Willmington will be put at the head of the treasury: but what further steps will be taken, are yet by no means settled among themselves.

To give your grace a short view of this great revolution, I must inform you that the panick was so great among what I should call my own friends, that *they all* declared my retiring was become absolutely necessary, as the only means to carry on the publick business, and this to be attended with honour and security, &c. This was fixed with the D. of N—, lord Ch—r, lord Ca—tt, and Mr. Pulteney, but the king has declared lord Will—n my successor, which leaves the presidentship open, so that lord C—tt can be only president, except one of the secretaries be removed for him. This had fallen upon the D. of N. if I had not prevented it. But I am of opinion that the Whig party must be kept together, which may be done with this parliament, if a Whig administration be formed. The prince was not acquainted with this sudden step till this morning, and I have just heard he receives it in a proper manner.

Your grace may easily imagine that a great deal more might be said upon this subject, than is proper to commit to paper; and when I have an opportunity, I shall explain some things to you which are scarce credible. I believe the D. of A.*, lord Ch—d†, and lord Cobham, have not been in the secret; and into what share they will lett them, and how go on without satisfying them, I do not see; and all that I shall say is, that they who thought they had but one obstacle to remove to make all things easy, I believe, before they have begun their scheme, encounter such difficulties that they are already almost at a stand: but during the recess the scene must open to shew the actors.

I shall be very glad when the business of Ireland will permitt your grace to come among us. Few honest men are to be found, and still fewer dukes of Devon. One of the greatest prides and pleasures of my life is, that I have the

* Argyle.
† Chesterfield.

honour to call you my friend; which is a title that I will never forfeit nor abandon. As occurrences happen, I will be watchfull; and may still have more opportunities of observing than it will be prudent for me to make use of. I will conclude with acquainting you that the king has behav'd towards me with more grace and steadiness than can ever be enough acknowledg'd, and never yielded at all to the change till I made it my desire.

Period VII.

1737 to 1742.

1742.

MARQUIS OF HARTINGTON TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

Regard shewn to sir Robert Walpole.—Is determined to support him.—The king's affectionate concern.

DEAR SIR,

London, February 4, 1741-2.

I Was with sir Robert Walpole this morning. He has desir'd me to write to you, to beg of you not to determine yourself in any way till he has spoke to you. He seems to bear his change of fortune with great spirit. I own for my part I never saw a more melancholy scene than his levee was this morning. It was the fullest that ever was I believe, and the greatest concern in every body's looks. I hope you will let me hear from you as soon as possible. Our situation will be, I am afraid, a very confus'd one; and I shall be desirous of acting as I thought would be most agreeable to you, and I flatter myself that I shall have your approbation, when I told sir Robert to-day, upon his saying that he hop'd I would stand by the government, which he himself would endeavour to support, that he might depend upon it that I would do every thing that I could to support him, and the measures that he should advise. But I hope now he will be above the reach of all his enemys, tho' the Jac—tes, and people of that complexion, were very warm yesterday in the house of commons, and declar'd that they did not yet despair of having his life; but sir Robert told me that he had wrote you a full account when the bills went, that it will be unnecessary for me to say any thing more on this subject. They say, and I had it from his son, that when he took leave of the king, and kneel'd down, the king burst into a flood of tears, and express'd great concern at parting with him. I shall be very impatient till I see you in England, which now, I hope, will not be long; but, I think, I can have no doubt that by acting sincerely for the interests of sir Robert, and as he would have me, will be the most agreeable to you, which is what I shall always endeavour to do.

Devonshire
Papers.

Period VII.
1737 to 1742.

1742.

Devonshire
Papers.

SIR ROBERT WILMOT TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

On the disposal of places.

MY LORD,

Queen-street, February 4th, 1741-2.

EXCEPTING that Mr. Legge and Mr. Keene are to have a reversionary grant of lord Scarborough's place in the customs, worth 1200*l.* *per annum*, for their joint lives, and to the survivor of them, which is not yet made publick, I have heard nothing but common rumour; as that lord Chesterfield and lord Carteret are contending which shall be secretary of state. Others say lord Carteret wishes to be president of the council. The duke of Argyle and his squadron go hand in hand with the former; Mr. Pulteney goes with the latter: that sir J. Rushout is to be secretary at war, notwithstanding lord Gage had set his heart upon it; but that his lordship may not go unrewarded, he is to be transported*: that Sandys is to be chancellor of the exchequer, Scrope secretary to the treasury, and Bootle chief baron.

* To some
government
abroad.

SIR ROBERT WILMOT TO THE DUKE OF DEVONSHIRE.

Prince of Wales assures sir Robert Walpole that he shall not be molested.

MY LORD,

Queen-street, February 6th, 1741-2.

Devonshire
Papers.

I Am sure your grace will be very glad to hear that sir Robert Walpole has receiv'd the strongest assurances from the prince of Wales, (whom he has been privately with,) and others, that he shall not be molested in any shape, or upon any account: that his majesty hath done something or other, I don't know what, in a most affectionate and generous manner for him; and that sir Robert has really declar'd upon his honour, to some of his particular friends, he is, in every respect relating to himself, perfectly satisfied and happy. His schemes for the supplies this year are to be put in execution. I am told my lord chancellor, the duke of Newcastle, Mr. Pelham, and Mr. Pulteney, agreed upon the adjournment, and other things, last Sunday † night: that they went upon the Chippenham election on Tuesday, and came to a resolution to go upon the state of the nation the day after only to blind the Tories. But their eyes seem to be a little open'd at present.

† January 31.

M E M O I R S
OF
SIR ROBERT WALPOLE.

Original Correspondence and Authentic Papers.

PERIOD THE EIGHTH.

From the Resignation of Sir Robert Walpole to his
Death.

1742—1745.

1742.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

Motion for committee of enquiry negatived.—The prince of Wales gratified by the appointments of lord Baltimore and Archibald Hamilton.

(March 9, 1741-2.) The motion for a committee of enquiry is over : carried against it 244 to 242. I wish you joy of it.

(March 11th, 1741.) I wrote the above, in order to give you the earliest intelligence of this event as soon as I was informed of it, on Tuesday night, but 'twas too late for the post. The motion was "for appointing a committee to enquire into the conduct of our affairs at home and abroad for twenty years last past;" it was made by lord Limerick, and seconded by sir John St. Albin : Pitt, Lyttleton, sir John Cotton, and Phillips, were the chief who spoke for it. Mr. Pelham, sir William Yonge, Wynnington, the attorney-general, Mr. Coke, and lord Hartington, against it. The two last spoke very prettily ; the attorney and sir William, very well ; Wynnington, never better

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Etough
Papers.

Extract.

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or so well. 'Twas in general a decent, orderly debate. Sir John Barnard did not speak, nor any of the new lords of the treasury; but they divided for the question. Sir John St. Albin was shut out on the division, and there were a matter of fourteen retired into the speaker's chamber. Not a friend of lord Orford's deserted him, except Jemmy Lumley: lord Baltimore was either absent, or voted against the question; the rest of the prince's servants were for it.

* Oxenden.

Never was a greater disappointment. Those who proved the minority were so confident of being the majority, that the great Mr. D——n harangued in the lobby those who went out at the division, to desire them not to go away, because there were several other motions to be made in consequence of that, and likewise to bespeak their attendance at the Fountain as to night, in order to settle the committee. Upon which, sir G. O.* after they found it was lost, whisper'd a friend thus—"Suppose we were to desire Mr. D. to print the speeches he made just now in the lobby." The first good consequence of this has been the duke of A.'s throwing up. The new ministers may now surely be satisfied they can do without him; and can't but think they may do better without him than with him. I am assured, that yesterday a fresh signification was made from the P. to the K. that he and his would heartily concur in the K.'s measures. It is now pretty certain that neither lord Granard nor sir John Cotton will be in the admiralty: the list that at present is printed is—Lord Winchelsea, admiral Cavendish, lord Archibald Hamilton, Mr. Cockburn, lord Baltimore, Dr. Lee, and Mr. Trevor. There is no great doubt made but that the six first will be in the commission: whether or no Mr. Trevor will, is not so clear. It seems very well judged to put in lord Archibald and lord Baltimore.

THOMAS ROBINSON TO HORACE WALPOLE.

Expresses his regret at the resignation of sir Robert Walpole, and a high sense of his obligations to both the brothers.

SIR,

March 9, 1742.

Walpole
Papers.

WITH the news only of sir Robert Walpole's going into the house of lords, we are here in expectation of great changes. It is just in such doubtful moments, that men of my temper choose to make the warmest professions of friendship, service, and devotion. If I had been in England I could have distinguished them with that fidelity which I have owed so long to you, and all your friends. Deprived of that happiness, I have only this one method, of

writing to you, in particular, to assure you of those sentiments which you supposed in me when you called me to Paris; and which you have found, I hope, confirmed, by a continual experience of 20 years. Without presuming to guess what may or may not happen, I shall go on, in acting as I have done of my own head, as it were, for some time, to the best of my capacity, for the service of my king; but there is no man whose opinion and commands with respect to my private conduct and fortunes I should be more glad to be honoured with than your's; you have known a long while my hopes to return home; there is no time that I can long for it more than at this.

I have always desired that my letters to you may be looked upon as written to your brother. In that sense, sir, if haply you should mention my name to the earl of Orford, be pleased, in putting him in mind of what you presumed upon with respect to me, in the year 1722, to add,

Saltem hunc et fortem crede bonumque.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

The prince of Wales expresses his satisfaction at the king's conduct.

(March 13, 1741-2.) Though I am to hope for the pleasure of seeing you soon, yet I would not omit any opportunity of communicating to you, as soon as I can, what will keep your spirits in a comfortable condition; and I now tell you (what I think you can absolutely depend on) that the P. expresses himself in the highest good-humour. He himself, on Thursday last, told Dr. W—b, who attended him at Kew, that he was highly obliged, by his father's having done more for his servants than he had asked, or could expect. That he had desired lord C—t to move the K., in his name, for making lord B.* a lord of the admiralty; and at the same time told lord C. that he should be glad, if lord A. H.† might be another; but that he thought that too much to ask. That the K.'s design of appointing them both, gave him the highest satisfaction. This, 'tis to be hoped, will contribute a good deal to make matters go on smoothly.

A strong motion in the house of commons was expected again yesterday, from a meeting there was on Thursday night at the Fountain; but there was none made, but for Haddock's instructions and letters, which produced no debate; and I am informed, by a gentleman who was at the Fountain, that nothing was proposed there, but only attendance recommended: the number at that meeting was but 186; which seems to me to fall far short of any they have had there before.

ROBERT

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Etough
Papers.

Extract.

* Baltimore.

† Archibald
Hamilton.

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1742.

Grantham
Papers.

ROBERT TREVOR TO THOMAS ROBINSON.

On the change of administration.

(March 30, 1742.) Notwithstanding the late dryness of my correspondence, I have not left you unacquainted with the cardinal events of this station; and, I fancy, you cannot have been at a loss yourself to account for my not giving a greater loose to my political conjectures or speculations, at a season when the lethargy of this country, and the fever of our native one, would not allow me to form any tolerable judgment upon the fate of the public; and, indeed, my being nearer the scene of news than you, only indisposed me the more for talking or writing about them.

At present, I hope, we have almost weathered the crisis of the two diseases above mentioned. In England, I have the satisfaction of seeing our old friends rather relieved at their several stations, than broke with ignominy. Their principles, both with respect to our own constitution, and the system of Europe, adopted; and their very projects for the maintenance of both carried into execution by their successors; with that additional vigour, indeed, which popularity and novelty can alone lend, with us, to the best-intentioned counsels. I wish, and hope, that this transaction may take place in as an agreeable manner for you, as it has done for me; whom our royal master's new servants seem willing to receive into their confidence, without requiring at my hand the least derogation from the old ones.

JOHN ORLEBAR TO THE REV. HENRY ETOUGH.

*The members attached to the prince of Wales vote with the majority.*Etough
Papers.*Extract.*

(May 15, 1742.) We have had some divisions and a report this week: the first remarkable division was on Wednesday in the committee of supply, on a motion for paying the arrears due to the Hessians, or for continuing the pay this year: I am not quite clear upon which of those questions it was, but am told 'twas upon the first. The motion was carried by 264 against 159. All the p—ce's people in the majority. The report was made on Thursday; it will be printed. I don't hear there is any considerable matter produced in it. The design in making it then seems to be in order to ground a motion for a bill, "For indemnifying such persons as shall, upon examination, make discoveries touching the disposition of publick money, or concerning the disposition of offices, or any payment or agreements in respect thereof; or concerning other matters relating to the conduct of Robert earl of Orford." Upon this question there was a division: it was carried by 251 against 228.

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THE EARL OF ORFORD TO ARCHIBALD DUKE OF ARGYLE.

Condole with him on the death of John duke of Argyle, and congratulates him on his accession to the title and estate.

MY LORD,

Houghton, October 8, 1743.

Campbell
Papers.

I Condole with you for the losse of a brother; and, having discharged that debt of ceremony, give me leave to congratulate your grace upon every accession of honour, influence, and interest that descends to you from this change of fortune, which can never be greater than I most sincerely wish, and you deserve. Honour and titles are but your birth-right; and as they carry along with them hereditary influence, that will not bring a greater increase of esteem and regard, than it will receive from your naturall and personal merit: may they be attended with such an addition of fortune, as may place the duke of Argyle in the full lustre of his antient family! But I will putt an end to compliments, least a letter in this style should favour more of form than of cordiality and sincerity. You do not love compliments, and I am no professor of ceremony. Lett it suffice that I truly am, &c.

I am happy to have it in my power to lay before the classical reader an elegant Imitation of Lord Orford's Letter to General Churchill, by Nicholas Hardinge, clerk of the house of commons, communicated by his son George Hardinge, Esq. attorney-general to the queen.

ROBERTO WALPOLE

NICOLAUS HARDINGE.

1743.

Urbis ingratae strepitus, Icenò
Rure permutans, minùs invidendæ
Semitam vitæ petit, et senectæ
Castra secutus,

Imperî nuper columen, paternos
Lætior fundos regit, artiumque
Dives exultat, proprioque vincit
Seria risu.

Sint

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Sint salutantum procul ora ; vulgus
 Sit procul mendax : abeant amici
 Transfugæ ; fidam tibi adhuc ministrat
 Sylva catervam.

Te cliens ambît, pia te factorem
 Protegit fagus, memorem juventæ
 Corticem præbet, dominumque jactat
 Laude colendum

Posterâ. Crescit pia sylva crescit
 Fama Walpoli : tibi, quercus ultrò
 Civicam gratâ properare gestit
 Fronde coronam.

Sume jam longi meritum laboris
 Sume lenimen, vicibusque gaude
 Debitis ; rerum, sine *, plebis ultor
 Poscat habenas ;

Irritâ poscat prece. Tu, peracto
 Gloriæ cursu, miserum lucelli
 Sperne certamen, patriâque felix
 Sospite, curas

Pone ; nec ventis libeat retrorsum
 Vela mutatis dare, nec tenentem
 Littus, a portu popularis olim
 Te ferat aura.

 1744.

THE EARL OF ORFORD TO LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE.

Recommends Mr. Courteville to be a justice of the peace.

MY LORD,

Houghton, July 28, 1744.

Hardwicke
Papers.

I Once or twice troubled your lordship in behalf of Mr. Ralph Courteville to be put in the commission of the peace for Middlesex. I have several reasons to wish him well, and have never heard any objection to him, but that he employed his pen and pains in defence of the government when it was most furiously attacked ; and if his genius did not appear in the first light, it was

* Alluding to Pulteney's application for the place of first lord of the treasury. See Memoirs, chap. 62.

not

not inferiour to others, who have found their account on the contrary side; at least, I will venture to say, he has shew'd capacity enough for the post to which I recommend him; and I have never heard any thing of him that can be a reason to refuse this common favour. Excuse me, my lord, giving you this trouble, for I truly think this gentleman deserves thus much regard from me and my friends.

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LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE TO THE EARL OF ORFORD.

Gives his reasons for not putting Mr. Courteville into the commission of the peace.

MY LORD,

Powis House, August 4, 1744.

I Receiv'd the honour of your lordship's letter relating to Mr. Ralph Courteville, and am sorry you have had the trouble of writing upon the subject. I begg your lordship will be assur'd that no person in the world can have more zeal than I have to obey your commands, nor can think themselves more interested when you or your friends are concern'd. The objections, which you suppose to have been made against this gentleman, are such as nobody has presum'd to mention to me in the light of objections; on the contrary, they would be pressing with me to shew him all due regard, and if the question was concerning any thing that ought to be made lucrative, I would contribute to it all in my little power: but the true and real reason why I have not yet put him into the commission for Westminster is, the low employment of organist of St. James's church, which he is now in the actual possession of. This has made some persons of that parish, who are justices of the peace, object against him; they consider him only as their organist, and, whether from a certain hauteur or other considerations, think it improper that he should be brought upon the bench with them. Neither can I find that any person in that situation has ever been put into the commission. These are the grounds why I have hitherto delay'd complying with your request in this little affair; and I beg your lordship will be assur'd, that when I do so, I do a thing much more disagreeable to myself than it can be to you. I hope your lordship enjoys perfect health and satisfaction in the place where you are, the work of your own hands; I do most heartily wish you a long enjoyment of it.

Hardwicke
Papers.

THE EARL OF CHOLMONDELEY TO THE EARL OF ORFORD.

The king desires his presence in London before the meeting of parliament.

MY LORD,

November 5, 1744.

I Had this morning the honour of attending his majesty in his closet, being called for by the lord of the bedchamber, by his majesty's command;

Walpole
Papers.

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1742 to 1745.

1744.

when he was pleased, after many gracious expressions in your favour, and speaking of your service, the last year in particular, in relation to the question of the continuance of the Hanover troops, in the strongest terms, to command me to inform you, that it would be highly agreeable to him your coming to town a week or ten days before the meeting of parliament. He further added, that the experience he had for so many years received of your lordship's zeal for his service, your consummate judgement in the interior and domestic affairs of this kingdom, were so many motives to desire your attendance when England was under the necessity of taking upon herself so large a share in the conduct and support of the common cause, in the present dangerous and disturbed situation of Europe; knowing of what real weight your opinion and influence must be with numbers in both houses of parliament, when such nice and important points must come before them for their deliberation and advice. As I write by express command, I make use of his majesty's very expressions, to the best of my recollection, and shall, therefore, not presume to add any thing of my own, but only to assure you that I am. &c.

I send this express, being directed so to do by his majesty.

THE EARL OF ORFORD TO THE EARL OF CHOLMONDELEY.

Will obey the king's commands.—Laments the difficult situation of affairs.

MY LORD,

November 7, 1744.

Walpole
Papers.

I Am infinitely obliged to his majesty for the goodness he was pleased to expresse for me by you. He does me but justice in believing that the care and study of my life, whilst I had the honour to serve his majesty, was to deserve his favour and good opinion; and I shall still persevere, in a private capacity, to endeavour to merit the continuance of his grace and goodness, the only reward I have now to ask for all my past and future services.

I will sett out for London with all the expedition I can; and am heartily sorry to see his majesty's affairs reduced to such extremities. It has been a long time easy to foresee the unavoidable and almost unsurmountable difficulties that would attend the present system of politics. I wish to God it was as easy to show the way out of them. But be assured, that I will, in every thing, to the utmost of my power, consult and contribute to the honour, interest, and safety of the king and kingdom.

I have often been out of order this summer with making bloody urine, which has frequently returned upon me from the motion in a coach. I am at present perfectly free from it, and hope, by lying still and quiet a week longer,

I shall

I shall be able to undertake a London journey, and, by care and management, to perform it, so as to gett to town several days before the meeting of parliament will be finally adjusted and settled at court; till that is done, I can be of no use or service in recommending the measures to such as may have a regard for my opinion.

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THE EARL OF CHOLMONDELEY TO THE EARL OF ORFORD.

The king earnestly wishes that he would hasten his journey to London.

My lord, I had the favour of your lordship's letter, and communicated the contents of it immediately; and am directed to tell you, that nothing could be more acceptable than the assurances you give, and that they were received with great cordiality. The desire of seeing your lordship in town grows every day stronger; and I am to enforce your doing it, without inconvenience to yourself, as early as may be. The warmest and strongest expressions were made use of in speaking of your lordship's behaviour. I venture this by the post, as I imagine it will still find you at Houghton. The moment you arrive I will, in person, assure you of the real respect, &c.

HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF ORFORD.

Explains the motives of Carteret's, Newcastle's, and Pelham's conduct.—Approves his answer to the king's message.

MY DEAR LORD,

Woolterton, November 8th, 1744.

THE circumstances and contents of the letter you received from lord Cholmondeley by express, evidently show that it was first concerted by the influence of Carteret with the king, then settled and dispatched between his lordship and lord Cholmondeley alone, all entirely without the privity and knowledge of the P—ms; that there has been a contest in the closet about the conduct of the approaching session; and that Carteret's opinion, for supporting with vigour the present war prevails. I was convinced, by some observations on Mr. Pelham's behaviour, before I left the town, that either want of resolution or capacity in his great and difficult station, or both, inclined him to wish an end to the present troubles abroad at any rate. His intimation by Mr. Selwin to you, to stay in the country, and the language the speaker is sayd to hold lately, (who is in Pelham's confidence,) that we should wrap ourselves up within ourselves, has strengthened that opinion; and the inclosed letter of the 3d instant, from the duke of Newcastle, in answer to one I had wrote to him about the Sicilian abbot, induces me to believe, that his hatred to Carteret has

Walpole
Papers.

Period VIII. even made his grace fall from his glorious notions, of making a figure abroad,
 1742 to 1745. into his brother's way of thinking.

1744.

Your lordship will observe how coolly and doubtfully he speaks of the two only points that seem favourable to the allies abroad; and how remarkable his conclusion is about the backwardness of the Dutch, and our inability to do without them; so that upon our arrival in town, we shall meet, among that set, the same doctrine about the war as we did last year about the Hannover troops. Your lordship's answer to lord Cholmondeley (for the fight of which I return you my thanks) is, in my opinion, as proper and prudent, considering your situation, as could be. But the wipe you give to *the present system of politics*, and your avoyding to enter into any previous consultation of measures, will make Carteret perceive that you decline having any thing to doe with him. However, your strong expressions of zeal and attachment to his majesty and his service, must obviate any ill impression he may endeavour to make upon the king to your prejudice.

It is not possible that the baron's * advantageous report of you may have had a great effect upon his majesty; and that Carteret perceiving it, may have taken this turn, either to engage you in his measures, or to make an ill use of your coldness, where your assistance is sought for by his majesty himselfe. But lett that be as it will, I think it impossible for you to return any other answer than you have done. I think Mr. P——m can't avoyd writing circular letters to the members; but I much doubt whether you will hear from him on account of his sentiments relating to measures; because he will not encourage Carteret's notions; and he will scarce venture to write against what he knows to be his majesty's inclinations.

We sett out for London next Saturday sevensnight; so that we shall not interfere with you upon the road.

Perhaps you will hear something from your son Horace: if any thing material comes, I should be glad to know it.

THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE TO HORACE WALPOLE.

(Enclosed in the preceding letter.)

(Newcastle-house, November 3d, 1744.) I had the favour of your letter relating to the Sicilian abbot, &c. We know yet nothing certain of the Prussian

* Baron Hartenberg, who had lately made the tour of Norfolk, and was extreemly pleased with lord Orford, whom he had never seen before.

and

and Austrian armys, except that the latter was certainly joined by the Saxons; and the former seeming to go towards Prague, with a view to lie under the cannon of that town. The siege of — we think is certainly raised, tho' we have yet no certain advice of it. *I am sorry to say your old friends the Dutch are much too backward, considering their interest and danger, and our inability to do without them.*

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HORACE WALPOLE TO THE EARL OF ORFORD.

Resignation of lord Granville.—Changes in the administration.—Recommends him to defer his journey to London.

MY DEAR LORD,

Wolterton, November 27, 1744.

FINDING, by your lordship's letter, that you had received nothing from any body else, but your son Horace, relating to the present crisis at court, I have thought proper to send you the inclosed anonymous letter which I received by the last post, wrote, I suppose, the same day with your son's, because it is plain that it wholly concerns yourself: the hand is so well counterfeited, that it is impossible to guess the author by that; but the sense and substance of it shews plainly that it is from some friend that is well-informed; and I imagine it may be from John Selwyn. The inclosed, that came at the same time from Popple, who I conclude must have had his intelligence from Cleveland Court, by his intimacy there, in some measure strengthens that opinion. Whether you think the hint of such weight and authority as to make you put off your journey to London for some time longer, you are the best judge; if you should, your weakness of bloody urine may be an excuse; and in that case, a letter wrote by this day's post to me, addressed to the Cockpit, will be in town on Monday, and will, upon my arrival there, enable me to say what you shall think proper, for your not coming to town, or to execute any other commands.

Walpole
Papers.

I must own that this unexpected revolution at court, without any previous notice to you, gives a new turn and interpretation to lord Cholmondeley's express; and inclines me to think, that it concerns men more than measures, tho' the last are in consequence included in it. And as this grand affair (pursuant to what Mr. Pelham hinted to you in his letter by Morris, that *the dance would no farther goe*) has been some time in agitation, I am really surprized that lord Cholmondeley was not so kind as to inform you by a private letter, when he sent the express, how matters stood at court; for it is very possible, unless you hear this day of the disposition of places, and a compleat and determined scheme of the new ministry, the king's, or rather lord Granville's, resolution
for

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for filling up the vacancies may be reserved for your arrival; which, as it concerns persons, is extremely hazardous and embarrassing; for I take it for granted, that the meeting of parliament will be put off for some time, or adjourned immediately. As I thought it my duty to send you the anonymous letter, I could not forbear these loose speculations, entirely submitted to your better judgement.

Anonymous letter, enclosed in the preceding; received November 15, 1744.

BY the time you receive this, you may reckon upon alterations in the administration, and that Carteret has quitted his office. I mean literally his office, for he has parted with none of the king's confidence or favour, but enjoys that as amply as ever, with assurances of its continuance. In the hurly burly with which this will be attended, will it not be adviseable that your brother defer'd his journey a few days, till there is some consistency? I am clear it wou'd be right; but every one knows his own business best. Adieu.

 1745.

J. FOWLE TO HENRY ETOUGH.

Account of lord Orford's illness.

DEAR SIR,

London, Excise-office, February 12, 1744-5.

Etough
Papers.

MR. Burton and I had you within our thoughts for a letter, by Saturday's post; but as no good news was to be forwarded to you, we agreed to omit writing. Lord Orford's case is bad, but hopes are given for his recovery. His lordship, about two months past, began Dr. Jurin's medicine of soap lees for the stone. This medicine had no effect till last Monday was se'nnight: about the noon of that day, my lord voided a stone, somewhat larger than a kidney bean; and about an hour after voided another of a lesser size. He had no more pain than in the passage of these stones. My lord was easy before dinner, eat heartily, and with his usual chearfulness. About 7 in the evening, he complained of a pain in his bowells. This was followed with a discharge of blood by the urinary passage, and an avoidance of small broken pieces of stone. He continued in this way till 3 o'clock on Tuesday morning; and by that time had voided 30 pieces of stone and near 40 ounces of blood. His lordship, from the pain he had suffered, and by the loss of blood, was so reduced as to be in a very dangerous way; he was so chilled as to be cold of one side,

side, and to be without pulse in one arm. He was given over, and with the greatest magnanimity and patience resigned himself, and submitted, and took leave of lord Wilpole and his other children.

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On Tuesday in the afternoon he began to have some favourable symptoms: his pulse returned, and a kindly equal warmth, and without much pain. About 2 o'clock on Wednesday morning he had another discharge of blood by the urinary passage, but without any stones. This discharge has continued upon him once in 24 hours, more or less, and was not to be affected by the bark or the stypticum regale till yesterday, when it was in great measure stopped so far as only to tinge and discolour his water. Sir Edward Hulse and Dr. Jurin were the only phisicians 'till yesterday: Dr. Crow was then called in, and joined in directing what had been before prescribed. My lord, from Tuesday night, has had a good pulse; he has been in good temper, except the necessary heat his medicines occasioned, and is in strength and spirits, and clear in his understanding. The danger is from the tearing and lacerating the parts by the stones voided; and that some artery may have been broke thereby, and occasioned the flux of blood into the bladder. The urine comes from my lord involuntarily, and without his feeling of it: but this evil may be cured, if the wounds from the stones be healed. I have the pleasure to tell you that my lord has this day been better and easier, and I hope that to-morrow will make us happy in more favourable symptoms.

I am upon a subject which gives me great disorder: however, I have recollected myself upon it as well and as particularly as I can. My lord's greatness, ability, and goodness, is under generall acknowledgement, and there truly appears to be a generall concern for his lordship. You shall hear from me again by next Saturday's post; and I wish myself the great satisfaction to assure you that my lord is better, and in a good and proper way towards a perfect recovery.

JOHN SELWYN JUN. TO STEPHEN POYNTZ*.

Motives and intentions of the Seceders.—Declarations of Pulteney.—Conduct of the prince of Wales.

SIR,

Cleveland Court, March 17, 1739-40.

I Should have given you a farther account of the deserters by the last post, if I had then known any thing more of their designs; nor can I yet say whether they will adhere to their resolution. Perhaps they don't know themselves;

Sidney
Papers.

* This letter was received too late to insert in its proper order of date. It is referred to in vol. i. p. 607. as being from John Selwyn to Thomas Townshend, an error which the reader is desired to correct.

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for I find that many of those who have been prevailed with to absent themselves are dissatisfied and frightened at the measure; at the same time the leaders, after the very strong declarations that they have made, cannot return without exposing themselves to great ridicule. But as I have seen some of them, and they were very free to answer any questions, I will give you an account of what they said to me. I asked them if what had passed in the house of commons was only the effect of a sudden passion in particular persons, or a concerted measure of the party. They told me that all, except about thirty, were engaged in it. I asked them when they proposed to return, and they said not while this parliament sits; unless a revolt of our friends gave them hopes of becoming a majority. I then put them in mind of the dissenters' bill, which may pass if the Tories don't come to oppose it, and also that several private bills had been recommended by some of them, which they could not expect us to support while they were in open rebellion against the parliament, and lessening the authority of any other laws that we might think necessary. They said as to the dissenters they should be extremely entertained with the difficulties of sir Robert Walpole, who, when he is left to himself, can have no excuse to impose upon them; but that with regard to that point they were come to no resolution: that they had thoughts of coming upon that occasion, but they were rather inclined to let it pass the house of commons, being sure that it would be thrown out by the lords; and as to the private bills, those who are immediately concerned will attend them, and do as well as they can. And upon asking them how they would justify to their constituents this neglect of their interest, they said they should every one write to their boroughs reasons for their conduct. Their reasons, I hear, are preparing, and that they will not spare us; they are likewise going to publish a list of our names, with our trades, and the motives by which we act, in answer to the enclosed list of the common council, among whom, tho' they all signed the merchants' petition, but one is concerned in the American trade.

A serious expostulation with the freeholders, by Mr. Pulteney, is likewise talked of; but I cannot believe that he will venture to publish an appeal from the parliament to the people, at least during the session. Among the few of the minority who stay with us are the city members, (at this time very well-come,) Mr. Gibbon, who told them that they were doing either too much or too little, my lord Cornbury, and Mr. Harley, and some others of lesser note. I don't find that we are to take any notice of this step, but we had reason to think that they would take the opportunity of the call of the house, which was
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to have been next Monday, to come down in a body, and execute some design which they have talked of as a counterpart of their last measure. Therefore we have adjourned the house over Monday, by which the call is absolutely dropped.

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Mr. Pulteney's way of talking is very wild and various. Sometimes he says that tho' he will come no more he is sorry that other people follow his example. At other times he says he sees the confusion to which this tends, but he does not care, and he will persist in it. The P.'s behaviour has not been only imprudent with regard to himself, but improper with regard to the parliament. He was the whole time in the house, applauding all abuse and canvassing the members. Mr. Whitmore he got within the last hour, and he kissed Mr. Pitt in the house for his speech, which was very pretty and more scurrilous. Mr. Winnington properly enough said it was the prettiest words, and the worst language he had ever heard. To me his R. H. was extremely gracious, making me many compliments that I did not at all deserve; he also enquired much about the D., and said he was glad to hear he hunted, because it would do him good.

This, sir, is our present situation. Our prospect is not agreeable: but, in the mean time, we shall have leisure to pass some good laws with regard to wool and other national affairs, which party animosity and disputes for power have hitherto postponed. I ask pardon for the unreasonable length of this letter, and will only trouble you now with my humble service to all at Midgham.

DRAUGHT OF AN INTENDED VINDICATION OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE,
BY HIMSELF.

Account of the exchequer, and mode of issuing payments from thence.

THE exchequer, properly speaking, consists of two parts; the court of exchequer, and the receipt of exchequer.

Walpole
Papers.

The court of exchequer is the law side of the exchequer, where the barons sit and give judgment in all judicial causes that come before them, have a jurisdiction in bringing in the treasure and revenue of the crown, and a power over it whilst it is in transitu; but no power over it when it is once lodged in the receipt of the exchequer; and consequently the court of exchequer is not to be considered as having any share or part in the present question.

The receipt of exchequer is therefore the only subject of the present consideration, into which all the publick revenue and treasure of the crown (a few small branches of the land revenues, wood sales, and the like, only excepted)

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is paid, where it is received, lodged, and kept, and from whence it cannot be issued but by the known and ancient custom and method of the receipt of the exchequer.

The principal business of the receipt of the exchequer is what is called the *introitus* and *exitus*; that is to say, the receipt and issue of the publick money, revenue, and treasure of the crown; and rules are established from time immemorial for the regular receiving and lodging, for the safe custody and legal issuing of all the treasure of the crown brought into the receipt of the exchequer.

These rules constitute the course of the exchequer, which is the law of the exchequer, and consequently so far the law of the land; and are attended with proper cheques through the whole progress of the several offices, which make it almost impossible to defraud or misapply any part of the publick revenues.

The principal officers hold their employments not *durante beneplacito*, but *quam diu se bene gesserint*; a tenure which, as it adds value to the offices, equally adds security to the publick, and cannot be otherwise granted or held by law; an institution, no doubt, wisely contrived, on purpose that the officers from this independency might not be influenced to be guilty of any breach of trust, and, from the danger of forfeiting their office, might be deterred from committing any indirect practices.

And as all orders warranted by these rules, and agreeable to the course of the exchequer, are legal and sufficient vouchers for all issues made at the exchequer, they likewise carry an authority with them which must be obeyed and complied with; and the authorities by which alone the publick revenues can be issued out of the exchequer are all derived from the crown only.

For no payments ever were or can be made at the receipt of the exchequer but by warrants under the great seal or privy seal, except by authority of acts of parliament, in cases of the funds appropriated by act of parliament.

And this makes it necessary to explain what is meant by the publick revenue or treasure of the crown in the receipt of the exchequer.

Upon a general notion which has been industriously propagated and too much misunderstood, that all the revenues and treasure in the exchequer, including even the king's civil list revenue, are publick money, are founded all the mistakes and misrepresentations, which are now made use of to the most false and wicked purposes.

It is not to be controverted but that all the revenues paid into the exchequer, and the treasure kept there, are originally, and by the laws and constitution of
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this realm, the revenues and treasure of the crown. All taxes, duties, customs, and impositions, of what nature or kind soever, are aids and subsidies granted to the crown, laid upon the people by the legislature, raised, levied, and collected, and paid into the exchequer by the officers and authority of the crown, and our law knows no other language but the king's taxes, the king's revenues.

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These publick revenues placed in the exchequer may be reduced to three heads; the appropriated funds, the supplies granted annually for the service of the current year, and the civil list revenues; which are all equally the treasure of the crown, vested in the crown either absolutely or under certain trusts and limitations, which are all contained in the clauses of appropriation.

These appropriations, being conditions annexed to the grants themselves, may be said in some sense to take the particular property out of the crown at the time that the grant is made to the crown; and the crown becomes a trustee either for the publick uses and services to which the money is appropriated, or for the interest of the publick creditors who have a property in the funds, and the several duties and revenues purchased by them upon the faith of publick credit and the authority of acts of parliament. And in this sense the revenues of the crown may properly be said to be publick money, as likewise all the monies granted for and appropriated to the uses and services of the publick.

That is to say, all money payable by virtue of the several acts of parliament passed in that behalf is paid upon orders, grounded upon, and reciting the particular acts of parliament, without any regard to letters patent or letters of privy seal, and without account. All money, granted out of the supplies granted for the publick service, is issued to the paymasters and treasurers of the respective offices, by virtue of a particular privy seal for each accountant, grounded upon the clauses of appropriation, and adapted to the sums appropriated, and always upon account.

The civil list revenues remain then singly upon their own foot, issuable at the will and direction of the king upon account, or without account, as the king shall direct; but these directions are confined within the bounds and limits of the course and law of the exchequer, and carry no authority if that is deviated from, but must be obeyed, and cannot be criminal if conformable thereto.

For the ready and necessary dispatch of publick business, there are always general standing letters patent dormant, and general letters of privy seal dormant, lodged in the exchequer as the foundation of all issues out of the civil list revenues.

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These general letters patent and letters of privy seal are of very ancient date, and have been continued without interruption from the restoration to the present time, and are generally one of the first works of every new reign. They are the standing authorities to the treasury to act and proceed upon, and are always recited in all deeds and instruments relative to them; and the better to enlighten this material circumstance, it may not be improper to insert here the general clause expressing thereby the power given to the treasury.

In the general letters patent, after an enumeration of several particular powers, it is said, *And also to pay or cause to be paid unto any of our officers, or unto any other person or persons, in reward for services performed, or to be performed, or in satisfaction for charges or disbursements by them or any of them expended, or to be expended for our service, such sum or sums of money as to you shall seem reasonable and fit to be allowed and paid in such cases.*

In the general letters of privy seal, the clause runs thus, *Our will and pleasure is, and we do hereby direct, authorize, and command that out of any our treasure or revenue from time to time being and remaining in the receipt of our exchequer, you issue and pay, or cause to be issued and paid, all such sum and sums of money for any publick or particular uses and services, as we, by any warrant or warrants under our royal sign manual, shall direct and appoint; the said sums of money respectively to be paid to such officer, or other persons, by way of imprest or otherwise, and in such manner and form in all respects, as by such warrant or warrants shall be required and directed.*

These letters patent and letters of privy seal relate to the issuing of the civil list revenues only: the letters patent are generally made use of, when the money issued is issued upon account; the privy seals, when the issues are directed without imprest or account.

It is to be observed that the king, in the disposition and expenditure of the revenues of the crown, directs some part to be issued upon account, and some without account, according to the particular uses and services to which the money is to be applied; and according to the custom and usage of the exchequer, there are several officers who receive and pay all the fees, wages, salaries, and other expences made and incurred in the several branches of the king's household, and upon the several heads of the civil establishment: such are the cofferer, the treasurer of the chamber, the paymaster of the works, the master of the horse, the master of the great wardrobe, and all receivers and paymasters to whom money is issued to be paid over by them to other officers and servants

servants of the crown, and other persons having legal and regular debts and demands upon the crown.

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To these officers all mony is issued upon account, and they are regularly charged upon the imprest, and made accountants, and all orders for issuing mony to such as are accountants, are always grounded upon the general letters patent; and among the rest all sums that have been issued to Mr. Paxton and Mr. Lowther come under this class, and they are accountable for what they do receive from time to time.

But as the publick revenues in the exchequer are made publick mony, only by virtue of appropriations and particular clauses of restrictions and limitations, the treasure of the exchequer, whether arising to the crown by ancient and hereditary right, *et jure coronæ*, or by grants of parliament if without restriction or limitation, is the private right and property of the crown, and in no sense to be considered as publick mony.

Upon these foundations, in considering further upon the issues of the publick revenues out of the exchequer, the first proper question and inquiry ought to be, whether any part of the publick mony, allowed to be such, has been diverted from the proper uses and purposes, or the least misapplication made of any part of the publick funds and revenues.

And here I need not spend much time, since it's manifest that the grand inquisition, who, if you believe themselves, want no abilities, and all the world sees want no will, to discover any the least errors that may have happened in the late administration of publick affairs, have not so much as attempted to shew any crimes or faults in the application or disposition of any part of the publick mony granted and appropriated to the uses and services of the publick.

And it is as unnecessary to insist upon a justification, barely upon these righteous and impartial inquisitors not having been able to fix the least imputation upon the conduct and management of these great and essential articles of the publick revenues, I mean the great sums of mony that have been granted and expended in the annual supplies of so many years, and in the application of the publick funds, where the people and the proprietors of the appropriated funds have so immediate and valuable an interest. Because during the whole time of the noble lord's being at the head of the treasury, who is supposed to be answerable for every minute circumstance in the management of the revenue, there have been annual accounts laid before the parliament, of the receipts and issues and application of every part of the supplies of every year, and the like accounts have been as duly given into parliament of the produce and distribution of

Period VIII. of every branch of the publick revenues, which constitute the national funds
 1742 to 1745. settled and appointed for payment of the principal and interest of the national
 1744. debt. And of this these upright and able and impartial patriots cannot be ignorant; and yet not one observation has ever been made, either in parliament or out of parliament, upon the executive part of the administration, upon any of these principal and essential points.

What then shall be said of those wicked outcries and clamours, which have so long filled and distracted the nation, of publick robbers, plunderers, of the publick ministers enriching themselves with the spoils of the people, and all that infamous weight of calumny, detraction, and defamation with which the patriots have loaded the servants of the crown, have inflamed the minds of the populace, and for which we are told the nation are in the highest expectation of obtaining national justice? I think offenders of this sort, if any such there be, are proper objects of parliamentary justice; but if none such are to be found, what curse is not due to the authors of these detestable practices? And I think the vengeance of the people ought to be satisfied either upon the delinquents, if any crimes can be proved, or upon the inventors of such scandalous reports, who have so vilely imposed upon and deluded the people. This is common justice; but to that height of impudence are some men now come, as avowedly to declare it is necessary that even injustice should be done to answer the unjust expectations which they themselves have raised in the kingdom.

These matters being thus free and clear from all objection, they were reduced to the necessity, if it was not the choice of some of their principal leaders, to fall upon the king's civil list revenues, and here they hope to fix the source of corruption, of which they have so loudly complained, without being able to prove it in any one instance.

And here I must insist that the civil list revenues of the crown, being granted to the king for his life, without any appropriation, restriction, or limitation, are the sole right and legal property of the crown, to be disposed of and expended according to the will and direction of the king, not subject to any account, controul, or inquiry; cases of illegal and corrupt abuses upon proof only excepted, and except upon application from the crown for the assistance of parliament upon any deficiency, arrears, or debts incurred in the civil list.

The distinction then between the publick money so deemed, and the king's civil list revenue, being thus established, there can be no crime in the issuing any part of them to their proper and legal uses and purposes, but in departing from

from the course of the exchequer, and transgressing the known rules and forms established for that purpose.

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It has been already observed that no money can be paid at the exchequer by any less authority than by letters patent under the great seal or letters of privy seal. All money payable to the bank of England, the South Sea company, and East India company, for the several annuities, and for principal and interest upon loans * * * * *

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Cetera desiderantur.

ON THE CONDUCT AND PRINCIPLES OF SIR ROBERT WALPOLE,
BY GOVERNOR POWNAL.

THE publick characters of men who have been engaged in the service of their country, must be considered with reference to the drama in which they performed their part; that is, with reference to the state of things and men, and to the spirit of the times in which they acted: their actions must be compared with the nature and merit of the object which it was their duty to aim at; and the measures which they operated by must be judged of by the effect that they produced upon the whole.

Let the conduct and character of this great minister be examined by these references.

First, with reference to the drama.

Kings and the abettors of regal power, as inherent *in the person*, not in the *office of kings*, have always invariably, from the time of the Norman intrusion, been endeavouring to establish the *Norman system* of government on the ruin of the *Saxon system*. The genuine English have always as invariably resisted this attempt. *Nolumus leges Angliæ mutari* were the words of their constant protest. They always set up that system of government, which they held to be *constitutional*, in opposition to that which power attempted to make *legal*. These and such were the *Whiggs* and *Tories* of this kingdom ages before the names which distinguish them were known. In obtaining the great charter (as an act of parliament is called) no new liberties or rights were granted to the people: but the liberties and rights of the constitution were restored, and the government recalled back to its Saxon principles. This act was repeatedly explained and confirmed, yet was again encroached upon by a system of regal power which

Period VIII. which the kings in general, but the Tudors and Stuarts more especially, endeavoured to frame.
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The *first* patriots in the great civil war meant only to reform the office of king, as it was originally established by the principles of the constitution. By too violent a revulsion of the national spirit, the regal office was ruined instead of being restored; and power was carried into a contrary extreme, to the domination of a democracy. On the other hand, by too hasty and too inconsiderate a restoration of Charles the Second, without constitutional conditions annexed to the monarchy, the true Saxon system of government came again into danger; and the nation, during the reigns of Charles II. and James II., was in a constant succession of suffering under, or of struggles against, *the Norman system, a system of indefeasible right of power in the king, of power neither responsible nor to be resisted, and against which there was no legal remedy.*

This system was maintained and enforced by a party that assumed, and were called by, the name of *Tories*, allied with and abetted by Papists. The English spirit of the nation, animating a body of patriots who took the name of *Whigs*, resisted and prevailed against this party. A revolution took place. A Tory and Popish king was exiled; a Whig and Protestant prince was called to the throne; and the succession was settled and limited in a Protestant line. The rights of the monarchy and the liberties of the people were fixed and established. After this period a very great and powerful party, formed by a combination of civil and ecclesiastical Tories and Papists, never ceased to exert every effort to restore the exiled Popish family; to set up again the Tory system in the state; and to erect an hierarchy in the church approaching every day nearer and nearer to Popery. On the decease of William, Mary, and Ann, without heirs, who were Protestants, the nation was again brought into danger of falling back to a Popish king and a Tory government.

Against this system, which endangers or subverts the liberties of the subject; against this Papal tyranny; the British Whigs, both civil and ecclesiastical, came forward in opposition: allied with the Protestants of all denominations, they formed an united and determined phalanx, and stood forth in support of the established government as founded on the principles of the constitution, and under those principles settled on the house of Hanover, being Protestants.

These two parties were arrayed against each other. The Whigs exerted themselves in defending the constitution and religion of their country. The Tories were become desperate, and were rendered more malignant by being allied with Popery. These were no ordinary times: every thing was at hazard; the
 spirits

spirits of men were wound up to the utmost energy of exertion. In these times, amidst men of rank and fortune in the country, amongst active politicians of the first abilities, the genius and abilities, the vigour and practical knowledge of Walpole *rose ascendant*. Nothing but a spirit of enterprize would then have dared to undertake the business of the nation, knowing what and how perilous it was. The standing foremost in such a political warfare, risking in the contest an actual war against such an inveterate and desperate party, could arise from and be animated by nothing but courage derived from principle and knowledge. The point to be gained was a great object, and necessary to the existence of the constitution; the measures by which it was to be obtained were fraught not only with open and direct, but with secret and treacherous dangers, which no man of an ordinary zeal or knowledge would have dared to encounter. Walpole undertook this business, stood foremost, and *had the command in it*. He held the ascendant over the spirits of men, and they ranged themselves in a voluntary subordination to him. With this command he broke the measures of the Tories; he made the Papists understand that it was their best interest to be quiet; he bore down and suppressed the Jacobite party, and rendered them impotent; he warded off the hostile designs of foreign powers; he settled the peace of the nation; he established the government, by fixing the house of Hanover firmly on the throne, under such conditions of administration as restored, perfected, and secured the constitution of his country.

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The constitution of a limited monarchy in a state takes out of the hands of the monarch all such power as is not responsible, and which might do wrong, while there are no legal means of remedy or resistance. This part of the system, which is necessary to the people's rights, renders *the king* as to power in himself in some degree *inefficient*: but this great minister, by a constitutional division of power, rendered the *administration of government actually efficient*. Every branch of authority remained in the office of king which could do good and no wrong: that power which was yet necessary to efficiency, but which might be capable of doing wrong without remedy, actuated by the king, was annexed in its operations to the office of minister. *Here* it was responsible, and, upon any excess of its exertions, *here* it might be resisted, and was amenable to justice. He took this responsibility on himself, he became amenable. In the establishment therefore of the power of his administration, he secured the liberties of the state; but rendered government effective.

While the struggle and contest of parties last, men are actuated by the spirit and passions of their party; they require no other motive. When those

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struggles have ceased, and the contest subsides, men are to be ranged under a general system of established polity. Then that spirit of party by which they ranked in obedience to their leaders, feels no longer those motives; sees not that object; has no longer that scope which excited their love or hatred, and gave motion and direction to their will. If they consider themselves as the comrades of an army that hath conquered, quitting their subordination, many of them demand their share of power, whilst the bulk of the herd clamour for plunder and their share of the booty. Other motives therefore, *such as may influence* their will, must be sought out and applied. Not such motives as theorists, essay-writers, and historians talk of, when they dream: but such as the practical politician knows *are motives* in the nature of things, and must influence the wills of men, being what they are.

A life of active politics, exercised and trained in forming and opposing parties, in acquiring and holding a lead amongst men, had given Walpole experimental knowledge of the human heart. He had lived with men in their homes in private; he had acted with them abroad in public; he had seen them in all tempers and seasons; he knew them to the quick, *intus & in cute*: he had experience to feel how little (whatever they might pretend) they were connected by general principle, where the spirit of party ceased; and how ready many of them were to betray one another, or to forsake their leaders, if any offer could make it worth their while to enlist with others. He had on all sides, and in almost every period, had experience of their proneness to change. Many were ready to promote arbitrary measures: he used the influence of government only to make them free and obedient subjects of a limited government. Even against his enemies, and the enemies of the constitution, where he might have used *force*, he applied only *influence* so far as to disarm mischief; and at the same time, with the same *influence*, taught those enemies to find it their interest to become in some degree friends. Yet, as these proselite and mercenary friends could *not be trusted in principle*, he led them, bound to obedience, by such notions as had and did continue to operate on them.

With this discernment of the spirits of men, with this temper and moderation, he fixed a new establishment. He secured the house of Hanover on the throne without bloodshed, except of those who were mad enough to run obstinately on the point of the sword of state.

Having perfected and secured the foundations of liberty, having established effective government, having settled the nation in peace, he introduced system into the business of the state, and order, connection, and subordination amongst
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all the departments. He recovered the administration of the finances out of Period VIII.
1742 to 1745. confusion, and rescued them from corrupt and ruinous management: he established them on a solid basis, and opened sources which might not only have given a continually increasing supply, but through which they might have become reservoirs to the most extensive credit. Had this system of finance, by a general excise, advancing in an increasing series of aggregate surplusses, taken place, the resources of this country would have forerun the calls of any service that common sense or common honesty could have engaged in; would have been equal to any accident which in the ordinary course of human affairs could have come into event. As it was, the funds, of which he formed the plan, and *the part only* which he established, laid the foundation of our greatness. Whilst he maintained the station of this nation amidst the nations of Europe, *by a system of peace*, commerce flourished, and was extended; and Great Britain became a rich and powerful empire.

Although he could not but feel conscious of the degree of power to which he had raised his country, yet, so long as he maintained his authority in government, he never suffered the foreign views of a stranger king, the pride of the nation, the presumption of military men, or the avarice of merchants, to involve this kingdom in the foolish enterprizes of war. He had a courage that felt no fear when the meeting of danger was necessary; he had wisdom that knew how to fear it when it was not necessary.

Although he acquired a high degree of power, and possessed a degree of influence which would have enabled him as a man to do any thing; yet, under every provocation that can exasperate, *he never did an injury*, scarce ever revenged one. He had a magnanimity above all the resentments of the private man. On the contrary, from the suggestions of the same magnanimity, he spared the lives and fortunes of many who had forfeited both, and who would have taken his. He did many kind things to irreconcilable enemies, and conferred many benefits on ungrateful friends.

Although he had established and secured the liberties of his country in peace, yet his own situation was an unceasing warfare. A spirit however, which always took the ascendant, rendered his post impregnable to his enemies without, and maintained subordination to his command within. The human constitution, both in mind and body, is so framed that, if always on the stretch of exertion, it must at length lose part of its energy. As the activity of his spirit at times abated, he at times ceasing to act as sole minister, entrusted parts of his command to those who should have been friends. In proportion as they were entrusted, they had it in their power to betray. Some who were admitted to this

Period VIII.
1742 to 1745.

communication as friends, having by this confidence the means of seeing that he began to abate of his activity, meditated a desertion, in order to enlist under a capitulation with the enemy. Many who had offered him service, but whom he had rejected, turned their views to a new party, on which a rising sun seemed to shine. Sir Robert Walpole thus lost the majority of the house of commons, and surrendered his post. He disdained to capitulate: disarmed as he was of all power, and at the mercy of his enemies in their quarters, he disdained to ask quarter. They meant to destroy him; but here they found his innocence as invulnerable, as they had before found his spirit impregnable. They appointed a committee of inquisition, *to search for proof* of crimes which for twenty years they had imputed to him without proof. Proofs light as air would have served for conviction; but even these could not be found: and so unsubstantial were even the imputed crimes, that they vanished upon the touch. His enemies, to their eternal infamy and dishonour, established upon their own inquisition this only fact, that they had been for twenty years writing, speaking, and acting upon ground that was false.

He retired not with a fortune greater than his fame. While his character became every day more and more admired and praised, as it became understood; and every day more brilliant and illustrious while it was reviewed, under the aggravating sense of regret. Men could not but see in the comparison how unequal the fortunes, which he had left to his family, were to the support of the honour with which he had graced and adorned it; how much below the degree of prosperity to which he had elevated his country.

He retained his anxiety and zeal for the safety of his country to his latest breath, which in a critical and dangerous period (in the year 1743) he expressed in one of the finest speeches ever made in the house of lords, in his last speech, spoken to apprise the nation of its danger, to which it remained insensible. Those who succeeded him shut their eyes against a danger that they dared not own they saw; because they dared not look it in the face, and had taken no precaution to ward it off: they therefore neglected the wisdom of his fear and advice. They affected in themselves, and attempted in others, to stifle all apprehensions, while the danger encreased, and continued advancing into event. The danger which had been thus imminent fell upon the nation in the year 1745, by a rebellion in which the British crown was (as he had told the house of lords it would be) fought for on British ground.

He died in the interval of these periods; and his immediate successors lived upon the fragments of his system, which they had laboured to destroy.

A SHORT HISTORY OF EXCHEQUER BILLS:

Corrected by Sir ROBERT WALPOLE.

THE recoinage of the old, hammer'd, clipt monies, during the war against France, gave the first rise to the issuing out bills of credit, called exchequer bills, to supply the want of silver at that time; of which very beneficial invention the late earl of Halifax was the author; and tho' not, till lately, rendered complete and perfect, will, however, allways be remember'd to the honour of that noble lord.

Walpole
Papers.

1724.

Anno 1696. 7 and 8 W. III. The first exchequer bills were made out and issued, pursuant to an act of parliament, *anno* 1696, for raising 2,564,000 l. *viz.* 1,064,000 l. by orders of loan, at 7 l. *per cent. per ann.* and 1,500,000 l. by such bills, at 3 d. *per cent. per diem*, payable out of loans, or other monies, in the exchequer, arising from the duties on salt, glass, stone, and earthen wares.

The auditor of the receipt of exchequer was to prepare and sign indented bills to be sealed with a publick seal, of 10, 20, 30, 50, and 100 pounds each; the counterparts of which were to remain in his office. He was to deliver these bills to the tellers, and take their receipts for the same, charging them with so much cash as they amounted unto. The tellers were to issue them out to such as would accept them, and exchange them for money, paying principal and interest. These bills might be issued out again from the exchequer as money, or new bills in lieu of such as were cancelled. It was made felony to forge or counterfeit them. If there was not cash in the exchequer sufficient to answer such bills, persons might apply to the auditor to exchange such bills for orders bearing a perpetual rent at 7 l. *per cent. per ann.* payable half-yearly, out of the salt duties, &c. until the principal and interest were paid off.

Anno 1696. 8 W. III. page 130. The treasurer was impower'd to cause exchequer bills to be made out for one million and an half, to be current and pass in all payments to any of his majesty's receivers or collectors of any aids, taxes, &c. (except the 3 s. aid on land,) for the service of the year 1697, to carry interest at 5 d. *per cent. per diem*, for which receivers were obliged to pay milled money, or gold, to any person who desired it, under a penalty of forfeiting double the sum; and to keep proper books for the view of any person who desired it. These receivers might pay into the exchequer such bills, for which they were to have tallies for their discharge; and then such bills, so paid in, were immediately to be cancelled, or endorsed and issued out again from the exchequer.

Anno 1697. 8 and 9 W. III. page 384 and 385. Power was given to issue the aforesaid 1,500,000 l. at 5 d. *per cent. per diem*, and to agree with any persons immediately to advance money for exchanging and circulating such bills as people were unwilling to accept in payment for tallies and orders at the
4 exchequer,

exchequer, who were to have 10 l. *per cent. per ann.* and trustees were appointed to circulate them. Hence arose the distinction between *specie bills* and *non specie bills*, and a discount immediately was the consequence on the non specie bills. This gave birth to several frauds, by persons entrusted with the receipt of publick monies, who bought up such non specie bills at a discount; and, by endorsing them as received for the revenues, made them specie bills sooner than they wou'd have been.

The next bills were issued in the year 1707, for 1,500,000 l. which were circulated at 4 l. 10 s. *per cent.* and cancelled by the bank, to whom an annuity was granted out of the duties on houses. The bank have also circulated and cancelled most of the exchequer bills since that time, by contract with the treasury for certain premiums, and taking subscriptions from divers persons, who paid down part of their subscription money, and were liable to calls for the residue, to strengthen them in circulating such bills.

About the years 1710, 1711, and 1712. the bills *anno* 1709, &c. were about 3 l. *per cent.* discount, wherefore the government allowed the bank a sufficient sum to enable them to make the said bills specie, which had so good an effect, that no discount has been upon such bills ever since.

At Christmas 1717, they deliver'd up to be cancelled two millions of exchequer bills, issued in the years 1709 and 1713, for which they receive an annuity of 100,000 l. at 5 l. *per cent. per ann.* and the remainder of those bills have been cancelled out of the several revenues granted for that service.

In the year 1720, one million of exchequer bills were lent to the South Sea Company, which were since cancelled, out of the sinking fund, having been first circulated by trustees chosen for that purpose.

In the year 1722, another million was issued in exchequer bills, and cancelled by the repayment of the former million lent the South Sea Company.

In July 1723, another million was issued for redeeming certain annuities at 5 l. *per cent. per ann.* payable at the bank, who circulated the same, as they have done all the bills issued since that time, in manner aforesaid.

But what has rendered the invention of exchequer bills of the utmost use and service to the publick, is the late great improvement thereon, by registering them, and paying them off in course, as the monies came in, on the land-tax and malt; whereby all interest is saved to the very day on which any money is wanted; and any sum may be raised, at moderate interest, on the security of the land-tax or malt, without taking in a loan in money, or striking fictitious tallies usually put off at a discount.

THE END.

*By the same AUTHOR, and printed for and sold by T. CADELL jun. and
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
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- Page 12. line 18. *before done insert been*
 25. ——— 3. *instead of for England read to England*
 29. ——— 3. *for treating read breaking*
 156. ——— 23. *after drinks insert with*
 168. ——— 27. *for afferted read affected*
 439. ——— 7. *for he read we*





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